Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter XXII
Chapter XXII of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Delli segretari de’ Principi.
Non è di poca importanza a un Principe la elezione de’ ministri, li quali sono buoni o no, secondo la prudenza del Principe. E la prima coniettura che si fa di un signore, e del cervel suo, è vedere gli uomini che lui ha d’intorno; e quando sono sufficienti e fedeli, sempre si può riputarlo savio, perchè ha saputo cognoscergli sufficienti e mantenerseli fedeli. Ma quando siano altrimenti, sempre si può fare non buono giudizio di lui; perchè il primo errore che e’ fa, lo fa in questa elezione. Non era alcuno che cognoscesse Messer Antonio da Venafro per ministro di Pandolfo Petrucci Principe di Siena, che non giudicasse Pandolfo essere prudentissimo uomo, avendo quello per suo ministro. E perchè sono di tre generazioni cervelli; l’uno intende per sè, l’altro intende quanto da altri gli è mostro, il terzo non intende nè sè stesso nè per dimostrazione d’altri. Quel primo è eccellentissimo, il secondo eccellente, il terzo inutile.
Conveniva pertanto di necessità, che se Pandolfo non era nel primo grado, fusse nel secondo; perchè ogni volta che uno ha giudicio di cognoscere il bene ed il male che un fa e dice, ancorachè da sè non abbia invenzione, cognosce le opere triste e le buone del ministro, e quelle esalta e le altre corregge; ed il ministro non può sperare d’ingannarlo, e mantiensi buono. Ma come un Principe possa cognoscere il ministro, ci è questo modo che non falla mai. Quando tu vedi il ministro pensare più a sè, che a te, e che in tutte le azioni vi ricerca l’utile suo, questo tale così fatto mai non fia buon ministro, nè mai te ne potrai fidare; perchè quello che ha lo Stato di uno in mano, non deve mai pensare a sè, ma al Principe; e non gli ricordare mai cosa, che non appartenga a lui. E dall’altra parte il Principe per mantenerlo buono deve pensare al ministro, onorandolo, facendolo ricco, obbligandoselo, partecipandogli gli onori e carichi, acciocchè li assai onori, le assai ricchezze concessegli siano causa che egli non desideri altri onori, e ricchezze; e gli assai carichi gli faccino temere le mutazioni, cognoscendo non poter reggersi senza lui. Quando adunque i Principi e li ministri sono così fatti, possono confidare l’uno dell’altro; quando altrimenti, il fine sarà sempre dannoso o per l’uno, o per l’altro.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Secretaries of Princes
The choice of ministers is no small matter for a Prince; whether they are good or not depends on the Prince's judgment. The first conjecture we make about a ruler and his intelligence comes from looking at the men around him. When they are capable and loyal, he can always be judged wise, for he has known how to recognize their abilities and keep their loyalty. But when they are otherwise, we can always judge him unfavorably, because his first error was in choosing them. No one who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as minister to Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, failed to judge Pandolfo a most prudent man for having him as his minister. There are three kinds of minds: one understands things for itself; another understands what is shown to it by others; the third understands neither on its own nor through what others show it. The first is outstanding, the second excellent, the third useless.
It followed necessarily, then, that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was of the second. For whenever a man has the judgment to recognize the good and bad in what another man does and says, even if he has no ideas of his own, he recognizes his minister's bad actions and good ones, praises the latter, and corrects the former. The minister cannot hope to deceive him and so remains honest. As for how a Prince can recognize a minister, there is a method that never fails. When you see a minister think more of himself than of you, seeking his own advantage in everything he does, such a man will never be a good minister, and you will never be able to trust him. For a man who has another's state in his hands must never think of himself, but of the Prince; he must never bring anything to the Prince's attention that does not concern the Prince. For his part, to keep his minister honest, the Prince must think of him: honor him, make him rich, bind him to himself, and share honors and responsibilities with him. Then the many honors and riches bestowed on him will leave him with no desire for more, and his many responsibilities will make him fear any change, knowing that he cannot stand without the Prince. When Princes and ministers are constituted in this way, they can trust one another; otherwise the outcome will always be harmful to one or the other.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
On the secretaries of princes.
A Prince's choice of ministers matters a great deal. They are good or bad according to the Prince's judgment. The first way people judge a ruler and his intelligence is by looking at the men around him. When they are capable and loyal, he can always be considered wise, because he knew how to recognize their ability and keep their loyalty. But when they are not, people can always judge him poorly. Choosing them was his first mistake. Everyone who knew Antonio da Venafro as a minister to Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, judged Pandolfo a very shrewd man for having him as a minister. There are three kinds of minds. One understands things on its own. Another understands what others explain to it. The third understands neither on its own nor through someone else's explanation. The first is outstanding, the second is good, and the third is useless.
Pandolfo must therefore have had at least the second kind of mind, if not the first. Whenever a person can judge the good and bad in what another man does and says, even if he cannot come up with ideas himself, he recognizes both the good and the bad work of his minister. He praises the good and corrects the bad. The minister cannot hope to deceive him, and so behaves well. There is one sure way for a Prince to judge a minister. If you see that he thinks more about himself than about you, and looks for his own advantage in everything he does, he will never be a good minister. You will never be able to trust him. A man responsible for someone else's state must never think of himself, only of the Prince. He must never bring up a matter that does not concern the Prince. For his part, the Prince must look after the minister to keep him loyal. He should honor him, make him rich, bind him to himself, and share honors and responsibilities with him. The many honors and riches he receives should leave him wanting no more. His many responsibilities should make him fear any change, knowing he cannot maintain his position without the Prince. When princes and ministers act in these ways, they can trust each other. Otherwise, the outcome will always harm one of them, or both.