Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter XIX
Chapter XIX of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Che si debbe fuggire l’essere disprezzato e odiato.
Ma perchè circa le qualità, di che di sopra si fa menzione, io ho parlato delle più importanti, l’altre voglio discorrere brevemente sotto queste generalità, che il Principe pensi, come di sopra in parte è detto, di fuggire quelle cose che lo faccino odioso o vile; e qualunque volta fuggirà questo, arà adempiuto le parti sue, e non troverà nell’altre infamie pericolo alcuno. Odioso lo fa soprattutto, come io dissi, lo esser rapace, ed usurpatore della roba, e delle donne de’ sudditi; di che si deve astenere. Qualunque volta alle università degli uomini non si toglie nè roba nè onore, vivono contenti, e solo s’ha a combattere con l’ambizione di pochi, la quale in molti modi e con facilità si raffrena. Abietto lo fa l’esser tenuto vario, leggiero, effeminato, pusillanimo, irresoluto; di che un Principe si deve guardare come da uno scoglio, ed ingegnarsi che nelle azioni sue si riconosca grandezza, animosità, gravità, fortezza; e, circa i maneggi privati de’ sudditi, volere che la sua sentenzia sia irrevocabile, e si mantenga in tale opinione, che alcuno non pensi nè ad ingannarlo, nè ad aggirarlo. Quel Principe che dà di sè questa opinione, è riputato assai; e contro a chi è riputato assai con difficultà si congiura, e con difficultà è assaltato, purchè si intenda che sia eccellente e reverito da’ suoi. Perchè un Principe deve avere due paure: una dentro per conto de’ sudditi; l’altra di fuori per conto de’ potenti esterni. Da questa si difende con le buone arme e buoni amici; e sempre, se arà buone arme, arà buoni amici; e sempre staranno ferme le cose di dentro, quando stieno ferme quelle di fuori, se già le non fossero perturbate da una congiura; e quando pure quelle di fuori movessero, se egli è ordinato, e vissuto come io ho detto, quando non si abbandoni, sosterrà ogni impeto, come dissi che fece Nabide Spartano. Ma circa i sudditi, quando le cose di fuori non muovino, s’ha a temere, che non congiurino segretamente; del che il Principe si assicura assai, fuggendo l’essere odiato e disprezzato, e tenendosi il popolo satisfatto di lui; il che è necessario conseguire, come di sopra si disse a lungo. Ed uno de’ più potenti rimedi che abbi un Principe contro le congiure, è non essere odiato o disprezzato dall’universale; perchè sempre chi congiura crede con la morte del Principe satisfare al popolo; ma quando ei creda offenderlo, non piglia animo a prendere simil partito; perchè le difficultà che sono dalla parte de’ congiuranti, sono infinite. Per esperienzia si vede molte essere state le congiure, e poche aver avuto buon fine; perchè chi congiura non può esser solo, nè può prendere compagnia, se non di quelli, che crede essere malcontenti; e subito che a uno malcontento tu hai scoperto l’animo tuo, gli dai materia a contentarsi, perchè, manifestandolo, lui ne può sperare ogni comodità; talmentechè veggendo il guadagno fermo da questa parte, e dall’altra veggendolo dubbio e pieno di pericolo, convien bene o che sia raro amico, o che sia al tutto ostinato nimico del Principe ad osservarti la fede. E, per ridurre la cosa in brevi termini, dico, che dalla parte del congiurante non è, se non paura, gelosia, sospetto di pena che lo sbigottisce; ma dalla parte del Principe è la maestà del Principato, le leggi, le difese degli amici e dello Stato che lo difendono; talmentechè aggiunto a tutte queste cose la benivolenza populare, è impossibile che alcun sia sì temerario, che congiuri. Perchè per l’ordinario dove uno congiurante ha a temere innanzi alla esecuzione del male, in questo caso debbe temere ancora dappoi, avendo per nimico il popolo, seguíto l’eccesso, nè potendo per questo sperare rifugio alcuno. Di questa materia se ne potria dare infiniti esempi; ma voglio solo esser contento d’uno, seguíto alla memoria de’ padri nostri.
