Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter XIV, 1
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OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES
1 How law differs from counsel. 2. How from covenant. 3. How from right. 4. Division of laws into divine and human: the divine into natural and positive; and the natural into the laws of single men and of nations. 5. The division of human, that is to say, of civil laws into sacred and secular. 6. Into distributive and vindicative. 7. That distributive and vindicative are not species, but parts of the laws. 8. All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it. 9. The precepts of the decalogue of honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witness, are civil laws. 10. It is impossible to command aught by the civil law contrary to the law of nature. 11. It is essential to a law, both that itself and also the lawgiver be known. 12. Whence the lawgiver comes to be known. 13. Publishing and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. 14. The division of the civil law into written and unwritten. 15. The natural laws are not written laws; neither are the wise sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power. 16. What the word sin, most largely taken, signifies. 17. The definition of sin. 18. The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice. 19. Under what kind of sin atheism is contained. 20. What treason is. 21. That by treason not the civil, but the natural laws are broken. 22. And that therefore it is to be punished not by the right of dominion, but by the right of war. 23. That obedience is not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
How law differs from counsel.
1 They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes confound law with counsel, sometimes with covenant, sometimes with right. They confound law with counsel, who think that it is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their counsellors, but also to obey them; as though it were in vain to take counsel, unless it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between counsel and law, from the difference between counsel and command. Now counsel is a precept, in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing itself which is advised; but command is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the commander. For it is not properly said, thus I will and thus I command, except the will stand for a reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser’s will, the law is not a counsel, but a command, and is defined thus: law is the command of that person, whether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws. Law and counsel therefore differ many ways. Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth; counsel to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by law, is duty; what by counsel, is free-will. Counsel is directed to his end, that receives it; law, to his that gives it. Counsel is given to none but the willing; law even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the counsellor is made void by the will of him to whom he gives counsel; the right of the law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a law imposed.
How it differs from a covenant.
2 They confound law and covenant, who conceive the laws to be nothing else but certain ὁμολογήματα, or forms of living determined by the common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle, who defines law on this manner; Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is to say, law is a speech, limited according to the common consent of the city, declaring every thing that we ought to do. Which definition is not simply of law, but of the civil law. For it is manifest that the divine laws sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the laws of nature. For if they had their original from the consent of men, they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed, that is no right definition of a civil law. For in that place, a city is taken either for one civil person, having one will; or for a multitude of men, who have each of them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those words common consent are ill-placed here; for one person hath no common consent. Neither ought he to have said, declaring what was needful to be done, but commanding; for what the city declares, it commands its subjects. He therefore by a city understood a multitude of men, declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirmed by votes) some certain forms of living. But these are nothing else but some mutual contracts, which oblige not any man (and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power being constituted, which can compel, have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Laws therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but naked and weak contracts; which then at length, when there is one who by right doth exercise the supreme power, shall either become laws or no laws at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds contracts with laws, which he ought not to have done; for contract is a promise, law a command. In contracts we say, I will do this; in laws, do this. Contracts oblige us;16 laws tie us fast, being obliged. A contract obligeth of itself; the law holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal contract of yielding obedience. Therefore in contract, it is first determined what is to be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in law, we are first obliged to perform, and what is to be done is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civil law thus: a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city, commanding everything behoveful to be done. Which is the same with that we have given above, in chap. VI. art. 9: to wit, that the civil laws are the command of him, whether man or court of men, who is endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future actions of his subjects.
How it differs from right.
3 They confound laws with right, who continue still to do what is permitted by divine right, notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civil law. That which is prohibited by the divine law, cannot be permitted by the civil; neither can that which is commanded by the divine law, be prohibited by the civil. Notwithstanding, that which is permitted by the divine right, that is to say, that which may be done by divine right, doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civil laws; for inferior laws may restrain the liberty allowed by the superior, although they cannot enlarge them. Now natural liberty is a right not constituted, but allowed by the laws. For the laws being removed, our liberty is absolute. This is first restrained by the natural and divine laws; the residue is bounded by the civil law; and what remains, may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular towns and societies. There is great difference therefore between law and right. For law is a fetter, right is freedom; and they differ like contraries.
