Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter VIII
Dominion, Chapter VIII of 46. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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OF THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS
1 What lord and servant signify. 2. The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters. 3. The obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed him by his lord. 4. Servants that are bound, are not by any compacts tied to their lords. 5. Servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord. 6. The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testament 7. The lord cannot injure his servant. 8. He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his servants. 9. By what means servants are freed. 10. Dominion over beasts belongs to the right of nature.
What lord and servant are.
1 In the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an institutive or framed government, as being that which receives its original from the consent of many, who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged each other. Now follows what may be said concerning a natural government; which may also be called acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power and natural force. But we must know in the first place, by what means the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons of men. Where such a right is gotten, there is a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a king, is nothing else but to have dominion over many persons; and thus a great family is a kingdom, and a little kingdom a family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other. There are but three ways only, whereby one can have a dominion over the person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutual contract made between themselves, for peace and self-defence’s sake, they have willingly given up themselves to the power and authority of some man, or council of men; and of this we have already spoken. The second is, if a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his own forces, to avoid death, promises the conqueror or the stronger party his service, that is, to do all whatsoever he shall command him. In which contract, the good which the vanquished or inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might have been deprived of; but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By virtue therefore of this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the divine laws; for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before he knows what he will command him, is simply and without any restriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tied, is called a servant; he to whom he is tied, a lord. Thirdly, there is a right acquired over the person of a man by generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following chapter.
The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or fettered.
2 Every one that is taken in the war, and hath his life spared him, is not supposed to have contracted with his lord; for every one is not trusted with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able, if he desired it, either to fly away, or quit his service, or contrive any mischief to his lord. And these serve indeed, but within prisons or bound within irons; and therefore they were called not by the common name of servant only, but by the peculiar name of slave; even as now at this day, un serviteur, and un serf, or un esclave have diverse significations.
The obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom which is granted him by his lord.
3 The obligation therefore of a servant to his lord, ariseth not from a simple grant of his life; but from hence rather, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from contract; but where there is no trust, there can be no contract, as appears by chap. ii. art. 9; where a compact is defined to be the promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty; so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had happened, he might not only have made his escape, but also have killed his lord who was the preserver of his life.
Servants that are bound, are not obliged to their lord by any contract.
4 Wherefore such kind of servants as are restrained by imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of servants given above; because those serve not for the contract’s sake, but to the end they may not suffer. And therefore if they fly, or kill their lord, they offend not against the laws of nature. For to bind any man, is a plain sign that the binder supposes him that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation.
Servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord.
5 The lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is not, than over one that is bound; for he hath a supreme power over both, and may say of his servant no less than of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine. Whence it follows, that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the lord’s; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath he, by his lord’s distribution, a propriety and dominion over his own goods: insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his own against the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow-subject.
The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testament.
6 Since therefore both the servant himself, and all that belongs to him are his lord’s, and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant, according to his own will and pleasure.
The lord cannot be injurious to his servant.
7 Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive government, namely, that he who hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also concerning servants, because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their will; but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.
He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his servants.
8 But if it happen that the lord, either by captivity or voluntary subjection, doth become a servant or subject to another, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his servants; supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now because not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord’s; therefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord have an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be derived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly passed over by the civil law.
By what means servants are freed.
9 A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection. First, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission; which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city. Secondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a city is banishment; neither differs it from manumission in effect, but in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by war, whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir. For no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given. But the lord who himself serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme; for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme lord’s.
The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature.
10 We get a right over irrational creatures, in the same manner that we do over the persons of men; to wit, by force and natural strength. For if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one, by reason of that war which is of all against all, to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good; much more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their own discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by art may be tamed and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetual war as dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over beasts, hath its original from the right of nature, not from divine positive right. For if such a right had not been before the publishing of the Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy writ; a most hard condition for men indeed, whom the beasts might devour without injury, and yet they might not destroy them. Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast may kill a man, it is also by the same right that a man may slay a beast.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS
1 What lord and servant mean. 2. The distinction between servants entrusted with their natural liberty and slaves, who serve while imprisoned or bound in fetters. 3. A servant’s obligation arises from the bodily freedom his lord allows him. 4. Servants kept in bonds are not bound to their lords by any covenant. 5. Servants have no property of their own against their lord. 6. The lord may sell his servant or transfer him by testament. 7. The lord cannot injure his servant. 8. Whoever is lord of the lord is also lord of his servants. 9. How servants are freed. 10. Dominion over animals belongs to the right of nature.
