Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Liberty, Chapter I, 1
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OF THE STATE OF MEN WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY
1 The Introduction. 2. That the beginning of civil society is from mutual fear. 3. That men by nature are all equal. 4. Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth. 5. The discord arising from comparison of wits. 6. From the appetite many have to the same thing. 7. The definition of right. 8. A right to the end, gives a right to the means necessary to that end. 9. By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation. 10. By nature all men have equal right to all things. 11. This right which all men have to all things, is unprofitable. 12. The state of men without civil society, is a mere state of war: the definitions of peace and war. 13. War is an adversary to man’s preservation. 14. It is lawful for any man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power, to give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature dictates the seeking after peace.
Introduction.
The faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of this following doctrine from these, we will declare, in the first place, what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are born apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual violence; then proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this business, and what are the conditions of society, or of human peace; that is to say, (changing the words only), what are the fundamental laws of nature.
That the beginning of mutual society is from fear.
2 The greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning commonwealths, either suppose, or require us or beg of us to believe, that man is a creature born fit1 for society. The Greeks call him πολιτικονπολιτικον; and on this foundation they so build up the doctrine of civil society, as if for the preservation of peace, and the government of mankind, there were nothing else necessary than that men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions together, which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly false; and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature. For they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together, and delight in each other’s company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man should love another, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man; or why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it; these we desire primarily, that secondarily. How, by what advice, men do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they do when they are met. For if they meet for traffic, it is plain every man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes may arise, but good will never; if for pleasure and recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stir up laughter, whence he may, according to the nature of that which is ridiculous, by comparison of another man’s defects and infirmities, pass the more current in his own opinion. And although this be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain glory. But for the most part, in these kinds of meeting we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged, condemned. Nay, it is very rare but some present receive a fling as soon as they part; so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always at parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of society, unto which we are carried by nature, that is, by those passions which are incident to all creatures, until either by sad experience or good precepts it so fall out, which in many it never happens, that the appetite of present matters be dulled with the memory of things past: without which the discourse of most quick and nimble men on this subject, is but cold and hungry.
But if it so happen, that being met they pass their time in relating some stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concerns himself; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell you miracles, if they have them; if not, they will feign them. Lastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than others: if they meet to talk of philosophy, look, how many men, so many would be esteemed masters, or else they not only love not their fellows, but even persecute them with hatred. So clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider human affairs, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory, whence the parties met endeavour to carry with them either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same εὐδοκιμεῖνεὐδοκιμεῖν, some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have been conversant. The same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves of will, good, honour, profitable. For when we voluntarily contract society, in all manner of society we look after the object of the will, that is, that which every one of those who gather together, propounds to himself for good. Now whatsoever seems good, is pleasant, and relates either to the senses, or the mind. But all the mind’s pleasure is either glory, (or to have a good opinion of one’s self), or refers to glory in the end; the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality, which may be all comprehended under the word conveniences. All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear2 they had of each other.
That men by nature are all equal.
3 The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security. For if we look on men full-grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest: there is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others. They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law.
Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth.
4 All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned. For one man, according to that natural equality which is among us, permits as much to others as he assumes to himself; which is an argument of a temperate man, and one that rightly values his power. Another, supposing himself above others, will have a license to do what he lists, and challenges respect and honour, as due to him before others; which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This man’s will to hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he hath of his own strength; the other’s from the necessity of defending himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this man’s violence.
The discord arising from comparison of wits.
5 Furthermore, since the combat of wits is the fiercest, the greatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this contention. For in this case it is not only odious to contend against, but also not to consent. For not to approve of what a man saith, is no less than tacitly to accuse him of an error in that thing which he speaketh: as in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from. Which may appear hence, that there are no wars so sharply waged as between sects of the same religion, and factions of the same commonweal, where the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic prudence. And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this, even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt, either by laughter, or by words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than which there is no greater vexation of mind, and than from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt.
From the appetite many have to the same thing.
6 But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.
The definition of right.
7 Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one’s self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word right is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.
A right to the end gives also a right to the means.
8 But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end, if the right to the necessary means be denied him, it follows, that since every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also be allowed a right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE CONDITION OF HUMAN BEINGS WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY
1 The introduction. 2. Civil society begins in mutual fear. 3. Human beings are all equal by nature. 4. The origin of the will to harm one another. 5. Discord arising from comparisons of intelligence. 6. Discord arising when many desire the same thing. 7. The definition of right. 8. A right to an end confers a right to the means necessary to it. 9. By the right of nature, each person judges what means serve his own preservation. 10. By nature everyone has an equal right to everything. 11. This right of everyone to everything is of no use. 12. Without civil society, the human condition is simply a state of war: definitions of peace and war. 13. War is hostile to human preservation. 14. By natural right, a person may compel someone in his power to provide assurance of future obedience. 15. Nature dictates the pursuit of peace.