The division of laws into divine and human; and of the divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into those laws of single men, and those of nations.
4 All law may be divided, first according to the diversity of its authors into divine and human. The divine, according to the two ways whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold; natural or moral, and positive. Natural is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born with them, to wit, their natural reason; and this is that law, which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold. Positive is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of prophecy, wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man. Such are the laws which he gave to the Jews concerning their government and divine worship; and they may be termed the divine civil laws, because they were peculiar to the civil government of the Jews, his peculiar people. Again, the natural law may be divided into that of men, which alone hath obtained the title of the law of nature; and that of cities, which may be called that of nations, but vulgarly it is termed the right of nations. The precepts of both are alike. But because cities once instituted do put on the personal proprieties of men, that law, which speaking of the duty of single men we call natural, being applied to whole cities and nations, is called the right of nations. And the same elements of natural law and right, which have hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole cities and nations, may be taken for the elements of the laws and right of nations.
The division of human, that is to say, civil laws into secular and sacred.
5 All human law is civil. For the state of men considered out of civil society, is hostile; in which, because one is not subject to another, there are no other laws beside the dictates of natural reason, which is the divine law. But in civil government the city only, that is to say, that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is committed, is the legislator; and the laws of the city are civil. The civil laws may be divided, according to the diversity of their subject matter, into sacred or secular. Sacred are those which pertain to religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies and worship of God: to wit, what persons, things, places, are to be consecrated, and in what fashion; what opinions concerning the Deity are to be taught publicly; and with what words and in what order supplications are to be made; and the like; and are not determined by any divine positive law. For the civil sacred laws are the human laws (which are also called ecclesiastical) concerning things sacred; but the secular, under a general notion, are usually called the civil laws.
Into distributive and vindicative.
6 Again, the civil law (according to the two offices of the legislator, whereof one is to judge, the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his judgments) hath two parts; the one distributive, the other vindicative or penal. By the distributive it is, that every man hath his proper rights; that is to say, it sets forth rules for all things, whereby we may know what is properly our’s, what another man’s; so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own, and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of their’s; and what is lawful for every man to do or omit, and what is not lawful. Vindicative is that, whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the law.
Distributive and vindicative are not two species of the laws.
7 Now distributive and vindicative are not two several species of the laws, but two parts of the same law. For if the law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you take with your net in the sea, be it yours, it is in vain. For although another should take that away from you which you have caught, it hinders not but that it still remains yours. For in the state of nature where all things are common to all, yours and others are all one; insomuch as what the law defines to be yours, was yours even before the law, and after the law ceases not to be yours, although in another man’s possession. Wherefore the law doth nothing, unless it be understood to be so yours, as all other men be forbidden to interrupt your free use and secure enjoyment of it at all times, according to your own will and pleasure. For this is that which is required to a propriety of goods; not that a man may be able to use them, but to use them alone; which is done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain do they also prohibit any men, who do not withal strike a fear of punishment into them. In vain therefore is the law, unless it contain both parts, that which forbids injuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of them, which is called distributive, is prohibitory, and speaks to all; the second, which is styled vindicative or penary, is mandatory, and only speaks to public ministers.
All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON LAWS AND OFFENSES
1 How law differs from counsel. 2. How it differs from covenant. 3. How it differs from right. 4. The division of laws into divine and human; of divine laws into natural and positive; and of natural laws into the laws of individuals and of nations. 5. The division of human, or civil, laws into sacred and secular. 6. Into distributive and punitive. 7. Distributive and punitive laws are not distinct kinds, but parts of laws. 8. Every law is understood to carry a penalty. 9. The precepts of the Decalogue concerning honoring parents, murder, adultery, theft, and false witness are civil laws. 10. Nothing contrary to the law of nature can be commanded by civil law. 11. A law requires that both the law and its maker be known. 12. How the lawmaker becomes known. 13. Publication and interpretation are necessary for knowledge of a law. 14. The division of civil law into written and unwritten. 15. The laws of nature are not written laws; neither the judgments of lawyers nor custom have the force of law in themselves, but only by consent of the supreme power. 16. What sin means in its broadest sense. 17. The definition of sin. 18. The difference between a sin of weakness and one of malice. 19. What kind of sin includes atheism. 20. What treason is. 21. Treason breaks natural law, not civil law. 22. Therefore it is punished by the right of war, not the right of dominion. 23. Why the division of obedience into active and passive is unsound.
