Dominion, Chapter XIV, 2

8 From this we can also understand that every civil law carries a penalty, either explicitly or implicitly. Where no penalty is specified, whether in writing or by the example of someone punished for breaking that law, the penalty is understood to be discretionary: it depends on the will of the legislator, that is, the supreme ruler. A law that can be broken without punishment is useless.

The precepts of the Decalogue concerning honoring parents, murder, adultery, theft, and false witness are civil laws.

9 Civil laws both assign each person a distinct right of his own and forbid him to invade the rights of others. It follows that these precepts are civil laws: “Do not refuse your parents the honor prescribed by law”; “Do not kill anyone whom the law forbids you to kill”; “Avoid every sexual union forbidden by law”; “Do not take another person's goods against their owner's will”; and “Do not defeat the laws and judgments by false testimony.” The laws of nature command the same things, but implicitly. For the law of nature, as stated in chap. III. art. 2, commands us to keep contracts, and therefore to obey when we have covenanted to obey, and to keep our hands off another's goods when civil law has determined what belongs to another. All subjects, however, by chap. VI. art. 13, covenant in the very founding of government to obey the commands of the holder of supreme power—that is, the civil laws—even before it is possible to break those laws. For the law of nature was binding in the state of nature: first, nature gave everything to everyone, so nothing properly belonged to another and it was impossible to invade another's right; next, all things were common, so all sexual unions were lawful; third, it was a state of war, so killing was lawful; fourth, each person judged everything for himself, including the respects due to parents; and lastly, there were no public judgments and therefore no occasion for testimony, true or false.

Nothing contrary to the laws of nature can be commanded by civil law.

10 Our obligation to observe those laws, then, is older than their publication, since it is contained in the very founding of the city. By force of the natural law forbidding breach of covenant, the law of nature commands us to keep all civil laws. For when we are bound to obey before we know what will be commanded, we are bound to obey in all things. It follows that no civil law whatsoever, provided it does not tend to dishonor the Deity—in relation to whom cities themselves have no right of their own and cannot be said to make laws—can possibly conflict with the law of nature. For though the law of nature forbids theft, adultery, and the like, if civil law commands an encroachment, that encroachment is not theft, adultery, or the like. When the ancient Lacedaemonians allowed young men by law to take other people's goods, they commanded that the goods be reckoned not as other people's but as the property of those who took them; those acts of stealth were therefore not theft. Likewise, sexual unions between heathen men and women sanctioned by their laws were lawful marriages.

A law requires that both it and the legislator be known.

11 For a law to exist as law, subjects must know two things: first, which person or assembly holds supreme power, that is, the right to make laws; and second, what the law itself says. Someone who knows neither to whom nor to what he is bound cannot obey and is consequently in the same position as if he were not bound at all. I do not say that both things must remain perpetually known for a law to exist, only that they must have been known once. If a subject afterward forgets either the right of the person who made the law or the law itself, he is no less bound to obey, since he could have remembered had he wished to obey.

How the legislator becomes known.

12 Knowledge of the legislator depends on the subject himself. The right to make laws could not be conferred on anyone without the subject's own consent and covenant, whether expressed or presumed. It is expressed when citizens themselves establish a form of government at the outset, or promise to submit to someone's dominion. At the least it is presumed when they enjoy the benefits of the realm and its laws for their protection and preservation against others. For when we require our fellow subjects, for our own benefit, to obey someone's authority, we acknowledge that authority as legitimate by that very request. Ignorance of the power to make laws can therefore never be an adequate excuse: everyone knows what he himself has done.

Publication and interpretation are necessary for knowledge of a law.

13 Knowledge of the laws depends on the legislator, who must publish them; otherwise they are not laws. Law is the command of the lawmaker, and his command is the declaration of his will. There is therefore no law unless the lawmaker's will is declared, and publication makes that declaration. Two things must be evident in publication: first, that those publishing a law either have the right to make laws themselves or act on authority delegated by those who have it; second, what the law means. Strictly and philosophically speaking, that a published law proceeds from the supreme ruler can be evident only to those who have received it from the ruler's own mouth. Everyone else believes it; but the grounds for their belief are so numerous that disbelief is scarcely possible. Indeed, in a democratic city, where anyone may attend the making of laws if he wishes, an absentee must believe those who were present. But in monarchies and aristocracies, where only a few are admitted to hear the commands of the monarch or nobles openly, those few had to be granted authority to publish the commands to everyone else. Thus we believe that the edicts and decrees presented to us as a prince's through the writings or voices of those whose office is to publish them really are his. Consider, moreover, the grounds for this belief: we have seen the prince or supreme council consistently employ those counselors, secretaries, publishers, seals, and similar means to declare its will; it has never withdrawn their authority; and those who refused to credit such publications and broke the law have been punished. Given these grounds, not only is someone who believes and obeys the edicts and decrees they publish everywhere excused, but someone who disbelieves and refuses obedience is punished. For their consistent authorization is sufficient visible evidence and a clear declaration of the ruler's will, provided the law, edict, or decree contains nothing diminishing his supreme power. One cannot imagine him allowing any officer to take away any of his power while he still intends to govern. Where the meaning of a law is in doubt, it must be obtained from those whom the supreme authority has charged with hearing cases or pronouncing judgments. To judge is simply to apply laws to particular cases by interpreting them. We can recognize those entrusted with that office in the same way that we recognize those authorized to publish laws.