Introduction.
The faculties of human nature may be divided into four kinds: bodily strength, experience, reason, and passion. Beginning with these, we shall first explain how human beings endowed with such faculties are disposed toward one another; whether, and through which faculty, they are born fit for society and for preserving themselves against mutual violence. Then we shall explain what counsel must be taken toward that end, and what the conditions of society, or human peace, are—that is, to put the same thing in other words, the fundamental laws of nature.
Civil society begins in mutual fear.
2 Most writers on commonwealths either assume, require, or beg us to believe that a human being is a creature born fit for society. The Greeks call him a political creature. Upon this foundation they build their account of civil society, as though nothing more were needed to preserve peace and govern humankind than an agreement among people to establish certain covenants and conditions, which they would then call laws. Though widely accepted, this axiom is certainly false; the error comes from looking too lightly at human nature. Whoever looks more closely at why people assemble and enjoy one another's company will readily discover that it happens not from any natural necessity, but by circumstance. For if one person naturally loved another simply as a human being, there would be no reason why everyone should not love everyone else equally, since each is equally human; nor why anyone should prefer the company of those who bring him honor or profit. We do not, then, seek society by nature for its own sake: we primarily desire honor or profit from it, and society only secondarily. The best way to learn why people meet is to observe what they do when gathered. If they meet to trade, clearly each attends not to his companion but to his business. If they meet to conduct an office, they form a kind of commercial friendship, containing more jealousy than genuine affection and capable of breeding factions but never goodwill. If they meet for pleasure and recreation, each is most amused by what provokes laughter: by comparing himself with another's failings and weaknesses, he can rise in his own estimation, as ridicule itself invites. Though such amusement is sometimes harmless and without offense, plainly it is not one another's company that pleases them so much as their own vainglory. Usually, indeed, in such gatherings we wound those who are absent: their whole lives, words, and deeds are examined, judged, and condemned. Rarely does someone present escape a thrust as soon as he has gone; so the man who always left a gathering last had good reason. These, in fact, are the true pleasures of society to which nature draws us—that is, the passions common to all creatures—until painful experience or good instruction, which many never receive, dulls our appetite for the present with remembrance of the past. Without such remembrance, even the discourse of the quickest and liveliest minds on this subject remains cold and meager.
But if people assembled together pass the time telling stories, and one begins an account of himself, everyone else immediately becomes eager to speak of himself too. If someone relates a wonder, the others will offer miracles, if they have any; otherwise they will invent them. Finally, consider those who pretend to superior wisdom: if they meet to discuss philosophy, each wants to be regarded as a master; failing that, they not only cease to love their companions but pursue them with hatred. Thus experience makes plain to anyone who observes human affairs closely that every free gathering arises either from mutual need or from vainglory. Those present seek to take away some advantage, or to leave behind a favorable opinion of themselves among their companions. Reason draws the same conclusion from the definitions of will, good, honor, and advantage. Whenever we voluntarily enter society, in every kind of society we seek the object of our will: what each participant proposes to himself as good. Whatever appears good is pleasing and concerns either the senses or the mind. All pleasure of the mind is either glory—a good opinion of oneself—or ultimately tends toward glory. The rest concerns the senses or serves their gratification, and can all be called conveniences. Every society, therefore, is formed either for gain or for glory; it springs less from love of our companions than from love of ourselves. But a society beginning in vainglory cannot be great or enduring. Glory resembles honor: if everyone possesses it, no one does, since both depend upon comparison and preeminence. Nor does the company of others do anything to increase the grounds for my pride in myself: each must reckon his own worth by what he can make of himself without their help. And although mutual aid can greatly increase the benefits of life, those benefits may be secured still more effectively by dominion than by association. I trust, therefore, that no one will doubt that, if all fear were removed, nature would draw people far more eagerly to seek dominion than society. We must conclude that the origin of all great and enduring societies lay not in people's goodwill toward one another, but in their mutual fear.
Human beings are all equal by nature.
3 Mutual fear arises partly from the natural equality of human beings and partly from their mutual willingness to harm. Hence we can neither expect from others nor promise ourselves the least security. Consider adults: the human body is fragile, and when it perishes, all its strength, vigor, and wisdom perish with it; even the weakest can easily kill the strongest. No one, therefore, has reason to imagine that his strength places him by nature above others. Those who can do equal things to one another are equals; and those who can do the greatest thing—kill—can do equal things. All human beings are thus equal among themselves by nature. The inequality we now perceive originates in civil law.
The origin of the will to harm one another.
