Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Liberty, Chapter I, 2
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By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation.
9 Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he is performing, be necessary to the preservation of his life and members or not, he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge. For if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine own peril, say, that another man is judge. Why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are equal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him. Therefore it agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce to my preservation or not.
By right of nature, all men have equal right to all things.
10 Nature hath given to every one a right to all; that is, it was lawful for every man, in the bare state of nature,3 or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be judge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth or not, insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and by the 7th article it appears that by the right of nature those things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of nature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying, nature hath given all to all. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right.
The right of all to all is unprofitable.
11 But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things. For the effects of this right are the same, almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his.
The state of men without society is a state of war.
12 If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an intention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number, and no great provision; it cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. |The definition of war and peace.|For what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or deeds? The time remaining is termed PEACE.
War is an adversary to man’s preservation.
13 But it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual war is. But it is perpetual in its own nature; because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory. For in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should close up his life with many years and old age. They of America are examples hereof, even in this present age: other nations have been in former ages; which now indeed are become civil and flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and to get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.
That by the right of nature, it is lawful for any man to compel him whom he hath in his power, to give him caution for his future obedience.
14 Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; by constraint, when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve him, either through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him: by consent, when men enter into society to help each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by right compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a child), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural state of men, that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.
Nature dictates the seeking after peace.
15 Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of that equality of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal. Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be showed in the next chapter.
1 Born fit.] Since we now see actually a constituted society among men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of congress and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a stumbling block before the reader, as to deny man to be born fit for society. Therefore I must more plainly say, that it is true indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools, and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what society is, cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society. Many also, perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without which there can be no society, do yet desire it.
2 The mutual fear.] It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each others looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each others power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each other’s spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.
3 In the bare state of nature. This is thus to be understood: what any man does in the bare state of nature, is injurious to no man; not that in such a state he cannot offend God, or break the laws of nature; for injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such as in the state of nature there are none. Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived, is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises, I will contract this argument, and make it most evident to a single view. Every man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the seventh article. The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end, by the eighth article. But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such, by the ninth article. He therefore hath a right to make use of, and to do all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation; wherefore by the judgment of him that doth it, the thing done is either right or wrong, and therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare state of nature, &c. But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature, as in the third chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father’s or his mother’s, or him that nourished him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
By the right of nature, every person judges the means that serve their preservation.
9 Whether the means a person is about to use, and the act they are performing, are necessary to preserve their life and limbs, they themselves must judge by the right of nature. For if it is contrary to right reason that I should judge my own danger, suppose another person is to judge it. But since that person judges what concerns me, by the same reasoning, since we are equal by nature, I shall judge what concerns them. It therefore accords with right reason—that is, it is the right of nature—that I judge their opinion, and whether it serves my preservation.
By the right of nature, all people have an equal right to all things.
10 Nature has given everyone a right to everything: that is, in the bare state of nature,3 before people bound themselves by any covenants or obligations, everyone was free to do as they wished, against whomever they thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy whatever they wished or could obtain. Since whatever a person wishes appears good to them precisely because they wish it, and either truly does contribute to their preservation or at least seems to do so—and we have already granted them, in the preceding article, the judgment of whether it does, so that we must regard as necessary whatever they judge necessary—and since article 7 shows that the right of nature permits us to do and obtain whatever is necessary to protect life and limbs, it follows that in the state of nature everyone may lawfully possess and do everything. This is the meaning of the common saying that nature has given everything to everyone. From it we also understand that, in the state of nature, advantage is the measure of right.
The right of all to all is of no advantage.
11 Yet it was hardly a benefit for people to have this common right to everything. Its effects are nearly the same as if there were no right at all. For though anyone could say of anything, “This is mine,” they could not enjoy it because their neighbor, with equal right and equal power, would claim the same thing as their own.
The condition of people without society is a state of war.
12 Add to this natural inclination of people to hurt one another, arising from their passions and chiefly from their vain opinion of themselves, the right of all to all: one person invades by right, another resists by right, and constant jealousy and suspicion arise on every side. Consider, too, how hard it is to guard against an enemy bent on subduing and ruining us, even if that enemy comes with few people and scant provisions. It cannot be denied that the natural condition of people before they entered society was outright war—not merely war, but a war of everyone against everyone. The definition of war and peace. For what is WAR but the time when the will to contend by force is plainly declared in words or deeds? The remaining time is called PEACE.
