Dominion, Chapter IX, 1

ON THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND ON HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT

1 Paternal dominion does not arise from generation. 2. Dominion over infants belongs to the person who first has them in their power. 3. Dominion over infants belongs originally to the mother. 4. An exposed infant belongs to the person from whom it receives its preservation. 5. A child with one parent a subject and the other a sovereign belongs to the parent in authority. 6. Where a man and woman are joined without either commanding the other, the children belong to the mother, unless a compact or civil law determines otherwise. 7. Children are no less subject to their parents than servants to their lords and subjects to their princes. 8. On the honor due to parents and lords. 9. What liberty consists in, and the difference between subjects and servants. 10. The right over subjects is the same in hereditary as in instituted government. 11. The question of the right of succession belongs only to monarchy. 12. A monarch may dispose of his supreme authority by will and testament: 13. Or give or sell it. 14. A monarch who dies without a testament is always presumed to wish a monarch to succeed him: 15. And one of his children: 16. And a male rather than a female: 17. And the eldest rather than the younger: 18. And, if he has no offspring, his brother before anyone else. 19. People succeed to the right of succession in the same way that they succeed to power.

Paternal dominion does not arise from generation.

1 Socrates is a man, and therefore a living creature: this is sound reasoning, and manifestly so, because to recognize the truth of its consequence one need only understand the word man. A living creature is included in the very definition of man, and anyone can supply the proposition required: a man is a living creature. But this inference—Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father, and therefore his lord—may be true without being evident, since lord is not part of the definition of father. To make the inference evident, then, we must explain the connection between father and lord. Those who have hitherto tried to prove a parent's dominion over his children have offered no argument beyond generation, as though it were self-evident that whatever I beget is mine. One might as well suppose that the mere existence of a triangle makes it immediately apparent, without further reasoning, that its angles equal two right angles. Moreover, dominion—that is, supreme power—is indivisible, since no one can serve two masters; yet generation requires two people, male and female. Dominion therefore cannot possibly be acquired through generation alone. We shall accordingly examine the origin of paternal government here with greater care.

Dominion over infants belongs to whoever first has them in their power.

2 We must return, then, to the state of nature, where all people of mature years must be regarded as equal because of their natural equality. There the conqueror is lord of the conquered by right of nature. By that same right, dominion over an infant belongs first to whoever first has the infant in their power. Plainly a newborn is in the mother's power before anyone else's: she may rightfully choose either to raise the child or to expose it to fortune.

Dominion over infants belongs originally to the mother.

3 If she raises the child, then, since the state of nature is a state of war, she is presumed to do so on the condition that when grown the child will not become her enemy—that is, that the child will obey her. Since by natural necessity we all desire what appears good to us, we cannot suppose that anyone grants another life on terms allowing that person to grow strong with age and become an enemy at once. And each person is an enemy to anyone whom they neither obey nor command. Thus in the state of nature every woman who bears children becomes both mother and lord. Some say that the father, not the mother, becomes lord in this case by virtue of the superiority of his sex; but this amounts to nothing. Reason shows the contrary: the difference in their natural strength is not so great that a man could gain dominion over a woman without war. Nor does custom contradict it: women, namely the Amazons, once waged war against their adversaries and disposed of their children as they chose. Even today in various places women hold supreme authority, and their husbands do not dispose of their children; the women themselves do. They do so by right of nature, since those who possess supreme power are not bound at all by civil laws, as has been shown. Besides, in the state of nature the father's identity cannot be known except through the mother's testimony. The child therefore belongs to whomever the mother chooses to name, and consequently to her. Original dominion over children thus belongs to the mother; among humans no less than among other creatures, birth follows the womb.

An exposed infant belongs to whoever preserves it.

4 Dominion passes from the mother to others in several ways. First, she may relinquish and abandon her right by exposing the child. Whoever raises a child so exposed then has the same dominion over it that the mother had. For by exposing the child she now takes away the life she had given it—not by conceiving it but by nourishing it. Consequently the obligation arising from the benefit of life is annulled by its exposure. The child whose life is preserved owes everything to the preserver, whether for nurture as to a mother or for service as to a lord. Although the mother in the state of nature, where everyone has a right to everything, may recover her child by the same right as anyone else, the child cannot rightfully transfer itself back to her.

The child of a subject and a sovereign belongs to the one who commands.

