Dominion, Chapter IX, 2

What liberty consists in, and the difference between subjects and servants.

9 What, someone will ask, is the difference between a child or a subject and a servant? I know of no writer who has fully explained what liberty and slavery are. Commonly, liberty is thought to mean doing everything we please without punishment, and bondage the inability to do so. Yet such liberty is impossible in civil government and among people living in peace, because no city exists without commands and a right to restrain. Liberty, to define it, is simply the absence of impediments and hindrances to motion. Water enclosed in a vessel is not at liberty, because the vessel prevents its escape; break the vessel, and the water is free. Each person has greater or less liberty according to the greater or lesser scope in which they may act: a prisoner in a spacious prison has more liberty than one confined in a narrow one. A person may be free in one direction but not another, just as a traveler is bounded on either side by hedges or stone walls to prevent damage to the vineyards or grain beside the road. Such impediments are external and absolute. In this sense all servants and subjects who are neither shackled nor imprisoned are free. Other impediments are conditional: they do not absolutely prevent movement, but do so incidentally through our own choice. A person aboard ship, for instance, may still cast themselves into the sea if they choose. Here too, the more paths open to a person, the greater their liberty. Civil liberty consists in this: no person, whether subject, child, or servant, is so restrained by punishments prescribed by the city, father, or lord, however cruel, that they cannot do everything and use every means necessary to preserve their life and health. For my part, then, I cannot see what grounds a mere servant has for complaint if it concerns only a want of liberty—unless the servant counts it misery to be prevented from harming themselves and to receive back a life forfeited through war, misfortune, or their own idleness, together with sustenance and everything necessary to maintain health, on the sole condition of accepting rule. Someone restrained by threatened punishments, and so afraid to give their will free rein in everything, is not oppressed by servitude but governed and sustained. Free subjects and children of the family do, however, have this privilege over servants wherever servants exist: they may hold the more honorable offices of city or household and possess a larger share of things beyond necessity. Here lies the difference between a free subject and a servant: the person who serves only their city is free, but one who also serves a fellow subject is a servant. Every other liberty is exemption from the laws of the city, belonging only to those who rule.

The right is the same in hereditary as in instituted government.

10 A father and his children and servants, made into a civil person by his paternal jurisdiction, are called a family. If this family becomes so numerous through the multiplication of children and acquisition of servants that it cannot be subdued without risking the uncertain chances of war, it is called a hereditary kingdom. Though acquired by force and thus differing from an instituted monarchy in origin and mode of formation, once established it has all the same properties and the same right of authority throughout. There is therefore no need to discuss them separately.

The question of the right of succession belongs only to monarchy.

11 We have spoken of the right by which supreme authorities are established; now we must briefly say by what right they may be continued. The right of their continuance is called the right of succession. In a democracy, supreme authority belongs to the people; so long as any subjects survive, it remains with the same person, for the people have no successor. Similarly, in an aristocracy, when one of the nobles dies, the others appoint another in that noble's place. Unless they all die together—which I suppose will never happen—there is no succession. The question of the right of succession therefore arises only in absolute monarchy: those who exercise supreme power merely for a term are not monarchs themselves, but ministers of state.

A monarch may dispose of the government by testament:

12 First, if a monarch names a successor by testament, the named person succeeds. For if the monarch was appointed by the people, he possesses every right over the city that the people possessed, as shown in chap. VII. art. 11. The people could choose him, and by the same right he can choose another. An hereditary kingdom has the same rights as an instituted one. Therefore every monarch may name a successor in his will.

Or give it away, or sell it.

13 Whatever a person may transfer to another by testament, that person has the same right to give or sell while still alive. Accordingly, whoever receives the supreme power from a monarch as a gift or by sale receives it rightfully.

A monarch dying without a testament is always understood to wish a monarch to succeed him:

14 But if while alive he has not declared his wishes about a successor by testament or otherwise, we must suppose, first, that he did not wish his government reduced to anarchy or a state of war—that is, to the destruction of his subjects. He could not wish this without breaking the laws of nature, which obliged him to do everything necessary to preserve peace; and if he had wished it, he could easily have said so openly. Next, since the right passes according to the father's will, we must judge who succeeds by the signs of that will. We must therefore understand that he wished his subjects to remain under monarchical government rather than any other kind, since he had already endorsed that form by his own example in ruling, and had not subsequently condemned it in word or deed.