Civil law divided into written and unwritten.

14 Civil law, again, has two kinds corresponding to its two modes of publication: written and unwritten. By written law I mean one that needs a voice or some other sign of the legislator's will in order to become law. For every kind of law is as old as humanity, in both origin and duration, and therefore older than the invention of letters and the art of writing. Consequently a written text is not necessary to a written law, but a voice is: the voice is necessary to its existence, while the writing serves its preservation in memory. We read that before letters were devised to help memory, laws were put into verse and sung. Unwritten law needs no publication beyond the voice of nature or natural reason; such are the laws of nature. Although natural law is distinguished from civil law in that it commands the will, insofar as it concerns our actions it is civil. Thus “Do not covet,” which concerns the mind alone, is solely a natural law; but “Do not invade” is both natural and civil. For since it is impossible to lay down universal rules settling every future dispute, of which there may be infinitely many, we must understand that in every case omitted from written laws we are to follow the law of natural equity. This law commands us to treat equals equally, and does so through the force of civil law, which also punishes those who knowingly and willingly violate the laws of nature in their actions.

The laws of nature are not written laws; neither lawyers' judgments nor customs are laws of themselves, but only by consent of the supreme power.

15 From this it appears, first, that the laws of nature are not to be called written laws merely because some philosophers have described them in books. The writings of those who interpret laws likewise lacked the supreme authority and were not laws; nor were the pronouncements of wise men, that is, judges, laws except insofar as the consent of the supreme power allowed them to pass into custom. Then they must be accepted among written laws, not for the sake of custom—which has no power to establish a law in itself—but because of the supreme ruler's will, evident from his having allowed the judge's ruling, fair or unfair, to become customary.

What the word sin means in its broadest sense.

16 In its broadest sense, sin includes every deed, word, and thought contrary to right reason. For everyone reasons in search of means to an end he has set himself. If he reasons rightly—that is, starts from the most evident principles and draws a continuous chain of necessary consequences—he will take the most direct path. Otherwise he goes astray: he does, says, or attempts something contrary to his own end. When he does so, we say that in reasoning he has erred, but in action and will he has sinned. For sin follows error just as the will follows the understanding. This is the most general sense of the word, encompassing every imprudent action, whether unlawful, like demolishing another person's house, or lawful, like building one's own house on sand.

The definition of sin.

8 This also shows that every civil law has a penalty attached, whether stated outright or understood. If neither a written provision nor an example of someone punished for breaking the law specifies the penalty, the penalty is left to the discretion of the lawgiver—that is, the supreme ruler. A law that can be broken without punishment serves no purpose.

The Ten Commandments about honoring parents, murder, adultery, theft, and false witness are civil laws.

9 Civil laws give each person distinct property rights and forbid invading the rights of others. It follows that these commands are civil laws: Give your parents the honor the laws prescribe. Do not kill anyone the laws forbid you to kill. Avoid sexual relations the laws forbid. Do not take another person’s property against its owner’s will. Do not undermine laws and judgments with false testimony. The laws of nature command the same things, but indirectly. The law of nature, as stated in chap. III. art. 2, commands us to keep contracts. So it also commands us to obey when we have covenanted to obey, and to leave another person’s property alone once civil law has established what belongs to that person. Every subject, under chap. VI. art. 13, covenants to obey the commands of the holder of supreme power—that is, civil laws—when government is established, before anyone can even break those laws. The law of nature already bound people in the state of nature. But there, first, nature had given everything to everyone. Nothing belonged exclusively to another person, so one could not invade another’s rights. Second, everything was common, so every sexual union was lawful. Third, people were at war, so killing was lawful. Fourth, each person settled everything by personal judgment, including what respect was due to parents. Finally, there were no public judgments, so there was no occasion to testify, truthfully or falsely.

Civil law cannot command anything contrary to the laws of nature.

10 Our obligation to obey civil laws is older than the publication of the laws themselves, because it is part of the city’s foundation. The natural law against breaking covenants therefore commands us to keep all civil laws. If we are bound to obey before we know what will be commanded, we are bound to obey in all matters. Consequently, no civil law can conflict with the law of nature unless it dishonors God. Cities have no independent right against God and cannot make laws governing him. The law of nature forbids theft, adultery, and similar acts. But if civil law commands us to take something or enter a sexual union, doing so is not theft or adultery. When the ancient Lacedæmonians made a law allowing young men to take other people’s property, they declared that the property should count not as someone else’s but as the taker’s. Those takings were therefore not theft. Likewise, sexual unions between men and women among nonbelievers were lawful marriages under their laws.

