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Liberty, Chapter III, 2
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9 The fourth precept of nature is, that every man render himself useful unto others: which that we may rightly understand, we must remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the building, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by reason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be useless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by right only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his main might to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war; because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature, that every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulness, as having regard to this very law.
The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.
10 The fifth precept of the law of nature is, that we must forgive him who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is become penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to the natural law.
The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.
11 The sixth precept of the natural law is, that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the future good: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no end; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing to come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory, and is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason, introduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature. It is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we look not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is commonly called cruelty.
The seventh law of nature, against slander.
12 But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of nature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or laughter, do declare himself to hate or scorn another. The breach of which law is called reproach. But although nothing be more frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak, and namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these kind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.
The eighth law, against pride.
13 The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before (Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is not only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also against experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore it is in the eighth place a precept of the law of nature, that every man be accounted by nature equal to another; the contrary to which law is pride.
The ninth law, of humility.
14 As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he should part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to the same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges to himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equal things to equals, is the same with giving things proportional to proportionals. The observation of this law is called meekness, the violation πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the Latins are styled immodici et immodesti.
The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of persons.
15 In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, that every man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either party. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right by nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if we will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The observance of this precept is called equity; the breach, respect of persons. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.
The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.
16 From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, those things which cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if the quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists; but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the number of the users. For otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.
The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.
17 Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by the law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, that the use of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot; and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who shall have the first use of it. For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.
The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.
18 But all lot is twofold, arbitrary or natural.
Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders, and it consists in mere chance, as they say, or fortune. Natural is primogeniture, in Greek κληρονομια, as it were, given by lot; or first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessor; as also those things which belonged to the father are due to the son, unless the father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature.
The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are mediators for peace.
19 The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, that safety must be assured to the mediators for peace. For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to obtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is therefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we must give all security to the mediators for peace.
The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.
20 Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done were against the law or not, which we call the question of right; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the preservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom they thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law, that both parties disputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the opinion and judgment of some third.
The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own cause.
21 But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the arbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man would do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature, that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own cause.
The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be judged.
22 From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, that no man must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part: for the like reason sways here, as in the foregoing law.
The eighteenth law, of witnesses.
23 But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit, whether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is, because they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, that where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both parts.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
9 The fourth precept of nature is that everyone make himself useful to others. To understand this properly, we must remember that men differ in their dispositions for entering society because their affections differ, rather as stones brought together for a building differ in material and shape. A stone whose sharp, angular shape takes up more space among other stones than it fills itself, and whose hard substance makes it difficult to compress or cut, would prevent the building from fitting closely together; it is cast aside as useless. So too a man whose harsh disposition makes him keep surplus goods for himself while withholding necessities from others, and whose stubborn affections make him incorrigible, is commonly called useless and troublesome to others. Now everyone is presumed, not only by right but by natural necessity, to devote all his strength to procuring what is necessary for his preservation. If someone insists instead on fighting for superfluities, war will arise through his fault, since he alone had no necessity to fight. He thus acts against the fundamental law of nature. It follows, as we set out to show, that it is a precept of nature that everyone accommodate himself to others. Whoever breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome. Cicero, however, sets inhumanity against such usefulness, with this very law in view.
The fifth law of nature, concerning mercy.
10 The fifth precept of the law of nature is that we must forgive someone who repents and asks pardon for what is past, once we have first obtained assurance for the future. Pardoning the past, or remitting an offense, is simply granting peace to someone who has made war on us, now repents, and asks for it. But granting peace to someone who does not repent and remains hostile, or who gives no assurance for the future and seeks not peace but an opportunity, is not properly peace but fear, and is therefore not commanded by nature. Someone unwilling to pardon a penitent person who offers assurance for the future appears unwilling to have peace itself, contrary to natural law.
The sixth law, that punishments look only to the future.
11 The sixth precept of natural law is that in taking revenge and imposing punishments we look not to past evil but to future good: it is lawful to inflict punishment only to reform the offender or to improve others by the warning his punishment gives them. This follows above all from the obligation under natural law to forgive one another when assurance is given for the future, as shown in the preceding article. Moreover, revenge concerned solely with the past is nothing but a certain triumph and exultation of the mind, directed toward no end: it contemplates only what has passed, while an end lies in the future. What is directed toward no end is vain. Revenge without regard for the future thus proceeds from vainglory and is without reason. But to hurt another without reason brings about war and contradicts the fundamental law of nature. The law of nature therefore commands that in taking revenge we look forward, not backward. Breach of this law is commonly called cruelty.
The seventh law of nature, against slander.
