Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter XX
Chapter XX of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Se le fortezze, e molte altre cose che spesse volte i Principi fanno, sono utili o dannose.
Alcuni Principi, per tenere sicuramente lo Stato, hanno disarmato i loro sudditi; alcuni altri hanno tenuto divise in parti le terre suggette; alcuni altri hanno nutrito nimicizie contro a sè medesimi; alcuni altri si sono volti a guadagnarsi quelli che gli erano sospetti nel principio del suo Stato; alcuni hanno edificato fortezze; alcuni le hanno rovinate e distrutte. E benchè di tutte queste cose non si possa dare determinata sentenzia, se non si viene su’ particulari di questi Stati, dove si avesse da pigliare alcuna simile deliberazione; nondimeno io parlerò in quel modo largo che la materia per sè medesima sopporta. Non fu mai adunque che un Principe nuovo disarmasse i suoi sudditi; anzi, quando gli ha trovati disarmati, gli ha sempre armati; perchè armandosi, quelle arme diventano tue; diventano fedeli quelli che ti sono sospetti; e quelli che erano fedeli, si mantengono; e gli sudditi tuoi si fanno tuoi partigiani. E perchè tutti i sudditi non si possono armare, quando si benefichino quelli che tu armi, con gli altri si può fare più sicurtà; e quella diversità del procedere che conoscono in loro, gli fa tuoi obbligati; quelli altri ti scusano, giudicando esser necessario quelli aver più merito che hanno più pericolo e più obbligo. Ma quando tu gli disarmi, tu incominci ad offendergli, e mostrare che tu abbi in loro diffidenza o per viltà, o per poca fede; e l’una e l’altra di queste opinioni concipe odio contro di te. E perchè tu non puoi stare disarmato, conviene che ti volti alla milizia mercenaria, della quale di sopra abbiam detto quale sia; e quando essa fusse buona, non può esser tanta, che ti difenda da’ nimici potenti, e da’ sudditi sospetti. Però, come io ho detto, un Principe nuovo in un nuovo Principato sempre vi ha ordinato l’arme. Di questi esempi son piene le istorie. Ma quando un Principe acquista uno Stato nuovo, che come membro si aggiunga al suo vecchio, allora è necessario disarmare quello Stato, eccetto quelli che nello acquistarlo si sono per te scoperti; e questi ancora con il tempo ed occasioni è necessario fargli molli ed effeminati, e ordinarsi in modo, che tutte l’arme del tuo Stato sieno in quelli soldati tuoi propri, che nello Stato tuo antico vivono appresso di te.
Solevano li antichi nostri, e quelli che erano stimati savi, dire, come era necessario tenere Pistoia con le parti, e Pisa con le fortezze; e per questo nutrivano in qualche terra lor suddita le differenze per possederla più facilmente. Questo, in quelli tempi che Italia era in un certo modo bilanciata, doveva essere ben fatto; ma non mi pare si possa dare oggi per precetto; perchè io non credo che le divisioni fatte faccino mai bene alcuno; anzi è necessario, quando il nimico si accosta, che le città divise si perdino subito; perchè sempre la parte più debole si accosterà alle forze esterne, e l’altra non potrà reggere. I Viniziani mossi, come io credo, dalle ragioni sopraddette, nutrivano le sette Guelfe e Ghibelline nelle città loro suddite; e benchè non gli lasciassino mai venire al sangue, pure nutrivano fra loro questi dispareri acciocchè, occupati quelli cittadini in quelle loro differenze, non si muovessero contro di loro. Il che, come si vide, non tornò poi loro a proposito; perchè, essendo rotti a Vailà, subito una parte di quelle prese ardire, e tolsono loro tutto lo Stato. Arguiscano pertanto simili modi debolezza del Principe; perchè in un Principato gagliardo mai si permetteranno tali divisioni; perchè le fanno solo profitto a tempo di pace, potendosi, mediante quelle, più facilmente maneggiare i sudditi; ma, venendo la guerra, mostra simile ordine la fallacia sua.