Messer Annibale Bentivogli, avolo del presente Messer Annibale, che era Principe in Bologna, essendo da’ Canneschi, che gli congiurarono contro, ammazzato, nè rimanendo di lui altri che Messer Giovanni, quale era in fasce, subito dopo tale omicidio si levò il popolo, ed ammazzò tutti i Canneschi. Il che nacque dalla benivolenza popolare che la casa de’ Bentivogli aveva in quei tempi in Bologna; la qual fu tanta, che non vi restando alcuno che potesse, morto Annibale, reggere lo Stato, ed avendo indizio come in Firenze era un nato de’ Bentivogli, che si teneva fino allora figliuolo di un fabbro, vennero i Bolognesi per quello in Firenze, e li dettono il governo di quella città, la quale fu governata da lui fino a tanto che Messer Giovanni pervenisse in età conveniente al governo. Conchiudo adunque, che un Principe deve tenere delle congiure poco conto, quando il popolo gli sia benivolo; ma quando gli sia inimico, ed abbilo in odio, deve temere di ogni cosa e di ognuno. E gli stati bene ordinati, e li Principi savi hanno con ogni diligenza pensato di non far cadere in disperazione i grandi e di satisfare al popolo, e tenerlo contento, perchè questa è una delle più importanti materie che abbia un Principe. Tra i Regni bene ordinati e governati a’ nostri tempi è quello di Francia, ed in esso si trovano infinite costituzioni buone, donde ne dipende la libertà e sicurtà del Re, delle quali la prima è il Parlamento, e la sua autorità; perchè quello che ordinò quel Regno, cognoscendo l’ambizione de’ potenti e la insolenza loro, e giudicando esser necessario loro un freno in bocca che gli correggesse; e dall’altra parte cognoscendo l’odio dell’universale contro i grandi, fondato in su la paura, e volendo assicurarli, non volse che questa fusse particolar cura del Re, per torli quel carico che e’ potesse avere con i grandi, favorendo i popolari, e con i popolari, favorendo i grandi; e però constituì un giudice terzo, che fusse quello, che senza carico del Re, battesse i grandi, e favorisse i minori. Nè potè essere questo ordine migliore, nè più prudente, nè maggior cagione di sicurtà del Re, e del Regno. Di che si può trarre un altro notabile, che li Principi debbono le cose di carico fare sumministrare ad altri, e quelle di grazie a lor medesimi. Di nuovo conchiudo, che un Principe debbe stimare i grandi, ma non si far odiare dal popolo.
Parrebbe forse a molti, che, considerata la vita e morte di molti Imperatori Romani, fussono esempi contrarii a questa mia opinione, trovando alcuno esser vissuto sempre egregiamente, e mostro grande virtù d’animo, nondimeno aver perso l’imperio, ovvero essere stato morto da’ suoi che gli hanno congiurato contro. Volendo adunque rispondere a queste obiezioni, discorrerò le qualità di alcuni Imperatori, mostrando la cagione della lor rovina, non disforme da quello che da me si è addutto; e parte metterò in considerazione quelle cose che sono notabili a chi legge le azioni di quelli tempi. E voglio mi basti pigliare tutti quelli Imperatori, che succederono nell’Imperio da Marco Filosofo a Massimino, li quali furono Marco, Commodo suo figliuolo, Pertinace, Iuliano, Severo, Antonino, Caracalla suo figliuolo, Macrino, Eliogabalo, Alessandro, e Massimino. Ed è prima da notare, che dove negli altri Principi si ha solo a contendere con l’ambizione de’ grandi e insolenza de’ popoli, gl’Imperatori Romani avevano una terza difficultà, d’avere a sopportare la crudeltà ed avarizia de’ soldati; la qual cosa era sì difficile, che la fu cagione della rovina di molti, sendo difficile satisfare a’ soldati ed a’ popoli; perchè i populi amano la quiete, e per questo amano i Principi modesti, e li soldati amano il Principe d’animo militare, e che sia insolente, e crudele, e rapace. Le quali cose volevano che egli esercitasse ne’ popoli, per potere avere duplicato stipendio, e sfogare la loro avarizia e crudeltà; donde ne nacque che quelli Imperatori che per natura o per arte non avevano riputazione tale, che con quella tenessero l’uno e l’altro in freno, sempre rovinavano; e li più di loro, massime quelli che come uomini nuovi venivano al Principato, conosciuta la difficultà di questi duoi diversi umori, si volgevano a satisfare a’ soldati, stimando poco l’ingiuriare il popolo. Il qual partito era necessario; perchè non potendo i Principi mancare di non essere odiati da qualcuno, si debbono prima sforzare di non essere odiati dall’università; e quando non possono conseguir questo, si debbono ingegnare con ogni industria fuggire l’odio di quelle università che sono più potenti. E però quelli Imperatori, che per novità avevano bisogno di favori straordinari, aderivano ai soldati più volentieri, che alli popoli; il che tornava loro nondimeno utile o no, secondo che quel Principe si sapeva mantenere riputato con loro.