For a law to exist, both it and its lawgiver must be known.

11 A law requires subjects to know two things: who has supreme power, and thus the right to make laws, and what the law itself says. A person who knows neither to whom they are bound nor what they are bound to do cannot obey. In effect, they are not bound at all. This does not mean that both must remain known at every moment, only that they must have been known once. If a subject later forgets either the lawgiver’s authority or the law itself, the obligation remains. The subject could have remembered them if willing to obey.

How the lawgiver becomes known.

12 Knowing who makes the laws depends on the subject. The right to make laws cannot have been given to anyone without the subject’s own consent and covenant, whether explicit or implied. Consent is explicit when citizens initially establish a form of city government themselves or promise to submit to someone’s rule. It is implied, at least, when they use the protection that the realm and its laws give them against others. When we ask our fellow subjects to obey someone’s rule for our benefit, that very request acknowledges the rule as legitimate. Ignorance of who has the power to legislate can therefore never be an adequate excuse: everyone knows what they themselves have done.

Publication and interpretation are necessary for a law to be known.

13 Knowing the laws depends on the lawgiver, who must publish them. Otherwise they are not laws. A law is the lawgiver’s command, and a command declares the lawgiver’s will. It therefore cannot be law unless that will is declared through publication. Two things must be clear when a law is published. First, whoever publishes it must have the right to make laws or authority granted by someone who has that right. Second, its meaning must be clear. Strictly speaking, only those who hear a published law from the supreme ruler’s own mouth can know that it comes from that ruler. Everyone else believes it. But there are so many reasons to believe that they can hardly avoid doing so. In a democratic city anyone who wishes can attend the making of laws. Anyone absent must trust those who attended. In monarchies and aristocracies, only a few are allowed to attend and hear the commands of the monarch or nobles directly. Those few must therefore be authorized to publish the commands to everyone else. Thus we accept as princely edicts and decrees the ones presented to us as such by the writings or words of officials appointed to publish them. We may have seen the prince or supreme council regularly use particular counselors, secretaries, publishers, seals, and other means to announce its will. We may have seen that it never withdrew their authority and that those who refused to trust such publications and broke the law were punished. Given these grounds for belief, a person who obeys the edicts and decrees published by those officials is everywhere excused; one who refuses to believe and obey is punished. The ruler’s consistent permission is a clear enough sign of the ruler’s will, provided the law, edict, or decree contains nothing that diminishes the ruler’s supreme power. We cannot imagine a ruler who still wishes to govern allowing an official to take away that power. When a law’s meaning is in doubt, we must take its meaning from those to whom the supreme authority has entrusted cases or judgments. Judging is simply interpreting laws and applying them to particular cases. We can learn who holds this office in the same way we learn who is authorized to publish laws.

Civil law divided into written and unwritten law.

14 Civil law can also be divided into written and unwritten law according to two ways of publishing it. By written law I mean law that needs a voice or some other sign of the lawgiver’s will to become law. Laws of every kind are as old as humanity, both by nature and in time, so they predate letters and the art of writing. A voice, then, rather than writing, is necessary even for a written law: a voice establishes it; writing preserves its memory. We read that before letters were invented as an aid to memory, people set laws to verse and sang them. Unwritten law needs no publication beyond the voice of nature, or natural reason. The laws of nature are of this kind. Natural law differs from civil law insofar as it governs the will. But insofar as it concerns our actions, it is civil law too. For example, “Do not desire what is another’s” concerns only the mind and is solely natural law. “Do not invade what is another’s” is both natural and civil law. No universal set of rules can settle every future dispute, whose number may be unlimited. So when written laws say nothing about a case, we must follow natural equity, which commands equal treatment for equals. We must do this under the civil law, which also punishes those who knowingly and deliberately violate natural laws in their actions.

Natural laws are not written laws; lawyers’ opinions and customs become laws only with the supreme power’s consent.

15 It follows, first, that writing the laws of nature in philosophers’ books does not make them written laws. The writings of legal interpreters are not laws without supreme authority. Nor are the statements of wise people—that is, judges—laws, except insofar as the supreme power consents to their becoming customary. Once they do, they count among written laws, not because custom creates law by its own force, but because the supreme ruler wills it. That will is shown by allowing the judge’s decision, whether fair or unfair, to become customary.

What sin means in its broadest sense.

16 In its broadest sense, sin includes every deed, word, and thought contrary to sound reasoning. Everyone reasons about how to reach a chosen end. If a person reasons correctly, starting from the clearest principles and moving through consistently necessary conclusions, the path to that end will be direct. Otherwise the person will go astray, doing, saying, or attempting something contrary to their own end. In reasoning, this is called an error; in action and intention, a sin. Sin follows error just as the will follows understanding. This is the broadest sense of the word. It includes every imprudent act, whether it breaks the law, as when someone demolishes another person’s house, or does not, as when someone builds their own house on sand.

The definition of sin.