How law differs from counsel.
1 Those who consider the force of words too lightly sometimes confuse law with counsel, sometimes with covenant, and sometimes with right. Those who suppose that monarchs have a duty not merely to hear their counselors but to obey them confuse law with counsel, as though seeking advice were pointless unless one followed it. The distinction between counsel and law must be drawn from the difference between advice and command. Counsel is an instruction whose reason for my compliance lies in the matter advised; command is an instruction whose reason for my obedience lies in the commander's will. For the words “I will it, and so I command it” are properly spoken only when the will itself supplies the reason. Now when a law is obeyed not for the matter advised but because of the adviser's will, it is not counsel but command. Law, then, is defined as the command of a person, whether an individual or an assembly, whose instruction carries within it the reason for obedience. Thus God's instructions to human beings, magistrates' instructions to their subjects, and, in general, the instructions of all who possess power to those who cannot resist them may be called their laws. Law and counsel therefore differ in many ways. Law belongs to one who has power over those he instructs; counsel to one who has no such power. To follow the law's prescription is a duty; to follow counsel is a matter of free choice. Counsel serves the end of its recipient; law serves the end of its giver. Counsel is given only to those willing to receive it; law is imposed even on the unwilling. Finally, the counselor's claim is defeated by the will of the person he counsels; the lawgiver's claim is not annulled at the pleasure of the person upon whom the law is imposed.
How it differs from a covenant.
2 Those who take laws to be nothing more than certain ὁμολογήματα, or ways of life established by the common consent of human beings, confuse law and covenant. Aristotle is among them, defining law thus: Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is, law is a declaration determined by the common consent of the city, setting out everything we ought to do. This does not define law in general, however, but civil law. Clearly neither divine laws nor the laws of nature arise from human consent: if they did, the same consent could revoke them, whereas they are unchangeable. Indeed, it is not even a sound definition of civil law. Here a city must mean either a single civil person with a single will or a multitude of people, each free to exercise a private will. If it means a single person, the phrase “common consent” is misplaced, since one person has no common consent. Nor should he have said “setting out what ought to be done” but “commanding it”; what the city declares, it commands its subjects to do. By city, therefore, he meant a multitude who by common consent—imagine a written resolution confirmed by votes—set out certain ways of life. But these are merely mutual contracts, which bind no one, and hence are no laws, until a supreme power is established that can compel performance and provide adequate remedy against the rest, who otherwise are unlikely to keep them. On Aristotle's definition, then, laws are merely bare, feeble contracts; only when someone rightfully exercises supreme power do they become laws, or fail to become laws, as he pleases. Thus he confuses contracts with laws, though he ought not to have done so: a contract is a promise, a law a command. In contracts we say, “I will do this”; in laws, “Do this.” Contracts obligate us;16 laws bind us fast when we are already obligated. A contract creates obligation by itself; the law holds the person to that obligation through the universal covenant to obey. Thus in a contract what is to be done is settled before we are obligated to do it; under law we are first obligated to perform, and what we must do is settled afterward. Aristotle should therefore have defined civil law this way: a civil law is a declaration determined by the will of the city, commanding everything that ought to be done. This agrees with the definition given above in chap. VI. art. 9: civil laws are the commands, concerning their subjects' future actions, of the person or assembly endowed with supreme power in the city.
How it differs from right.