Sanza dubbio li Principi diventano grandi quando superano le difficultà e le opposizioni che son fatte loro; e però la fortuna, massime quando vuole far grande un Principe nuovo, il quale ha maggiore necessità di acquistare riputazione, che uno ereditario, gli fa nascere de’ nimici, e gli fa fare delle imprese contro, acciocchè quello abbia cagione di superarle, e su per quella scala, che gli hanno portata i nimici suoi, salir più alto. E però molti giudicano che un Principe savio, quando ne abbia l'occasione, deve nutrirsi con astuzia qualche inimicizia, acciocchè, oppressa quella, ne seguiti maggiore sua grandezza. Hanno i Principi, e specialmente quelli che son nuovi, trovato più fede e più utilità in quelli uomini, che nel principio del loro Stato son tenuti sospetti, che in quelli che nel principio erano confidenti. Pandolfo Petrucci Principe di Siena reggeva lo Stato suo più con quelli che furono sospetti, che con gli altri. Ma di questa cosa non si può parlare largamente, perchè ella varia secondo il subietto; solo dirò questo, che quelli uomini che nel principio di un Principato erano stati nimici, che sono di qualità che a mantenersi abbino bisogno di appoggio, sempre il Principe con facilità grandissima se li potrà guadagnare; e loro maggiormente son forzati a servirlo con fede, quanto cognoscono essere loro più necessario cancellare con l'opere quella opinione sinistra che si aveva di loro; e così il Principe ne trae sempre più utilità, che di coloro, i quali, servendolo con troppa sicurtà, trascurano le cose sue. E poichè la materia lo ricerca, non voglio lasciare indietro il ricordare a un Principe che ha preso uno Stato di nuovo, mediante i favori intrinsechi di quello, che consideri bene qual cagione abbi mosso quelli che l'hanno favorito, a favorirlo; e se ella non è affezione naturale verso di quello, ma fusse solo perchè quelli non si contentavano di quello Stato, con fatica e difficultà grande se gli potrà mantenere amici; perchè e’ fia impossibile che lui possa contentargli. E discorrendo bene con quelli esempi che dalle cose antiche e moderne si traggono la cagione di questo, vedrà esser molto più facile il guadagnarsi amici quelli uomini che dello Stato innanzi si contentavono, e però erano suoi nimici, che quelli, i quali, per non se ne contentare, gli diventarono amici, e favorironlo ad occuparlo.
È stata consuetudine de’ Principi, per poter tenere più sicuramente lo Stato loro, edificare fortezze che sieno briglia e freno di quelli che disegnassino far loro contro, ed avere un rifugio sicuro da un primo impeto. Io lodo questo modo, perchè gli è usitato anticamente. Nondimeno Messer Niccolò Vitelli ne’ tempi nostri si è visto disfare due fortezze in Città di Castello, per tener quello Stato. Guid’Ubaldo Duca di Urbino, ritornato nel suo Stato, donde da Cesare Borgia era stato cacciato, rovinò da fondamenti tutte le fortezze di quella provincia; e giudicò senza quelle più difficilmente riperdere quello Stato. I Bentivogli, ritornati in Bologna, usarono simil termine. Sono adunque le fortezze utili o no, secondo li tempi; e se ti fanno bene in una parte, ti offendono in una altra. E puossi discorrere questa parte così. Quel Principe che ha più paura de’ popoli, che de’ forestieri, deve fare le fortezze; ma quello che ha più paura de’ forestieri, che de’ popoli, deve lasciarle indietro. Alla Casa Sforzesca ha fatto e farà più guerra il castello di Milano che vi edificò Francesco Sforza, che alcun altro disordine di quello Stato. Però la migliore fortezza che sia, è non essere odiato da' popoli; perchè ancora che tu abbi le fortezze, ed il popolo ti abbi in odio, le non ti salvano; perchè non mancano mai a’ popoli, preso che egli hanno l’armi, forestieri che gli soccorrino. Ne’ tempi nostri non si vede che quelle abbin fatto profitto ad alcun Principe, se non alla Contessa di Furlì quando fu morto il Conte Girolamo suo consorte; perchè, mediante quella, potè fuggire l’impeto popolare, ed aspettare il soccorso di Milano, e ricuperare lo Stato; e li tempi stavano allora in modo, che il forestiero non poteva soccorrere il popolo. Ma dipoi valsono ancor poco a lei, quando Cesare Borgia l’assaltò, e che il popolo nimico suo si congiunse col forestiero. Pertanto ed allora, e prima, saria stato più sicuro a lei non essere odiata dal popolo, che avere le fortezze. Considerate adunque queste cose, io loderò chi farà fortezze, e chi non le farà; e biasimerò qualunque, fidandosi delle fortezze, stimerà poco l'essere odiato da’ popoli.