What lord and servant mean.
1 In the preceding two chapters we dealt with instituted or constructed government, which originates in the consent of many people who bind one another by contract and mutual pledges of faith. We now turn to natural government, which may also be called acquired government, since it is gained by power and natural force. First, however, we must understand how the right of dominion over human persons can be acquired. Where such a right is acquired, a kind of small kingdom arises: to be a king is simply to have dominion over many persons. Thus a large family is a kingdom, and a small kingdom a family. Let us return to the state of nature and consider human beings as if they had only now sprung from the earth and, like mushrooms, had suddenly reached full maturity without any obligations to one another. There are only three ways for one person to acquire dominion over another. The first is by mutual contract: for the sake of peace and self-defense, people willingly submit themselves to the power and authority of a man or council of men. We have already discussed this. The second is when a man taken prisoner in war, defeated, or distrustful of his own strength promises his service to the conqueror or stronger party to escape death: that is, he promises to do whatever the other commands. In this contract the benefit received by the defeated or weaker man is the preservation of his life, which by the right of war in the natural condition of humanity he might have lost; the benefit he promises in return is his service and obedience. By virtue of this promise, therefore, the defeated owes the victor service and obedience as absolute as possible, except where they conflict with divine law. A man bound to obey another’s commands before knowing what those commands will be is bound, simply and without restriction, to carry out every command. The man thus bound is called a servant; the man to whom he is bound, a lord. Third, a right over a human person may be acquired by generation; we shall say something about this form of acquisition in the following chapter.
The distinction between servants entrusted with their natural liberty and slaves, who serve while imprisoned or fettered.
2 Not everyone captured in war and spared is presumed to have contracted with his lord. Not every captive is entrusted with enough of his natural liberty to flee, leave service, or plot harm against his lord if he wished. Such people do serve, but in prison or in chains, and so they have been called not merely by the general name of servant but by the distinctive name of slave. Even today un serviteur and un serf, or un esclave, have different meanings.
A servant’s obligation arises from the freedom his lord allows him.
3 A servant’s obligation to his lord arises not simply from the gift of his life but rather from the fact that the lord does not keep him bound or imprisoned. Every obligation arises from contract, and where there is no trust there can be no contract, as appears in chap. ii. art. 9, where a covenant is defined as the promise of a person who is trusted. Thus pardon of the servant’s life is accompanied by confidence and trust, through which the lord grants him bodily liberty. Had no obligation or contractual bond arisen, he might not only have escaped but even have killed the lord who saved his life.
Servants kept in bonds are not bound to their lord by any contract.
4 Accordingly, servants confined by imprisonment or chains do not fall under the definition of servants given above: they serve not because of a contract, but to avoid suffering. If they flee or kill their lord, therefore, they do not violate the laws of nature. To bind a man is a clear sign that the person who binds him does not think him sufficiently bound by any other obligation.
Servants have no property of their own against their lord.
5 The lord therefore has no less dominion over a servant who is not bound than over one who is: he holds supreme power over both, and may say of a servant no less than of any other thing, living or lifeless, “This is mine.” It follows that everything the servant owned before entering service afterward becomes the lord’s, and everything he acquires is acquired for his lord. For one who may rightfully dispose of a person may surely dispose of everything that person could dispose of. Thus the servant can keep nothing as his own against his lord’s will. Yet through his lord’s allotment he has property and dominion over his own possessions, so that he may keep and defend them against another servant’s encroachment. In the same way, as shown earlier, a subject owns nothing against the will of the supreme authority but does have property against his fellow subject.
The lord may sell his servant or transfer him by testament.
6 Since the servant himself and everything belonging to him are his lord’s, and by the right of nature everyone may dispose of his own property as he pleases, the lord may sell, pledge, or transfer by testament his dominion over his servant according to his own will.
The lord cannot injure his servant.
7 What we demonstrated earlier concerning subjects under instituted government—that the holder of supreme power cannot injure his subject—is also true of servants, since they have subjected their will to their lord’s will. Whatever he does, therefore, is done with their will; and no injury can be done to someone who wills it.
Whoever is lord of the lord is also lord of his servants.
8 If the lord becomes another’s servant or subject, whether through captivity or voluntary submission, that other person becomes lord not only of him but also of his servants: supreme lord over them, immediate lord over him. For not only the servant himself but everything he owns belongs to his lord; his servants therefore now belong to this other person, and their intermediate lord cannot dispose of them except as the supreme lord sees fit. Thus if a lord in a civil government sometimes has absolute power over his servants, that power is understood to derive from the right of nature. It was not established by civil law but merely left almost untouched by it.