12 Since signs of hatred and contempt are among the strongest provocations to quarreling and fighting—so much so that most men would sooner lose their lives, let alone their peace, than endure slander—it follows, in the seventh place, that the law of nature forbids anyone to declare hatred or scorn for another by deed, word, expression, or laughter. Breach of this law is called reproach. Yet nothing is more common than the mockery and jeering of the powerful at the weak, and particularly of judges at guilty persons, even when these taunts concern neither the offense of the guilty nor the duty of the judge. Such people nevertheless act against the law of nature and must be considered insulting.
The eighth law, against pride.
13 The question which of two men is worthier belongs not to the natural state but to the civil one. For it was shown above (Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men are equal by nature; consequently, the inequalities now arising from wealth, power, or noble descent originate in civil law. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, maintains as the foundation of the entire science of politics that some men are born fit to command and others only to serve—as though masters and servants were distinguished not by human agreement but by aptitude, that is, by some natural kind of knowledge or ignorance. This foundation contradicts not only reason, as we have just shown, but experience too. Hardly anyone is so dull that he would not judge it better to govern himself than submit to another's rule; and when the wiser and stronger contend with others, they do not always, or even often, gain the upper hand. If men are equal by nature, their equality must be acknowledged; if unequal, then because they are likely to contend for dominion, peace requires that they be regarded as equal. Thus the eighth precept of the law of nature is to regard every man as by nature equal to every other; the contrary of this law is pride.
The ninth law, concerning humility.
14 Just as each person's preservation required him to surrender some of his rights, so that same preservation requires him to retain others: the right to defend his body and to enjoy freely air, water, and everything necessary for life. Since people entering a state of peace retain many rights in common and acquire many rights peculiar to themselves, this ninth dictate of natural law arises: whatever rights a man claims for himself, he must grant as due to everyone else. Otherwise he defeats the equality recognized in the preceding article. For what does it mean to acknowledge equality of persons when forming a society, if not to attribute equal right and power to people whom no other reason would induce to enter it? To assign equal things to equals is the same as giving things in proportion to those proportionately entitled to them. Observance of this law is called meekness; its violation, πλεονεξὶα. The Latins call its violators immodici et immodesti.
The tenth law of equity, or against favoritism.
15 In the tenth place, the law of nature commands everyone who distributes rights to others to deal equally with either party. The preceding law forbids us to claim for ourselves more right by nature than we grant to others. We may take less if we wish, for that is sometimes a mark of modesty. But when it falls to us to distribute rights among others, this law forbids us to favor one above another. For whoever fails to observe natural equality by favoring one person over another reproaches the one he undervalues; and we have already shown that reproach violates the laws of nature. Observance of this precept is called equity; its violation, partiality. The Greeks call it προσωποληψία.
The eleventh law, concerning things held in common.
16 From the preceding law follows the eleventh: things that cannot be divided must be used in common if they can be; if there is enough, each person may use as much as he wishes, but if there is not enough, use must be limited in proportion to the number of users. Otherwise the equality that the preceding article showed natural law to command cannot possibly be observed.
The twelfth law, concerning things divided by lot.
17 For something that can neither be divided nor used in common, the law of nature provides, as its twelfth precept, that it be used in turns or assigned to one person alone by lot; and where it is used in turns, the first user must also be chosen by lot. Here too equality must be respected, and none but the equality of a lottery can be found.
The thirteenth law, concerning birthright and first possession.
18 Every lot, however, is either arbitrary or natural.
An arbitrary lot is cast by agreement among the contenders and depends on mere chance, or fortune, as they say. Natural lot is birthright—in Greek, κληρονομια, as though given by lot—or first possession. Things that can neither be divided nor held in common must therefore be granted to their first possessor; likewise, things belonging to a father are due to his son, unless the father has already transferred that right to someone else. Let this stand as the thirteenth law of nature.
The fourteenth law, concerning the safety of mediators for peace.
19 The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is to guarantee safety to mediators for peace. Reason, in commanding an end, also commands the means necessary to it. The first dictate of reason is peace; all the remaining dictates are means to attain it, without which it cannot be obtained. But peace cannot be obtained without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is therefore a dictate of reason, and thus a law of nature, that we give mediators for peace every assurance of safety.
The fifteenth law, concerning the appointment of an arbiter.
20 Furthermore, even if men agreed to make all these laws of nature, and any others, and endeavored to observe them, doubts and disputes would still arise every day over their application to particular actions: whether a deed violated the law or not, which we call a question of right. Fighting between the parties would follow, each believing himself wronged. For the preservation of peace, since no other adequate remedy can be imagined in this case, both disputing parties must refer the matter to a third person and bind themselves by mutual compacts to abide by his decision of the dispute. The person to whom they thus refer it is called an arbiter. The fifteenth precept of natural law is therefore that both parties to a dispute over right submit to the opinion and judgment of a third person.
