Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter X, 1
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COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES
1 A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard of the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want of secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit. 16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of a city is that, where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. 19. The nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it keeps from it, the worse.
A comparing the state of nature with the civil.
1 What democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are, hath already been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike.
2 Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics, saith, that there are two sorts of governments; whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler, the other to that of the subjects. As if where subjects are severely dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the ruler and the subject. The damages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But those relate not to the government itself, being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy, both the commander and the parties commanded are equally concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way public treasures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the ill-administration of a well-established government.
CHAPTER XI. PLACES AND EXAMPLES OF SCRIPTURE OF THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT, AGREEABLE TO WHAT HATH BEEN SAID BEFORE.
The praise of monarchy.
3 Now that monarchy, of the foresaid forms of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, hath the pre-eminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the ancients preferred the monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government, instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men15 out of the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings: although, I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over.
The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest.
4 Some there are, who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing, that one man among so many should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge it to be as unreasonable if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality, whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man, attend his person, not his unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.
Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city.
5 But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth chapter, a city is defined to be one person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the same article of the same chapter, one person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared in the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure. It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted by a lord and many servants. Neither can any reason be brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father and his sons. For to a lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of sons; for they are both his honour and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their lords, then children to their parents, as hath been manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.
The exactions are more grievous under command of the people, than under the monarch.
6 Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles, waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of government, but are more tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a democracy, look how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing), so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of themselves. A monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a democracy, where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done without the subject’s oppression. Though a monarch may promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a democracy, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it, because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it, would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those others, but even to the whole city also.
Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under a monarch, than under the people.
7 Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself, that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done. But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned under one ruler, than under the people. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly punished. Whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people. For each one of them can do as much as the people, and they mutually give way to each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, spare me to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow, while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care, that the common weal do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party, without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was usually practised in democracies. For the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a kingdom. In this democracy and monarchy were even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And therefore what the monarch does, is said to be done out of envy to their virtues; which if it were done by the people, would be accounted policy.
Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than under the people.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
A COMPARISON OF THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THEIR VARIOUS DISADVANTAGES
1 A comparison of the state of nature and the civil state. 2. The advantages and disadvantages of the ruler and his subjects are alike. 3. The merits of monarchy. 4. Government by one person cannot be called unreasonable because that person has more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of the opinion that a lord with his servants cannot constitute a city. 6. Exactions are more burdensome under popular government than under monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects face less danger of punishment under a monarch than under the people. 8. Individual subjects have no less liberty under a monarch than under the people. 9. It is no disadvantage to subjects that not all of them are admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil deliberations are unwisely entrusted to great assemblies because most people lack the requisite skill: 11. With respect to eloquence: 12. With respect to faction: 13. With respect to the instability of laws: 14. With respect to the lack of secrecy. 15. These disadvantages belong to democracy because people naturally delight in a reputation for intelligence. 16. The disadvantages to a city when its king is a child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of monarchy's excellence. 18. The best condition for a city is one in which its subjects are the ruler's inheritance. 19. The closer aristocracy approaches monarchy, the better it is; the further away it stands, the worse.
A comparison of the state of nature and the civil state.
1 We have already said what democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are; we must now compare them to see which best preserves the peace and advances the interests of subjects. But first let us set out the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general, lest anyone think it better to let each person live as they choose than to establish a society at all. Outside civil government, every person indeed has a liberty complete but barren. For the person who, by their own liberty, does everything as they wish must, by the equal liberty of others, suffer everything others wish to do. In an established city, by contrast, every subject retains enough freedom to live well and in peace, while enough is taken from others to make them no cause for fear. Outside it, everyone has a right to everything but can enjoy nothing; within it, each securely enjoys a limited right. Outside it, anyone may rightfully despoil or kill another; within it, only one may. Outside it, our own strength protects us; within it, the strength of all. Outside it, no one is sure of the fruit of their labor; within it, everyone is. Finally, outside it reign passion, war, fear, poverty, squalor, isolation, barbarism, ignorance, and cruelty; within it reign reason, peace, security, wealth, decency, society, refinement, knowledge, and goodwill.
