Liberty, Chapter II, 2

No one can make covenants with animals, or with God without revelation.

12 Because every free gift and covenant requires acceptance of the transfer of a right, no one can make a covenant with someone who does not declare acceptance. We therefore cannot make covenants with animals, or give them or receive from them any kind of right, since they lack speech and understanding. Nor can anyone covenant with God or be bound to him by a vow, except insofar as Holy Scripture shows that he has appointed certain people with authority to accept such vows and covenants on his behalf.

Nor can anyone make a vow to God.

13 Those in the state of nature, where no civil law binds them, therefore make vows in vain unless God's will to accept their vow or covenant has been made known to them by a revelation beyond doubt. For if what they vow is contrary to the law of nature, their vow does not bind them: no one is bound to perform an unlawful act. If what they vow is commanded by a law of nature, that law itself binds them, not the vow. But if before the vow they were free either to do the thing or not, that freedom remains, since an obligation arising from a vow requires the openly declared will of the one to whom the vow binds them, and in the case proposed this is assumed to be absent. I call the one to whom a person is bound the obliger, and the one bound the obliged.

CHAPTER III. OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.

Covenants oblige us only to do our utmost.

14 Covenants concern only things within our power to deliberate about. For without the will of a contracting party there can be no covenant; and the will is the final act of one who deliberates. Covenants therefore concern only future possibilities. No one, then, binds themselves by a covenant to do the impossible. Yet if we covenant to do something that seems possible when we promise it but later proves impossible, we are not thereby released from every obligation. The reason is that a person who promises a future benefit receives a present benefit with certainty, on condition of returning another for it. The person who confers the present benefit has in view an equivalent good: not unconditionally the promised thing itself, but the promised thing on condition that it can be done. If even that proves impossible, the person who promised must do as much as they can. Covenants, then, do not oblige us to accomplish precisely the thing covenanted for, but to make our utmost effort: our effort alone, not the thing itself, is in our power.

How we are released from covenants.

15 We are released from covenants in two ways: by performance or by forgiveness. By performance, because we did not bind ourselves to anything beyond it. By forgiveness, because the one to whom we bound ourselves is understood, in forgiving us, to return the right we transferred to them. For forgiving implies giving, which, by article 4 of this chapter, means transferring a right to the recipient of the gift.

Promises extracted through fear of death are valid in the state of nature.

16 It is often asked whether covenants extracted from us through fear are binding. Suppose, for example, that to save my life from a robber I promise to pay him 100l. the next day and not to take any step toward his arrest and prosecution: am I bound to keep that promise? Though such a promise must sometimes be judged ineffective, it must not be judged so merely because it arises from fear. Otherwise the promises that brought people into civil life and established laws might likewise be ineffective, since fear of mutual slaughter leads one person to submit to another's rule. Nor would anyone be wise to trust a captive's covenant to pay for their release. The rule holds universally: promises bind when a benefit is received and when both the promise and what is promised are lawful. And to save my life I may lawfully promise and give anything of my own to anyone, even a thief. We are therefore bound by promises made from fear unless civil law forbids them, in which case what is promised becomes unlawful by virtue of that law.

A later covenant contradicting an earlier one is invalid.

17 Whoever contracts with one person to do or refrain from something and afterward covenants with another to do the opposite makes the later contract unlawful, not the earlier one. For someone who has transferred the right to do or refrain from an act by an earlier contract no longer possesses that right. They can therefore transfer no right by a later contract, and they make a promise without the right to do so. They are bound only by the first contract, which it is unlawful to break.

A promise not to resist someone who harms my body is invalid.