The sixteenth law, that no one judge his own cause.
21 From the fact that an arbiter or judge is chosen by disputing parties to settle their controversy, we infer that the arbiter must not be one of those parties. Everyone is presumed naturally to pursue his own good, and to pursue justice only for the sake of peace and incidentally; he therefore cannot observe the equality commanded by natural law as exactly as a third person can. Thus the sixteenth precept of the law of nature is that no one may be judge or arbiter in his own cause.
The seventeenth law, that arbiters have no hope of reward from the parties whose cause they judge.
22 From the same premise it follows, in the seventeenth place, that no one may judge a case if he expects profit or glory for himself from the victory of either party; the same reason applies as in the preceding law.
The eighteenth law, concerning witnesses.
23 When the fact itself is in dispute—whether what is alleged to have happened actually happened—natural law requires the arbiter to trust both parties equally: since their claims contradict each other, he must believe neither. He must therefore give credence to a third person, or to a third and fourth, or to more, so that he can decide the facts whenever he cannot discover them from other signs. The eighteenth law of nature accordingly instructs arbiters and judges of fact, where firm and certain signs of the facts are lacking, to base their decisions on witnesses who appear impartial toward both sides.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
9 The fourth precept of nature says that everyone should make himself useful to others. To understand this properly, remember that people's dispositions toward joining society differ because their feelings differ. They are rather like the stones assembled for a building, which differ in material and shape. A sharp, angular stone takes up more space among the other stones than it fills itself. If its material is so hard that it cannot easily be pressed into place or cut, it prevents the building from fitting together properly and is thrown away as useless. Likewise, a person with a harsh disposition holds on to more than he needs and withholds necessities from others. If his stubborn feelings make him impossible to correct, he is commonly called useless and troublesome to others. Everyone is assumed, not only by right but also by natural necessity, to do everything he can to get what he needs to survive. If someone insists instead on fighting for things he does not need, a war will arise through his fault. Unlike the others, he had no need to fight. He therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. It follows, as we set out to show, that nature commands everyone to adapt himself to others. Someone who breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome. Cicero, however, calls its opposite inhumanity, with this very law in mind.
The fifth law of nature, concerning mercy.
10 The fifth precept of natural law says that we must forgive someone who repents and asks pardon for the past, once we have taken precautions for the future. Forgiving a past act, or pardoning an offense, simply means granting peace to someone who has fought against us but now repents and asks for it. Granting peace to someone who has not repented, and so remains hostile, or who offers no assurance for the future, and so seeks an opportunity rather than peace, is not really peace. It is fear, and nature does not command it. But if someone refuses to forgive a repentant person who offers assurances for the future, he appears not to want peace itself. That goes against natural law.
The sixth law: punishment must look only to the future.
11 The sixth precept of natural law says that in taking revenge or imposing punishments, we must consider future good rather than past wrongdoing. In other words, we may punish someone only to correct the offender or to improve others by warning them through his punishment. The main reason is that, as the previous article showed, natural law binds everyone to forgive someone who gives assurances for the future. Moreover, revenge that considers only the past is nothing but a kind of triumph and private satisfaction. It has no goal. It looks only backward, whereas a goal lies in the future. Anything without a goal is pointless. Revenge that disregards the future therefore springs from empty pride and is unreasonable. Hurting someone without reason brings about war and violates the fundamental law of nature. Natural law thus commands us to look forward rather than backward when taking revenge. Breaking this law is commonly called cruelty.
The seventh law of nature, against insults.
12 Signs of hatred and contempt are particularly likely to provoke quarrels and fighting. Most people would rather lose their lives, let alone their peace, than bear an insult. It follows, as the seventh law of nature, that no one may express hatred or contempt for someone else through deeds, words, facial expressions, or laughter. Breaking this law is called an insult. The powerful often mock the weak, and judges in particular mock people found guilty. These taunts have nothing to do with the defendants' offenses or the judges' duties. Yet the people who do this act against natural law and should be considered insulting.
The eighth law, against pride.
13 Which of two people is worthier is a question that belongs to the civil state, not the natural state. As shown above (Chap. I. Art. 3), all people are equal by nature. Today's inequalities, whether due to wealth, power, or noble birth, come from civil law. I know that Aristotle says, in the first book of his Politics, that the whole science of politics rests on a principle: some people are naturally fit to command and others only to serve. He treats the difference between master and servant as arising not from people's agreement but from aptitude—that is, from a kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. This principle goes against both reason, as just shown, and experience. Almost no one is so lacking in understanding that he would not prefer to govern himself rather than submit to another's rule. And when wiser and stronger people fight others, they do not always, or even often, prevail. If people are naturally equal, then, their equality must be recognized. If they are naturally unequal, they are still likely to fight for power, and peace requires that they be treated as equals. Thus the eighth precept of natural law says that everyone must be regarded as naturally equal to everyone else. Its opposite is pride.