The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike.
2 Aristotle, in the seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics, says there are two kinds of government: one directed to the ruler's benefit, the other to the subjects'. This suggests that severe treatment of subjects constitutes one form of government and gentler treatment another. We cannot accept this opinion at all, for every advantage and disadvantage arising from government is shared by ruler and subject alike. The harms that befall particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, idleness, or their own extravagance may indeed be distinguished from those that concern the ruler; but they do not pertain to government itself, since they may happen under any form of government whatever. If those same harms stem from the city's original foundation, then they can truly be called disadvantages of government, but the ruler will share them with his subjects, just as he shares its benefits. The first and greatest benefit, peace and defense, belongs to both: ruler and ruled alike employ the collective forces of their fellow subjects to defend their lives. And the greatest disaster that can befall a city—the slaughter of subjects brought on by anarchy—concerns commander and commanded equally. Again, if the ruler exacts such vast sums from his subjects that they cannot support themselves and their families or maintain their bodily strength and vigor, he suffers as much as they do. However great his store of riches, he cannot preserve either his authority or his wealth without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raises no more than is needed for the proper exercise of his power, this benefits him and his subjects equally, serving their common peace and defense. Nor is it clear how public treasuries can burden private subjects unless those subjects are so depleted that their own industry can no longer obtain the necessities to sustain bodily and mental strength. Even then the harm would fall on the ruler as well. It would arise not from a faulty founding or ordering of government—for subjects may be oppressed under any form—but from poor administration of a well-established government.
The merits of monarchy.
3 That monarchy stands above the forms just mentioned—democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy—will become clearest when we compare the advantages and disadvantages of each. Consider the arguments that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the ancients preferred monarchy to every other form, assigning the rule of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginnings of states and nations princes' decrees served as laws; that paternal government, established by God himself at creation, was monarchical; that other governments were contrived by human ingenuity from the ashes of monarchy after sedition had destroyed it; and that God's people lived under the jurisdiction of kings. Although these arguments present monarchy as the superior form, they rely on examples and testimony rather than sound reasoning, so we shall pass them over.
Government by one person cannot be called bad merely because one person has more power than everyone else.
4 Some people dislike government by one for no other reason than that it is government by one, as though it were unreasonable for a single person among so many to surpass the rest so greatly in power that he could dispose of them all at his pleasure. If they could, surely these people would withdraw from the dominion of one God. But envy prompts their objection to one ruler when they see a single person possessing what they all desire. For the same reason they would find it equally unreasonable for a few to command, unless they were among those few or hoped to join them. If unequal rights are unreasonable, an aristocracy must surely be unreasonable too. But we have shown that equality is a state of war and that inequality was therefore introduced by general consent. Hence it is no longer unreasonable that someone should enjoy more when we have voluntarily given him more. The disadvantages attending the dominion of one man arise from the man himself, not from his being one. Let us then consider which brings greater hardships on subjects: rule by one or by many.
A rejection of the opinion that a lord and his servants cannot constitute a city.
5 First we must dismiss the opinion of those who deny that even a very great number of servants under a common lord can constitute a city. In the ninth article of the fifth chapter, a city is defined as one person formed from many people, whose will, by their own contracts, is to be regarded as the will of them all, so that this person may use the strength and abilities of each for the public peace and safety. According to the same article, they are one person when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of every servant is contained in the will of the servant's lord, as explained in the fifth article of the eighth chapter, allowing the lord to employ all their strength and abilities as he pleases. It follows that a lord and many servants do constitute a city. No argument against this can avoid striking equally against a city formed by a father and his children. To a childless lord, servants are like children, being both his honor and his safeguard; and servants are no more subject to their lords than children to their parents, as was shown above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.
Exactions are more burdensome under popular government than under a monarch.
