Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter XIV, 3
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17 But when we speak of the laws, the word sin is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason, but that only which is blameable; and therefore it is called malum culpæ, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be culpable, it is not presently to be termed a sin or fault; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately after looks on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies, because they increase their honours, goods, and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife of honours which is among them; both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should say that all men account those things evil, to which theythey have given names which are usually taken in an evil sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another, because of the equality of human nature; and there are no other reasons in being, but only those of particular men, and that of the city: it follows, that the city is to determine what with reason is culpable. So as a fault, that is to say, a sin, is that which a man does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of the city, that is, contrary to the laws.
The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice.
18 But a man may do somewhat against the laws through human infirmity, although he desire to fulfil them; and yet his action, as being against the laws, is rightly blamed, and called a sin. But there are some who neglect the laws; and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only the deeds, but even the minds of these men are against the laws. They who sin only through infirmity, are good men even when they sin; but these, even when they do not sin, are wicked. For though both the action and the mind be repugnant to the laws, yet those repugnances are distinguished by different appellations. For the irregularity of the action is called ἀδίκημαἀδίκημα, unjust deed; that of the mind ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, injustice and malice; that is the infirmity of a disturbed soul, this the pravity of a sober mind.
Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.
19 But seeing there is no sin which is not against some law, and that there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he will say: that he never submitted his will to God’s will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being: and granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech seems so far forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence;17 but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is punished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted under God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps not the laws; but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring against God. For whosoever are not subject either to some common lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.
What the sin of treason is.
20 Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience (such as is defined above, chap. VI. art. 13) to the city, that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which trespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin always, is worse than to sin once. And this is that sin which is called treason; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or subject declares, that he will no longer obey that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted. And the subject declares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth or endeavours to do violence to the sovereign’s person, or to them who execute his commands. Of which sort are traitors, regicides, and such as take up arms against the city, or during a war fly to the enemy’s side. And they show the same will in word, who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tied to any such kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that we must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God entire) simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should say, that he had no right to wage war at his own will, to make peace, enlist soldiers, levy monies, elect magistrates and public ministers, enact laws, decide controversies, set penalties, or do aught else without which the state cannot stand. And these and the like words and deeds are treason by the natural, not the civil law. But it may so happen, that some action, which before the civil law was made, was not treason, yet will become such if it be done afterwards. As if it be declared by the law, that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience, that is to say, for treason, if any man shall coin monies, or forge the privy-seal; he that after that declaration shall do this, will be no less guilty of treason than the other. Yet he sins less, because he breaks not all the laws at once, but one law only. For the law by calling that treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons; but it makes not the sin itself more grievous.
Treason breaks not the civil, but the natural law.
21 But that sin, which by the law of nature is treason, is a transgression of the natural, not the civil law. For since our obligation to civil obedience, by virtue whereof the civil laws are valid, is before all civil law, and the sin of treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it follows, that by the sin of treason that law is broken which preceded the civil law, to wit, the natural, which forbids us to violate covenants and betrothed faith. But if some sovereign prince should set forth a law on this manner, thou shalt not rebel, he would effect just nothing. For except subjects were before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to rebel, all law is of no force. Now the obligation which obligeth to what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.
And therefore is punished not by the right of sovereignty, but by the right of war.
22 Hence it follows, that rebels, traitors, and all others convicted of treason, are punished not by civil, but natural right; that is to say, not as civil subjects, but as enemies to the government; not by the right of sovereignty and dominion, but by the right of war.