The ninth law, concerning humility.
14 Just as each person must give up some of his rights to preserve himself, he must also keep others. These include the right to protect his body and to use air, water, and everything else necessary for life without restriction. People who enter a peaceful condition keep many rights in common and acquire many rights of their own. This gives rise to the ninth command of natural law: whatever rights someone claims for himself, he must recognize as belonging to everyone else as well. Otherwise he defeats the equality acknowledged in the previous article. What does it mean to recognize people's equality when forming a society, if not to grant equal right and power to people who would otherwise have no reason to join it? Giving equal things to equals is the same as giving things in proportion to those entitled to them. Following this law is called meekness. Breaking it is called πλεονεξὶα; the Latins call those who break it immodici et immodesti.
The tenth law of equity, or against favoritism.
15 Tenth, natural law commands anyone who distributes rights to other people to treat both sides equally. The previous law forbids us to assume that we have more right by nature than we grant others. We may claim less if we like, since doing so sometimes shows modesty. But when we distribute rights to others, this law forbids us to favor either one. Someone who favors one person over another fails to observe this natural equality and insults the person he values less. As explained above, an insult violates the laws of nature. Following this precept is called equity; breaking it is called favoritism. The Greeks express it in one word, προσωποληψία.
The eleventh law, concerning things held in common.
16 The eleventh law follows from the previous one. Things that cannot be divided must be shared if sharing is possible. If there is enough of the thing, everyone may use as much as he wants. If there is not enough, use must be limited in proportion to the number of users. Otherwise we cannot preserve the equality that the previous article showed to be required by natural law.
The twelfth law, concerning things distributed by lot.
17 Natural law also provides, as its twelfth precept, for something that can neither be divided nor shared. People must use it in turns, or a lot must award its use to one person alone. If they take turns, a lot must also decide who uses it first. Equality must be respected here too, and no other way of achieving it is available except a lot.
The thirteenth law, concerning birthright and first possession.
18 There are two kinds of lot, agreed and natural.
An agreed lot is drawn by the consent of the competing parties and depends on mere chance, or fortune, as people call it. A natural lot is the right of the firstborn, in Greek κληρονομια, as though assigned by lot, or the right of the first possessor. Things that can neither be divided nor shared must therefore be granted to whoever possessed them first. Likewise, things that belonged to a father are owed to his son, unless the father himself previously transferred that right to someone else. Let this stand as the thirteenth law of nature.
The fourteenth law, concerning the safety of peace mediators.
19 The fourteenth precept of natural law says that mediators for peace must be guaranteed safety. Reason, when it commands an end, also commands the means necessary to achieve it. Reason's first command is peace. All the other commands are means to achieve it, and without them there can be no peace. But peace cannot be achieved without mediation, and mediation cannot happen without safety. Reason therefore commands us, as a law of nature, to provide every protection for peace mediators.
The fifteenth law, concerning the appointment of an arbitrator.
20 Even if people agreed to establish all these laws of nature and any others, and tried to follow them, doubts and disputes would still arise every day about how the laws apply to their actions. They would dispute whether an act violated a law. We call this a question of right. The opposing parties would fight because each thought the other had wronged him. To preserve peace, since there is no other suitable remedy, the parties must submit the dispute to a third person. By mutual agreements they must bind themselves to accept his judgment in settling it. This person is called an arbitrator. The fifteenth precept of natural law therefore says that both sides in a dispute about right must submit to the opinion and judgment of a third person.
The sixteenth law: no one may judge his own case.
21 The opposing parties choose an arbitrator or judge to decide their dispute. It follows that the arbitrator cannot be one of the parties. We assume that everyone naturally seeks what is good for himself, and seeks what is just only for the sake of peace, as a secondary concern. One of the parties therefore cannot maintain the equality commanded by natural law as carefully as a third person would. Thus the sixteenth law of nature says that no one may be a judge or arbitrator in his own case.
The seventeenth law: arbitrators must have no hope of a reward from the people whose case they judge.
22 The same principle yields the seventeenth law: no one may serve as judge if he hopes to gain profit or glory from either side's victory. The same reason applies here as in the previous law.
The eighteenth law, concerning witnesses.
23 Sometimes the dispute concerns the facts themselves: whether the act alleged actually happened. Natural law then directs the arbitrator to trust both parties equally. Since their accounts contradict each other, this means believing neither. He must therefore credit a third person, or a third and fourth, or more, so that he can decide the facts whenever other evidence is insufficient. The eighteenth law of nature commands judges and arbitrators deciding facts to base their decisions on witnesses who seem impartial toward both sides when there is no firm, certain evidence of the facts.