Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter VII
Chapter VII of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal Italian
De’ Principati nuovi, che con forze d’altri e per fortuna si acquistano.
Coloro i quali solamente per fortuna diventano di privati Principi, con poca fatica diventano, ma con assai si mantengono: e non hanno difficultà alcuna tra via, perchè vi volano; ma tutte le difficultà nascono dappoi che vi sono posti. E questi tali sono quelli, a chi è concesso alcuno Stato o per danari, o per grazia di chi lo concede, come intervenne a molti in Grecia nelle città di Ionia, e dell’Ellesponto, dove furono fatti Principi da Dario, acciò le tenessero per sua sicurtà e gloria, come erano ancora fatti quelli Imperadori, che di privati per corruzione de’ soldati pervenivano allo Imperio. Questi stanno semplicemente in su la volontà e fortuna di chi gli ha fatti grandi, che sono due cose volubilissime e instabili, e non sanno e non possono tenere quel grado; non sanno, perchè se non è uomo di grande ingegno e virtù, non è ragionevole, che, essendo sempre vissuto in privata fortuna, sappia comandare; non possono, perchè non hanno forze che gli possino essere amiche e fedeli. Dipoi gli Stati che vengono subito, come tutte le altre cose della natura che nascono e crescono presto, non possono avere le radici e corrispondenzie loro in modo che il primo tempo avverso non le spenga; se già quelli, come è detto, che sì in un subito sono diventati Principi, non sono di tanta virtù, che quello che la fortuna ha messo loro in grembo, sappino subito prepararsi a conservare, e quelli fondamenti, che gli altri hanno fatti avanti che diventino Principi, gli faccino poi.
Io voglio all’uno e all’altro di questi modi, circa il diventare Principe per virtù o per fortuna, addurre duoi esempi stati ne’ dì della memoria nostra: e questi sono Francesco Sforza, e Cesare Borgia. Francesco per li debiti mezzi, e con una sua gran virtù, di privato diventò Duca di Milano, e quello che con mille affanni aveva acquistato, con poca fatica mantenne. Dall’altra parte Cesare Borgia, chiamato dal vulgo Duca Valentino, acquistò lo Stato con la fortuna del Padre, e con quella lo perdette, non ostante che per lui si usasse ogni opera, e facessinsi tutte quelle cose che per un prudente e virtuoso uomo si dovevano fare, per mettere le radici sue in quelli Stati, che l’armi e fortuna di altri gli aveva concessi. Perchè, come di sopra si disse, chi non fa i fondamenti prima, gli potrebbe con una gran virtù fare dipoi, ancorchè si faccino con disagio dell’architettore, e pericolo dello edificio. Se adunque si considererà tutti i progressi del Duca, si vedrà quanto lui avesse fatto gran fondamenti alla futura potenzia, li quali non giudico superfluo discorrere, perchè io non saprei quali precetti mi dare migliori ad un Principe nuovo, che lo esempio delle azioni sue; e se gli ordini suoi non gli giovarono, non fu sua colpa, perchè nacque da una strasordinaria ed estrema malignità di fortuna. Aveva Alessandro VI nel voler fare grande il Duca suo figliuolo assai difficultà presenti e future. Prima non vedeva via di poterlo fare Signore di alcuno Stato, che non fusse Stato di Chiesa; e sapeva che il Duca di Milano e i Viniziani non glielo consentirebbono, perchè Faenza e Rimino erano di già sotto la protezione de’ Viniziani. Vedeva, oltre a questo, le armi d’Italia, e quelle in spezie, di chi si fusse possuto servire, essere nelle mani di coloro che dovevano temere la grandezza del Papa; e però non se ne poteva fidare, essendo tutte negli Orsini, e Colonnesi, e loro seguaci. Era adunque necessario che si turbassero quelli ordini, e disordinare gli Stati d’Italia, per potersi insignorire sicuramente di parte di quelli; il che gli fu facile; perchè trovò i Viniziani, che mossi da altre cagioni si erano volti a fare ripassare i Francesi in Italia; il che non solamente non contradisse, ma fece più facile con la risoluzione del matrimonio antico del Re Luigi. Passò adunque il Re in Italia con lo aiuto de’ Viniziani e consenso di Alessandro; nè prima fu in Milano, che il Papa ebbe da lui gente per l’impresa di Romagna, la quale gli fu consentita per la riputazione del Re.