How servants are freed.
9 A servant is released from service in the same ways that a subject under instituted government is released from subjection. First, his lord may emancipate him, restoring to the servant the right over himself that the servant transferred to his lord. This grant of liberty is called manumission; it is as though a city allowed a citizen to place himself under another city’s jurisdiction. Second, the lord may cast away his servant, an act equivalent to banishment in a city. Its effect differs from manumission only in manner: in the first case liberty is given as a favor, in the second as a punishment; in both, dominion is renounced. Third, if the servant is taken prisoner, new servitude abolishes the old. Servants, like all other things, can be acquired by war, and the lord must in fairness protect them if he wishes to keep them as his own. Fourth, a servant is freed when he cannot identify a successor—for example, when the lord dies leaving neither a testament nor an heir. No one is understood to be bound unless he knows to whom he must discharge his obligation. Finally, a servant put in chains or otherwise deprived of bodily liberty is freed from the further obligation of contract: there can be no contract without trust, and a pledge never given cannot be broken. A lord who is himself another’s servant, however, cannot free his servants in such a way as to remove them from the supreme lord’s power. As we have shown, those servants belong not to him but to the supreme lord.
Dominion over animals belongs to the right of nature.
10 We acquire a right over creatures without reason in the same way that we acquire one over human persons: by force and natural strength. For if, in the state of nature, the war of all against all makes it lawful for anyone to subdue or kill other people whenever he judges it to serve his good, it is all the more lawful to do so to beasts. He may, at his own discretion, bring into service those that skill can tame and make useful, and wage unceasing war to hunt down and destroy the rest as dangerous and harmful. Our dominion over animals, therefore, originates in the right of nature, not in a positive divine right. If such a right had not existed before the publication of the Sacred Scriptures, no one could rightfully have killed an animal for food unless God’s will had been revealed to him through holy writ. That would indeed be a harsh condition for people: beasts could devour them without injury, while they could not destroy the beasts. Therefore, just as it follows from the right of nature that a beast may kill a man, so by that same right a man may kill a beast.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
The Rights of Lords over Their Servants
1 What lord and servant mean. 2. The difference between servants trusted with their natural freedom and slaves who serve while imprisoned or shackled. 3. A servant's obligation arises from the freedom of movement his lord allows him. 4. Servants kept in bonds owe their lords no obligation under any covenant. 5. Servants have no property of their own as against their lord. 6. A lord may sell his servant or transfer him by will. 7. A lord cannot injure his servant. 8. Whoever is lord of a lord is also lord of his servants. 9. How servants are freed. 10. Dominion over animals comes from the right of nature.
What lord and servant mean.
1 In the previous two chapters we discussed government established by agreement. It begins when many people consent and bind themselves to one another by contract and mutual pledges. We will now discuss natural government, which may also be called acquired government because it is obtained through power and natural force. First, we must understand how someone acquires the right to rule over other people. Wherever that right is acquired, there is a kind of small kingdom. To be a king is simply to rule over many people. In that sense a large family is a kingdom, and a small kingdom is a family. Let us return to the state of nature. Imagine that people have just emerged from the ground and have suddenly grown to adulthood like mushrooms, with no obligations of any kind to one another. There are only three ways for one person to gain dominion over another. The first is a mutual contract made for peace and self-defense: people willingly put themselves under the power and authority of a man or an assembly. We have already discussed this. The second is when a man captured or defeated in war, or one who distrusts his own strength, promises to serve the victor or stronger party to avoid death. He promises to do whatever that person commands. In this contract, the defeated or weaker man receives the benefit of having his life spared. Under the right of war in the natural human condition, his life could have been taken. In return, he promises service and obedience. Because of this promise, the defeated man owes the victor the fullest possible service and obedience, except when it conflicts with divine law. Someone who agrees to obey another person's commands before knowing what they will be agrees, without any other limit, to carry out every command. A person bound in this way is called a servant, and the person he is bound to is called a lord. Third, a right over a person can be acquired through birth. We will say more about that way in the next chapter.
The difference between servants trusted with their natural freedom and slaves who serve while imprisoned or shackled.
2 Not everyone captured in war and allowed to live is assumed to have made a contract with his lord. Not every captive is trusted with enough of his natural freedom to flee, leave his service, or plot harm against his lord if he wishes. Such captives do serve, but they serve in prison or in chains. They have therefore been called not just by the general name servant, but by the particular name slave. In the same way, un serviteur and un serf or un esclave have different meanings today.
