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Liberty, Chapter III, 1
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OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE
1 The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. 2. That trust is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What injury is. 4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract. 5. The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and distributive justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to him that is willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9. The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful. 10. The fifth law, of mercy. 11. The sixth law, that punishments regard the future only. 12. The seventh law, against reproach. 13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, of humility. 15. The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of persons. 16. The eleventh, of things to be had in common. 17. The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth, of birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth, of the safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. 20. The fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no man is judge in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth, that there can no contract be made with the umpire. 25. The twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may presently know, whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not. 27. The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience. 28. The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things agreeable to those laws. 29. The laws of nature are unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is a just man. 31. The natural and moral law are one. 32. How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.
The second law of nature, to perform contracts.
1 Another of the laws of nature is, to perform contracts, or to keep trust. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract. But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the natural law.
That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.
2 Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with whom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For he that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain, and not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.
Injury defined.
3 The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an injury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing, and both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it seems the word injury came to be given to any action or omission, because they were without right; he that acted or omitted, having before conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury, and that which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the Schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.
4 From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no man6 but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined. For if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any man offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages him to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus: what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath no manner of pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.
The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.
5 These words, just and unjust, as also justice and injustice, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are attributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are attributed to actions, just signifies as much as what is done with right, and unjust, as what is done with injury. He who hath done some just thing, is not therefore said to be a just person, but guiltless; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind.
The distinction of commutative and distributive justice, examined.
6 The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds, commutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to contractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they say, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the dignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that deserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth distributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an equality secundum quod; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and four hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six hundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal distribution. But such like equality is the same thing with geometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he have fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of justice, although now almost generally received by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been defined above.
No injury can be done to him that is willing.
7 It is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria, the willing man receives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our principles. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by his will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the contract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter) becomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it is done by right; wherefore it is no injury.
The third law of nature, of ingratitude.
8 The third precept of the natural law is, that you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this, he should act without reason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind of benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract, (for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore is it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called ingratitude.
The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE
1 The second law of nature: fulfill contracts. 2. Trust must be kept with everyone without exception. 3. What an injury is. 4. An injury can be done only to someone with whom we contract. 5. The distinction between justice in persons and justice in actions. 6. The distinction between commutative and distributive justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to a willing person. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9. The fourth law of nature, that everyone make himself useful. 10. The fifth law, concerning mercy. 11. The sixth law, that punishments look only to the future. 12. The seventh law, against reproach. 13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, concerning humility. 15. The tenth law, concerning equity, or against favoritism. 16. The eleventh law, concerning things held in common. 17. The twelfth law, concerning things divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth law, concerning birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth law, concerning the safety of mediators for peace. 20. The fifteenth law, concerning the appointment of an arbiter. 21. The sixteenth law, that no one judge his own cause. 22. The seventeenth law, that arbiters have no hope of reward from those whose cause they judge. 23. The eighteenth law, concerning witnesses. 24. The nineteenth law, that no contract may be made with an arbiter. 25. The twentieth law, against gluttony and everything that obstructs the use of reason. 26. A rule for knowing at once whether what we do is against the law of nature. 27. The laws of nature bind only in the court of conscience. 28. The laws of nature are sometimes broken by doing things that agree with them. 29. The laws of nature are unchangeable. 30. Whoever endeavors to fulfill the laws of nature is a just person. 31. Natural and moral law are one. 32. Why what has been said of the laws of nature differs from what philosophers have taught about the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not properly a law except as delivered in Holy Scripture.
The second law of nature: fulfill contracts.
1 Another law of nature is to fulfill contracts, or keep faith. The preceding chapter showed that the law of nature commands everyone, as a necessity for obtaining peace, to transfer certain rights to one another; and whenever this is done, it is called a contract. But this contributes to peace only insofar as we ourselves perform what we have contracted with others to do or refrain from doing; contracts would be made in vain unless we honored them. Since keeping our covenants, or keeping faith, is therefore necessary for obtaining peace, it follows from the second article of the second chapter that it is a precept of natural law.
Faith must be kept with everyone without exception.
2 Nor is there any exception here for the persons with whom we contract, even if they keep no faith with others, believe no faith should be kept, or are guilty of any other vice. Whoever contracts, precisely by contracting, denies that the act is in vain; and it is contrary to reason for someone who knows what he is doing to act in vain. If he thinks himself under no obligation to keep the contract, by that very thought he affirms that it was made in vain. Thus a man who contracts with someone to whom he believes he owes no faith thinks at once that contracting is an act done in vain and an act not done in vain—which is absurd. We must either keep faith with everyone or make no bargains with them: that is, there must be either open war or secure and faithful peace.