Acquistata adunque il Duca la Romagna, e battuti i Colonnesi, volendo mantenere quella, e procedere più avanti, l’impedivano due cose: l’una l’armi sue, che non gli parevano fedeli; l’altra la volontà di Francia; cioè temeva che l’armi Orsine, delle quali si era servito, non gli mancassero sotto, e non solamente gl’impedissero l’acquistare, ma gli togliessero l’acquistato; e che il Re ancora non gli facesse il simile. Degli Orsini ne ebbe uno riscontro quando dopo l’espugnazione di Faenza assaltò Bologna, che gli vide andare freddi in quello assalto. E circa il Re, cognobbe l’animo suo, quando, preso il Ducato di Urbino, assaltò la Toscana; dalla quale impresa il Re lo fece desistere; ondechè il Duca deliberò non dipendere più dalla fortuna ed armi d’altri. E la prima cosa indebolì le parti Orsine e Colonnesi in Roma, perchè tutti gli aderenti loro, che fussino gentiluomini, si guadagnò, facendogli suoi gentiluomini, e, dando loro gran provvisioni, gli onorò secondo le qualità loro, di condotte e di governi; in modo che in pochi mesi negli animi loro l’affezione delle parti si spense, e tutta si volse nel Duca.
Dopo questo aspettò l’occasione di spegnere gli Orsini, avendo dispersi quelli di casa Colonna, la quale gli venne bene, ed egli usò meglio; perchè avvedutisi gli Orsini tardi che la grandezza del Duca e della Chiesa era la lor rovina, fecero una dieta a Magione nel Perugino. Da quella nacque la ribellione di Urbino, e li tumulti di Romagna, ed infiniti pericoli del Duca, li quali superò tutti con l’aiuto de’ Francesi; e ritornatoli la riputazione, nè si fidando di Francia, nè di altre forze esterne, per non le avere a cimentare si volse agl’inganni, e seppe tanto dissimulare l’animo suo, che gli Orsini, mediante il Signor Paulo, si riconciliarono seco, con il quale il duca non mancò di ogni ragione di ufizio per assicurarlo, dandoli veste, danari, e cavalli; tantochè la semplicità loro gli condusse a Sinigaglia nelle sue mani. Spenti adunque questi capi, e ridotti li partigiani loro amici suoi, aveva il Duca gittati assai buoni fondamenti alla potenza sua, avendo tutta la Romagna con il Ducato di Urbino, e guadagnatosi tutti quei popoli, per avere incominciato a gustare il ben essere loro. E perchè questa parte è degna di notizia, e da essere imitata da altri, non la voglio lasciare indietro.
Preso che ebbe il Duca la Romagna, trovandola essere stata comandata da Signori impotenti, quali piuttosto avevano spogliato i loro sudditi, che correttoli, e dato loro materia di disunione, che di unione; tantochè quella provincia era tutta piena di latrocini, di brighe, e di ogni altra sorte d’insolenza, giudicò necessario, a volerla ridurre pacifica ed obbediente al braccio regio, darli un buon governo. Però vi prepose messer Ramiro d’Orco, uomo crudele ed espedito, al quale dette pienissima potestà. Costui in breve tempo la ridusse pacifica e unita con grandissima riputazione. Dipoi giudicò il Duca non essere a proposito sì eccessiva autorità, perchè dubitava non diventasse odiosa; e preposevi un giudizio civile nel mezzo della provincia, con un presidente eccellentissimo, dove ogni città avea l’avvocato suo. E perchè cognosceva le rigorosità passate avergli generato qualche odio, per purgare gli animi di quelli popoli, e guadagnarseli in tutto, volse mostrare che se crudeltà alcuna era seguita, non era nata da lui, ma dall’acerba natura del ministro. E, preso sopra questo occasione, lo fece mettere una mattina in duo pezzi a Cesena in su la piazza con un pezzo di legno e un coltello sanguinoso a canto. La ferocità del quale spettacolo fece quelli popoli in un tempo rimanere soddisfatti e stupidi. Ma torniamo donde noi partimmo.