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Whether Fortresses and Many Other Things Princes Often Do Are Useful or Harmful
Some Princes, to hold their states securely, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept the territories under them divided into factions; others have fostered hostility against themselves; others have set about winning over those they suspected at the beginning of their rule; some have built fortresses, and some have razed and destroyed them. Although no definite judgment can be given on any of these measures without examining the particular states in which such a decision would have to be made, I shall speak as broadly as the subject itself permits. Now a new Prince has never disarmed his subjects; on the contrary, when he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them. For by arming them, you make those arms yours; those you suspect become loyal, those already loyal remain so, and your subjects become your supporters. And because you cannot arm all your subjects, if you favor those you do arm, you can deal with the others more securely: the distinction they see in their treatment binds the armed men to you, while the rest excuse it, judging it necessary that those who face more danger and bear more responsibility should have greater reward. But when you disarm them, you begin to offend them and show that you distrust them, whether through fear of their courage or of their loyalty; either opinion breeds hatred of you. And because you cannot remain without arms, you must turn to mercenary troops, whose nature we have discussed above; even if they were good, they could never be numerous enough to defend you against powerful enemies and subjects you suspect. Thus, as I have said, a new Prince in a new principality has always established his own armed forces there. Histories are full of examples. But when a Prince acquires a new state to be joined as a member to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who declared themselves for you in its conquest; and even these, in time and as occasions arise, must be made soft and unmanly. You must arrange matters so that all the arms in your state are in the hands of your own soldiers, who live close to you in your original state.
Our forebears, including those accounted wise, used to say that Pistoia must be held through factions and Pisa through fortresses; accordingly they fostered divisions in some subject city in order to possess it more easily. In those days, when Italy was in a certain balance, this may have been well done; but I do not think it can be prescribed today. I do not believe that divisions deliberately created ever do any good. Indeed, when an enemy approaches, divided cities must fall at once, for the weaker faction will always join the foreign forces, and the other will be unable to hold out. Moved, I believe, by the reasons just given, the Venetians fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their subject cities. Though they never let them come to bloodshed, they kept these quarrels alive so that the citizens, occupied with their differences, would not rise against them. As became clear, this did them no good: after their defeat at Vailà, one of those factions immediately took courage and stripped them of the whole state. Such methods therefore betray a Prince's weakness. In a strong principality such divisions will never be allowed: they are useful only in peacetime, when they make subjects easier to manage; with the coming of war, the arrangement reveals its own deception.