Injury defined.
3 Breaking a bargain, as well as taking back a gift (which always consists in some action or omission), is called an injury. The action or omission itself is called unjust: injury and an unjust action or omission mean the same thing, and both amount to a breach of contract and trust. The word injury seems to have come to designate such actions or omissions because they are committed without right: the person acting or omitting had already transferred his right to another. What we call an injury in ordinary life bears some likeness to what the Schools call an absurdity. Just as someone who is driven by argument to deny the proposition he first defended is said to have been brought to an absurdity, so someone who through weakness of mind does what he contracted not to do, or fails to do what he contracted to do, commits an injury and falls into no less a contradiction. By contracting for a future action he wills that it be done; by failing to perform it he wills that it not be done. He thus wills that one thing be done and not done at the same time, a contradiction. An injury, then, is a kind of absurdity in human dealings, just as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
An injury can be done only to someone with whom we contract.
4 From these premises it follows that no man can be injured except someone with whom we enter into a covenant, to whom something is transferred by deed of gift, or to whom something is promised by bargain. Harm and injury are therefore often distinct. If a master orders his servant, who has promised obedience, to pay a sum of money or deliver a present to a third man, and the servant does not do so, he has indeed harmed the third man but has injured only his master. Likewise, in a civil government, if someone offends another with whom he has made no contract, he harms the person who suffers the evil, but injures only the person to whom the power of government belongs. If the injured party complained of the harm, the wrongdoer might answer: “What are you to me? Why should I follow your will rather than my own, since I do not prevent you from following yours instead of mine?” Where no prior contract of any kind has passed between them, I confess I see nothing reprehensible in that answer.
The distinction between justice in persons and justice in actions.
5 The words just and unjust, and justice and injustice, have two meanings: they signify one thing when attributed to persons and another when attributed to actions. Applied to actions, just means done with right, and unjust means done with injury. A person who has done a just thing is not on that account called just, but innocent; and one who has done an unjust thing is not therefore called unjust, but guilty. Applied to persons, however, to be just means to delight in just dealing, to pursue righteousness, or to endeavor in everything to do what is just. To be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it should be measured by some immediate advantage rather than by one's contract. Thus the justice or injustice of a mind, an intention, or a person is one thing, and that of an action or omission another: countless actions of a just person may be unjust, and those of an unjust person just. The person to be considered just does just things because the law commands them, and does unjust things only through weakness. The person properly called unjust acts righteously for fear of the penalty attached to the law, and unrighteously because his mind is corrupt.
The distinction between commutative and distributive justice examined.
6 The justice of actions is commonly divided into two kinds, commutative and distributive. The former, it is said, consists in arithmetical proportion, the latter in geometrical proportion. The former concerns exchange, buying, selling, borrowing, lending, renting and hiring, and every other act between contracting parties: when an equal return is made, they say, commutative justice arises. The latter concerns the dignity and merits of persons: when each receives κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to the more worthy and less to the less deserving, in proportion to their deserts, distributive justice is said to arise. I acknowledge a distinction between kinds of equality: one is equality simply speaking, as when two things of equal value are compared, a pound of silver and twelve ounces of the same silver. The other is equality in a qualified sense: when a thousand pounds is divided among a hundred men, six hundred pounds go to sixty men and four hundred to forty. Six hundred and four hundred are not equal, but when the number of recipients varies in the same proportion, each receives an equal share, and the distribution is therefore called equal. Such equality is the same as geometrical proportion. But what has any of this to do with justice? If I sell my goods for as much as I can get, I do no injury to the buyer who sought and wanted them from me. Nor, if I distribute more of my own property to someone who deserves less, do I wrong either party, so long as I give the other what I agreed to give him. Our Savior himself, being God, bears witness to this truth in the Gospel. This is therefore a distinction not of justice but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be denied that justice is a kind of equality, consisting simply in this: since we are all equal by nature, no one should claim more right for himself than he grants another, unless he has fairly acquired it by compact. Let this suffice against a distinction of justice now almost universally accepted, lest anyone suppose an injury to be anything other than a breach of faith or contract, as defined above.
No injury can be done to someone who is willing.