5 Second, if the mother is taken prisoner, her child belongs to her captor, because whoever has dominion over a person also has dominion over everything belonging to that person, including the child, as shown in the fifth article of the preceding chapter. Third, if the mother is a subject under any government, whoever holds supreme authority there also has dominion over the child she bears: he is lord of the mother, who must obey him in all things. Fourth, if a woman joins a man for companionship on the condition that he shall rule, a child produced by them both belongs to the father because of his authority over the mother. But if a woman who rules has children by a subject, the children belong to her; otherwise she could not have children without impairing her authority. In general, when the union of male and female is such that one has subjected themselves to the other, the children belong to the one who commands.

Where neither partner commands the other, the children belong to the mother, unless compact or civil law determines otherwise.

6 But if in the state of nature a man and woman make a contract without either submitting to the other's command, the children belong to the mother, for the reasons given above in the third article, unless their agreements provide otherwise. The mother may dispose of her right by agreement as she wishes. The Amazons did so in former times: by compact they gave their neighbors the male children conceived with them and kept the female children themselves. In a civil government, however, if a man and woman contract marriage, the children belong to the father, because in all cities—that is, cities formed by fathers rather than mothers governing their families—domestic command belongs to the man; a contract made according to civil law is called matrimony. But if they agree merely to sleep together, the children belong to father or mother according to the differing civil laws of different cities.

Children are no less subject to their parents than servants to their lords and subjects to their city.

7 Since, by the third article, the mother is originally lord of her children, and the father or someone else derives the right from her, children are plainly no less subject to those who nurture and raise them than servants to their lords or subjects to the holder of supreme rule. A parent cannot wrong a child while that child remains under the parent's power. A child, too, is freed from subjection in the same way as a subject or servant: emancipation is the same as manumission, and repudiation the same as banishment.

On the honor due to parents and lords.

8 An emancipated child or released servant now fears their father or lord less, since he has lost his natural or lordly power over them; and, if we mean true inward honor, they honor him less than before. For honor, as was said in the preceding section, is nothing but an estimate of another's power, so whoever has the least power always has the least honor. Yet we cannot suppose that a person freeing someone meant to make that person so completely their equal that they need not even acknowledge a benefit, but might behave in all respects as though wholly equal. We must therefore always understand that whoever is freed from subjection—whether servant, child, or colony—promises at least all the outward signs by which inferiors customarily honor superiors. Thus the precept to honor our parents belongs to the law of nature not only by reason of gratitude but also by reason of agreement.

On the Right of Parents over Their Children, and on Hereditary Government

1 A father's authority does not come from having fathered a child. 2. Authority over infants belongs to the person who first has them in their power. 3. Authority over infants originally belongs to the mother. 4. An abandoned infant belongs to the person who keeps it alive. 5. A child with one parent who is a subject and another who is sovereign belongs to the parent who holds authority. 6. When a man and woman live together and neither rules the other, the children belong to the mother, unless an agreement or civil law decides otherwise. 7. Children are as subject to their parents as servants are to their masters and subjects to their rulers. 8. On honoring parents and masters. 9. What liberty is and how subjects differ from servants. 10. The ruler has the same rights over subjects in a hereditary government as in one established by agreement. 11. The question of succession applies only to monarchy. 12. A monarch may pass on supreme authority in a will: 13. Or give it away or sell it. 14. A monarch who dies without a will is always presumed to want another monarch to succeed him: 15. And one of his own children: 16. And a male rather than a female: 17. And the eldest rather than a younger child: 18. And, if he has no children, his brother before anyone else. 19. The right to decide succession passes on in the same way as power itself.

A father's authority does not come from having fathered a child.

1 “Socrates is a man, so Socrates is a living creature” is sound reasoning. It is plainly sound. To see why the conclusion follows, one only has to understand the word “man.” A living creature is part of the very definition of a man, so everyone can supply the needed statement: “A man is a living creature.” But “Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father, so he is Socrates’ master” may be a sound inference without being plainly so. “Master” is not part of the definition of a father. We must explain the connection between father and master to make the inference clear. People who have tried to prove a parent's authority over a child have offered no argument except that the parent produced the child. They seem to think it obvious that whatever I produce belongs to me. That would be like thinking the mere existence of a triangle proves, without further reasoning, that its angles equal two right angles. Besides, authority, or supreme power, cannot be divided: no one can serve two masters. Yet two people, a man and a woman, must take part in producing a child. So producing a child alone cannot possibly give anyone authority over it. We will therefore look more carefully at the origin of parental government.

Authority over infants belongs to the person who first has them in their power.

2 We must go back to the state of nature. There, because people are naturally equal, all adults must be counted as equals. In that state, the right of nature makes a conqueror master of the conquered. By the right of nature, then, authority over an infant first belongs to whoever first has the infant in their power. Clearly, a newborn is in its mother's power before it is in anyone else's. She therefore has the right to raise it or, if she chooses, leave it to chance.