Obedience not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
23 There are some who think that those acts which are done against the law, when the punishment is determined by the law itself, are expiated, if the punished willingly undergo the punishment; and that they are not guilty before God of breaking the natural law, (although by breaking the civil laws, we break the natural too, which command us to keep the civil), who have suffered the punishment which the law required; as if by the law the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price, whereby a license might be bought of doing what the law forbids. By the same reason they might infer too, that no transgression of the law were a sin; but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own peril. But we must know, that the words of the law may be understood in a two-fold sense. The one as containing two parts, (as hath been declared above in art. 7), namely, that of absolutely prohibiting, as, thou shalt not do this; and revenging, as, he that doth this, shall be punished. The other, as containing a condition, for example, thou shalt not do this thing, unless thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus the law forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth it sins, because he doth what the law forbids to be done; if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to do what is forbidden him, that performs the condition. For in the first sense, all men are forbidden to do it; in the second, they only who keep themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative part of the law obligeth not the guilty, but the magistrate to require punishment; in the second, he himself that owes the punishment, is obliged to exact it; to the payment whereof, if it be capital or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what sense the law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath the sovereignty. When therefore there is any doubt of the meaning of the law, since we are sure they sin not who do it not, it will be sin if we do it, howsoever the law may afterward be explained. For to do that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he hath freedom to forbear it, is a contempt of the laws; and therefore by chap. III. art. 28, a sin against the law of nature. Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into active and passive; as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by human decrees, which is a sin against the law of nature, which is the law of God; or as though they sinned not, who sin at their own peril.
CHAPTER XIV. OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES.
16 Contracts oblige us.] To be obliged, and to be tied being obliged, seems to some men to be one and the same thing; and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the law.
17 Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence.] Many find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a God by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates; and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said, that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this; except they think, that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and honour; also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it; lastly, fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
17 But when we speak of laws, sin has a narrower meaning: not everything contrary to right reason, but only what deserves blame. Hence it is called malum culpæ, the evil of fault. Yet not everything that someone blames should immediately be called a sin or fault, but only what can reasonably be blamed. We must therefore ask what it means to be reasonably blameworthy, and what it means to be blamed against reason. Human nature is such that everyone calls what he desires good and what he avoids evil. Because our passions differ, one person consequently counts as good what another counts as evil; what a person esteems good one moment he regards as evil the next; and what he calls good in himself he calls evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we feel now or expect later. The successful actions of enemies are distressing to all because they increase the enemy's honor, goods, and power; the success of equals is distressing because of rivalry over honors. Such actions both seem evil and are unpleasant, and people habitually call those from whom they suffer harm evil—that is, they lay some fault at their door. Since individuals are not pleased or displeased by the same things, their agreement cannot determine which actions deserve blame and which do not. They may agree on certain generalities, such as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins, as though saying that everyone regards as evil the things to which they have given names ordinarily taken in a bad sense. But we ask not whether theft is a sin, but what should be called theft; likewise in other cases. In this great diversity of judges, what reason condemns cannot be measured by one person's reason rather than another's, since human beings are equal in nature. And since the only reasons that exist are the reasons of particular persons and the reason of the city, it follows that the city must determine what is reasonably blameworthy. A fault, then—that is, a sin—is whatever someone does, fails to do, says, or wills contrary to the reason of the city, that is, contrary to the laws.
The difference between a sin of weakness and one of malice.
18 A person may act against the laws out of human weakness, even while wishing to obey them; the act nonetheless deserves blame and is rightly called a sin because it violates the laws. But others disregard the laws: whenever the prospect of gain and escape from punishment appears, no conscience of their contracts or pledged faith can hold them back from breaking them. Not only these people's deeds but their minds are opposed to the laws. Those who sin only through weakness are good people even when they sin; the others are wicked even when they do not sin. Though both deed and mind can be opposed to the laws, these forms of opposition have different names. The disorder of the deed is called ἀδίκημα, an unjust act; that of the mind is called ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, injustice and malice. The former is the weakness of a troubled soul; the latter, the perversity of a mind in full possession of itself.
What kind of sin includes atheism.