Dico, che trovandosi il Duca assai potente, ed in parte assicurato da’ presenti pericoli, per essersi armato a suo modo, ed avere in buona parte spente quelle armi che vicine lo potevano offendere, li restava, volendo procedere con l’acquisto, il respetto di Francia; perchè cognosceva che dal Re, il quale tardi si era avveduto dell’errore suo, non gli sarebbe sopportato. E cominciò per questo a cercare amicizie nuove, e vacillare con Francia, nella venuta che fecero i Francesi verso il Regno di Napoli contro li Spagnuoli che assediavano Gaeta. E l’animo suo era di assicurarsi di loro; il che già saria presto riuscito, se Alessandro viveva. E questi furono i governi suoi circa le cose presenti. Ma quanto alle future egli aveva da dubitare; prima che un nuovo successore alla Chiesa non gli fusse amico, e cercasse torgli quello che Alessandro gli aveva dato; e pensò farlo in quattro modi. Primo, con ispegnere tutti i sangui di quelli Signori che egli aveva spogliato, per torre al Papa quelle occasioni. Secondo, con guadagnarsi tutti i gentiluomini di Roma per potere con quelli, come è detto, tenere il Papa in freno. Terzo, con ridurre il Collegio più suo che poteva. Quarto, con acquistare tanto imperio, avanti che il Papa morisse, che potesse per sè medesimo resistere a un primo impeto.
Di queste quattro cose alla morte di Alessandro ne aveva condotte tre; la quarta aveva quasi per condotta. Perchè de’ Signori spogliati ne ammazzò quanti ne potè aggiugnere, e pochissimi si salvarono; i gentiluomini Romani si aveva guadagnato; e nel Collegio aveva grandissima parte. E quanto al nuovo acquisto, aveva disegnato diventare Signore di Toscana; e possedeva già Perugia e Piombino, e di Pisa aveva preso la protezione. E come non avesse dovuto avere rispetto a Francia (che non glie n’aveva ad aver più, per essere già i Francesi spogliati del Regno di Napoli dagli Spagnuoli, in forma che ciascun di loro era necessitato di comperare l’amicizia sua), saltava in Pisa. Dopo questo, Lucca e Siena cedeva subito, parte per invidia de’ Fiorentini, e parte per paura; i Fiorentini non avevano rimedio; il che se li fusse riuscito, che gli riusciva l’anno medesimo che Alessandro morì, si acquistava tante forze e tanta riputazione, che per sè stesso si sarebbe retto, senza dipendere dalla fortuna o forza d’altri, ma solo dalla potenza e virtù sua. Ma Alessandro morì dopo cinque anni, che egli aveva incominciato a trarre fuora la spada. Lasciollo con lo Stato di Roma solamente assolidato, con tutti gli altri in aria, intra duoi potentissimi eserciti inimici, ammalato a morte. Ed era nel Duca tanta ferocia e tanta virtù, e si ben cognosceva come gli uomini s’abbino a guadagnare o perdere, e tanto erano validi i fondamenti che in sì poco tempo si aveva fatti, che se non avesse avuto quelli eserciti addosso, o fusse stato sano, arebbe retto ad ogni difficultà. E che li fondamenti suoi fussino buoni, si vide, che la Romagna l’aspettò più di un mese; in Roma, ancora che mezzo morto, stette sicuro; e benchè i Baglioni, Vitelli, e Orsini venissero in Roma, non ebbero seguito contro di lui. Potè fare, se non chi egli volle, almeno che non fusse Papa chi egli non voleva. Ma se nella morte di Alessandro fusse stato sano, ogni cosa gli era facile. Ed egli mi disse ne’ dì che fu creato Iulio II, che avea pensato a tutto quello che potesse nascere morendo il Padre, e a tutto aveva trovato rimedio, eccetto che non pensò mai in su la sua morte di stare ancora lui per morire. Raccolte adunque tutte queste azioni del Duca, non saprei riprenderlo, anzi mi pare, come io ho fatto, di proporlo ad imitare a tutti coloro, che per fortuna e con l’armi d’altri sono saliti all’imperio. Perchè egli avendo l’animo grande, e la sua intenzione alta, non si poteva governare altrimente; e solo si oppose alli suoi disegni la brevità della vita di Alessandro, e la sua infirmità.