4 In the state of nature everyone has a desire and a will to harm, but these do not spring from the same cause, nor deserve the same condemnation. One person grants others as much liberty as he claims for himself, in keeping with our natural equality; this shows moderation and a sound judgment of his own power. Another, imagining himself above others, claims license to do whatever he pleases and demands respect and honor before them; this reveals an ardent spirit. The latter's will to harm springs from vainglory and an inflated estimate of his strength; the former's springs from the need to defend himself, his liberty, and his goods against the other's violence.
Discord arising from comparisons of intelligence.
5 Moreover, because contests of intelligence are the fiercest, they must give rise to the greatest discord. In such a contest it is offensive not only to contradict someone but even to withhold agreement. To disapprove of what a person says is to accuse him silently of error in that matter; to disagree with him repeatedly is almost to call him a fool. This is evident from the fact that no wars are fought more bitterly than those between sects of the same religion or factions of the same commonwealth, where doctrine or political judgment is at issue. And since the mind takes its pleasure and delight in finding someone against whom it can measure itself, and some ground on which to triumph and boast, people must sometimes express mutual scorn and contempt—in laughter, words, gestures, or other signs. Nothing distresses the mind more, or can provoke a greater desire to do harm.
Discord arising when many desire the same thing.
6 The most frequent cause of the desire to harm, however, is that many people want the same thing at the same time, though they can often neither enjoy it together nor divide it. It follows that the strongest must possess it, and the sword must decide who is strongest.
The definition of right.
7 Amid the many dangers with which natural human appetites daily threaten one another, looking after oneself is so far from contemptible that no one has either the power or the wish to do otherwise. Everyone desires what is good for him and avoids what is evil, above all the greatest natural evil, death; he does so by an impulse of nature no less certain than the one that draws a stone downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor blameworthy, nor contrary to the dictates of right reason, for a person to exert every effort to preserve and defend his body and its members from death and suffering. What is not contrary to right reason everyone recognizes as done justly and by right. The word right signifies nothing other than each person's liberty to use his natural faculties in accordance with right reason. The first foundation of the right of nature, therefore, is that each person strive as far as he can to protect his life and limbs.
A right to an end also confers a right to the means.
8 Since a right to an end is useless if the right to the necessary means is denied, it follows that each person, having the right to preserve himself, must also be allowed the right to employ every means and perform every action without which he cannot preserve himself.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE CONDITION OF PEOPLE OUTSIDE CIVIL SOCIETY
1 Introduction. 2. Civil society begins in mutual fear. 3. People are all equal by nature. 4. Why people want to hurt each other. 5. Disagreement arising from comparisons of intelligence. 6. Disagreement arising when many want the same thing. 7. Definition of right. 8. A right to an end gives a right to the means needed to reach it. 9. By the right of nature, everyone judges which means will preserve his own life. 10. By nature everyone has an equal right to everything. 11. This universal right to everything is useless. 12. The condition of people outside civil society is a state of war: definitions of peace and war. 13. War threatens human survival. 14. Natural right permits anyone who has another person in his power to force that person to give a guarantee of future obedience. 15. Nature tells us to seek peace.
Introduction.
We can divide human abilities into four kinds: bodily strength, experience, reason, and passion. Starting with these, I will first explain how people with these abilities are disposed toward one another. I will ask whether they are born fit for society, which ability makes them fit for it, and whether they can protect themselves from violence by others. Then I will explain what measures they must take and what conditions make society, or human peace, possible. In other words, I will explain the fundamental laws of nature.
Society begins in mutual fear.
2 Most writers on commonwealths either assume, demand, or beg us to believe that human beings are born fit for society. The Greeks call a human being a political animal. On this basis, these writers build a theory of civil society as though peace and the government of humankind required nothing more than an agreement to make covenants and set terms, which the participants would then call laws. Most people accept this claim, but it is certainly false. The error comes from looking at human nature too casually. Look more closely at why people come together and enjoy each other’s company. You will find that they do so not because nature necessarily makes them do it, but because of circumstances. If one person naturally loved another simply as a human being, there would be no reason not to love all people equally, since all are equally human. Nor would there be a reason to prefer the company of people who bring honor or profit. We do not seek society for its own sake by nature. We seek it to gain honor or profit. These are our primary desires; society comes second. We can best learn why people meet by watching what they do when they are together. When they meet to trade, each attends to his business, not to his fellow. When they meet to carry out a task, they develop a kind of marketplace friendship. It contains more rivalry than real affection and may produce factions, but never goodwill. When they meet for pleasure and relaxation, each takes most delight in what provokes laughter. Something about the ridiculous person’s faults and weaknesses lets the observer think better of himself by comparison. This can sometimes be harmless, but clearly people enjoy their own vanity more than the company. Usually, at these gatherings, we attack those who are absent. We examine, judge, and condemn their entire lives, words, and deeds. Rarely does anyone present escape an insult the moment he leaves. The man who always made sure to leave last had good reason. These, in fact, are the pleasures of society that nature draws us toward. They come from passions shared by all living creatures, until painful experience or good teaching happens to check our desire for immediate pleasures with memories of the past. Many people never learn to do this. Without that experience or teaching, even the talk of the quickest minds on this subject is cold and empty.
