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Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work

Chapter XXIII

Chapter XXIII of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.

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Original Italian

Come si debbino fuggire gli adulatori.

Non voglio lasciare indietro un capo importante, ed un errore, dal quale i Principi con difficultà si difendono, se non sono prudentissimi, o se non hanno buona elezione. E questo è quello degli adulatori, delli quali le corti sono piene, perchè gli uomini si compiacciono tanto nelle cose lor proprie, e in modo vi s’ingannano, che con difficultà si difendono da questa peste; ed a volersene difendere si porta pericolo di non diventare disprezzato. Perchè non ci è altro modo a guardarsi dalle adulazioni, se non che gli uomini intendino che non ti offendono a dirti il vero; ma quando ciascuno può dirti il vero, ti manca la riverenza. Pertanto un Principe prudente deve tenere un terzo modo, eleggendo nel suo Stato uomini savi, e solo a quelli deve dare libero arbitrio a parlargli la verità, e di quelle cose sole che lui domanda, e non di altro; ma deve domandargli di ogni cosa, e udire le opinioni loro, dipoi deliberare da sè a suo modo; e con questi consigli, e con ciascun di loro portarsi in modo, che ognuno conosca che quanto più liberamente si parlerà, tanto più gli sarà accettato; fuori di quelli, non volere udire alcuno, andar dietro alla cosa deliberata, ed essere ostinato nelle deliberazioni sue. Chi fa altrimenti o precipita per gli adulatori, o si muta spesso per la variazione de’ pareri; di che nasce la poca estimazione sua. Io voglio a questo proposito addurre un esempio moderno. Pre’ Luca, uomo di Massimiliano presente Imperatore, parlando di sua Maestà, disse, come non si consigliava con persona, e non faceva mai d’alcuna cosa a suo modo; il che nasceva dal tenere contrario termine al sopradetto; perchè l’Imperatore è uomo segreto, non comunica li suoi segreti con persona, non ne piglia parere. Ma come nel mettergli ad effetto s’incominciano a conoscere e scuoprire, gl’incominciano ad esser contradetti da coloro che egli ha d’intorno, e quello come facile se ne stoglie. Di qui nasce che quelle cose che fa l’un giorno, distrugge l’altro; e che non s’intenda mai quello che vogli, o disegni fare, e che sopra le sue deliberazioni non si può fondare.

Un Principe pertanto deve consigliarsi sempre, ma quando lui vuole, non quando altri vuole; anzi deve torre animo a ciascuno di consigliarlo d’alcuna cosa, se non gliene domanda; ma lui deve ben essere largo domandatore, e dipoi, circa le cose domandate, paziente auditore del vero; anzi intendendo che alcuno per qualche rispetto non gliene dica, turbarsene. E perchè molti stimano che alcun Principe, il quale dà di sè opinione di prudente, sia così tenuto non per sua natura, ma per li buoni consigli che lui ha d’intorno, senza dubbio s’ingannano; perchè questa non falla mai, ed è regola generale, che un Principe, il quale non sia savio per sè stesso, non può essere consigliato bene, se già a sorte non si rimettesse in un solo che al tutto lo governasse, che fusse uomo prudentissimo. In questo caso potria bene essere ben governato, ma durerebbe poco, perchè quello governatore in breve tempo gli torrebbe lo Stato; ma consigliandosi con più d’uno, un Principe che non sia savio, non arà mai uniti consigli, nè saprà per sè stesso unirgli. Dei consiglieri ciascuno penserà alla proprietà sua; ed egli non gli saprà correggere, nè cognoscere. E non si possono trovare altrimenti, perchè gli uomini sempre ti riusciranno tristi, se da una necessità non sono fatti buoni. Però si conchiude che li buoni consigli, da qualunque venghino, conviene naschino dalla prudenza del Principe, e non la prudenza del Principe da’ buoni consigli.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.