Chi adunque giudica necessario nel suo Principato nuovo assicurarsi degl’inimici, guadagnarsi amici, vincere o per forza o per fraude, farsi amare e temere da’ populi, seguire e riverire da’ soldati, spegnere quelli che ti possono o debbono offendere, e innovare con nuovi modi gli ordini antichi, essere severo e grato, magnanimo e liberale, spegnere la milizia infedele, creare della nuova, mantenersi le amicizie de’ Re e delli Principi, in modo che ti abbino a beneficare con grazia, o ad offendere con rispetto, non può trovare più freschi esempi, che le azioni di costui. Solamente si può accusarlo nella creazione di Iulio II, nella quale egli ebbe mala elezione; perchè, come è detto, non potendo fare un Papa a suo modo, poteva tenere, che uno non fusse Papa; e non dovea acconsentire mai al Papato di quelli Cardinali, che lui avesse offesi, o che diventati Pontefici avessino ad avere paura di lui. Perchè gli uomini offendono o per paura, o per odio. Quelli che egli aveva offesi, erano, tra gli altri, S. Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, S. Giorgio, Ascanio. Tutti gli altri assunti al Pontificato avevano da temerlo, eccetto Roano e gli Spagnuoli. Questi per coniunzione e obbligo, quello per potenza, avendo congiunto seco il Regno di Francia. Pertanto il Duca innanzi ad ogni cosa doveva creare Papa uno Spagnuolo; e, non potendo, dovea consentire che fusse Roano, e non S. Pietro ad Vincula. E chi crede che ne’ personaggi grandi beneficii nuovi faccino dimenticare l’ingiurie vecchie, s’inganna. Errò adunque il Duca in questa elezione, e fu cagione dell’ultima rovina sua.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of New Principalities Acquired Through the Forces of Others and by Fortune
Those who rise from private life to become Princes solely through fortune rise with little effort, but maintain their position with much. They meet no difficulty on the way, for they fly there; all the difficulties arise once they have arrived. Such men are those to whom a state is granted either for money or through the favor of the one who grants it, as happened to many in the Greek cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where Darius made them Princes so that they might hold those cities for his security and glory. So too were those emperors made who rose from private life to the empire by corrupting the soldiers. Such men depend entirely on the will and fortune of those who have made them great, two of the most changeable and unstable things; they neither know how nor are able to maintain their rank. They do not know how, because unless a man has great intelligence and ability, it is unreasonable to expect that someone who has always lived as a private person should know how to command. They are not able to, because they have no forces that can be friendly and loyal to them. Moreover, states that spring up suddenly, like all other things in nature that are born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and connections so firm that the first adversity will not destroy them—unless those who have so suddenly become Princes possess enough ability to prepare at once to preserve what fortune has placed in their laps, and afterward lay the foundations that others laid before they became Princes.
To illustrate each of these two ways of becoming a Prince, by ability or by fortune, I wish to offer two examples from our own time: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and his own great ability, rose from private life to become Duke of Milan; what he had acquired through a thousand hardships he maintained with little effort. Cesare Borgia, on the other hand, popularly called Duke Valentino, acquired his state through his father's fortune and lost it along with that fortune, despite employing every effort himself and doing everything a prudent and capable man should do to put down roots in the states that the arms and fortune of others had granted him. For, as I said above, a man who does not lay foundations beforehand may still lay them afterward through great ability, although the work is difficult for the builder and dangerous for the building. If, then, we consider all the Duke's actions, we shall see how substantial the foundations were that he laid for his future power. I do not think it superfluous to examine them, because I know no better counsel to give a new Prince than the example of his deeds. If his measures did not help him, it was not his fault; the cause was an extraordinary and extreme malice of fortune. In seeking to make his son the Duke powerful, Pope Alexander VI faced many difficulties, both immediate and future. First, he could see no way to make him lord of a state that was not a state of the Church; and he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not allow him to take one, since Faenza and Rimini were already under Venetian protection. He saw, moreover, that the arms of Italy, and especially those he might have used, were in the hands of men who had reason to fear the Pope's greatness. He could not trust them, for they all belonged to the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. It was therefore necessary to disrupt these arrangements and throw the states of Italy into disorder, so that he could securely take possession of a part of them. This proved easy for him: he found that the Venetians, moved by other causes, had resolved to bring the French back into Italy. Far from opposing this, he made it easier by dissolving King Louis's former marriage. The King thus entered Italy with Venetian help and Alexander's consent; and no sooner had he reached Milan than the Pope received troops from him for the campaign in Romagna, which was allowed to proceed because of the King's standing.
