Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Liberty, Chapter II, 1
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OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS
1 That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason. 2. That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves. 3. That the first special law of nature, is not to retain our right to all things. 4. What it is to quit our right: what to transfer it. 5. That in the transferring of our right, the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. 6. No words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. 7. Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify the will, are valid in the translation of right. 8. In matters of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact. 10. In compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future. 11. Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no effect and vain; but not so in civil government. 12. That no man can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with God without revelation. 13. Nor yet make a vow to God. 14. That compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. 15. By what means we are freed from our compacts. 16. That promises extorted through fear of death, in the state of nature are valid. 17. A later compact contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. 19. A compact to accuse one’s self, is invalid. 20. The definition of swearing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that form which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 23. An oath ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.
That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason.
1 All authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in their writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from definitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves it hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind; which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent, and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But since all do grant, that is done by right, which is not done against reason, we ought to judge those actions only wrong, which are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But that which is done wrong, we say it is done against some law. Therefore true reason is a certain law; which, since it is no less a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,4 conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.
That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace where it may be had, and, where not, to defend ourselves.
2 But the first and fundamental law of nature is, that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war. For we showed in the last article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first, because the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways either to peace or self-defence.
The first special law of nature is, that our rights to all things ought not to be retained.
3 But one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is this: that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained; but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished. For if every one should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade, and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them. For every man by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his body. Therefore war would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of peace, that is, against the law of nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his right to all things.
What it is to quit our right: what to convey it.
4 But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again, which before by right he might have done. But he conveys it to another, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance whereof he might before with right have resisted him. But that the conveyance of right consists merely in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was conveyed, he to whom he conveyed it, had even then also a right to all; whence he could not give any new right; but the resisting right he had before he gave it, by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his rights, is utterly abolished. Whosoever therefore acquires some right in the natural state of men, he only procures himself security and freedom from just molestation in the enjoyment of his primitive right. As for example, if any man shall sell or give away a farm, he utterly deprives himself only from all right to this farm; but he does not so others also.
The will of the receiver must necessarily be declared, before the right be conveyed.
5 But in the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of him that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the right remains. For if I would have given what was mine to one who refused to accept of it, I have not therefore either simply renounced my right, or conveyed it to any man. For the cause which moved me to part with it to this man, was in him only, not in others too.
Words convey not, except they relate to the time present.
6 But if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit or convey our right, but only words; those words must either relate to the present or time past; for if they be of the future only, they convey nothing. For example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will give to-morrow, declares openly that yet he hath not given it. So that all this day his right remains, and abides to-morrow too, unless in the interim he actually bestows it: for what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; I do give or have given you this to be received to-morrow: by these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his right to receive it to-morrow is conveyed to him by me to-day.
Words of the future suffice to convey, if other testimonies of our will be not wanting.
7 Nevertheless, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present. If therefore, as by reason of those other signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right depends not on words, but, as hath been instanced in the fourth article, on the declaration of the will.
In matters of free gift, words of the future convey no right.
8 If any man convey some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a conveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in free donation, those words only oblige us, which signify the present or the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing article. It must needs therefore be, that the obligation arise from some other tokens of the will. But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that wills it; there can no other token be assigned of the will to give it, except some benefit either already received, or to be acquired. But it is supposed that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift. It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn without agreement be expected. But no sign can be given, that he, who used future words toward him who was in no sort engaged to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood as to oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to reason, that those who are easily inclined to do well to others, should be obliged by every promise, testifying their present good affection. And for this cause, a promiser in this kind must be understood to have time to deliberate, and power to change that affection, as well as he to whom he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that deliberates, is so far forth free, nor can be said to have already given. But if he promise often, and yet give seldom, he ought to be condemned of levity, and be called not a donor, but doson.
The definition of contract and covenant.
9 But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying their rights, is called a contract. But in every contract, either both parties instantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is trusted; or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently, there the contract is ended as soon as it is performed. But where there is credit given, either to one or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called a covenant.
In covenants, we pass away our rights by words signifying the future.
10 But the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath already performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no less transfer the right of future time, than if it had been made by words signifying the present or time past. For the other’s performance is a most manifest sign that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this sign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood; which because he hindered not, was an evident token of his will to perform. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit received, which are also covenants, are tokens of the will; that is, as in the foregoing section hath been declared, of the last act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolished, and by consequence are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.