7 There is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria: no injury is done to a willing person. Its truth can be derived from our principles. Suppose a man is willing to have done to him something he conceives as an injury. What was not lawful to do by contract is then done by his will. But when he is willing to have done what the contract forbade, the contract itself becomes void (by the fifteenth article of the preceding chapter). The right to do it therefore returns; it is done by right, and consequently is no injury.
The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude.
8 The third precept of natural law is that you not leave someone worse off through his dealings with you when he first did you a good turn out of confidence in you; or that you accept no gift without intending to endeavor to give its donor no just cause to regret it. Otherwise, anyone who conferred a benefit when he could see it would be lost would act without reason. Beneficence and trust, together with every form of goodwill, would disappear from among men. No mutual aid would remain, nor any beginning from which favor and goodwill might grow; the state of war would necessarily persist, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. Because breaking this law is not a breach of faith or contract—we assume no contracts have passed between them—it is not usually called an injury. But because good turns and gratitude answer to each other, it is called ingratitude.
The fourth law of nature, that everyone make himself useful.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE
1 The second law of nature: fulfill contracts. 2. Keep faith with everyone, without exception. 3. What injury means. 4. You can injure only someone with whom you have made a contract. 5. The difference between justice in people and justice in actions. 6. An examination of the distinction between commutative and distributive justice. 7. You cannot injure a willing person. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9. The fourth law of nature: everyone should make himself useful. 10. The fifth law, concerning mercy. 11. The sixth law: punishment must look only to the future. 12. The seventh law, against insults. 13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, concerning humility. 15. The tenth law, concerning equity, or against favoritism. 16. The eleventh law, concerning things held in common. 17. The twelfth law, concerning things distributed by lot. 18. The thirteenth law, concerning birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth law, concerning the safety of peace mediators. 20. The fifteenth law, concerning the appointment of an arbitrator. 21. The sixteenth law: no one may judge his own case. 22. The seventeenth law: arbitrators must have no hope of a reward from the people whose case they judge. 23. The eighteenth law, concerning witnesses. 24. The nineteenth law: no contract may be made with the arbitrator. 25. The twentieth law, against gluttony and everything else that interferes with reason. 26. A rule for knowing immediately whether what we are doing violates the law of nature. 27. The laws of nature always bind us in conscience, but not always in action. 28. The laws of nature can sometimes be broken by acts that agree with them. 29. The laws of nature never change. 30. Anyone who tries to fulfill the laws of nature is a just person. 31. Natural law and moral law are the same. 32. Why this account of natural law differs from what philosophers have said about the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not strictly a law except as it is given in Holy Scripture.
The second law of nature: fulfill contracts.
1 Another law of nature says to fulfill contracts, or keep faith. The previous chapter showed that the law of nature commands everyone, as a necessary step toward peace, to transfer certain rights to one another. Whenever this happens, it is called a contract. But this helps bring peace only insofar as we do what we have agreed with others to do, or refrain from what we have agreed not to do. Contracts would be pointless unless we kept them. Keeping our covenants and our word is therefore necessary for peace. By the second article of the second chapter, it follows that this is a precept of natural law.
Keep faith with everyone, without exception.
2 This rule makes no exception for the people with whom we contract. It does not matter whether they break faith with others, believe no one should keep faith, or have any other vice. A person who makes a contract, simply by making it, denies that the act is pointless. It is unreasonable for someone who knows what he is doing to do something pointless. If he thinks he has no duty to keep the contract, however, he is saying that making it was pointless. So a person who contracts with someone he thinks he has no duty to keep faith with thinks, at the same time, that making the contract is both pointless and not pointless. That is absurd. We must therefore either keep faith with everyone or make no bargains with them. In other words, we must have either open war or a secure and faithful peace.
What injury means.
3 Breaking a bargain, or taking back a gift, is called an injury. Each involves doing something or failing to do something. The action or failure to act is called unjust. Thus an injury and an unjust action or omission mean the same thing: each is a breach of contract and trust. It seems that the word injury came to be applied to an action or omission because it was done without right. The person acting or failing to act had already transferred his right to someone else. There is a similarity between what we call an injury in daily life and what is usually called an absurdity in the schools. A person whom arguments force to deny his original claim is said to have been brought to an absurdity. Similarly, someone who, through weakness of mind, does what he promised by contract not to do, or fails to do what he promised to do, commits an injury. He falls into just as clear a contradiction as the person brought to an absurdity in a debate. By contracting to take some future action, he wills that it be done. By not taking it, he wills that it not be done. He thus wills the same thing both to be done and not to be done at once. This is a contradiction. An injury is therefore a kind of absurdity in dealing with others, just as an absurdity is a kind of injury in debate.