6 One grievance of supreme authority is that the ruler, besides collecting the money needed for public expenses—the maintenance of public ministers, the building and defense of fortresses, the conduct of wars, and the honorable support of his own household—may, if he wishes, exact more to gratify his desires and enrich his children, relatives, favorites, and flatterers. I admit that this is a grievance, but it attends every form of government and is more bearable in monarchy than democracy. For though a monarch may wish to enrich these people, they cannot be numerous, since they belong to only one man. In a democracy, however, there are as many groups of children, relatives, friends, and flatterers to reward as there are demagogues—that is, powerful orators who sway the people; and such orators are always numerous, with new ones appearing daily. Each wishes not only to make their own family as powerful and illustrious in wealth as possible, but also to bind others to themselves through favors and thus strengthen their position. Because his officers and friends are few, a monarch can largely satisfy them at no cost to his subjects—that is, without taking from the funds provided to maintain war and peace. In a democracy, with many to satisfy and new claimants continually appearing, this cannot be done without oppressing the subjects. A monarch may promote the unworthy but often will not; popular leaders in a democracy, however, may be presumed to do so because they must. Otherwise the power of those who do promote their followers would grow threatening not only to the other leaders but to the whole city.
Innocent subjects face less danger of punishment under a monarch than under the people.
7 Another grievance is the constant fear of death a person must feel when considering that the ruler can not only prescribe whatever punishment he likes for offenses but also, in anger or indulgence, slaughter innocent subjects who have broken no law. This is indeed a grave grievance under any form of government wherever it actually occurs: it is a grievance because it happens, not merely because it could happen. The fault lies with the ruler, not the form of government: Nero's every act is not inherent in monarchy. Yet subjects are condemned unjustly less often under one ruler than under the people. Kings are harsh only toward those who trouble them with unwelcome advice, confront them with insulting words, or resist their wishes; but kings also keep harmless the excessive power that one subject might otherwise hold over another. Thus when a Nero or Caligula reigns, only people known to him can suffer unjustly: courtiers and those distinguished by some high office. Not even all of them suffer, but only those who possess something he wants. Those who offend and insult him, on the other hand, are deservedly punished. Whoever chooses a quiet life under monarchy is out of danger, whoever reigns. Only the ambitious suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the powerful. Under popular rule, however, there may be as many Neros as there are orators who flatter the people. Each can wield as much power as the people and indulges the others' appetites, as if bound by a secret compact: “Spare me today and I'll spare you tomorrow.” Thus they shield from punishment those who have unjustly killed fellow subjects to satisfy lust or private hatred. Moreover, private power has a certain limit beyond which it may become dangerous to the realm; monarchs must sometimes take care that it does not harm the commonwealth. When that power lay in great wealth, they reduced it by diminishing fortunes; when it lay in popular acclaim, a powerful person could be removed without being charged with any other crime. Democracies commonly did the same. The Athenians punished powerful people with ten years of banishment solely for their power, though they were guilty of no other offense. At Rome, people who sought public favor by generous gifts were put to death as aspirants to kingship. Democracy and monarchy were alike in this, though their reputations differed greatly. Reputation comes from the people, and what many do, many praise. What the monarch does is therefore called envy of another's virtues; done by the people, it would be called good policy.
Individual people have no less liberty under a monarch than under the people.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
Comparison of Three Kinds of Government According to Their Different Drawbacks
1 A comparison of the state of nature and civil government. 2. Rulers and subjects share the benefits and drawbacks of government. 3. The advantages of monarchy. 4. Rule by one person is not unreasonable just because that person has more power than everyone else. 5. Against the claim that a master and servants cannot form a commonwealth. 6. Taxes and demands are more burdensome under popular government than under monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects face less risk of punishment under a monarch than under the people. 8. Individual subjects have as much liberty under a monarch as under the people. 9. It does not harm subjects if they cannot all take part in public deliberations. 10. Giving public deliberations to large assemblies is unwise because most people lack the necessary skill: 11. And because of eloquence: 12. And faction: 13. And changing laws: 14. And lack of secrecy. 15. These drawbacks are inherent in democracy because people naturally enjoy being thought clever. 16. The drawbacks for a commonwealth when its king is a child. 17. The power of military commanders clearly shows the advantages of monarchy. 18. The best kind of commonwealth is one in which the subjects are the ruler's inheritance. 19. The closer aristocracy comes to monarchy, the better it is; the farther away it moves, the worse it is.
A comparison of the state of nature and civil government.