Covenants, in the state of nature, are in vain and of none effect: not so in civil government.
11 But the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there arise5 a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For he that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable or not, he that doubts it must be judge of, as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in the ninth article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature. But in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first perform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause which made him fear the other’s non-performance, ceaseth.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS
1 The law of nature is not an agreement among people but a dictate of reason. 2. The fundamental law of nature is to seek peace where it can be found, and where it cannot, to defend ourselves. 3. The first particular law of nature is not to retain our right to all things. 4. What it means to relinquish our right, and what it means to transfer it. 5. A transfer of our right necessarily requires the will of the recipient. 6. Words referring only to the future do not transfer a right. 7. Words referring to the future can transfer a right if other signs indicate the will to do so. 8. In a free gift, words referring to the future do not transfer our right. 9. The definitions of contract and covenant. 10. In covenants, words referring to the future transfer our right. 11. Covenants resting on mutual trust are void in the state of nature, but not in civil government. 12. No one can make covenants with animals, or with God without revelation. 13. Nor can anyone make a vow to God. 14. Covenants oblige us only to do our utmost. 15. How we are released from our covenants. 16. Promises extracted through fear of death are valid in the state of nature. 17. A later covenant contradicting an earlier one is invalid. 18. A covenant not to resist someone who harms my body is invalid. 19. A covenant to accuse oneself is invalid. 20. The definition of an oath. 21. An oath must be understood in the form used by the person taking it. 22. An oath adds nothing to the obligation created by a covenant. 23. An oath should be required only where a breach of covenant can be concealed or can be punished only by God himself.
The law of nature is not an agreement among people but a dictate of reason.
1 Authors do not all agree on the definition of natural law, though they use the term very often in their writings. Thus the method that begins with definitions and excludes ambiguity is the only proper method for those who wish to leave no room for disputes. Otherwise, if someone says an act is against the law of nature, one person proves it by saying it contradicts the general agreement of all the wisest and most learned nations; but this does not tell us who judges the wisdom and learning of nations. Another proves it by saying it contradicts the general consent of all mankind; this definition cannot be accepted at all. For then only children and fools could offend against such a law: surely, by mankind they mean all those actually endowed with reason. Such people, then, either do nothing contrary to it, or, if they do, act without their own consent and must be excused. Yet it is unreasonable to take the laws of nature from the consent of people who break them more often than they observe them. Moreover, people condemn in others the very things they approve in themselves; conversely, they praise in public what they condemn in private. They form their opinions more from hearsay than from reflection of their own, and agree with others more from hatred of some object, fear, hope, love, or some other disturbance of mind than from true reason. Hence whole peoples often commit, with the greatest unanimity and zeal, acts these writers readily admit are contrary to the law of nature. But since everyone grants that an act not contrary to reason is done by right, we should judge as wrong only those acts contrary to right reason: acts that contradict a definite truth derived by sound reasoning from true principles. An act done wrongly is said to be done against a law. Therefore true reason is a kind of law; and because it is as much a part of human nature as any other faculty or affection of the mind, it is also called natural. To define it, then: the law of nature is the dictate of right reason,4 concerning what we must do or refrain from doing for the continual preservation of our life and limbs, so far as it lies within our power.
The fundamental law of nature is to seek peace where it can be found, and where it cannot, to defend ourselves.
2 The first and fundamental law of nature is to seek peace where it can be found, and where it cannot, to obtain help for war. For in the last article of the preceding chapter we showed that this precept is the dictate of right reason; and we have just proved that the dictates of right reason are natural laws. It is the first because the rest follow from it and direct us toward either peace or self-defense.
The first particular law of nature is that we should not retain our rights to all things.
3 One natural law derived from this fundamental law is that the right of everyone to everything must not be retained: some rights must be transferred or relinquished. For if everyone retained their right to everything, some would by right invade, and others by the same right would defend themselves. Each person, by natural necessity, tries to defend their body and the things they judge necessary for its protection. War would therefore follow. Whoever refuses to part with their right to everything acts against the reason of peace, and thus against the law of nature.
What it means to relinquish our right, and what it means to transfer it.