19 But no sin exists except against some law; no law exists except as the command of a holder of supreme power; and no person holds supreme power unless it has been conferred by our own consent. How, then, can someone be said to sin if he denies that God exists, denies that he governs the world, or otherwise reproaches him? Such a person will say that he never submitted his will to God's, since he did not even believe that God existed. He will add that even if his belief was mistaken and therefore sinful, it must be counted among sins of imprudence or ignorance, which cannot rightfully be punished. This argument must be accepted insofar as this kind of sin, though the greatest and most harmful, belongs among sins of imprudence;17 but it is absurd to claim that imprudence or ignorance excuses it. For the atheist is punished either directly by God or by kings established under God, not as a subject is punished by a king for failing to keep his laws, but as one enemy by another for refusing to accept the laws: by the right of war, as in the case of the giants who warred against God. For those who are subject neither to a common lord nor to each other are enemies to one another.
What the sin of treason is.
20 The covenant by which each subject is bound to every other to render absolute and universal obedience to the city—that is, to the sovereign power, whether lodged in one person or an assembly, as defined above in chap. VI. art. 13—creates the obligation to observe each civil law. That covenant therefore contains all the laws at once. Plainly, a subject who renounces the general covenant of obedience renounces all the laws at once. Such an offense is worse than any single sin in the same measure that sinning always is worse than sinning once. This is the sin called treason: a word or deed by which a citizen or subject declares that he will no longer obey the person or assembly entrusted with the city's supreme power. A subject declares this intention by deed when he commits or attempts violence against the sovereign's person or against those who execute his commands. Traitors, regicides, those who take up arms against the city, and those who desert to the enemy in wartime are of this kind. The same intention is expressed in words by those who flatly deny that they or other subjects are bound to such obedience, whether entirely—as when someone says that we must not obey the sovereign simply, absolutely, and universally, while preserving intact the obedience owed to God—or in part, as when someone says that the sovereign has no right at his own discretion to wage war, make peace, enlist soldiers, raise money, appoint magistrates and public officers, enact laws, decide disputes, fix penalties, or do anything else without which the state cannot survive. These and similar words and deeds are treason under natural law, not civil law. It can happen, however, that an act which was not treason before a civil law was enacted becomes treason afterward. If a law declares that minting money or forging the privy seal shall be regarded as a sign of renouncing public obedience—that is, as treason—anyone who does so after that declaration will be no less guilty of treason than the other kind of traitor. Yet his sin is less grave, for he breaks only one law rather than all the laws at once. By naming as treason something that is not treason by nature, a law can rightly attach a more hateful name, and perhaps a more severe punishment, to the offender; it does not, however, make the sin itself more grave.
Treason breaks natural law, not civil law.
21 The sin that is treason by the law of nature violates natural law, not civil law. Our obligation to obey civil authority, by virtue of which civil laws have force, precedes every civil law; and the sin of treason is, by its nature, nothing but a breach of that obligation. It follows that treason breaks the law that preceded civil law: natural law, which forbids us to break covenants and pledged faith. A sovereign prince who issued a law saying “Do not rebel” would accomplish nothing. Unless subjects were already bound to obey, that is, not to rebel, no law would have any force. An obligation to do what we were already bound to do is redundant.
It is therefore punished not by the right of sovereignty, but by the right of war.
22 Hence rebels, traitors, and all others convicted of treason are punished by natural, not civil, right: not as civil subjects but as enemies of the government; not by the right of sovereignty and dominion but by the right of war.
Obedience is not rightly divided into active and passive.