Da queste cagioni sopradette nacque che Marco, Pertinace, e Alessandro essendo tutti di modesta vita, amatori della giustizia, inimici della crudeltà, umani, e benigni, ebbero tutti, da Marco infuora, tristo fine; Marco solo visse e morì onoratissimo, perchè lui succedè all’Imperio per eredità, e non aveva a ricognoscer quello nè dai soldati, nè dai popoli; dipoi essendo accompagnato da molte virtù che lo facevano venerando, tenne sempre, mentre visse, l’uno ordine e l’altro dentro a’ suoi termini, e non fu mai nè odiato, nè disprezzato. Ma Pertinace fu creato Imperadore contro alla voglia de’ soldati, li quali, essendo usi a vivere licenziosamente sotto Commodo, non poterono sopportare quella vita onesta, alla quale Pertinace gli voleva ridurre; onde avendosi creato odio, ed a questo odio aggiunto dispregio per l’esser vecchio, rovinò ne’ primi principii della sua amministrazione. Onde si deve notare che l’odio si acquista così mediante le buone opere, come le triste; e però, come io dissi di sopra, volendo un Principe mantenere lo Stato, è spesso forzato a non esser buono; perchè quando quella università, o popolo, o soldati, o grandi che sieno, della quale tu giudichi, per mantenerti, aver bisogno, è corrotta, ti convien seguire l’umor suo, e sodisfarle; e allora le buone opere ti sono inimiche. Ma vegniamo ad Alessandro, il quale fu di tanta bontà, che tra l’altre lodi che gli sono attribuite, è, che in quattordici anni, che tenne l’imperio, non fu mai morto da lui nessuno ingiudicato; nondimanco, essendo tenuto effeminato, e uomo che si lasciasse governare dalla madre, e per questo venuto in dispregio; conspirò contro di lui l’esercito, ed ammazzollo.
Discorrendo ora per opposito le qualità di Commodo, di Severo, di Antonino, di Caracalla, e di Massimino, gli troverete crudelissimi e rapacissimi, li quali, per satisfare a’ soldati, non perdonarono a nissuna qualità d’ingiuria che ne’ popoli si potesse commettere; e tutti, eccetto Severo, ebbero tristo fine; perchè in Severo fu tanta virtù, che, mantenendosi i soldati amici, ancorchè i popoli fossero da lui gravati, potè sempre regnare felicemente; perchè quelle sue virtù lo facevano nel cospetto de’ soldati e de’ popoli sì mirabile, che questi rimanevano in un certo modo attoniti e stupidi, e quelli altri riverenti e satisfatti. E perchè le azioni di costui furono grandi in un Principe nuovo, io voglio mostrare brevemente quanto egli seppe bene usare la persona della volpe e del lione, le quali nature dico, come di sopra, esser necessario imitare ad un Principe.
