Section 12
Original German
III.
Begründung der Ethik.
Anforderungen.
Also auch Kants Begründung der Ethik, seit sechzig Jahren für ein festes Fundament derselben gehalten, versinkt vor unsern Augen in den tiefen, vielleicht unausfüllbaren Abgrund der philosophischen Irrthümer, indem sie sich als eine unstatthafte Annahme und als eine bloße Verkleidung der theologischen Moral erweist. — Daß die früheren Versuche, die Ethik zu begründen, noch weniger genügen können, darf ich, wie gesagt, als bekannt voraussetzen. Es sind meistens unerwiesene, aus der Luft gegriffene Behauptungen, und zugleich, wie eben auch Kants Begründung selbst, künstliche Subtilitäten, welche die feinsten Unterscheidungen verlangen und auf den abstraktesten Begriffen beruhen, schwierige Kombinationen, heuristische Regeln, Sätze, die auf einer Nadelspitze balanciren, und stelzbeinige Maximen, von deren Höhe herab man das wirkliche Leben und sein Gewühl nicht mehr sehen kann. Daher sind sie allerdings trefflich geeignet, in den Hörsälen widerzuhallen und eine Uebung des Scharfsinnes abzugeben: aber dergleichen kann es nicht seyn, was den in jedem Menschen dennoch wirklich vorhandenen Aufruf zum Rechtthun und Wohlthun hervorbringt, noch kann es den starken Antrieben zur Ungerechtigkeit und Härte das Gleichgewicht halten, noch auch den Vorwürfen des Gewissens zum Grunde liegen; welche auf die Verletzung solcher spitzfindigen Maximen zurückführen zu wollen, nur dienen kann, diese lächerlich zu machen. Künstliche Begriffs-Kombinationen jener Art können also, wenn wir die Sache ernstlich nehmen, nimmermehr den wahren Antrieb zur Gerechtigkeit und Menschenliebe enthalten. Dieser muß vielmehr etwas seyn, das wenig Nachdenken, noch weniger Abstraktion und Kombination erfordert, das, von der Verstandesbildung unabhängig, Jeden, auch den rohesten Menschen, anspreche, bloß auf anschaulicher Auffassung beruhe und unmittelbar aus der Realität der Dinge sich aufdringe. Solange die Ethik nicht ein Fundament dieser Art aufzuweisen hat, mag sie in den Hörsälen disputiren und paradiren: das wirkliche Leben wird ihr Hohn sprechen. Ich muß daher den Ethikern den paradoxen Rath ertheilen, sich erst ein wenig im Menschenleben umzusehen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
III.
The Foundation of Ethics.
Requirements.
Thus Kant's foundation of ethics, too, held for sixty years to be its firm bedrock, sinks before our eyes into the deep, perhaps unfillable abyss of philosophical errors, proving to be an inadmissible assumption and a mere disguise for theological morality.—As I have said, I may take it as known that earlier attempts to establish a foundation for ethics are still less satisfactory. For the most part, they consist of unproven assertions plucked out of thin air, and at the same time, like Kant's own foundation, artificial subtleties demanding the finest distinctions and resting on the most abstract concepts, difficult combinations, heuristic rules, propositions balancing on a needlepoint, and maxims on stilts, from whose height actual life and its bustle can no longer be seen. They are therefore indeed admirably suited to echoing through lecture halls and providing an exercise in acuteness: but such things cannot produce the summons to do right and do good that nonetheless really exists in every human being, nor can they counterbalance the powerful impulses toward injustice and harshness, nor yet underlie the reproaches of conscience; to try to trace these back to the violation of such hair-splitting maxims can serve only to make them ridiculous. Artificial combinations of concepts of that kind, then, if we take the matter seriously, can never contain the true impulse toward justice and human kindness. Rather, this must be something that requires little reflection and still less abstraction and combination, something that, independent of the cultivation of the understanding, speaks to everyone, even the most uncultivated person, rests solely on perceptual apprehension, and presses itself upon us directly from the reality of things. Until ethics can exhibit a foundation of this kind, it may dispute and parade in lecture halls: actual life will mock it. I must therefore offer moral philosophers the paradoxical advice to begin by taking a little look around at human life.
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
III.
Establishing a Foundation for Ethics.
Requirements.
So even Kant's foundation for ethics, regarded for sixty years as solid ground, sinks before our eyes into the deep, perhaps unfillable abyss of philosophical errors. It turns out to be an unjustified assumption and nothing more than theological morality in disguise.—As I have said, I can take it as known that earlier attempts to establish a foundation for ethics are even less satisfactory. They mostly consist of unproved assertions plucked out of thin air. Like Kant's own foundation, they are also contrived subtleties that demand the finest distinctions and rest on the most abstract concepts: difficult combinations of ideas, rules for finding answers, propositions balanced on a needlepoint, and maxims on stilts, so high up that real life and its bustle are no longer visible below. That is why they are certainly well suited to echoing around lecture halls and providing an exercise in sharp thinking. But things like these cannot produce the call to act justly and help others that, after all, really does exist in every human being. Nor can they counterbalance the strong impulses toward injustice and harshness, or form the basis for the reproaches of conscience. Trying to trace these reproaches back to the violation of such hair-splitting maxims can only make them ridiculous. So if we take the matter seriously, artificial combinations of concepts like these can never contain the true impulse toward justice and human kindness. Instead, this impulse must be something that needs little reflection and still less abstraction or combination of ideas. It must speak to everyone, even the least cultivated person, regardless of intellectual training. It must rest solely on directly grasping what is before us, and impress itself on us straight from the reality of things. Until ethics can show a foundation of this kind, it may argue and parade around in lecture halls: real life will mock it. I must therefore give moral philosophers this paradoxical advice: first take a little look around at human life.
About this section
Section 12 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 13 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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