23 Some think that when a law prescribes a punishment for acts that violate it, the acts are expiated if the offender willingly undergoes the punishment. They think that those who have suffered the punishment the law requires are not guilty before God of breaking natural law, even though breaking civil law also breaks the natural law that commands us to keep it. This treats the law as though it did not forbid the act, but instead set a price in the form of a penalty by which permission to do the forbidden thing could be bought. By the same reasoning they might conclude that no violation of law is a sin, and that everyone may enjoy whatever liberty he has bought at his own risk. But we must understand that the words of a law can be taken in two ways. In the first they contain two parts, as explained above in art. 7: an absolute prohibition, such as “Do not do this,” and a provision for punishment, such as “Whoever does this shall be punished.” In the second they contain a condition, such as “Do not do this unless you are willing to suffer punishment”; here the law prohibits the act not absolutely but conditionally. Under the first interpretation, the person who acts sins because he does what the law forbids; under the second, he does not sin, because one who satisfies the condition cannot be said to do what is forbidden him. Under the first, everyone is forbidden to do it; under the second, only those who refrain from undergoing the punishment are forbidden. Under the first, the punitive part of the law obligates not the offender but the magistrate to exact punishment; under the second, the person who owes the punishment is himself obliged to exact it, though he cannot be obliged to pay it if it is death or some other severe penalty. Which interpretation a law bears depends on the will of the sovereign. When its meaning is in doubt, therefore, since we know that refraining from the act is no sin, committing it will be a sin however the law is later explained. To do what one doubts may be a sin when one is free to refrain shows contempt for the laws and is therefore, by chap. III. art. 28, a sin against the law of nature. The division of obedience into active and passive is thus empty: it is as though penalties established by human decrees could expiate a sin against the law of nature, which is the law of God, or as though those who sin at their own risk do not sin at all.
CHAPTER XIV. ON LAWS AND OFFENSES.
16 Contracts obligate us.] To some, being obligated and being bound when already obligated seem identical; accordingly they may see here a difference in words but none in substance. Let me therefore put it more plainly: a person is obligated by his contracts, meaning that he ought to perform for the sake of his promise; but the law binds him when already obligated, meaning that fear of the penalty established by law compels him to fulfill his promise.
17 Yet it belongs among sins of imprudence.] Many object to my classifying atheism as imprudence rather than injustice; some even take this as a sign that I have not declared myself a sufficiently bitter enemy of atheists. They object further that, since I have elsewhere said that natural reason can discover that God exists, I should have acknowledged that atheists at least sin against the law of nature and are therefore guilty not merely of imprudence but also of injustice. Yet I am such an enemy to atheists that I have diligently sought, and ardently wished to find, a law by which I might condemn them of injustice. Finding none, I next asked what name God himself gave to those whom he detests so deeply. God says of the atheist, “The fool has said in his heart, There is no God.” I therefore placed their sin in the very class to which God assigns it. Next I show that they are God's enemies; and I consider the name “enemy” at times rather sharper than “unjust person.” Finally, I affirm that under this description both God and supreme magistrates may justly punish them. I therefore neither excuse nor diminish this sin in any way. As for my saying that natural reason can discover that God exists, this should not be understood to mean that everyone can discover it—unless one supposes that because Archimedes used natural reason to discover the proportion of the circle to the square, every ordinary person could have discovered it too. I say, then, that although some people can know by the light of reason that God exists, those constantly occupied with pleasures or the pursuit of riches and honor, those unaccustomed or unable or unwilling to reason rightly, and finally fools—among whom atheists are numbered—cannot know it.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
17 When discussing laws, however, we use “sin” more narrowly. It does not mean everything contrary to sound reasoning, but only what deserves blame. Hence it is called malum culpæ, the evil of fault. Yet we cannot immediately call something a sin or fault simply because someone blames it. It must deserve blame on reasonable grounds. We must ask, then, what reasonably deserves blame and what does not. Human nature leads each person to call what they desire good and what they avoid evil. Because people’s feelings differ, one person calls good what another calls evil. A single person may call something good one moment and evil the next, or call their own action good and another person’s identical action evil. We all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we feel now or expect later. Enemies’ successes increase their honor, property, and power, while equals’ successes provoke rivalry over honor. Both seem unpleasant to everyone, and are unpleasant; people therefore call them evil. People also tend to blame those from whom they suffer harm. So individuals with different likes and dislikes cannot reach agreement about which actions deserve blame. They may agree on general statements, such as that theft and adultery are sins. But that is like saying everyone calls things evil once they have given them names with a negative meaning. The question is not whether theft is a sin, but what should be called theft. The same applies to other offenses. People differ so greatly in their judgments that one individual’s reason cannot be preferred over another’s when deciding what reasonably deserves blame; human beings are equal by nature. The only available reasoning belongs either to individuals or to the city. Therefore the city must determine what reasonably deserves blame. A fault, or sin, is consequently something a person does, fails to do, says, or wills against the city’s reason—that is, against its laws.