4 A person parts with their right by either renouncing it outright or transferring it to another. They renounce it outright when they declare, by a sufficient sign or appropriate indications, that they wish never again to be permitted to do what they previously had a right to do. They transfer it to another when they declare, by a sufficient sign or appropriate indications, that they wish no longer to be permitted to resist that other person in doing something they previously had a right to resist. That the transfer of a right consists solely in not resisting is clear from the fact that the recipient had a right to everything even before the transfer, so no new right could be given to them. Instead, the transfer abolishes the right to resist that previously prevented the recipient from freely enjoying their rights. Whoever acquires a right in the natural condition of mankind thus secures only protection and freedom from rightful interference in the enjoyment of their original right. For example, someone who sells or gives away a farm deprives only themselves of all right to that farm; they do not deprive others of theirs.
The recipient's will must also be declared before the right is transferred.
5 The transfer of a right requires the will of the recipient as well as that of the person transferring it. If either is absent, the right remains. For if I intended to give what was mine to someone who refused it, I have neither renounced my right outright nor transferred it to anyone. The reason that moved me to part with it concerned that person alone, not anyone else.
Words do not transfer rights unless they refer to the present or past.
6 If words are the only sign of our will to relinquish or transfer a right, those words must refer either to the present or to the past; words referring only to the future transfer nothing. Someone who says, for example, “I will give it tomorrow,” plainly declares that they have not given it yet. Their right thus remains all that day and remains tomorrow as well, unless they actually give it in the meantime: what is mine remains mine until I part with it. But if I speak of the present, saying, for example, “I give you this to receive tomorrow,” or “I have given you this to receive tomorrow,” these words signify that I have already given it, and that I transfer to you today the right to receive it tomorrow.
Words referring to the future suffice for a transfer if other signs of our will are present.
7 Although words alone do not adequately indicate the will, words referring to the future can be just as valid as words referring to the present if other signs accompany them. If these other signs show that the speaker intends the future words to effect a complete transfer of the right, those words should be valid. For the transfer of a right depends not on words but, as explained in article 4, on the declaration of the will.
In a free gift, words referring to the future transfer no right.
8 When someone transfers part of their right to another, not in return for a definite benefit received or under a covenant, such a transfer is called a gift or free donation. In a free donation, only words referring to the present or the past oblige us. If they refer to the future, they do not oblige as words, for the reason given in the preceding article. The obligation must therefore arise from some other sign of the will. But since whatever is done voluntarily is done for some good to the person willing it, no other sign of the will to give can be identified except some benefit already received or expected. Yet we have assumed that no such benefit has been received and no covenant exists: otherwise the act would cease to be a free gift. What remains is the expectation of a return favor without agreement. But there is no sign that a person using future words toward someone who has undertaken no return favor intends those words to bind them. Nor is it reasonable that those readily inclined to do good to others should be bound by every promise expressing their present goodwill. A person making such a promise must therefore be understood to retain time for deliberation and the power to change their feelings, just as the person to whom the promise is made may become less deserving. Someone still deliberating is still free and cannot be said to have already given. If a person often promises but seldom gives, however, they deserve condemnation for their fickleness and should be called not a giver but an empty promiser.
The definitions of contract and covenant.
9 The act by which two or more people mutually transfer their rights is called a contract. In every contract either both parties immediately perform their obligations, so that neither trusts the other; one performs and the other is trusted; or neither performs. Where both perform at once, the contract is completed as soon as they perform. But where credit is given to one party or both, the trusted party promises to perform afterward; a promise of this kind is called a covenant.
In covenants, words referring to the future transfer our rights.
10 When the trusted party makes a covenant with someone who has already performed, that promise transfers the right to future performance no less when its words refer to the future than when they refer to the present or past. The other party's performance is a most evident sign that they understood the trusted party's words as a firm commitment to perform at the appointed time. That sign also made the trusted party aware of this understanding; by doing nothing to prevent it, they plainly indicated their will to perform. Promises made in return for a benefit received, which are also covenants, are therefore signs of the will: that is, as the preceding section explained, of the final act of deliberation, which ends the freedom not to perform and thus creates an obligation. For obligation begins where freedom ends.
Covenants are void in the state of nature, but not in civil government.