How to Avoid Flatterers

I do not want to leave out an important subject, and an error against which princes can defend themselves only with difficulty unless they are exceptionally prudent or choose their advisers well. I mean flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men take such pleasure in their own affairs, and deceive themselves about them so thoroughly, that they can scarcely guard against this plague; yet in trying to guard against it they risk falling into contempt. For there is no other way to protect oneself from flattery than to let men understand that they will not offend you by speaking the truth; but when anyone may tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent Prince, therefore, must take a third course: he must choose wise men within his state and give only them the freedom to speak the truth to him, and only on matters he asks about, not on others. But he must ask them about everything and hear their opinions, then make his own decision as he sees fit. He must behave toward these advisers, and toward each of them, so that all know the more freely they speak, the more welcome their words will be. Apart from them he must listen to no one, adhere to what he has decided, and remain firm in his decisions. Whoever does otherwise either comes to grief through flatterers or constantly changes course as opinions shift, and so loses esteem. On this subject I want to offer a modern example. Father Luca, a man in the service of Maximilian, the present emperor, said of His Majesty that he consulted no one and never did anything in his own way. This arose from his taking the opposite course to the one I have described: the emperor is secretive, shares his plans with no one, and asks no one's advice about them. But when he begins to put them into effect, they become known and come to light; then those around him begin to contradict them, and, easily swayed, he abandons them. Hence what he does one day he undoes the next; no one can ever tell what he wants or plans to do, and no one can rely on his decisions.

A Prince, then, should always seek counsel, but when he wishes, not when others wish. Indeed, he should discourage everyone from advising him about anything unless he asks for advice. He himself, however, should ask questions freely and then, on the matters he has asked about, listen patiently to the truth; and if he learns that anyone is withholding it for some reason, he should be angered. Many believe that a Prince reputed to be prudent owes his reputation not to his own nature but to the good advisers around him; they are certainly mistaken. For it is an unfailing general rule that a Prince who is not wise in his own right cannot be well advised, unless by chance he places himself entirely in the hands of one exceptionally prudent man, who governs him in every respect. In that case he might be well governed, but it would not last long, for that governor would soon take his state from him. If instead he consults more than one adviser, a Prince who is not himself wise will never receive counsel that agrees, nor will he know how to reconcile their advice himself. Each adviser will think of his own interests, and the Prince will know neither how to correct them nor how to recognize what they are doing. Nor can they be expected to be otherwise, for men will always turn out badly unless necessity makes them good. We may conclude, then, that good counsel, whoever gives it, must spring from the prudence of the Prince, and not the prudence of the Prince from good counsel.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.

How to Avoid Flatterers

I do not want to leave out an important subject and a mistake that Princes find hard to guard against unless they are very wise or choose their advisers well. The subject is flattery. Courts are full of flatterers because people take such pleasure in their own affairs, and deceive themselves so much about them, that they have trouble protecting themselves from this plague. Yet trying to protect yourself brings the risk of becoming despised. The only way to guard against flattery is to make people understand that telling you the truth will not offend you. But if everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A wise Prince should therefore take a third course. He should choose wise men in his state and give only them the freedom to speak the truth to him, and only about the things he asks them about. But he should ask them about everything and listen to their opinions. Then he should make his own decision in his own way. In dealing with these advisers, both together and individually, he should make it clear to each of them that the more openly he speaks, the more welcome his advice will be. He should refuse to listen to anyone else, follow through on what he has decided, and stand firm in his decisions. Anyone who acts differently either comes to ruin because of flatterers or keeps changing his mind as opinions change. As a result, people think less of him. I want to give a modern example of this. Father Luca, an associate of the current Emperor Maximilian, said of His Majesty that he consulted no one and never did anything as he himself intended. This came from doing the opposite of what I have described. The Emperor keeps his plans secret. He shares his secrets with no one and asks no one for an opinion. But when he starts putting his plans into effect, they become known and come to light. Those around him begin to oppose them, and he is easily persuaded to abandon them. That is why he undoes one day what he did the day before. No one can ever tell what he wants or plans to do, and no one can count on his decisions.

A Prince, then, should always seek advice, but when he wants it, not when other people want to give it. In fact, he should discourage everyone from advising him about anything unless he has asked. But he should ask plenty of questions, and then listen patiently to the truth about what he has asked. If he realizes that someone is holding back the truth for any reason, he should be upset. Some people think that a Prince with a reputation for wisdom owes it not to his own abilities but to the good advisers around him. They are certainly mistaken. There is a general rule that never fails: a Prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised. The only exception would be if he happened to put himself completely under the control of one extremely wise man. In that case, he might be governed well, but not for long, because that man would soon take his state away from him. If a Prince who lacks wisdom seeks advice from several people, he will never get consistent advice, and he will not know how to reconcile their views himself. Each adviser will look after his own interests, and the Prince will not know how to detect or correct this. Nor can advisers be expected to act otherwise: people will always turn out bad unless necessity makes them good. So good advice, whoever gives it, must grow out of the Prince's own good judgment. His good judgment cannot grow out of good advice.

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