The difference between a sin of weakness and one of malice.
18 A person may break a law through human weakness despite wanting to obey it. The act still deserves blame as a violation of the law, and is properly called a sin. Others disregard the laws whenever they see a chance of gain without punishment. Neither conscience about their contracts nor their pledged word prevents them from breaking them. Their actions and even their intentions oppose the laws. People who sin only through weakness are good people even when they sin. These others are wicked even when they commit no sin. Opposition to the laws in action and opposition in intention have different names. A wrongful action is called ἀδίκημα, an unjust deed; a wrongful intention is called ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, injustice and malice. The former is the weakness of a troubled mind; the latter is the corruption of a calm mind.
What kind of sin atheism is.
19 Every sin is against a law, and every law is the command of a holder of supreme power. No person holds supreme power over us unless we consent to it. How, then, can someone be said to sin by denying God’s existence or rule over the world, or by insulting him in some other way? Such a person will say, “I never submitted my will to God’s, since I did not even believe that he exists.” Even if the belief is mistaken and therefore a sin, the person may say, it belongs among mistakes of imprudence or ignorance, which cannot rightfully be punished. We can concede that much of the argument: though this sin is the greatest and most harmful, it must be classed as a sin of imprudence. But it is absurd to claim that imprudence or ignorance excuses it. An atheist is punished either directly by God or by kings established under God. The punishment is not like a king punishing a subject for disobeying a law. It is like one enemy punishing another for refusing to accept the laws: it comes under the right of war, as in the case of the giants who fought against God. People who are subject neither to a shared master nor to one another are enemies to one another.
What the sin of treason is.
20 Every subject covenants with every other subject to obey the city, meaning the sovereign power, absolutely and universally, whether that power belongs to one person or a council. This covenant, described above in chap. VI. art. 13, creates an obligation to obey each civil law. It therefore contains all the laws at once. A subject who renounces the general covenant to obey renounces every law at once. This offense is worse than any individual sin by as much as sinning always is worse than sinning once. It is called treason. Treason is a word or deed by which a citizen or subject announces that they will no longer obey the person or council entrusted with the city’s supreme power. A subject announces this through action by using or attempting violence against the sovereign or those carrying out the sovereign’s commands. Traitors, killers of kings, those who take up arms against the city, and those who defect to the enemy during a war are examples. People announce the same intent in words when they openly deny that they or other subjects owe such obedience. They might deny it altogether, saying that, even while fully preserving the obedience owed to God, we must not obey the sovereign simply, absolutely, and universally. Or they might deny part of it, saying that the sovereign has no right to wage war at will, make peace, enlist soldiers, levy money, select magistrates and public officials, pass laws, settle disputes, set penalties, or do anything else without which the state cannot survive. Words and deeds of this kind are treason under natural law, not civil law. Civil law can, however, make an action treason that was not treason before the law was made. Suppose a law declares that minting money or forging the private seal counts as a sign of rejecting public obedience, and therefore as treason. Anyone who then does so is just as guilty of treason as the others. Yet that person’s sin is less serious, since it breaks only one law rather than all laws at once. By naming a naturally different offense treason, the law may rightfully give offenders a more hateful label and perhaps a heavier punishment. It does not make their sin itself more serious.
Treason breaks natural law, not civil law.