Having acquired Romagna and defeated the Colonna, the Duke wished to hold that territory and advance farther, but two things stood in his way: his own forces, which he thought unreliable, and the will of France. He feared that the Orsini troops he had employed would fail him, not only obstructing further conquests but taking away what he had already won; he feared that the King might do the same. He received a warning about the Orsini when, after taking Faenza, he attacked Bologna and saw how little enthusiasm they showed for the assault. As for the King, he learned his intentions when, after taking the duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany and the King forced him to abandon the campaign. The Duke therefore resolved to depend no longer on the fortune and arms of others. His first step was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome: he won over all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his own courtiers, awarding them generous stipends, and honoring them according to their standing with military commands and governorships. Within a few months their attachment to their factions had died out and turned wholly toward the Duke.
After this, having scattered the members of the Colonna family, he waited for an opportunity to destroy the Orsini. The opportunity came, and he used it even better than it presented itself. The Orsini realized too late that the growing power of the Duke and the Church meant their ruin, and held a meeting at Magione in the Perugia district. From it came the rebellion of Urbino, disturbances in Romagna, and countless dangers for the Duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Once his standing was restored, however, he trusted neither France nor any other outside force. Rather than put them to the test, he turned to deception, concealing his intentions so well that the Orsini, through Signor Paolo, were reconciled with him. The Duke spared no courtesy to reassure Paolo, giving him clothes, money, and horses; thus the Orsini's credulity brought them into his hands at Senigallia. Having eliminated these leaders and made their followers his friends, the Duke had laid very sound foundations for his power: he held all Romagna and the duchy of Urbino, and had won over all those peoples, who had begun to taste the benefits of better government. Because this episode deserves notice and imitation by others, I do not wish to pass it over.
When the Duke took Romagna, he found that it had been ruled by ineffectual lords, who had despoiled their subjects rather than corrected them and given them causes for division rather than unity. The province was full of robberies, quarrels, and every other kind of lawlessness. He judged it necessary, if he wished to bring it to peace and obedience to his sovereign authority, to give it good government. He therefore placed Messer Ramiro d'Orco over it, a cruel and decisive man, and gave him full powers. In a short time Ramiro made it peaceful and united, to his own great renown. The Duke then judged that such excessive authority was no longer advisable, fearing that it might become hated. He established a civil court in the center of the province, presided over by an excellent magistrate, where every city had its own advocate. And because he knew that the earlier severities had aroused some hatred against him, he wished to clear the minds of the people and win them over completely by showing that whatever cruelty had occurred arose not from him but from the minister's harsh nature. Seizing an occasion to do so, he had Ramiro placed one morning in two pieces in the square at Cesena, with a block of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stunned. But let us return to where we left off.
I say that the Duke, having become quite powerful and in some measure secured himself against immediate dangers by arming himself as he wished and largely extinguishing the nearby forces that could harm him, still had to reckon with France if he wanted to extend his conquests. He knew that the King, who had belatedly realized his mistake, would not tolerate it. He therefore began to seek new alliances and waver in his loyalty to France when the French marched toward the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards besieging Gaeta. His intention was to secure himself against the French, and he would soon have succeeded had Alexander lived. Such were his measures for present affairs. As for the future, he had to fear, first, that a new pope would be unfriendly to him and seek to take away what Alexander had given him. He planned to prevent this in four ways. First, he would extinguish the bloodlines of all the lords he had dispossessed, removing those grounds for action from the pope. Second, he would win over all the gentlemen of Rome so that, as I have said, he could use them to keep the pope in check. Third, he would bring the College of Cardinals as much as possible onto his side. Fourth, he would acquire enough dominion before the pope died to withstand the first assault by his own strength.