1 We have already explained what democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are. Now we must compare them to see which does most to preserve the subjects' peace and promote their interests. First, though, let us set out the advantages and disadvantages of a commonwealth in general. Otherwise some people might think it better to let everyone live as they wish than to establish any society at all. Outside civil government, everyone has complete but useless liberty. Anyone free to do whatever they want must, because everyone else has that same liberty, also endure whatever others want to do to them. But in an established commonwealth, every subject keeps enough freedom to live well and peacefully. Enough freedom is taken from others that they need not be feared. Outside it, everyone has a right to everything but can enjoy nothing. Inside it, each person safely enjoys a limited right. Outside it, anyone has the right to rob or kill another; inside it, only one person does. Outside it, we rely on our own strength for protection; inside it, on the strength of everyone. Outside it, no one can be sure of the fruits of their work; inside it, everyone can. In short, outside it, passions rule, along with war, fear, poverty, filth, isolation, savagery, ignorance, and cruelty. Inside it, reason rules, along with peace, safety, wealth, cleanliness, companionship, refinement, knowledge, and goodwill.
Rulers and subjects share the benefits and drawbacks of government.
2 Aristotle says in the seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics that there are two kinds of government: one serves the ruler's interests, and the other serves the subjects'. He seems to treat severe rule as one kind of government and milder rule as another. We cannot accept that view. All the benefits and harms that arise from government are shared by ruler and subjects. We can separate the harms a particular subject suffers through misfortune, foolishness, carelessness, laziness, or personal extravagance from harms that affect the ruler. But those personal harms do not arise from the form of government: they can occur under any kind. If such harms arise from the commonwealth's original establishment, then they truly are drawbacks of government. In that case, the ruler shares those drawbacks with the subjects, just as the ruler shares its benefits. The first and greatest benefit, peace and defense, benefits both. The ruler and the ruled each rely on the combined strength of their fellow subjects to defend their lives. Both ruler and ruled are affected by the worst disaster a commonwealth can suffer: the killing of subjects when anarchy breaks out. Suppose next that the ruler takes such enormous sums of money from the subjects that they cannot support themselves or their families or maintain their physical strength and vigor. This harms the ruler as much as the subjects. However rich the ruler becomes, they cannot keep either their authority or their wealth without the living bodies of their subjects. But if the ruler raises only enough to exercise authority properly, that benefits ruler and subjects equally by supporting their common peace and defense. Nor can we see how a public treasury could burden private subjects unless taxes drain them so completely that their work can no longer provide what they need to sustain the strength of both body and mind. Even then, the ruler would suffer too. The harm would not come from the way the government was established or organized, since subjects can be oppressed under every form of government. It would come from the bad administration of a properly established government.
The advantages of monarchy.
3 We can best see that monarchy ranks above the three forms already mentioned—democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy—by comparing the benefits and drawbacks of each. Some arguments favor monarchy because one God governs the whole universe; because the ancients preferred monarchy over other governments and assigned rule over the gods to one Jupiter; because at the beginning of nations, rulers' decisions served as laws; because paternal government, which God himself established at creation, was monarchical; because people devised other governments out of monarchy's ruins after rebellions destroyed it; and because God's people lived under kings. All these examples and testimonies present monarchy as superior. But they do not give solid reasons, so we will pass them over.
Rule by one person is not bad just because that person has more power than everyone else.
4 Some dislike rule by one person for no reason other than that one person rules. They think it unreasonable that one man among so many should have so much more power that he can deal with everyone else as he wishes. If they could, these people would surely reject the rule of one God too. Envy drives this objection: they see one man possessing what everyone wants. For the same reason, they would call rule by a few equally unreasonable, unless they were among the few or hoped to join them. If it is unreasonable for people to have unequal rights, aristocracy too must be unreasonable. But we have shown that equality is the state of war and that inequality was introduced by general consent. It is therefore no longer unreasonable that someone should enjoy more power after we voluntarily gave that person more. The drawbacks of one person's rule arise from the person, not from the fact that there is only one. Let us therefore see which is more burdensome to subjects: being ruled by one person or by many.
Against the claim that a master and servants cannot form a commonwealth.