If those gathered instead tell stories, and one person starts a story about himself, everyone else immediately wants to talk about himself too. If one tells an astonishing story, the others will tell tales of miracles if they have any, or invent them if they do not. Finally, consider those who claim to be wiser than other people. When they meet to discuss philosophy, each wants to be recognized as a teacher. Otherwise, far from loving their companions, they hate and even persecute them. Anyone who pays close attention to human affairs can see clearly from experience that every freely chosen gathering arises either from a mutual need or from vanity. People meet to obtain a benefit or to leave with a good reputation among those they have met. Reason reaches the same conclusion from the definitions of will, good, honor, and advantage. Whenever we freely enter a society, every participant pursues what he wills: what he himself considers good. Whatever appears good is pleasant and appeals either to the senses or to the mind. Every pleasure of the mind is either glory—a good opinion of oneself—or something that ultimately contributes to glory. Other pleasures are sensual or lead to sensual pleasure. We can call them all advantages. So every society is formed for gain or for glory. Love of ourselves, not love of our fellows, is its main motive. But a society formed out of vanity cannot be large or last long. Glory is like honor: if everyone has it, no one does, since it depends on comparison and superiority. Other people’s company does not increase my grounds for glory in myself. Each person must judge himself by what he can do without their help. Mutual help can greatly increase the benefits of life, but domination can secure those benefits even better than association with others. I expect no one will doubt that if people felt no fear, nature would lead them much more eagerly to seek domination than society. We must conclude, then, that great and lasting societies originated not in mutual goodwill but in mutual fear.
People are all equal by nature.
3 Mutual fear comes partly from the natural equality of human beings and partly from their willingness to hurt one another. As a result, we can neither expect even the slightest security from others nor promise it to ourselves. Consider adults and the fragility of the human body. When the body dies, its strength, energy, and wisdom all die with it. Even the weakest person can easily kill the strongest. No one therefore has reason to trust in his strength and think nature has placed him above others. People who can do the same things to each other are equals. Anyone who can do the greatest thing—kill—can do the same thing to another. Therefore all people are naturally equal. The inequality we now see comes from civil law.
Why people want to hurt each other.
4 In the state of nature, everyone has a desire and willingness to hurt others. But the desire has different causes, and not everyone deserves equal blame. One person, recognizing our natural equality, allows others as much freedom as he claims for himself. That shows self-control and a sound judgment of his own power. Another thinks himself superior. He demands permission to do whatever he likes and claims that others owe him special respect and honor. That shows a hot temper. His desire to hurt others comes from vanity and an exaggerated opinion of his strength. The first person’s desire comes from the need to defend his life, liberty, and possessions against the second person’s violence.
Disagreement arising from comparisons of intelligence.
5 Contests of intelligence are the fiercest contests. The worst conflicts must therefore grow out of them. Here it is hateful not only to oppose someone, but even to withhold agreement. If you do not approve what a person says, you silently accuse him of being wrong. If you disagree with him on many things, you nearly call him a fool. We can see this in the wars fought most fiercely of all: those between branches of the same religion or factions of the same commonwealth, when they dispute doctrines or political judgment. Furthermore, mental pleasure and delight depend on finding someone to compare oneself with, so that one can discover something in oneself to celebrate and boast about. People will therefore sometimes show contempt for one another by laughter, words, gestures, or some other sign. Nothing irritates the mind more, and nothing can give rise to a stronger desire to hurt.
Disagreement arising when many want the same thing.
6 The most common reason people want to hurt each other is that several people want the same thing at the same time. Often they can neither enjoy it together nor divide it. The strongest person must then take it, and a fight must decide who is strongest.
Definition of right.
7 Human desires threaten one another with so many dangers every day that caring for oneself is not a thing to despise. Indeed, one could neither choose nor manage to do otherwise. Everyone wants what is good for him and avoids what is bad, especially the greatest natural evil, death. He does so by a natural impulse as sure as the one that makes a stone fall. It is therefore neither absurd nor blameworthy, nor contrary to sound reason, for a person to make every effort to protect his body and its parts from death and pain. Everyone considers an act that does not go against sound reason to be just and done by right. The word right means simply the freedom everyone has to use his natural abilities according to sound reason. So the first foundation of natural right is that each person should do everything he can to protect his life and body.
A right to an end also gives a right to the means.
8 A person’s right to an end is useless if he has no right to the means necessary to reach it. Since everyone has a right to preserve himself, he must also have the right to use any means and do any acts without which he cannot survive.