21 Treason under the law of nature breaks natural law, not civil law. Our obligation to obey civil authority gives civil laws their force and exists before any civil law. Treason is, by its nature, a breach of that obligation. It therefore breaks the earlier law of nature, which forbids breaking covenants and pledged faith. Suppose a sovereign prince issued a law saying, “Do not rebel.” It would accomplish nothing. If subjects were not already obliged to obey, and therefore not to rebel, no law would have force. An additional obligation to do what we are already obliged to do serves no purpose.
It is therefore punished under the right of war, not the right of sovereignty.
22 It follows that rebels, traitors, and everyone else convicted of treason are punished under natural right, not civil right. They are treated not as civil subjects but as enemies of the government, and punished not under the right of sovereignty and dominion but under the right of war.
It is wrong to divide obedience into active and passive.
23 Some think that a person who breaks a law setting a specific penalty makes up for the act by willingly accepting that penalty. They think such a person is not guilty before God of breaking natural law, even though breaking civil laws also breaks the natural law commanding us to obey them. This treats the penalty not as punishment for a prohibited act but as the price of permission to commit it. By the same reasoning, they could claim no violation of law is a sin and everyone can buy freedom to break it by taking the risk of punishment. But the words of a law can be understood in two ways. First, as containing two parts, as explained above in art. 7: an outright prohibition, such as “Do not do this,” and a punitive command, such as “Whoever does this shall be punished.” Second, as imposing a condition: “Do not do this unless you are willing to suffer punishment.” In that case it forbids the act conditionally, not absolutely. Under the first reading, the person who acts sins by doing what the law forbids. Under the second, the person does not sin by acting, because someone who meets the condition does not do what is forbidden. Under the first reading, everyone is forbidden to act. Under the second, only those who choose to avoid punishment are forbidden. Under the first, the punitive part of the law obligates the magistrate, not the offender, to demand punishment. Under the second, the offender who owes the punishment is personally obliged to exact it. But no one can be obliged to pay a penalty if it is death or some other severe punishment. Which reading is correct depends on the sovereign’s will. When a law’s meaning is uncertain, we know that refraining from the act is not a sin. If we act, it will be a sin, however the law is later explained. To do something when we doubt whether it is a sin and are free not to do it shows contempt for the laws. By chap. III. art. 28, that is a sin against the law of nature. The supposed distinction between active and passive obedience is therefore useless. A penalty established by human decree cannot make up for a sin against the law of nature, which is God’s law. Nor does taking the risk make an act of sin any less sinful.
CHAPTER XIV. ON LAWS AND OFFENSES.
16 Contracts obligate us. Some think that to be obligated and to be bound when already obligated are the same thing. They therefore think the distinction I have made is only verbal. To make it clearer: a person is obligated by a contract because the promise gives them a duty to perform it. The law binds that already obligated person because fear of the law’s appointed penalty compels them to keep the promise.
17 Yet it must be classed as a sin of imprudence. Many criticize my classification of atheism as imprudence rather than injustice. Some take it to mean that I have not been a bitter enough enemy of atheists. They also object that since I have said elsewhere that natural reason can establish God’s existence, I should admit that atheists sin at least against the law of nature and are thus guilty not just of imprudence but of injustice. But I am so much an enemy of atheists that I searched carefully and eagerly for a law under which I could condemn them as unjust. Finding none, I next asked what God himself calls people he so detests. God speaks of an atheist this way: “The fool has said in his heart, there is no God.” So I put their sin in the category God himself assigns it. Next I show that they are enemies of God. I think “enemy” can sometimes be a harsher name than “unjust person.” Finally, I say that as enemies they can justly be punished by God and by supreme magistrates. I neither excuse nor minimize their sin. When I said natural reason can establish that God exists, I did not mean that everyone could know it. To think otherwise would be like saying that because Archimedes used natural reason to discover the proportion of the circle to the square, any ordinary person could have discovered it. I say that some may know by reason’s light that God exists. But people continually absorbed in pleasure or in pursuing wealth and honor, those unaccustomed or unable or unwilling to reason correctly, and fools—in whose number I include atheists—cannot know this.