5 First we must reject the view that no group of servants under one master, however large, can count as a commonwealth. In chapter five, article nine, a commonwealth is defined as a single person formed from many people. By their own contracts, they agree to count that person's will as the will of them all, so that person can use the strength and abilities of each for public peace and safety. That same article says many people form a single person when their wills are contained in one person's will. As explained in chapter eight, article five, the will of every servant is contained in the master's will. The master can therefore employ all their strength and abilities as desired. It follows that a master and many servants do form a commonwealth. Any argument against this would apply equally to a commonwealth formed by a father and his children. For a master without children, servants serve the part that children would serve: they bring honor and provide protection. Servants are no more subject to their masters than children are to their parents, as shown above in chapter eight, article five.
Taxes and demands are more burdensome under rule by the people than under a monarch.
6 One complaint about supreme authority is that a ruler can demand money beyond what public needs require. Public spending includes paying officials, building and defending fortresses, fighting wars, and maintaining the ruler's own household in honorable style. But the ruler can also demand more at will to enrich children, relatives, favorites, and flatterers. I admit this is a burden. It affects every form of government, though it is easier to bear under monarchy than under democracy. A monarch might want to enrich such people, but there cannot be many of them since they belong to just one ruler. In a democracy, by contrast, there are many demagogues—that is, powerful speakers who influence the people—and new ones rise every day. Each has children, relatives, friends, and flatterers to reward. Each wants to make their family as powerful and wealthy as possible, and to strengthen their own position by placing others in their debt through gifts. Because a monarch's officials and friends are few, the monarch can largely satisfy them without burdening the subjects. I mean without taking money paid in to maintain war and peace. In a democracy, many people must be satisfied, with new ones constantly arriving, and this cannot be done without oppressing the subjects. A monarch may promote unworthy people, but often will not. In a democracy, the popular leaders are assumed to do so because they must. Otherwise those who do promote such people would gain so much power that the other leaders, and even the whole commonwealth, would have reason to fear them.
Innocent subjects are less likely to be punished under a monarch than under the people.
7 Another burden is the constant fear of death that people must feel when they consider the ruler's powers. The ruler can set any punishment for offenses and can also, out of anger or desire, kill innocent subjects who have broken no laws. This is indeed a very serious burden under any kind of government when it occurs. It is a burden because it actually happens, not simply because it could happen. It is the ruler's fault, not the government's. Nero's every act is not an essential feature of monarchy. Even so, innocent subjects are condemned less often under one ruler than under the people. Kings are harsh only toward those who trouble them with unwanted advice, insult them, or oppose their wishes. At the same time, kings prevent one subject's excessive power over others from causing harm. Thus, when a Nero or a Caligula rules, the only people who can suffer undeservedly are those the ruler knows: courtiers and people with prominent offices. Even among these, only those who possess something he wants are at risk. Those who insult and defy him, on the other hand, deserve punishment. Under monarchy, anyone who chooses a private life is safe, whoever rules. Only the ambitious suffer; everyone else is protected against injury from the powerful. Under popular rule, there can be as many Neros as there are speakers who flatter the people. Each of those speakers can wield as much power as the people do. They yield to one another's desires as if they had made a secret agreement: “Spare me today and I'll spare you tomorrow.” They protect from punishment people who have wrongfully killed fellow subjects to satisfy their desires and private hatreds. There is also a limit to how much private power a person can safely have. Beyond it, that power can threaten the realm, so monarchs must sometimes act to prevent harm to the commonwealth. When such power has rested on great wealth, rulers have reduced it by reducing people's fortunes. When it has rested on popular acclaim, they have removed the powerful person without charging any other crime. Democracies have often done the same. The Athenians banished powerful people for ten years simply because they were powerful, even when they had committed no other crime. In Rome, those who tried to win the people's favor with generous gifts were put to death as people seeking kingship. Democracy and monarchy were alike in this, but their reputations differed greatly. Reputation comes from the people, and what many people do is praised by many. So people say a monarch acts out of envy of a person's merits. If the people did the same thing, they would call it sound policy.
Individual people have as much liberty under a monarch as under the people.