A servant's obligation arises from the freedom his lord grants him.
3 A servant's obligation to his lord does not arise merely because his life has been spared. Rather, it arises because his lord does not keep him bound or imprisoned. Every obligation comes from a contract. But there can be no contract without trust, as shown in chap. ii. art. 9, where a covenant is defined as a promise made by a person who is trusted. So when a lord spares a captive's life and grants him freedom of movement, the benefit comes with trust. Without an obligation or the bonds of a contract, the captive could not only escape but also kill the lord who spared his life.
Servants kept in bonds owe their lord no obligation under any contract.
4 So servants confined in prison or kept in bonds do not fit the definition of servants given above. They serve not because of a contract, but to avoid suffering. If they escape or kill their lord, they do not violate the laws of nature. Binding a person plainly shows that the one who binds him does not think he is adequately restrained by any other obligation.
Servants have no property of their own as against their lord.
5 A lord has as much dominion over a servant who is not bound as over one who is. He has supreme power over both. He may say of a servant what he may say of any other thing, living or not: “This is mine.” So everything a servant owned before entering service afterward belongs to his lord, and everything he acquires is acquired for his lord. Someone who has the right to dispose of a person surely has the right to dispose of everything that person could dispose of. The servant can therefore keep nothing as his own against his lord's will. Yet through what his lord allocates to him, he does have property and authority over his goods. He may hold and defend them against another servant who tries to take them. As shown earlier, a subject likewise owns nothing as against the will of the supreme authority, but does have property as against another subject.
A lord may sell his servant or transfer him by will.
6 A servant and everything belonging to him are his lord's. And by the right of nature, everyone may dispose of his own property as he pleases. So a lord may sell his servant, pledge him as security, or transfer his dominion over him by will, as he chooses.
A lord cannot injure his servant.
7 We showed earlier that, in a government established by agreement, the holder of supreme power cannot injure his subject. This is also true of servants, because they have submitted their will to their lord's will. Whatever he does is therefore done with their consent, and no one can be injured by what he consents to.
Whoever is lord of a lord is also lord of his servants.
8 Suppose a lord becomes another person's servant or subject, either through capture or voluntary submission. That person becomes lord not only of him but also of his servants. He is the servants' supreme lord and the immediate lord of their lord. Not only the servant but all he owns belongs to his lord. So his servants now belong to the higher lord. The intermediate lord cannot dispose of them except as the supreme lord wishes. Thus, when a lord has absolute power over servants under a civil government, we should understand that power as coming from the right of nature. Civil law does not establish it, but simply passes over it without much attention.
How servants are freed.
9 A servant is freed from service in the same ways that a subject under a government established by agreement is freed from subjection. First, his lord may free him. The lord may give back the right over the servant that the servant had transferred to him. Granting freedom this way is called manumission. It is like a city's permitting one of its citizens to move under another city's authority. Second, the lord may cast off his servant, as a city does when it banishes a citizen. The outcome is the same as manumission, though the manner is different. In one case, freedom is given as a favor; in the other, as a punishment. In both cases, the lord gives up his dominion. Third, if the servant is captured, his new servitude ends his old one. Servants, like other things, can be acquired in war. A lord who wants to keep his servants must in fairness protect them. Fourth, a servant is freed when he cannot know who succeeds his lord—for example, when the lord dies without a will or an heir. No one is understood to be obligated unless he knows to whom he must fulfill the obligation. Finally, a servant who is put in chains or otherwise deprived of freedom of movement is freed from his separate obligation under the contract. There can be no contract without trust, and trust that was never given cannot be betrayed. But a lord who serves someone else cannot free his servants from the power of the supreme lord. As shown above, those servants belong to the supreme lord, not to him.
Dominion over animals comes from the right of nature.
10 We gain the right to rule animals without reason in the same way we gain the right to rule people: through force and natural strength. In the state of nature, because everyone is at war with everyone, a person may subdue or kill other people whenever it seems to serve his own good. He may do so all the more with animals. At his discretion, he may bring under his control the animals that can be tamed and made useful by training. He may wage continual war against the rest, pursuing and destroying them as dangerous and harmful. Our dominion over animals therefore comes from the right of nature, not from any explicit right granted by divine law. If this right had not existed before the Sacred Scriptures were made known, no one could rightfully have killed an animal for food unless God's will had been revealed to him in those writings. That would be a very hard condition for people: animals could devour them without committing an injury, while people could not kill the animals. Since the right of nature allows an animal to kill a person, the same right allows a person to kill an animal.