11 Covenants made under a contract of mutual trust, in which neither party performs at once, are invalid in the state of nature if a just suspicion arises5 in either party. For whoever performs first, given the wicked disposition of most people to pursue their own advantage by fair means or foul, exposes themselves to the perverse will of the person with whom they contracted. Reason does not require anyone to perform first when the other is unlikely to honor their promise afterward. And the person who doubts whether that is likely must judge for themselves, as shown in article 9 of the preceding chapter. This, I say, is the case in the state of nature. But in a civil state, where a power can compel both parties, the one who has contracted to perform first must do so: since the other can be compelled, the cause of fearing their failure to perform has disappeared.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
On the Law of Nature Concerning Contracts
1 The law of nature is not an agreement among people, but a rule of reason. 2. The fundamental law of nature is to seek peace when it is possible, and otherwise to defend ourselves. 3. The first specific law of nature is not to keep our right to everything. 4. What it means to give up a right and to transfer one. 5. Transferring a right also requires the consent of the person who receives it. 6. Words about the future alone transfer no right. 7. Words about the future can transfer a right if there are other signs of the person's intention. 8. In a free gift, words about the future do not transfer our right. 9. The definitions of contract and covenant. 10. In covenants, words about the future transfer our right. 11. Covenants based on mutual trust are ineffective in the state of nature, but not under civil government. 12. No one can make a covenant with an animal, or with God without revelation. 13. Nor can anyone make a vow to God. 14. Covenants bind us only to do our utmost. 15. How we are released from covenants. 16. Promises made under threat of death are valid in the state of nature. 17. A later covenant that contradicts an earlier one is invalid. 18. A covenant not to resist someone who harms my body is invalid. 19. A covenant to accuse oneself is invalid. 20. What an oath is. 21. An oath must be understood in the form used by the person who takes it. 22. An oath adds nothing to the obligation imposed by a covenant. 23. An oath should be required only where breaking a covenant can be kept secret, or only God can punish the breach.
The law of nature is not an agreement among people, but a rule of reason.
1 Writers do not all agree on the definition of natural law, although they often use the term. A method that starts with definitions and removes ambiguity is therefore the only suitable one if we want to leave no room for disputes based on conflicting meanings. Other writers offer different proofs that an action violates the law of nature. One points out that it is contrary to the general agreement of the wisest and most learned nations. But this does not tell us who is to judge which nations are wise and learned. Another points to the general consent of all humanity. We cannot accept that definition at all. If it were right, only children and people without understanding could violate natural law. Presumably "humanity" includes all people who actually have reason. These people either do nothing against a law they all agree to, or, if they do, they act without their own consent and should therefore be excused. It makes no sense to derive the laws of nature from the consent of people who break those laws more often than they obey them. People also condemn in others the same things they approve in themselves. They publicly praise what they privately condemn. They base their opinions on hearsay more than on their own thought. They agree out of hatred for something, fear, hope, love, or some other emotion more often than out of real reasoning. As a result, whole populations often do, with great unanimity and determination, exactly what these writers readily admit is against the law of nature. But everyone grants that an act is right if it does not contradict reason. So we should call wrong only those acts that contradict right reason—that is, acts that contradict a certain truth properly reasoned out from true principles. We say a wrongful act violates some law. True reasoning is therefore a kind of law. Reason is just as much a part of human nature as any other mental ability or feeling, so this law is also called natural. To define it, the law of nature is the rule of right reason about what we should do or avoid to preserve our lives and bodies continually, as far as we can.
The fundamental law of nature is to seek peace wherever possible, and otherwise to defend ourselves.
2 The first and fundamental law of nature is to seek peace wherever we can find it, and where we cannot, to secure help for war. The final article of the preceding chapter showed that this instruction comes from right reason. I have just shown that the rules of right reason are natural laws. This is the first law because the others follow from it and tell us how to achieve either peace or self-defense.
The first specific law of nature is that we must not keep our right to everything.
3 One natural law derived from this fundamental law says that everyone must not keep their right to everything; we must give up or transfer some rights. If everyone kept a right to everything, some would have a right to invade and others an equal right to defend themselves. Everyone naturally tries to protect their body and what they consider necessary for that protection. War would follow. So whoever refuses to give up the right to everything acts against the reason for peace, and thus against the law of nature.
What it means to give up or transfer a right.
4 Someone gives up a right by renouncing it completely or by transferring it to someone else. A person renounces it completely when they clearly declare, by adequate signs, that they will no longer be entitled to do something they previously had a right to do. A person transfers it to another when they clearly declare to that person that they will no longer be entitled to resist that person's doing something they previously could rightfully have resisted. Transferring a right consists simply in not resisting. Before the transfer, the recipient already had a right to everything, so no one can give that person a new right. What the giver eliminates is their own previous right to resist, which had kept the recipient from freely enjoying their rights. So when someone acquires a right in the natural human condition, they gain only security and freedom from rightful interference while enjoying a right they had from the beginning. If someone sells or gives away a farm, for instance, they deprive themselves entirely of their own right to it. They do not deprive anyone else of a right to it.