War is hostile to human preservation.
13 It is easy to see how contrary perpetual war is to the preservation of mankind and of each person. And war is perpetual by its own nature: given the equality of the combatants, victory cannot put an end to it. The victor remains in such danger that it would be a marvel if anyone, even the strongest, lived a long life and reached old age. The peoples of America exemplify this even now; other nations did so in earlier ages. Those nations have since become civilized and prosperous, but then their people were few, fierce, short-lived, poor, filthy, and deprived of all the pleasures and beauty of life that peace and society bring. Whoever holds, therefore, that it would have been best to remain in a state where everything was lawful for everyone contradicts themselves. For by natural necessity everyone desires what is good for them, and no one judges a war of all against all, which necessarily belongs to such a state, to be good for them. Thus, fearing one another, we think it best to leave that condition and find allies, so that if war must come, it need not be against everyone or fought without assistance.
By the right of nature, a person may compel someone in their power to give assurance of future obedience.
14 Allies are gained either by force or by consent: by force when, after a fight, the victor makes the defeated person serve, either by fear of death or by putting them in chains; by consent when people enter society to help one another, both sides agreeing without coercion. But the victor may rightfully compel the defeated, or the stronger the weaker—as a healthy person may compel someone sick, or an adult a child—to give assurance of future obedience unless they choose to die. For since our right to protect ourselves as we see fit arose from our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more reasonable and surer for our preservation to use a present advantage to secure ourselves by obtaining assurance than to try, through an uncertain fight, to regain power over them when they are fully grown and strong and have escaped our control. Conversely, nothing could be more absurd than to release someone already weak and in your power, making them at once an enemy and a strong one. As a further consequence, we may understand that, in the natural condition of mankind, a secure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and rule over those who cannot resist. The right to do everything one can do belongs inherently and immediately to the absolute power that thus arises.
Nature directs us to seek peace.
15 Yet people cannot expect lasting preservation while they remain in the state of nature—that is, of war—because they are equal in power and in the other human capacities they possess. Thus the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature, is to seek peace wherever there is hope of obtaining it, and where there is none, to seek help for war. This will be shown in the next chapter.
1 Born fit.] Since we now see a society established among people, with no one living outside it, and since we see everyone desiring company and mutual dealings, it may seem remarkably foolish to put such a stumbling block before the reader at the very threshold of this teaching as the denial that a person is born fit for society. I must therefore speak more plainly. It is indeed true that solitude is an enemy to a person by nature, simply as a human being, from the moment of birth: infants need others to help them live, and adults need others to help them live well. I do not deny, then, that people desire to come together, even under the compulsion of nature. But civil societies are not mere gatherings: they are bonds, which require trust and agreements for their formation. Children and fools know nothing of the power of these bonds, while those who have not yet experienced the miseries caused by their absence know nothing of their benefit. Hence the former cannot enter society because they do not know what it is, and the latter do not care to because they are unaware of its benefit. It is clear, therefore, that all people, being born as infants, are born unfit for society. Many, perhaps most, remain unfit throughout their lives, whether through a deficiency of mind or a lack of education; yet infants and adults alike possess human nature. A person is made fit for society, then, not by nature but by education. Moreover, even if someone were born with a desire for it, that would not mean they were born fit to enter it. To desire a thing is one thing; to have the capacity for it is another. Even those whose pride prevents them from accepting equal terms, without which society is impossible, still desire society.
2 The mutual fear.] An objection is raised: it is so unlikely that people should form civil societies out of fear that, had they been afraid, they could not have endured looking at one another. Those who say this assume, I think, that fear means nothing but terror. By fear I mean a certain foresight of future harm. Nor do I think flight is its only expression: distrust, suspicion, vigilance, and precautions taken so that one need not be afraid also belong to the fearful. People lock their doors when they go to sleep and carry swords when they travel because they fear thieves. Kingdoms defend their coasts and borders with forts and castles, and cities are enclosed by walls, all from fear of neighboring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, fully equipped for battle, sometimes negotiate for peace because each fears the other's power and the possibility of defeat. Fear does lead people to secure themselves by flight and by hiding in corners when they believe there is no other escape; but more often they do so with arms and defensive weapons. Then, venturing out, they come to know one another's temper. If they fight, civil society arises from victory; if they agree, from agreement.