18 No contract of any kind obliges a person not to resist someone who tries to kill, wound, or otherwise injure their body. For everyone has such a powerful fear of harm done to them that they regard it as the greatest evil; by natural necessity they avoid it by every means they can, and we assume they cannot act otherwise. At this pitch of fear, we cannot expect anyone to do anything but protect themselves by flight or by fighting. Since no one is bound to do the impossible, people threatened with death—the greatest natural evil—or with wounds or other bodily injury, who lack the courage to endure them, are not obliged to submit. Moreover, a person bound by contract is trusted, since trust alone binds contracts. But people brought to punishment, whether capital or less severe, are chained or closely guarded: a sure sign that their contracts were thought insufficient to bind them against resistance. It is one thing to promise, “If I do not do it on the appointed day, kill me.” It is another to promise, “If I do not do it, I will not resist you even if you try to kill me.” Everyone makes the first kind of contract if necessary, and sometimes it is necessary. No one makes the second, nor is it ever necessary. For in the bare state of nature, if you wish to kill someone, that state itself gives you the right; you need not first trust them and then kill them for breaking that trust. In a civil state, however, the right of life and death and of every bodily punishment belongs to the sovereign, so that right to kill cannot be granted to a private person. Nor does the sovereign need to make anyone covenant to submit patiently to punishment; the only covenant needed is that no one will defend others against the sovereign. If in the state of nature, as between two kingdoms, a contract were made on condition that a party be killed for failing to perform, we must assume a further contract not to kill before the appointed day. If performance is then lacking on that day, the right of war returns: the parties enter a hostile condition in which all things are lawful, including resistance. Finally, by a covenant not to resist, we would be bound to choose the greater of two evils. Certain death is worse than fighting; yet it is impossible not to choose the lesser of two evils. Such a covenant would therefore bind us to do the impossible, contrary to the very nature of covenants.

A covenant to accuse oneself is invalid.

19 Likewise, no covenant of any kind binds a person to accuse themselves, or someone else whose ruin would make their own life bitter. Thus a father is not obliged to testify against his son, a husband against his wife, a son against his father, or anyone against a person on whom their livelihood depends: testimony presumed corrupted by nature is worthless. Although no covenant binds a person to accuse themselves, however, they may be forced by torture to answer in a public trial. Such answers are not evidence of the deed, but aids to the search for truth. So whether the person under torture answers truthfully or falsely, or does not answer at all, whatever they do, they do by right.

The definition of an oath.

20 An oath is a statement joined to a promise by which the one making the promise declares that they renounce God's mercy if they fail to keep their word. This definition is contained in the very words expressing the essence of an oath, such as “So help me God,” or an equivalent, such as the Roman formula “May you, Jupiter, destroy the deceiver as I kill this animal.” This does not prevent an oath from sometimes affirming a fact rather than promising an act, for someone who confirms an assertion by an oath promises to speak the truth. Although subjects in some places customarily swore by their kings, that custom originated in those kings' claim to divine honors. For oaths were introduced so that religion and regard for divine power might make people fear to break their word more than they fear other people, from whose eyes they may hide their actions.

An oath must be understood in the form used by the person who takes it.

21 It follows that an oath must be understood in the form used by the one who takes it. It is useless to make someone swear by a God in whom they do not believe and whom, therefore, they do not fear. For though the light of nature may reveal the existence of a God, no one thinks they should swear by him in any form or by any name other than that prescribed by their own religion, which they believe to be the true one.

An oath adds nothing to the obligation created by a covenant.

22 From the definition of an oath we can see that an unsworn contract binds no less than a sworn one. It is the contract that binds us; the oath invokes divine punishment, which it could not call down if breaking the contract were not itself unlawful. But breaking it could not be unlawful if the contract did not bind. Moreover, someone who renounces God's mercy does not thereby bind themselves to suffer punishment, for it is always lawful to plead against a punishment, however much one has provoked it, and to receive God's pardon if it is granted. Thus the only effect of an oath is to make people naturally inclined to break every kind of promise more conscientious about their words and actions through fear of punishment.

An oath should be required only where a breach of covenant can be concealed or can be punished only by God.

23 To demand an oath when a breach of contract, should one occur, cannot remain unknown, and when the other party has the power to punish it, is to do more than self-defense requires. It reveals a desire not so much to benefit oneself as to harm another. For the very form of an oath calls down the anger of God, the all-powerful, on those who break their word because they think their own strength can shield them from human punishment; and of God, the all-knowing, on those who habitually break their trust because they hope no one will see them.

4 Right reason.] By right reason in the natural condition of mankind I do not mean, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning: each person's own true reasoning about their acts, which may harm or benefit their neighbors. I call it their own because, although under civil government each subject must accept the reason of the sovereign—that is, civil law—as the standard of right, outside civil government no one can distinguish right reason from false reason except by comparing it with their own. Each person's own reason must therefore count not only as the rule of their own actions, undertaken at their own risk, but also as the measure of another's reasoning in matters that concern them. I call it true, meaning that it draws sound conclusions from true and properly established principles, because every breach of the laws of nature consists in the false reasoning—or rather the folly—of those who fail to see the duties they must perform toward others for their own preservation. The principles of sound reasoning about such duties are explained in articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the first chapter.