And one of his children:

15 Furthermore, by natural necessity everyone wishes greater good to those from whom they receive glory and honor than to others. After death, a person receives honor and glory sooner from their children than from the power of anyone else. We infer, then, that a father intends better things for his children than for other people's children. Thus a father dying without a testament must be understood to have wished one of his children to succeed him. This holds, however, only if there are no clearer signs to the contrary, one of which, after many successions, may be custom. For whoever says nothing about succession is presumed to consent to the customs of his realm.

And a male rather than a female:

16 Among children, males take precedence: perhaps originally because they are generally, though not always, better suited to the management of weighty affairs, especially wars; but later, once it became customary, because that custom was not challenged. Thus the father's will is to be interpreted in their favor unless some other custom or sign clearly contradicts it.

And among males, the eldest rather than the younger:

17 Since sons are equal and power cannot be divided, the eldest succeeds. If age makes any difference, the eldest is presumed worthier: judged by nature, the oldest is usually the wisest, and no other judge is available. But if the brothers must be valued equally, succession must be settled by lot. Primogeniture is a natural lot, and by it the eldest has already been preferred; nor is anyone empowered to decide whether this lot or another should settle the question. The same reasoning that supports the firstborn son equally supports the firstborn daughter.

And, if he has no offspring, his brother before anyone else.

18 If he has no children, then command passes to his brothers and sisters, for the same reason that his children would have succeeded if he had had any: those nearest to us by nature are presumed nearest in affection. His brothers take precedence over his sisters, and the older over the younger, for the same reasons that apply to children.

People succeed to the right of succession in the same way that they succeed to power.

19 Moreover, the reasoning by which people succeed to power also gives them the right of succession. If the firstborn dies before the father, we shall judge that the firstborn passed the right of succession to their children, unless the father ruled otherwise. Grandchildren therefore have a stronger claim to succession than their uncles. All this holds, I say, unless the custom of the place prevents it—a custom to which the father is presumed to have consented by not opposing it.

What Liberty Is and How Subjects Differ from Servants.

9 Someone will ask, then, what the difference is between a child or a subject and a servant. I also know of no writer who has fully explained what liberty and slavery are. People usually think liberty means doing whatever we want without punishment, and slavery means not being able to do so. But no one can do whatever they want in a civil government that keeps people at peace. No commonwealth can exist without commands and the right to restrain people. To define liberty, it is simply the absence of obstacles that stop movement. Water held in a container is not free because the container keeps it from flowing out. Break the container and the water is free. A person has more or less liberty depending on how much room they have to move about. Someone in a large prison has more liberty than someone in a small one. A person can be free to move in one direction but not in another. A traveler, for example, may be bordered by hedges or stone walls on both sides of the road to prevent damage to the nearby vines or grain. These obstacles are external and absolute. In that sense, all servants and subjects who are not chained or imprisoned are free. There are other obstacles that depend on our choices. They do not absolutely prevent movement; they prevent it only because of what we choose to do. A person aboard a ship, for example, is still able to jump into the sea if they want to. Here too, the more ways someone can move, the more liberty they have. This is what civil liberty consists of. Whether someone is a subject, child, or servant, no punishment set by the commonwealth, father, or master can absolutely stop them from doing everything necessary to preserve their life and health, however cruel the punishment might be. For my part, I cannot see why a mere servant would complain of a lack of liberty alone. That is, unless the servant counts it a hardship to be stopped from harming themselves and to receive, on the sole condition of being governed, both the life they had forfeited through war, misfortune, or their own idleness and all the food and other things needed to keep healthy. Someone who holds back because of threatened punishments and so does not dare to follow every desire is not oppressed by slavery. That person is governed and supported. But in any government or family that has servants, free subjects and children of the family have an advantage over servants: they can hold the more honorable public or household positions and own more things beyond what they need. The difference between a free subject and a servant lies here: a free person serves only the commonwealth, while a servant also serves another subject. Any further liberty means exemption from the commonwealth's laws, and belongs only to those who govern.