Of these four aims he had achieved three when Alexander died; the fourth was nearly accomplished. He had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could reach, and very few escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen; and he had a very large following in the College. As for further conquest, he planned to become lord of Tuscany. He already held Perugia and Piombino and had taken Pisa under his protection. And once he no longer had to defer to France—as indeed he no longer did, since the Spaniards had already stripped the French of the kingdom of Naples, leaving both sides obliged to purchase his friendship—he would swoop upon Pisa. After that Lucca and Siena would yield at once, partly from envy of the Florentines and partly from fear; the Florentines would have no remedy. Had this succeeded, as it would have done in the very year Alexander died, he would have acquired such strength and such standing that he could have stood on his own, depending no longer on the fortune or forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability. Yet Alexander died only five years after the Duke had begun to draw his sword. He left the Duke with his hold on Rome alone secure, all his other possessions in the balance, between two immensely powerful enemy armies, and mortally ill. Such was the Duke's boldness and ability, so well did he understand how to win men or destroy them, and so strong were the foundations he had laid in so little time, that, had those armies not been upon him, or had he been healthy, he would have overcome every difficulty. That his foundations were sound was clear: Romagna waited for him for more than a month; in Rome, though half dead, he remained safe; and although the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini came to Rome, they gained no following against him. If he could not make the man he wanted pope, he could at least prevent the election of one he did not want. Had he been healthy when Alexander died, everything would have been easy for him. In the days when Julius II was elected, he told me that he had considered everything that might happen upon his father's death and found a remedy for it all, except that he had never imagined he himself would be near death at the same time. Considering all these actions of the Duke together, I cannot condemn him. Rather, as I have done, I think he should be held up for imitation by all who have risen to power through fortune and the arms of others. For a man of such great spirit and high ambition could not have acted otherwise; only the shortness of Alexander's life and his own illness thwarted his plans.
Whoever, then, judges it necessary in his new principality to secure himself against enemies, win friends, conquer by force or deception, make himself loved and feared by the people, followed and respected by soldiers, destroy those who can or are bound to harm him, replace old institutions with new ones, be stern and gracious, magnanimous and generous, destroy disloyal troops and create new ones, and maintain friendships with kings and Princes so that they help him willingly or harm him only with caution, can find no fresher examples than the actions of this man. He can be faulted only for his choice in the election of Julius II, in which he chose badly. For, as I have said, although he could not make the pope of his choice, he could prevent someone else from becoming pope; and he should never have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured, or who would have reason to fear him upon becoming pope. Men do harm either from fear or from hatred. Those he had injured included San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others, if raised to the papacy, would have had reason to fear him, except the cardinal of Rouen and the Spaniards: the Spaniards because of their ties and obligations to him, Rouen because of his power, with the kingdom of France allied to him. The Duke should therefore, above all, have made a Spaniard pope; if he could not, he should have agreed to Rouen, not San Pietro ad Vincula. Whoever believes that new favors make great men forget old injuries deceives himself. The Duke erred, then, in this election, and brought about his final ruin.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
On New Principalities Acquired with Other People's Forces and through Fortune
People who become Princes from private citizens solely through fortune have little trouble rising to power, but a great deal of trouble keeping it. They meet no difficulties on the way, because they fly there. All the difficulties begin once they are in place. Such people receive a state either for money or as a favor from the person granting it. This happened to many people in the Greek cities of Ionia and the Hellespont. Darius made them Princes so that they would hold those cities for his security and glory. It also happened to those emperors who rose from private life to imperial power by bribing the soldiers. These men depend entirely on the will and fortune of the person who raised them, two things that change easily and cannot be relied on. They do not know how to hold their position, and they cannot hold it. They do not know how because, unless a man has exceptional intelligence and ability, it is unreasonable to expect someone who has always lived as a private citizen to know how to command. They cannot hold it because they have no forces that can be their friends and stay loyal to them. Besides, states that spring up at once are like everything else in nature that is born and grows quickly. They cannot develop roots and connections strong enough to keep the first spell of bad weather from destroying them. The only exception is if these suddenly made Princes have enough ability to prepare at once to keep what fortune has put in their laps. They must build afterward the foundations that other Princes laid before coming to power.