5 Arise.] Unless some new cause for fear appears, whether in an act of the other party or in some other sign of their will not to perform, the fear cannot be judged justified. For a cause insufficient to prevent the making of a covenant must not suffice to authorize breaking it after it has been made.

No one can make a covenant with an animal, or with God without revelation.

12 Every free gift and covenant requires the recipient to accept the transfer of a right. It follows that we cannot make a covenant with anyone who does not declare acceptance. We cannot make covenants with animals or give or receive any right from them, since they lack speech and understanding. Nor can anyone make a covenant with God or be bound to him by a vow, unless the Holy Scriptures show that God has appointed people with authority to accept such vows and covenants on his behalf.

Nor can anyone make a vow to God.

13 People in the state of nature, who are not bound by civil law, therefore make vows in vain unless a completely certain revelation tells them God intends to accept their vow or agreement. If what they vow is contrary to the law of nature, the vow does not bind them. No one is bound to commit an unlawful act. If a law of nature commands what they vow, that law binds them, not the vow. And if they were free to do it or not before the vow, they remain free. An obligation created by a vow requires the declared will of the person to whom it is made, which is assumed to be absent in this case. By the person to whom an obligation is owed, I mean the one who is to receive it; the obligated person is the one bound by it.

Chapter III. On the Other Laws of Nature.

Covenants bind us only to do our utmost.

14 We can make covenants only about things we can consider doing. Without the contracting person's will there can be no covenant, and the will is the final act of deciding. Covenants therefore concern only things that are possible and lie in the future. No one binds themselves by covenant to do the impossible. But we often make covenants to do something that seems possible at the time and later proves impossible. That does not release us from every obligation. Here is why. Someone who promises a future benefit receives a present benefit for certain, on the condition that they give something in return. The person providing the present benefit intends to receive something of equal value, but only on the condition that the promised thing can be done. If even that turns out to be impossible, the promiser must do as much as they can. A covenant therefore binds us not to achieve exactly what we promised, but to make our best effort. Our effort is in our power; the outcome is not.

How we are released from covenants.

15 We are released from a covenant in two ways: by performing it or by being forgiven. Performance releases us because our obligation goes no further. Forgiveness releases us because the person to whom we owed performance gives back the right we transferred. Forgiving entails giving, which article 4 of this chapter defined as transferring a right to the recipient.

Promises made under threat of death are valid in the state of nature.

16 People often ask whether covenants made under threat bind us. Suppose a robber holds my life in their power. To get free, I promise to pay them 100l. the next day and to do nothing that might lead to their arrest and prosecution. Must I keep my promise? Such a promise may sometimes be judged invalid, but not simply because fear produced it. Otherwise the promises that brought people into civil society and established laws might also be invalid, since fear of killing one another leads a person to submit to another's rule. Nor would anyone be wise to trust a prisoner who promised payment for release. The general rule is that promises bind us when we have received a benefit and both the promise and what it promises are lawful. To save my life, I may lawfully promise or give any property of my own to anyone, even a thief. Promises made out of fear therefore bind us unless civil law forbids them, making what was promised unlawful.

A later covenant that contradicts an earlier one is invalid.

17 Suppose someone contracts with one person to do or refrain from doing something and later makes a contrary covenant with someone else. The later contract, not the first, is unlawful. The first contract transferred the person's right to act or refrain from acting, so they no longer have that right. They can transfer no right in the later contract, and they make its promise without having the right to do so. Only the first contract binds them. Breaking it is unlawful.

A promise not to resist someone who harms my body is invalid.

18 No contract can bind a person not to resist someone who tries to kill, wound, or otherwise harm their body. Each person experiences an intense fear that makes a harm done to them appear the greatest harm of all. They naturally avoid it as far as they can, and we assume they cannot do otherwise. At that level of fear, we must expect a person to defend themselves by fleeing or fighting. No one is bound to do the impossible. People threatened with death, the greatest harm to our nature, or with wounds or other bodily harm, are therefore not bound to endure those harms if they lack the strength to bear them. Moreover, someone bound by contract is trusted, since trust alone is what binds contracts. But people brought to receive a death sentence or a lesser punishment are put in chains or under strong guard. That clearly shows they are not thought to be sufficiently restrained from resisting by their contracts. There is a difference between promising, "If I do not do it on the appointed day, you may kill me," and promising, "If I do not do it, I will not resist even if you try to kill me." Everyone will agree to the first if necessary, and sometimes it is necessary. No one will agree to the second, and it is never necessary. In the bare state of nature, if you want to kill someone, that state already gives you the right. You need not first place your trust in that person before killing them for breaking it. In a civil state, the sovereign holds the right over life and death and all physical punishment. No private individual can receive that same right to kill. The sovereign, for their part, does not need anyone to agree to submit patiently to punishment. The sovereign needs only an agreement that no one will defend others against the sovereign. Suppose two realms in the state of nature make a contract providing for death if it is not fulfilled. We must assume they also agree not to kill before the appointed day. If they do not perform by that day, the right of war returns. The relationship becomes hostile, everything becomes permissible, and resistance is permissible too. Finally, a contract not to resist would bind us to choose the greater of two harms. Certain death is worse than a fight, but we cannot avoid choosing the lesser harm. Such a covenant would thus bind us to do the impossible, contrary to the nature of covenants.