3 In the bare state of nature. This should be understood as follows: what a person does in the bare state of nature wrongs no other person. It does not mean that a person in that condition cannot offend God or break the laws of nature; for injustice toward people presupposes human laws, and none exist in the state of nature. The attentive reader has seen this proposition, so understood, sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding articles. But because the difficulty of a conclusion sometimes makes us forget its premises, I shall condense the argument and make it clear at a glance. Everyone has a right to protect themselves, as article 7 shows. Therefore each has the right to use every means necessary to that end, by article 8. And by article 9, the necessary means are those they judge necessary. They therefore have the right to use and do whatever they judge requisite for their preservation. By the judgment of the person acting, then, the act is either right or wrong, and therefore right. Thus it is true that in the bare state of nature, etc. But if someone claims that something is necessary to their preservation without confidently believing it themselves, they may offend against the laws of nature, as is more fully explained in the third chapter of this book. Some have objected: if a son kills his father, does he do him no wrong? I answer that a son cannot be understood to be in the state of nature at any time: from birth he is under the power and command of those to whom he owes his protection—his father, his mother, or whoever nourished him—as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
By the right of nature, each person judges what means will help preserve their own life.
9 Each person must judge for themselves, by the right of nature, whether an action they are taking or a means they plan to use is necessary to protect their life and body. Suppose it were against right reason for me to judge the dangers I face. Then someone else would have to judge them. But if that person can judge what concerns me, I can also judge what concerns that person, since we are equal by nature. It therefore agrees with right reason, and with the right of nature, for me to judge that person's opinion about whether something helps preserve me.
By the right of nature, everyone has an equal right to everything.
10 Nature has given everyone a right to everything. In the bare state of nature, before people have bound themselves by covenants or other obligations, anyone may do whatever they wish, against anyone they choose, and possess, use, and enjoy whatever they wish or can obtain. A person considers what they want to be good, because they want it. It either really does help preserve them, or at least seems to do so. As the previous article established, that person judges whether it does, so we must count as necessary whatever that person considers necessary. Article 7 established that, by the right of nature, we may do and must possess what is necessary to protect life and body. It follows that, in the state of nature, everyone may possess everything and do anything. That is what the familiar saying means: nature has given everything to everyone. We can also see from this that, in the state of nature, advantage is the measure of right.
Everyone's right to everything is of little use.
11 A shared right to everything gave people very little benefit. Its effects are almost the same as having no rights at all. Someone might say of anything, "This is mine." Yet they could not enjoy it, because a neighbor with an equal right and equal power would claim it too.
Without society, people are in a state of war.
12 People have a natural tendency to hurt one another. It comes from their passions, especially their inflated opinion of themselves. Add to this the right of everyone to everything: one person has a right to invade, while another has a right to resist. Constant jealousy and suspicion follow on every side. Consider, too, how hard it is to guard against an enemy intent on oppressing and destroying us, even if that enemy arrives with few people and little equipment. We cannot deny that, before people formed societies, their natural condition was war—not just any war, but a war of everyone against everyone. The definition of war and peace: War is the period during which people have plainly declared, in words or actions, their willingness to fight by force. All other time is called peace.
War works against human survival.
13 We can readily see how harmful a continual war would be to the survival of humanity and of each individual. By its nature that war goes on indefinitely. Since the opponents are equal, victory cannot bring it to an end. Even the winner faces so much danger that it would be remarkable if anyone, even the strongest, lived for many years and died of old age. The peoples of America provide examples even now. Other peoples did in earlier times. They are now civilized and thriving, but then they were few in number, fierce, short-lived, poor, and dirty. They had none of the pleasure and beauty of life that peace and society ordinarily bring. Anyone who says it would have been best to stay in a condition where everyone could do anything contradicts themselves. Everyone necessarily wants what is good for them. No one thinks a war of everyone against everyone, which necessarily comes with that condition, is good for them. Fear of one another therefore leads us to try to escape that condition and find companions. Then, if there must be war, it will not be against everyone, and we will have some help.
The right of nature allows someone to compel a person in their power to give assurance of future obedience.