Authority over infants originally belongs to the mother.

3 If she raises the child, then, because the state of nature is a state of war, she is understood to raise it on the condition that it will not become her enemy when it grows up. That means it must obey her. We all naturally want what seems good to us. We therefore cannot suppose that someone gives life to another person on terms that let that person grow strong with age and then turn into an enemy. A person is an enemy to anyone whom that person neither obeys nor commands. Thus, in the state of nature, every woman who bears children becomes both a mother and a master. Some say the father becomes master in this case, rather than the mother, because men are the superior sex. That argument amounts to nothing. Reason says otherwise: the natural difference in their strength is not so great that a man could gain authority over a woman without fighting a war. Custom offers no support for the claim either. Women, such as the Amazons, have fought their enemies in the past and dealt with their children as they wished. Even today, women hold supreme authority in various places. They, not their husbands, decide what happens to their children. They do this by the right of nature, since, as shown already, those with supreme power are not bound by civil laws. Also, in the state of nature, no one can know who the father is except on the mother's word. The child therefore belongs to whichever man she says is its father, and for that reason belongs to her. Original authority over children therefore belongs to the mother. Among humans, as among other creatures, offspring follow the mother who bore them.

An abandoned infant belongs to the person who keeps it alive.

4 The mother's authority can pass to someone else in several ways. First, she can give up her right by abandoning the child. Whoever raises an abandoned child then has the same authority over it that the mother had. She gave the child life, not simply by giving birth but by feeding it. By abandoning it, she now takes that life away. Abandonment therefore cancels the obligation that arose from the gift of life. The person saved owes everything to the person who saved them: for their upbringing, as to a mother, and for their service, as to a master. In the state of nature everyone has a right to everything. The mother may therefore take back her child by the same right that anyone else could use to do so. But the child has no right to leave its rescuer and return to its mother.

The child of a subject and a ruler belongs to the ruler.

5 Second, if the mother is taken prisoner, her child belongs to the person who captured her. Whoever has authority over a person also has authority over everything belonging to that person, including the child, as shown in article 5 of the preceding chapter. Third, if the mother is a subject under any government, whoever holds supreme authority in that government also has authority over her child. That person is master of the mother too, and she is bound to obey in everything. Fourth, if a woman enters a union with a man on condition that he rules, the child they produce together belongs to the father because he commands the mother. But if a woman who rules has children with a subject, the children belong to her. Otherwise she could not have children without damaging her authority. In general, when a man and woman's union makes one subject to the other, their children belong to the one who commands.

When neither a man nor a woman commands the other, their children belong to the mother, unless an agreement or civil law decides otherwise.

6 In the state of nature, if a man and woman make an agreement under which neither is subject to the other's command, their children belong to the mother for the reasons given in article 3, unless they agree otherwise. The mother can make an agreement disposing of her right as she wishes. The Amazons did so in the past. They agreed to give their neighbors the male children conceived with them and to keep the female children themselves. But under civil government, if a man and woman make a marriage contract, the children belong to the father. In all commonwealths—that is, commonwealths founded by fathers rather than mothers who rule their households—domestic authority belongs to the man. Such a contract, when made under civil law, is called marriage. But if they agree only to have sex, whether the children belong to the father or mother depends on the different civil laws of different commonwealths.

Children are as subject to their parents as servants to their masters and subjects to their commonwealth.

7 As article 3 shows, the mother is originally the master of her children. The father or someone else gets that right from her. It follows that children are just as subject to those who feed and raise them as servants are to their masters and subjects to whoever holds supreme authority. A parent cannot wrong a child while that child is under the parent's power. A child is freed from this subjection in the same ways that a subject or servant is freed. Emancipating a child is like freeing a servant; rejecting a child is like banishing a subject.

On the honor owed to parents and masters.

8 An emancipated child or freed servant now has less reason to fear a parent or master, who has lost natural or masterly power over that person. If we consider genuine, inward honor, that person also honors the parent or master less than before. As stated in the preceding section, honor is simply our estimate of someone else's power. Someone with less power therefore always has less honor. But we cannot imagine that a person who frees another intends to make that person so entirely equal that the freed person need not even acknowledge the benefit, and may behave in every respect as a complete equal. We must therefore always understand a person freed from subjection—a servant, child, or colony—to promise at least the outward signs of honor that inferiors customarily give superiors. It follows that the command to honor our parents is part of the law of nature, both as a matter of gratitude and as a matter of agreement.