3 Those who persist in doing what divine right permits, even when civil law forbids it, confuse laws with right. Civil law cannot permit what divine law forbids, nor forbid what divine law commands. Yet the fact that divine right permits an act—that one may do it under divine right—does not prevent civil law from forbidding that same act. An inferior law can restrict the liberty allowed by a superior one, though it cannot enlarge that liberty. Natural liberty, moreover, is a right not established by laws but allowed by them: remove the laws, and our liberty is absolute. The laws of nature and of God first restrict it; civil law limits what remains; the remainder may be restricted again by the ordinances of particular towns and societies. Law and right are therefore profoundly different. Law is a bond, right is freedom; they stand opposed like contraries.
The division of laws into divine and human; of divine laws into natural and positive; and of natural laws into those of individuals and those of nations.
4 All law may first be divided by the difference between its authors into divine and human law. Divine law is of two kinds, according to the two ways in which God has made his will known to human beings: natural or moral, and positive. Natural law is what God has declared to all people through his eternal word born within them, namely, their natural reason; this is the law I have endeavored to explain throughout this book. Positive law is what God has revealed to us through prophecy, speaking to human beings as a man speaks. Such were the laws he gave the Jews concerning their government and divine worship. These may be called divine civil laws, since they belonged specifically to the civil government of the Jews, his own people. Natural law, again, may be divided into the law of individuals, which alone has acquired the name “law of nature,” and the law of cities, which might be called the law of nations but is commonly called the right of nations. Both have the same precepts. But because cities, once established, take on the attributes of persons, the law that we call natural when speaking of an individual's duty is called the right of nations when applied to whole cities and nations. And the same elements of natural law and right discussed so far, when transferred to entire cities and nations, may be taken as the elements of the law and right of nations.
The division of human, or civil, laws into secular and sacred.
5 Every human law is civil. The condition of human beings outside civil society is one of hostility; since no one there is subject to another, there are no laws beyond the dictates of natural reason, which is divine law. Under civil government only the city—that is, the person or assembly entrusted with the city's supreme power—makes law, and its laws are civil. Civil laws may be divided according to their subject matter into sacred and secular. Sacred laws concern religion, that is, the ceremonies and worship of God: which persons, things, and places are to be consecrated, and how; which opinions concerning the Deity are to be taught publicly; what words and order are to be used in supplication; and similar matters not settled by any divine positive law. Civil sacred laws, then, are human laws concerning sacred things, also called ecclesiastical laws; secular laws, by contrast, are commonly called civil laws in the narrower sense.
Into distributive and punitive.
6 Civil law, again, has two parts corresponding to the lawgiver's two functions, one to judge and the other to compel people to accept his judgments. One part is distributive, the other punitive, or vindicative. The distributive part gives each person his proper rights: it establishes rules for everything, by which we may know what properly belongs to us and what belongs to someone else, so that others may not hinder our free use and enjoyment of what is ours and we may not disturb others in the peaceful possession of what is theirs; it also establishes what each person may or may not do or omit. The punitive part defines the punishment to be inflicted on those who break the law.
Distributive and punitive are not two kinds of law.
7 Distributive and punitive are not two separate kinds of law, but two parts of the same law. If a law said only, for example, “Whatever you catch in your net at sea is yours,” it would be useless. Even if another person took your catch away, it would remain yours. For in the state of nature, when everything is common to all, what is yours and what is another's are one and the same: what the law declares yours was yours before the law, and does not cease to be yours after the law simply because another possesses it. The law therefore accomplishes nothing unless it is understood to make the thing yours in such a way that everyone else is forbidden to interfere at any time with your free use and secure enjoyment of it, according to your will. This is what ownership of goods requires: not merely the ability to use them, but the ability to use them exclusively, which is achieved by forbidding others to obstruct that use. Yet it is equally useless to forbid others without also instilling fear of punishment. A law is therefore useless unless it contains both parts: one forbidding injuries, the other punishing those who commit them. The first, called distributive, prohibits and addresses everyone; the second, called punitive or vindicative, commands and addresses only public officers.