Conosciuta Severo la ignavia di Iuliano Imperadore, persuase al suo esercito, del quale era in Schiavonia capitano, che egli era bene andare a Roma a vendicare la morte di Pertinace, il quale era stato morto dalla guardia imperiale, e sotto questo colore, senza mostrare di aspirare all’Imperio, mosse l’esercito contro a Roma, e fu prima in Italia che si sapesse la sua partita. Arrivato a Roma, fu dal Senato per timore eletto Imperadore, e morto Iuliano. Restavano a Severo dopo questo principio due difficultà a volersi insignorire di tutto lo Stato: l’una in Asia, dove Nigro capo degli eserciti Asiatici si era fatto chiamare Imperatore; l’altra in ponente di Albino, il quale ancora lui aspirava all’Imperio. E perchè giudicava pericoloso scoprirsi nimico a tutti duoi, deliberò di assaltar Nigro, e ingannare Albino; al quale scrisse, come essendo dal Senato eletto Imperadore, voleva partecipare quella dignità con lui, e mandogli il titolo di Cesare, e per deliberazione del Senato se lo aggiunse collega; le quali cose furono da Albino accettate per vere. Ma poichè Severo ebbe vinto e morto Nigro, e pacate le cose orientali, ritornatosi a Roma si querelò in Senato di Albino, che, come poco conoscente de’ beneficii ricevuti da lui, aveva a tradimento cerco d’ammazzarlo, e per questo era necessitato andare a punire la sua ingratitudine. Dipoi andò a trovarlo in Francia, e gli tolse lo Stato e la vita. Chi esaminerà adunque tritamente le azioni di costui, lo troverà un ferocissimo lione e un’astutissima volpe, e vedrà quello temuto e riverito da ciascuno, e dagli eserciti non odiato; e non si maraviglierà se lui, uomo nuovo, arà possuto tenere tanto Imperio, perchè la sua grandissima riputazione lo difese sempre da quell’odio che i popoli per le sue rapine avevano potuto concipere. Ma Antonino suo figliuolo fu ancor lui uomo eccellentissimo, ed aveva in sè parti eccellentissime, che lo facevano ammirabile nel cospetto de’ popoli, e grato a’ soldati, perchè era uomo militare, sopportantissimo di ogni fatica, disprezzatore di ogni cibo delicato, e di ogni altra mollizie; la qual cosa lo faceva amare da tutti gli eserciti. Nondimeno la sua ferocia e crudeltà fu tanta e sì inaudita, per avere dopo molte occisioni particulari morto gran parte del Popolo di Roma, e tutto quello d’Alessandria, che diventò odiosissimo a tutto il mondo, e cominciò ad esser temuto da quelli ancora che egli aveva intorno, in modo che fu ammazzato da un centurione in mezzo del suo esercito. Dove è da notare che queste simili morti, le quali seguitano per deliberazione di un animo deliberato e ostinato, non si possono da’ Principi evitare, perchè ciascuno che non si curi di morire, lo può fare; ma deve bene il Principe temerne meno, perchè le sono rarissime. Deve solo guardarsi di non fare ingiuria grave ad alcuno di coloro, de’ quali si serve, e che egli ha d’intorno al servizio del suo Principato, come aveva fatto Antonino, il quale aveva morto contumeliosamente un fratello di quel centurione, e lui ogni giorno minacciava, e nientedimeno lo teneva a guardia del suo corpo: il che era partito temerario, e da rovinarvi, come gl’intervenne. Ma vegniamo a Commodo, al quale era facilità grande tenere l’Imperio, per averlo ereditario, essendo figliuolo di Marco; e solo gli bastava seguire le vestigia del padre, ed a’ populi e a’ soldati arebbe satisfatto; ma essendo di animo crudele e bestiale, per potere usare la sua rapacità ne’ populi, si volse ad intrattenere gli eserciti, e fargli licenziosi; dall’altra parte non tenendo la sua dignità, descendendo spesso nelli teatri a combattere con i gladiatori, e facendo altre cose vilissime, e poco degne della Maiestà Imperiale, diventò vile nel cospetto de’ soldati; ed essendo odiato da una parte, e dall’altra disprezzato, fu conspirato contro di lui e morto.