You can injure only someone with whom you have made a contract.
4 It follows from these principles that a person can injure no one6 except someone with whom he has made a covenant, to whom he has transferred something by a deed of gift, or to whom he has promised something in a bargain. Causing harm and committing an injury are therefore often separate things. Suppose a master orders a servant who has promised to obey him to pay a sum of money or take a gift to a third person. If the servant does not do it, he harms that third person, but he injures only his master. Likewise, under civil government, if someone wrongs another person with whom he has no contract, he harms the person who suffers the wrong, but he injures only the person who holds the power of government. If the person harmed complained, the wrongdoer could answer, “What are you to me? Why should I follow your will rather than my own? I am not preventing you from following your own will instead of mine.” If they had made no prior contract of any kind, I confess I cannot see what is objectionable in that answer.
The difference between justice in people and justice in actions.
5 The words just and unjust, and justice and injustice, have two meanings. They mean one thing when applied to people and another when applied to actions. Applied to actions, just means done with right, and unjust means done with injury. We do not call someone a just person merely because he has done one just thing; we call him innocent. Nor do we call someone an unjust person merely because he has done one unjust thing; we call him guilty. When applied to people, however, just means taking pleasure in dealing justly, trying to do what is right, or striving to act justly in everything. Unjust means neglecting just dealings, or thinking that justice should be measured by some immediate gain rather than by one's contract. The justice or injustice of a mind, an intention, or a person is therefore different from that of an action or omission. A just person can perform countless unjust acts, and an unjust person countless just ones. We should count as just the person who acts justly because the law commands it and acts unjustly only through weakness. The person who does right for fear of the legal punishment, but does wrong because of the wickedness of his mind, is properly called unjust.
An examination of the distinction between commutative and distributive justice.
6 People commonly divide the justice of actions into two kinds, commutative and distributive. They say the first rests on arithmetic proportion and the second on geometric proportion. The first concerns exchanges: buying, selling, borrowing, lending, renting out, renting, and every other transaction between contracting parties. They say commutative justice arises when an equal return is made. The second concerns the worth and merits of people. They say distributive justice arises when each person receives κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, according to his worth: more to the more deserving, less to the less deserving, in proportion to their merits. I acknowledge two kinds of equality here. One is equality in the simple sense, as when we compare two things of equal value, such as a pound of silver and twelve ounces of the same silver. The other is equality in a qualified sense, secundum quod. Suppose a thousand pounds are divided among a hundred people, with six hundred pounds going to sixty people and four hundred to forty. Six hundred and four hundred are not equal. But because the numbers of people receiving them differ in the same proportion, each person gets an equal share. That is why this is called an equal distribution. Equality of this sort is the same as geometric proportion. But what does any of this have to do with justice? If I sell my goods for as much as I can get, I do not injure the buyer who sought them out and wanted them. Nor, if I give more of what belongs to me to a less deserving person, do I wrong either person, as long as I give the other what I agreed to give him. Our Savior himself, who is God, bears witness to this truth in the Gospel. This distinction, then, is between kinds of equality, not kinds of justice. Still, perhaps it cannot be denied that justice is a kind of equality. We are all equal by nature, so no one should claim more right for himself than he grants to another unless he has fairly acquired that right by agreement. That is all I need say against this now almost universally accepted distinction of justice. Otherwise someone might think that injury means something other than a breach of faith or contract, as I defined it above.
You cannot injure a willing person.
7 There is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria: no injury is done to someone who consents. Its truth can be derived from our principles. Suppose a person willingly allows something to be done to him that he thinks would injure him. His will now permits something the contract did not permit. But because he willingly permits what the contract forbade, the contract itself becomes void under the fifteenth article of the previous chapter. The right to do the thing therefore returns. It is done by right and so is not an injury.
The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude.
8 The third precept of natural law says not to make someone worse off for having trusted you and done you a good turn first. In other words, do not accept a gift unless you intend to try to give its giver no just reason to regret it. Without this rule, anyone who saw that a benefit would be wasted would act unreasonably by giving it. All acts of kindness, trust, and goodwill would disappear. People would no longer help one another or begin to win one another's favor. The state of war would therefore necessarily continue, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. Breaking this law is not a breach of trust or contract, since we are assuming the two people made no contract. It is therefore not usually called an injury. But since good deeds and gratitude answer one another, it is called ingratitude.
The fourth law of nature: everyone should make himself useful.