Without doubt Princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and opposition raised against them. Thus fortune, especially when she wishes to make a new Prince great—for he has greater need to win a reputation than a hereditary Prince—causes enemies to arise and enterprises to be undertaken against him, so that he has cause to overcome them and climb higher on the ladder his enemies have provided. Many therefore judge that a wise Prince, when the opportunity offers, should cunningly foster some hostility against himself, so that suppressing it will increase his greatness. Princes, particularly new ones, have found greater loyalty and greater use in men considered suspect at the outset of their rule than in those they trusted from the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state more through those who had been suspect than through the others. But no general rule can be given here, for the matter varies with the circumstances. I shall say only this: men who were enemies at the beginning of a principality, and whose position requires them to seek support in order to maintain themselves, can always be won over by the Prince with the greatest ease. They are all the more compelled to serve him faithfully when they recognize how necessary it is for them to erase through deeds the bad opinion once held of them. Thus the Prince always draws more use from them than from men who, serving him with too much assurance, neglect his affairs. And since the subject calls for it, I do not wish to neglect a warning to a Prince who has newly taken a state through support from within it: he should consider closely what moved his supporters to support him. If it was not a natural affection for him, but merely dissatisfaction with the former government, he will find it very hard to keep them as friends, for he will be unable to satisfy them. If he carefully examines the reason for this in examples drawn from ancient and modern affairs, he will see that it is much easier to win the friendship of men who were content with the former state, and therefore were his enemies, than of men who, discontented with it, became his friends and helped him seize it.
Princes have customarily built fortresses to hold their states more securely: these serve as a bridle and restraint on those who might plot against them, and provide a safe refuge from a first assault. I commend the practice, for it has long been used. Nevertheless, in our own day Messer Niccolò Vitelli was seen to tear down two fortresses in Città di Castello in order to hold that state. Guid'Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, returning to the state from which Cesare Borgia had expelled him, demolished every fortress in that province down to its foundations, judging that without them he would be less likely to lose the state again. The Bentivoglio, on their return to Bologna, did likewise. Fortresses, then, are useful or not according to the times; if they benefit you in one respect, they harm you in another. The question can be considered in this way: the Prince who fears his people more than foreigners should build fortresses; the one who fears foreigners more than his people should do without them. The castle of Milan, which Francesco Sforza built there, has brought and will bring more war upon the House of Sforza than any other disturbance in that state. Therefore the best fortress there is consists in not being hated by the people. Even if you have fortresses, they will not save you when the people hate you; once the people take up arms, foreigners willing to help them are never lacking. In our times fortresses have been of use to no Prince, as far as can be seen, except to the Countess of Forlì when her husband Count Girolamo was killed. By means of her fortress she escaped the first onslaught of the people, waited for help from Milan, and recovered the state; at that time circumstances prevented foreigners from helping the people. Later, however, her fortresses were of little use even to her when Cesare Borgia attacked and her hostile people joined forces with the foreigner. Thus, both then and before, she would have been safer from the people's hatred than behind fortresses. All these things considered, I shall praise both the man who builds fortresses and the man who does not; but I shall blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks it of little consequence to be hated by the people.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
Whether fortresses and many other things princes often do are useful or harmful.
Some princes have disarmed their subjects to keep their states secure. Others have kept the lands under their rule divided into factions. Some have encouraged hostility against themselves. Others have tried to win over people they distrusted when they first came to power. Some have built fortresses, while others have torn them down and destroyed them. We cannot give a definite answer about any of these things without looking at the particular states where such a decision might be made. Still, I will speak in the general terms the subject allows. A new Prince has never disarmed his subjects. On the contrary, if he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them. When you arm them, their weapons become yours. People you distrusted become loyal, those already loyal stay that way, and your subjects become your supporters. You cannot arm all your subjects. But if you favor those you do arm, you can be more secure with the rest. The armed men see that you treat them differently and feel indebted to you. The others accept it, judging that those who face greater danger and carry greater responsibilities deserve more. But if you disarm your subjects, you begin by offending them. You show that you distrust either their courage or their loyalty. Either judgment makes them hate you. And since you cannot remain unarmed, you must turn to mercenary soldiers, whose nature I have described above. Even if they were good, there could never be enough of them to defend you against powerful enemies and subjects you distrust. Therefore, as I have said, a new Prince in a new principality has always organized its armed forces. History is full of examples. But when a Prince acquires a new state and adds it to his old one, like a new limb, he must disarm the new state. He should make an exception for those who openly took his side during its conquest. Even these men must, with time and the right opportunities, be made soft and unfit for fighting. He must arrange things so that all the armed forces of his state are his own soldiers, the men who live near him in his original state.