I want to give two examples from our own time of these two ways of becoming a Prince, through ability or through fortune: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco used the proper means and his great ability to rise from private citizen to Duke of Milan. He had won the duchy with a thousand hardships, but kept it with little effort. Cesare Borgia, whom people commonly called Duke Valentino, gained his state through his father's fortune and lost it when that fortune failed. Yet he did everything he could and took every step that a sensible, capable man should take to put down roots in the states that another man's arms and fortune had given him. As I said above, a man who does not lay his foundations first can still lay them later if he has great ability, although this causes trouble for the builder and puts the building at risk. If we consider all the Duke's actions, we will see that he laid strong foundations for his future power. I think it is worth discussing them, because I know no better advice to give a new Prince than the example of what he did. If his measures did not save him, the fault was not his. It was due to an extraordinary and extreme stroke of bad fortune. Pope Alexander VI faced many difficulties, both immediate and future, when he tried to make his son, the Duke, powerful. First, he could see no way to make him lord of a state that was not already part of the Church's lands. He knew the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not allow that, since Faenza and Rimini were already under Venetian protection. He also saw that Italy's armed forces, especially those he might have used, were controlled by people who had reason to fear the Pope's growing power. He could not trust those forces: they all belonged to the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. So he had to upset that balance and throw the states of Italy into disorder before he could safely take control of part of them. This proved easy. He found the Venetians already willing, for reasons of their own, to bring the French back into Italy. He did not oppose their plan. Instead, he made it easier by dissolving King Louis's earlier marriage. The king then entered Italy with Venetian help and Alexander's consent. As soon as he reached Milan, the Pope received troops from him for his campaign in Romagna. The king's standing made that campaign possible.
After the Duke took Romagna and defeated the Colonna, two things stood in his way as he tried to keep it and conquer more: his own troops, who seemed unreliable, and the wishes of France. He feared that the Orsini troops he had employed might fail him. They might not only stop him from taking more territory but also take away what he had already won. He feared the king might do the same. He saw a sign of the Orsini's intentions when he attacked Bologna after capturing Faenza: they showed little enthusiasm for the attack. He learned what the king had in mind when, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany. The king made him abandon that campaign. The Duke therefore decided to stop relying on other people's fortune and arms. First he weakened the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome. He won over all their supporters who were gentlemen by making them members of his own household. He gave them large payments and, according to their rank, honored them with military commands and governorships. In a few months, their loyalty to their factions died away and shifted entirely to the Duke.
After scattering the Colonna family, he waited for a chance to destroy the Orsini. The chance came at just the right time, and he used it even better. The Orsini realized too late that the growing power of the Duke and the Church meant their ruin, and they held a meeting at Magione, near Perugia. That meeting led to the revolt of Urbino, unrest in Romagna, and countless dangers for the Duke. He overcame them all with French help. Once he had regained his standing, he did not want to depend on France or any other outside force, because he did not want to put those forces to the test. So he turned to deception. He hid his intentions so well that the Orsini made peace with him through Signor Paolo. The Duke did everything he could to reassure Paolo, giving him clothes, money, and horses. Their trustfulness finally brought them into his hands at Senigallia. After killing these leaders and winning their supporters over to his side, the Duke had laid very good foundations for his power. He held all of Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino, and he had won over their people, who had begun to enjoy better conditions. This part of his conduct deserves attention and imitation, so I do not want to pass it over.
When the Duke took Romagna, he found that it had been ruled by weak lords. They had robbed their subjects instead of correcting them and had given them reasons to quarrel rather than unite. As a result, the province was full of robberies, feuds, and every other kind of lawlessness. To make it peaceful and obedient to the ruler's authority, he decided it needed good government. He put Messer Ramiro d'Orco in charge, a cruel and decisive man, and gave him complete power. In a short time Ramiro restored peace and unity to the province and earned a great reputation for doing it. The Duke then decided that such sweeping power was no longer suitable. He feared it would become hated, so he set up a civil court in the center of the province. It had an excellent presiding judge, and each city had its own advocate there. The Duke knew that the past severity had produced some hatred toward him. He wanted to clear the people's minds of it and win them completely. So he decided to show that any cruelty had come not from him but from his minister's harsh nature. Seizing an opportunity, he had Ramiro placed in two pieces in the square at Cesena one morning, with a block of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The brutality of the sight left the people both satisfied and stunned. But let us return to where we left off.