Restaci a narrare le qualità di Massimino. Costui fu uomo bellicosissimo; ed essendo gli eserciti infastiditi dalla mollizie di Alessandro, del quale ho di sopra discorso, morto lui, lo elessero all'Imperio, il quale non molto tempo possedette, perchè due cose lo fecero odioso e disprezzato: l’una esser lui vilissimo per aver guardate le pecore in Tracia (la qual cosa era per tutto notissima, e gli faceva una gran dedignazione nel cospetto di ciascuno); l’altra, perchè avendo, nell'ingresso del suo Principato, differito l'andare a Roma, ed entrare nella possessione della sedia Imperiale, aveva dato opinione di crudelissimo, avendo per li suoi prefetti in Roma, e in qualunque luogo dell'Imperio esercitato molte crudeltà; a talchè commosso tutto il mondo dallo sdegno per la viltà del suo sangue, e dall'altra parte dallo odio per la paura della sua ferocia, prima l'Affrica, dipoi il Senato con tutto il Popolo di Roma, e tutta l'Italia gli cospirò contro; al che si aggiunse il suo proprio esercito, il quale campeggiando Aquileia, e trovando difficultà nell'espugnazione, infastidito della crudeltà sua, e, per vedergli tanti nimici, temendolo meno, lo ammazzò.Io non voglio ragionare nè di Eliogabalo, nè di Macrino, nè di Iuliano, i quali, per essere al tutto vili, si spensero subito; ma verrò alla conclusione di questo discorso; e dico, che li Principi de’ nostri tempi hanno meno questa difficultà di satisfare straordinariamente a’ soldati ne’ governi loro, perchè nonostante che si abbi ad avere a quelli qualche considerazione, pure si risolve presto, per non avere alcuno di questi Principi eserciti insieme, che sieno inveterati con li governi ed amministrazioni delle provincie, come erano gli eserciti dell'Imperio Romano; e però se allora era necessario sodisfare a’ soldati, più che a’ popoli, era perchè i soldati potevano più, che i popoli; ora è più necessario a tutti i Principi, eccetto che al Turco ed al Soldano, satisfare a’ popoli, che a’ soldati, perchè i popoli possono più, che quelli. Di che io ne eccettuo il Turco, tenendo sempre quello intorno dodicimila fanti e quindicimila cavalli, da’ quali dipende la sicurtà e la fortezza del suo Regno; ed è necessario che posposto ogni altro rispetto de' popoli, se gli mantenga amici. Simile è il Regno del Soldano, quale essendo tutto in mano de’ soldati, conviene che ancora lui, senza respetto de’ popoli, se gli mantenga amici. Ed avete a notare, che questo Stato del Soldano è disforme da tutti gli altri Principati; perchè egli è simile al Pontificato Cristiano, il quale non si può chiamare nè Principato ereditario, nè Principato nuovo; perchè non i figliuoli del Principe morto rimangono eredi e signori, ma colui che è eletto a quel grado da coloro che ne hanno autorità. Ed essendo questo ordine anticato, non si può chiamare Principato nuovo; perchè in quello non sono alcune di quelle difficultà che sono ne’ nuovi; perchè sebbene il Principe è nuovo, gli ordini di quello Stato sono vecchi, e ordinati a riceverlo come se fusse loro signore ereditario.