A covenant to accuse oneself is invalid.

19 Likewise, no covenant can bind anyone to accuse themselves, or to accuse another person whose loss would make their own life miserable. A father is not bound to testify against his son, a husband against his wife, or a son against his father. Nor is anyone bound to testify against a person on whom they depend for their livelihood. Such testimony is useless because we can expect natural feeling to distort it. Although no covenant binds anyone to accuse themselves, a public court can force a person to answer under torture. Those answers are not evidence that the alleged act occurred. They are aids to finding the truth. Whether the tortured person's answer is true or false, or whether they do not answer at all, whatever they do is within their right.

What an oath is.

20 An oath joins a promise to a declaration that the person making it gives up God's mercy if they fail to keep their word. The words that make up an oath express this very meaning: "So help me God," or an equivalent. The Romans said, "May Jupiter destroy the deceiver as I kill this animal." An oath can also affirm a claim rather than promise a future act. Someone who confirms a statement by oath promises they are speaking the truth. In some places subjects used to swear by their kings. That practice arose because those kings claimed divine honor. Oaths were introduced to make people fear breaking faith more through religion and awareness of God's power than they fear other people, from whose sight their actions may be hidden.

An oath must be understood in the form used by the person taking it.

21 So an oath must be understood according to the form used by the person who takes it. It is useless to make someone swear by a God they do not believe in and therefore do not fear. We may know through natural reason that God exists. Even so, no one believes they should swear by God using any form or name other than those prescribed by their own religion, which they believe is the true one.

An oath adds nothing to the obligation imposed by a covenant.

22 The definition of an oath shows that a contract without an oath binds us just as much as one with an oath. The contract creates the obligation. The oath calls down divine punishment. It could not bring such punishment if breaking the contract were not itself unlawful, and breaking it could not be unlawful if the contract did not already bind us. Further, someone who gives up God's mercy does not bind themselves to accept any punishment. It is always lawful to ask for relief from punishment, however it has been provoked, and to accept God's pardon if offered. The only effect of an oath, then, is to make people who are naturally inclined to break any promise more careful about their words and deeds through fear of punishment.

An oath should be required only where a broken contract can be kept secret or only God can punish the breach.

23 Suppose breaking a contract could not remain hidden, and the other party has the power to punish the breach. Requiring an oath in such a case goes beyond what self-defense needs. It shows a wish to harm another person rather than simply to help oneself. By its form an oath calls down the anger of the all-powerful God on those who break their word because they think their own strength will let them evade human punishment. It also calls down the anger of the all-knowing God on those who break trust because they think no person will see them.

4 Right reason. By right reason in the natural human condition, I do not mean an infallible faculty, as many people do. I mean the act of reasoning: each person's own correct reasoning about actions of theirs that may harm or benefit their neighbors. I call it each person's own because, under civil government, every subject must accept the sovereign's reason, expressed in civil law, as the standard of right. Without civil government, however, no one can tell correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning except by comparing it with their own. Each person's own reason must then be the rule for actions they undertake at their own risk, and also the measure of someone else's reasoning on matters that concern them. I call it correct because it reaches valid conclusions from true, properly constructed principles. Every violation of the laws of nature comes from bad reasoning, or rather from the foolishness of people who fail to see the duties they must perform toward others for their own survival. The principles for reasoning correctly about such duties are explained in articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of chapter 1.

5 Arise. Unless there is a new cause for fear, arising from something the other party has done or another sign that they do not intend to perform, the fear cannot be considered reasonable. A fear that was not enough to prevent someone from making a covenant cannot be enough to justify breaking it once made.