The Duke was now quite powerful and partly safe from immediate dangers. He had armed himself as he wished and had largely destroyed the nearby forces that could harm him. But if he wanted to gain more territory, he still had to reckon with France. He knew the king had belatedly realized his mistake and would not put up with further expansion. So the Duke began looking for new allies and pulling away from France as the French marched toward the Kingdom of Naples to fight the Spaniards besieging Gaeta. His aim was to protect himself against the French. He would soon have succeeded if Alexander had lived. These were the Duke's measures for dealing with immediate matters. He also had to think about the future. First, he had to fear that the next pope might be hostile and might try to take away what Alexander had given him. He planned four ways to prevent that. First, he would wipe out the families of all the lords he had dispossessed, leaving the pope no such opportunity to act against him. Second, he would win over all the gentlemen of Rome so he could use them, as I have said, to keep the pope in check. Third, he would bring as much of the College of Cardinals as possible onto his side. Fourth, he would gain enough territory before the Pope died to withstand an initial attack on his own.
By the time Alexander died, the Duke had accomplished three of these four things, and he had nearly accomplished the fourth. He killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could reach; very few escaped. He had won over the Roman gentlemen and had a large share of support in the College. As for gaining new territory, he planned to become lord of Tuscany. He already held Perugia and Piombino and had taken Pisa under his protection. He was ready to move into Pisa without worrying about France. He no longer needed to worry, because the Spaniards had already driven the French from the Kingdom of Naples. Both sides now needed to buy his friendship. After Pisa, Lucca and Siena would quickly yield, partly from hostility toward the Florentines and partly from fear. The Florentines would have had no way to stop him. If this plan had succeeded, as it would have in the very year Alexander died, the Duke would have gained enough strength and standing to stand on his own. He would no longer have depended on anyone else's fortune or force, but only on his own power and ability. Yet Alexander died only five years after the Duke first drew his sword. He left the Duke with only his position in Rome firmly secured; everything else was uncertain. The Duke was between two very powerful enemy armies, and he was deathly ill. Still, he had such fierce spirit and ability, knew so well how to win people over or cast them off, and had laid such strong foundations in so short a time, that he could have faced any difficulty if those armies had not been upon him or if he had been healthy. The soundness of his foundations was clear: Romagna waited for him for more than a month. In Rome, though half dead, he remained safe. And although the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came to Rome, they gained no support against him. Even if he could not make his preferred candidate pope, he could at least prevent someone he opposed from becoming pope. If he had been healthy when Alexander died, everything would have been easy for him. He told me, in the days when Julius II was made pope, that he had considered everything that might happen on his father's death and found a remedy for it all. The one thing he had never imagined was that he himself would be dying at the same time. Taking all the Duke's actions together, I cannot find fault with him. Instead, as I have done, I think he should be held up as an example to everyone who rises to power through fortune and other people's arms. His ambitions were great, and he could not have acted otherwise. Only Alexander's short remaining life and the Duke's own illness stood in the way of his plans.
Anyone who thinks it necessary, in a new principality, to secure himself against enemies, win friends, prevail by force or deception, make the people love and fear him, make soldiers follow and respect him, destroy those who can or are likely to harm him, and replace old arrangements with new ones should look to this Duke. The same goes for anyone who wants to be strict yet welcome, generous in spirit and in gifts, to get rid of disloyal troops and create a new army, and to keep the friendship of kings and Princes so that they gladly do him favors or hesitate before attacking him. No one will find more recent examples than this man's actions. He can be blamed only for the choice of Julius II as pope. It was a bad choice. As I said, though the Duke could not make his own choice pope, he could prevent a candidate he opposed from becoming pope. He should never have agreed to the election of any cardinal he had offended, or one who would fear him if made pope. People cause harm out of either fear or hatred. Among the cardinals he had offended were San Pietro in Vincoli, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others would have had reason to fear him if elected, except the cardinal of Rouen and the Spanish cardinals. The Spaniards were tied to him by their connections and obligations; Rouen had power because the Kingdom of France stood behind him. So the Duke should above all have made a Spaniard pope. If he could not do that, he should have agreed to Rouen, not San Pietro in Vincoli. Anyone who believes that new favors make powerful people forget old injuries is mistaken. The Duke made an error in this election, and it caused his final ruin.