Our ancestors and those thought wise used to say that Pistoia had to be held through its factions and Pisa through its fortresses. So they encouraged disputes in some of the towns they ruled, to hold them more easily. This may have worked when Italy was in a kind of balance, but I do not think it can be recommended today. I do not believe divisions deliberately created ever do any good. When an enemy approaches, divided cities are bound to fall at once. The weaker faction will always join the outside forces, and the other faction will not be able to stand against them. The Venetians, I believe, acted for the reasons just given when they kept the Guelph and Ghibelline factions alive in the cities under their rule. They never let the factions come to bloodshed, but they kept their quarrels going so that the citizens, busy fighting among themselves, would not turn against Venice. As events showed, this did not help the Venetians. Once they had been defeated at Vailà, one of those factions immediately took courage and seized their whole state. Methods like these therefore show a Prince's weakness. A strong principality would never allow such divisions. They help only in peacetime, when they make subjects easier to manage. When war comes, the weakness of this arrangement becomes clear.
There is no doubt that princes become great by overcoming difficulties and opposition. So fortune, especially when it wants to make a new Prince great, gives him enemies and leads them to attack him. A new Prince needs to earn a reputation more than a hereditary one does. By defeating his enemies, he can rise higher on the very ladder they have provided. Many therefore think that a wise Prince should, if he has the chance, cleverly foster some hostility toward himself. Once he has put it down, his greatness will increase. Princes, especially new ones, have found more loyalty and more help among men they first distrusted than among those they trusted at the start. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more through men he had distrusted than through the others. But no general rule can cover this matter, because circumstances vary. I will say only this: a Prince can very easily win over former enemies who need his support to keep their position. Such men feel all the more compelled to serve him faithfully because they know they must erase, through their actions, the bad opinion he once had of them. So the Prince always gets more help from them than from people who feel so secure in his service that they neglect his interests. Since the subject calls for it, I also want to remind a Prince who has gained a new state with the help of people within it to look carefully at why they helped him. If they were not moved by a natural affection for him, but only by dissatisfaction with the previous government, he will find it very hard to keep them as friends. He will never be able to satisfy them. If he examines the reasons for this in examples from ancient and modern times, he will see that it is much easier to make friends with men who were content with the old government, and so were his enemies, than with men who became his friends and helped him take power because they were discontented.
Princes have customarily built fortresses to hold their states more securely. These serve as a bridle and restraint on those planning to attack them, and as a safe refuge against an initial assault. I approve of this practice because it has long been used. Nevertheless, in our own times Niccolò Vitelli tore down two fortresses in Città di Castello to keep control of that state. When Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, returned to the state from which Cesare Borgia had driven him, he demolished every fortress in the region down to its foundations. He judged that without them he would be less likely to lose the state again. The Bentivoglio family did the same when they returned to Bologna. Fortresses, then, are useful or not according to the times. What helps you in one respect harms you in another. Here is how to think about it. A Prince who fears his people more than foreigners should build fortresses. One who fears foreigners more than his people should do without them. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has done and will do more harm to the Sforza family than any other disorder in that state. So the best fortress is not to be hated by the people. Even if you have fortresses, they will not save you if the people hate you. Once the people take up arms, foreigners willing to help them are never lacking. In our own times, fortresses seem to have helped no Prince except the Countess of Forlì when her husband, Count Girolamo, was killed. Her fortress let her escape the people's first attack, wait for help from Milan, and recover her state. At the time, conditions kept foreign powers from helping the people. But later her fortresses did her little good when Cesare Borgia attacked her and her hostile subjects joined the foreign invader. Both then and earlier, she would have been safer without the people's hatred than with her fortresses. Taking all this into account, I will praise princes who build fortresses and those who do not. But I will blame anyone who trusts in fortresses and thinks it matters little if the people hate him.