The rights in a hereditary government are the same as in a government established by agreement.

10 A father and his children and servants become one political person through his paternal authority. Together they are called a family. If the family grows numerous through the birth of children and the acquisition of servants, so numerous that no one can conquer it without taking the uncertain chance of war, it is called a hereditary kingdom. It differs from a monarchy established by agreement in its origin and the way it is formed: it is acquired by force. But once established, it has all the same features, and the right to govern is the same in both. There is therefore no need to discuss them separately.

The question of succession applies only to monarchy.

11 We have explained by what right supreme authorities are established. Now we must briefly explain by what right they can continue. The right by which they continue is called the right of succession. In a democracy, supreme authority belongs to the people. So long as any subjects remain alive, authority stays with that same political person: the people have no successor. Likewise, when one noble dies in an aristocracy, the others appoint someone to take that noble's place. Unless all the nobles die at once, which I assume will never happen, there is no succession. The question of the right of succession therefore arises only in an absolute monarchy. Those who wield supreme power for only a limited time are not monarchs themselves but ministers of state.

A monarch may pass on the government by will:

12 First, if a monarch names a successor in a will, the named person succeeds. If the people appointed the monarch, that monarch has all the rights over the commonwealth that the people had, as shown in chap. VII, art. 11. The people could choose a monarch, so the monarch has the same right to choose another. A hereditary kingdom has the same rights as a kingdom established by agreement. Every monarch can therefore name a successor in a will.

Or give it away or sell it.

13 Anything a person may transfer to another by will may, by the same right, be given away or sold during that person's life. So whoever receives supreme power by gift or sale receives it by right.

A monarch who dies without a will is always understood to want another monarch to succeed him:

14 Suppose a monarch has not declared a choice of successor by will or in any other way while alive. First, we assume the monarch would not want the government to return to anarchy or the state of war, destroying the subjects. Doing that would break the laws of nature, which obliged the monarch to do everything necessary to preserve peace. Besides, the monarch could easily have said so openly if that had been the intention. Second, because the right passes according to the father's wishes, we must judge who succeeds by the signs of those wishes. We therefore understand the monarch to want the subjects governed by another monarch rather than by any other kind of government. By ruling in that way, the monarch had already shown approval of monarchy and had never later rejected it by word or deed.

And one of his children:

15 Furthermore, everyone naturally wishes better things for those who bring them glory and honor than for others. After death, people receive honor and glory more directly from their children than from anyone else's power. From this we conclude that a father wants better things for his children than for anyone else's. We must therefore understand that a father who dies without a will intended one of his children to succeed him. This holds unless there are clearer signs that he intended otherwise. After many successions, custom may be one such sign. Someone who says nothing about succession is presumed to agree with the customs of the realm.

And a male rather than a female:

16 Sons take precedence over daughters. Perhaps this began because men are usually, though not always, better suited to managing important matters, especially wars. Later, it continued because the custom became established without being challenged. Unless some other custom or sign clearly contradicts it, the father's wishes must therefore be understood as favoring his sons.

And among males, the eldest rather than the younger:

17 Since the sons are equal and power cannot be divided, the eldest succeeds. If age makes any difference, the eldest is presumed more suitable. Judged by nature, the oldest is the wisest, as is usually the case. And there can be no other judge. If the brothers must instead be considered equally suitable, succession should be decided by lot. But being born first is a natural lottery, and it has already favored the eldest. No one has the authority to decide whether this lottery or another should settle the matter. The argument for the firstborn son also applies to the firstborn daughter.

And, if he has no children, his brother before anyone else.

18 If he has no children, authority passes to his brothers and sisters, for the same reason it would pass to his children if he had any. We presume that those closest to us by birth are also closest to us in goodwill. His brothers precede his sisters, and the older siblings precede the younger, for the same reasons given in the case of children.

The right to decide succession passes on in the same way as power itself.

19 Furthermore, the reason that governs the succession to power also governs the succession to the right of succession. If the firstborn dies before the father, we judge that the firstborn passed the right of succession to their own children, unless the father has decided otherwise. The grandchildren therefore have a better claim to succeed than the monarch's brothers. Everything I have said applies unless local custom prevents it. A father who does not challenge that custom is presumed to have agreed to it.