14 People gain companions either by force or by consent. They gain them by force when a victor in battle makes the defeated person serve, either by threatening death or by putting that person in chains. They gain them by consent when both sides freely agree to join together to help one another. A victor may by right require a defeated person to give assurance of future obedience rather than die. Likewise a stronger person may require it of a weaker one, as a healthy person might require it of a sick person or an adult of a child. Our right to defend ourselves as we see fit comes from the danger we face, and that danger comes from our equality. It is therefore more reasonable and safer for our survival to use a current advantage to secure ourselves by obtaining assurances. The alternative is to wait until those in our power have grown up, become strong, and escaped our control, then try to regain control in an uncertain fight. It would be particularly absurd to release someone weak who is already in your power, making that person both your enemy and a strong one. We may draw this further conclusion about the natural condition of humanity: a secure and irresistible power gives someone the right to rule those who cannot resist. The right to do anything possible follows directly and necessarily from this resulting absolute power.
Nature tells us to seek peace.
15 Yet people cannot expect to survive for long while they remain in the state of nature, or state of war. Their equal power and other human abilities prevent it. Right reason therefore tells us to seek peace where we have any hope of obtaining it, and where we have none, to seek help in war. This is the law of nature, as the next chapter will show.
1 Born fit. Today we see societies already formed, with no one living outside them, and we see that everyone desires contact and interaction with others. So it may seem remarkably foolish to put an obstacle in the reader's way at the very start of this argument by denying that human beings are born fit for society. Let me explain more clearly. It is true that solitude is hostile to a person by nature, simply because they are human, from the moment they are born. Infants need others to help them survive, and adults need others to help them live well. I do not deny that people want to come together, even because nature drives them to do so. But civil societies are not merely gatherings. They are binding relationships, and making them requires trust and agreements. Children and people lacking understanding know nothing of what those bonds can do. People who have not yet experienced the hardships caused by society's absence know nothing of its benefits. The former cannot enter society because they do not know what it is; the latter do not care to enter because they do not know what it offers. Clearly everyone is born unfit for society because everyone is born an infant. Many people, perhaps most, remain unfit throughout life through lack of understanding or education. Still, infants and adults alike have human nature. Education, not nature, makes a person fit for society. Even if people were born desiring it, they would not therefore be born able to enter it. Wanting something and being capable of it are different. Even people too proud to accept equal terms, without which there can be no society, still want society.
2 Mutual fear. Someone objects that fear is such an unlikely cause of civil society that, if people had been afraid, they could not even have stood looking at one another. That objection seems to assume fear means nothing but being frightened. By fear I also mean anticipating a future harm. Fear does not only make us run away. A fearful person may distrust, suspect, take precautions, and prepare so that there will be no need to fear. People lock their doors before going to sleep and carry swords when they travel because they fear thieves. Kingdoms protect their coasts and borders with forts and castles; towns build close-set walls. All do so for fear of neighboring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest and best-equipped armies sometimes discuss peace because each fears the other's power and the possibility of defeat. Fear may make people seek safety by running away and hiding in corners if they see no other escape. More often they arm and defend themselves. They then dare to come forward and learn what sort of spirit the others have. If they fight, civil society arises from victory; if they agree, it arises from agreement.
3 In the bare state of nature. Here is what this means: what a person does in the bare state of nature does not injure another person in the legal sense. It does not mean that the person cannot offend God or violate the laws of nature. Injustice against other people presupposes human laws, and there are none in the state of nature. The preceding articles sufficiently demonstrate this point to an attentive reader. But because a difficult conclusion sometimes makes us forget its premises, I will put the argument briefly and plainly. Everyone has a right to protect themselves, as article 7 shows. By article 8, everyone therefore has a right to use all means necessary for that purpose. Article 9 says that each person judges which means are necessary. So a person has the right to use or do whatever they consider necessary for their preservation. The person acting thus judges whether the act is right or wrong, and by that judgment it is right. That is why the proposition about the bare state of nature is true. But a person who claims an act is necessary for their survival while not actually believing that it is may violate the laws of nature, as chapter 3 of this book explains more fully. Some have objected: if a son kills his father, does he do his father no injury? My answer is that a son cannot at any time be understood to be in the state of nature. From birth he is subject to the power and command of the person to whom he owes his care, whether his father, his mother, or whoever has raised him. Chapter 9 demonstrates this.