The person receiving a right must declare their consent before it can be transferred.
5 Transferring a right requires the consent of both the giver and the recipient. If either does not consent, the right remains where it was. If I try to give my property to someone who refuses it, I have neither renounced my right outright nor transferred it to anyone. My reason for giving it concerned that particular person, not everyone else.
Words alone transfer a right only when they refer to the present or past.
6 If the only sign that we intend to renounce or transfer a right is our words, they must refer to the present or the past. Words referring only to the future transfer nothing. A person who says, "I will give it tomorrow," plainly says they have not given it yet. Their right remains throughout today, and it will remain tomorrow unless they actually give it away meanwhile. What belongs to me stays mine until I part with it. But suppose I say, "I give you this to receive tomorrow," or "I have given you this to receive tomorrow." Those words mean that I have already given it, transferring to the other person today the right to receive it tomorrow.
Words about the future can transfer a right if there are other signs of our intention.
7 Words alone are not enough to declare the intention to transfer a right when they refer only to the future. But if other signs accompany those words, together they can be as effective as words referring to the present. If those other signs show that someone speaking about the future intends the words to complete the transfer of a right, they should be effective. As article 4 explained, transferring a right depends on expressing an intention, not on a particular choice of words.
With a free gift, words about the future transfer no right.
8 When someone transfers part of their right to another person without receiving a definite benefit or making a covenant, that transfer is called a gift or free donation. For a free gift, only words referring to the present or past bind us. Words about the future do not bind us on their own, for the reason just given. Any obligation would therefore have to arise from some other sign of intention. But every voluntary action aims at some good for the person who acts. So the only other possible sign of an intention to give would be a benefit the giver has already received or expects to obtain. Here we assume no such benefit and no covenant; if either existed, it would no longer be a free gift. That leaves only the expectation of a kindness in return, without any agreement. But if someone uses words about the future with a recipient under no obligation to return the kindness, nothing shows that the speaker wants those words to bind them. Nor would it be reasonable to bind people inclined to help others by every promise showing their present goodwill. Someone making such a promise must have time to think and be free to change their mind, just as the prospective recipient can change whether they deserve the gift. Someone who is still deciding is free and has not already given anything. But if a person often promises and rarely gives, we should criticize their flightiness and call them not a giver but an empty promiser.
The definitions of contract and covenant.
9 A contract is the act of two or more people transferring rights to one another. In every contract, either both parties immediately do what they agreed to do, so neither must trust the other; one acts while the other must be trusted; or neither acts immediately. If both act at once, the contract ends as soon as they do. But if either or both extend credit to the other, whoever is trusted promises to act later. This kind of promise is called a covenant.
In covenants, words about the future transfer our rights.
10 Suppose someone has already performed their side of a contract and the other party, who has been trusted, makes a covenant with them. Even if that party's promise uses words about the future, it transfers a future right just as words about the present or past would. The first person's performance clearly shows that they understood the promise to mean the other party would perform at the agreed time. The party who received that performance knew how their words had been understood. By not correcting that understanding, they clearly signaled an intention to perform. Promises made in return for a benefit already received are therefore covenants and signs of intention. They show, as the preceding section explained, the final decision after deliberation. That decision ends the freedom not to perform and consequently creates an obligation. Where freedom ends, obligation begins.
Covenants based on mutual trust are ineffective in the state of nature, but not under civil government.
11 Suppose both parties make a covenant based on mutual trust, neither performs immediately, and one has reasonable grounds for suspicion. In the state of nature, that covenant is invalid. If one acts first, they expose themselves to the bad intentions of the other party, since most people seek their own advantage by fair means or foul. It is not reasonable to perform first if the other person is unlikely to keep their promise later. As article 9 of the preceding chapter showed, anyone with doubts must judge for themselves whether performance is likely. That is how things stand in the state of nature. In a civil state, however, a power can compel both parties. So whoever contracted to perform first must do so first. The other party can be compelled, and the reason for fearing that they will fail to perform has disappeared.