Every law is understood to carry a penalty.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON LAWS AND OFFENSES
1 How law differs from advice. 2. How it differs from covenant. 3. How it differs from right. 4. Laws divided into divine and human; divine laws divided into natural and positive; natural laws divided into laws for individuals and laws for nations. 5. Human, or civil, laws divided into sacred and secular. 6. Into distributive and punitive. 7. Distributive and punitive provisions are not kinds of laws but parts of them. 8. Every law is understood to carry a penalty. 9. The Ten Commandments concerning honoring parents, murder, adultery, theft, and false witness are civil laws. 10. A civil law cannot command anything contrary to the law of nature. 11. For a law to exist, both the law and the lawgiver must be known. 12. How the lawgiver becomes known. 13. A law must be published and interpreted to be known. 14. Civil law divided into written and unwritten law. 15. Natural laws are not written laws; lawyers’ wise opinions and customs become laws only with the sovereign power’s consent. 16. What sin means in its broadest sense. 17. The definition of sin. 18. The difference between a sin of weakness and one of malice. 19. What kind of sin atheism is. 20. What treason is. 21. Treason breaks natural law, not civil law. 22. It is therefore punished under the right of war, not the right of dominion. 23. Why dividing obedience into active and passive is mistaken.
How law differs from advice.
1 People who do not consider words carefully sometimes confuse law with advice, sometimes with covenant, and sometimes with right. Those who think monarchs have a duty not only to listen to their counselors but also to obey them confuse law with advice. They act as though there were no point in seeking advice unless it were followed. The distinction between advice and law comes from the difference between advice and command. Advice is an instruction we obey because of the merits of the action advised. A command is an instruction we obey because the commander wills it. For saying “This is my will, and this is my command” makes sense only when the will itself supplies the reason. When people obey laws because of the lawgiver’s will, rather than the merits of the action, a law is a command, not advice. Law can therefore be defined as the command of a person or council whose instruction itself supplies the reason for obedience. God’s instructions to human beings, magistrates’ instructions to their subjects, and, generally, the instructions of anyone powerful to those unable to resist may be called laws for those people. Law differs from advice in many ways. Law comes from someone with power over its recipients; advice comes from someone without such power. Following a law is a duty; following advice is a choice. Advice aims at the recipient’s end; law aims at the giver’s end. Advice is given only to willing recipients, but law applies even to unwilling ones. Finally, someone receiving advice can cancel the adviser’s claim by choosing not to follow it. Someone subject to a law cannot cancel the lawgiver’s authority at will.
How it differs from a covenant.
2 People confuse law with covenant when they think laws are nothing more than agreed forms of life, or ὁμολογήματα, settled by common consent. Aristotle is among them. He defines law this way: Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα. That means law is a statement set by the city’s common agreement, declaring what each person should do in every matter. This does not define law in general, only civil law. Divine laws clearly did not arise from human agreement, and neither did laws of nature. If they had arisen from human agreement, the same agreement could repeal them. But they cannot be changed. Even as a definition of civil law, it is wrong. Here “city” means either one political person with a single will or a group of people each free to follow a private will. If it means one person, “common agreement” is out of place: one person cannot agree in common. Aristotle should also have said “commanding,” not “declaring what should be done.” What the city declares to its subjects it commands. So he must mean a group of people jointly declaring rules for living, perhaps in a document approved by votes. But these are merely mutual contracts. They bind no one, and so are not laws, until a supreme power has been established with the means to compel compliance against others who otherwise are unlikely to keep them. On Aristotle’s definition, laws are only weak, unenforced contracts. Once someone rightfully exercises supreme power, they become laws or fail to become laws as that person wishes. Aristotle thus confuses contracts with laws. A contract is a promise; a law is a command. In a contract we say, “I will do this”; in a law, “Do this.” Contracts obligate us; laws hold us to obligations already undertaken. A contract obligates us by itself. A law holds us to our obligation through the general covenant to obey. In a contract, what we must do is specified before we become obligated to do it. Under law, we first become obligated to comply, and what we must do is specified afterward. Aristotle should therefore have defined civil law as a statement fixed by the will of the city, commanding everything that must be done. This matches the definition given above in chap. VI. art. 9: civil laws are the commands about their subjects’ future actions issued by the person or council holding supreme power in the city.
How it differs from right.
3 People confuse law with right when they continue to do what divine right permits even after civil law forbids it. Civil law cannot permit what divine law forbids or forbid what divine law commands. But a civil law can forbid something permitted by divine right. Lower laws can restrict freedom allowed by higher laws, though they cannot expand it. Natural liberty is a right allowed by laws, not created by them. Remove laws, and our freedom is unlimited. Natural and divine laws first limit this freedom. Civil law then limits what is left, and the rules of particular towns and associations may limit the remainder. So law and right are quite different. Law restrains; right frees. They are opposites.
Laws divided into divine and human; divine laws into natural and positive; natural laws into those for individuals and those for nations.
4 Laws can first be divided by their authors into divine and human. Divine law has two kinds, reflecting the two ways God has made his will known to people: natural or moral law, and positive law. Natural law is what God has made known to everyone through the eternal word born within them—their natural reason. This is the law I have tried to explain throughout this book. Positive law is what God has revealed through prophecy, speaking to human beings as one person speaks to another. The laws he gave the Jews about their government and worship are examples. They may be called divine civil laws because they belonged specifically to the civil government of the Jews, his particular people. Natural law can also be divided into the law for individual people, which alone has come to be called the law of nature, and the law for cities, which can be called the law of nations but is commonly called the right of nations. Both have the same rules. Once founded, cities take on the characteristics of individual persons. Thus the law called natural law when applied to individual duties is called the right of nations when applied to entire cities and nations. The principles of natural law and right discussed so far can likewise be applied to entire cities and nations as principles of the law and right of nations.
Human, or civil, laws divided into secular and sacred.
5 Every human law is civil law. Outside civil society, people are in a state of hostility. Since no one there is subject to another, there are no laws except the rules of natural reason, which is divine law. In a civil government, only the city—that is, the person or council entrusted with its supreme power—makes laws. Its laws are civil laws. According to their subject matter, civil laws can be divided into sacred and secular. Sacred laws concern religion, including ceremonies and worship of God. They specify which people, things, and places must be consecrated and how; which beliefs about God must be taught publicly; and what words and order must be used for prayers. They cover similar matters not settled by any positive divine law. Sacred civil laws are human laws about sacred things, also called ecclesiastical laws. Secular laws, in ordinary usage, are simply called civil laws.
Into distributive and punitive parts.
6 Civil law has two parts, corresponding to the lawgiver’s two duties: to judge and to make people accept those judgments. One part is distributive and the other punitive, or vindicative. The distributive part gives each person their proper rights. It lays down rules showing what belongs to us and what belongs to someone else. It prevents others from interfering with our free and peaceful use of our property, and prevents us from disturbing their peaceful possession of theirs. It also specifies what each person may or may not do or leave undone. The punitive part specifies the penalties for breaking the law.
Distributive and punitive provisions are not two kinds of law.
7 Distributive and punitive provisions are not two separate kinds of law. They are two parts of one law. Suppose, for instance, a law says only, “Whatever you catch with your net in the sea belongs to you.” That law accomplishes nothing. Even if another person takes your catch, it still belongs to you. In the state of nature, everything is common to everyone, so what is yours and what is another person’s are the same. What the law calls yours was already yours before the law, and it remains yours afterward even in another person’s possession. The law accomplishes something only if your ownership also means that everyone else is forbidden to interfere with your free and secure enjoyment of the thing whenever and however you wish. Ownership requires not simply that you can use a thing, but that you alone can use it. This is achieved by forbidding others to obstruct you. Yet a prohibition is useless if it gives people no fear of punishment. A law is therefore useless unless it both forbids offenses and punishes offenders. The first part, called distributive, prohibits acts and addresses everyone. The second, called vindicative or penal, commands action and addresses only public officials.
Every law is understood to carry a penalty.