Ma, tornando alla materia nostra, dico, che qualunque considererà al sopraddetto discorso, vedrà o l’odio, o il dispregio essere stato causa della rovina di quelli Imperadori prenominati, e cognoscerà ancora donde nacque, che parte di loro procedendo in uno modo, e parte al contrario, in qualunque di quelli uno ebbe felice, e gli altri infelice fine; perchè a Pertinace ed Alessandro, per essere Principi nuovi, fu inutile e dannoso il volere imitare Marco, che era nel Principato ereditario; e similmente a Caracalla, Commodo e Massimino essere stata cosa perniziosa imitar Severo, per non avere avuto tanta virtù che bastasse a seguitare le vestigia sue. Pertanto un Principe nuovo in un Principato non può imitare le azioni di Marco, nè ancora è necessario imitare quelle di Severo; ma deve pigliare di Severo quelle parti che per fondare il suo Stato sono necessarie, e da Marco quelle che sono convenienti e gloriose a conservare uno Stato, che sia di già stabilito e fermo.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Why a Prince Must Avoid Being Despised and Hated
Having spoken of the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I want to discuss the others briefly under this general rule: a Prince must take care, as I have said in part already, to avoid whatever makes him hated or despised. Whenever he avoids these things, he will have done his duty, and the other charges brought against him will pose no danger. Above all, as I have said, he becomes hated by being rapacious, by seizing the property and the women of his subjects; from this he must abstain. So long as the great body of men is deprived of neither property nor honor, they live content, and he has only the ambition of a few to contend with, which can be restrained in many ways and with ease. He becomes contemptible when he is thought fickle, frivolous, effeminate, timid, or irresolute. A Prince must guard against these qualities as against a reef, and strive to make his actions show greatness, courage, gravity, and strength. In the private affairs of his subjects he must insist that his judgment be irrevocable, and maintain such a reputation that no one thinks of deceiving or manipulating him. A Prince who inspires this opinion of himself is held in high esteem; against a man held in high esteem conspiracies are hard to mount and attacks hard to undertake, provided he is known to be capable and revered by his own people. For a Prince has two things to fear: one within his state, from his subjects, and the other outside it, from foreign powers. Against the latter he defends himself with good arms and good allies; and if he has good arms he will always have good allies. Affairs at home will always remain secure when those abroad remain secure, unless they are disturbed by a conspiracy. Even if foreign affairs turn against him, if he is organized and has lived as I have said, he will withstand every assault so long as he does not abandon himself, as I said Nabis of Sparta did. But as for his subjects, when foreign affairs are quiet, he must fear that they may conspire in secret. Against this a Prince can largely protect himself by avoiding hatred and contempt, and by keeping the people satisfied with him; achieving this is necessary, as I explained at length above. One of a Prince's strongest remedies against conspiracies is not to be hated or despised by the people at large. The conspirator always believes that by killing the Prince he will satisfy the people; but if he thinks he will offend them, he cannot bring himself to take that course, for the difficulties on the conspirators' side are endless. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies and few successful ones. A conspirator cannot act alone, nor can he recruit anyone except those he believes to be discontented. The moment you reveal your intentions to a discontented man, you give him a means of satisfying himself: by exposing you he may hope to gain every advantage. Seeing a certain profit on one side and an uncertain one, full of danger, on the other, he must either be an exceptionally loyal friend or an utterly determined enemy of the Prince to keep faith with you. To put the matter briefly, the conspirator has nothing on his side but fear, jealousy, and the suspicion of punishment, which dismays him. The Prince, by contrast, is defended by the majesty of the principality, the laws, and the protection of his friends and his state. When the goodwill of the people is added to all these, it is impossible for anyone to be so rash as to conspire. Ordinarily a conspirator has cause to fear before committing the crime; in this case he must fear afterward as well, since once the deed is done the people are his enemies and he can hope for no refuge. Countless examples could be given of this, but I shall be content with one that occurred within our fathers' memory.
Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, grandfather of the present Messer Annibale and Prince in Bologna, was murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him. He left no heir but Messer Giovanni, then an infant in swaddling clothes. Immediately after the murder the people rose and killed every one of the Canneschi. This came about because of the goodwill the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed among the people of Bologna at that time. So great was it that, with no one left to govern the state after Annibale's death, they heard that a Bentivoglio child was living in Florence, until then believed to be the son of a blacksmith. The Bolognese went to Florence to fetch him and gave him the government of their city, which he governed until Messer Giovanni reached an age fit to govern. I conclude, then, that a Prince need have little concern about conspiracies when the people bear him goodwill; but when they are his enemies and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. Well-ordered states and wise Princes have taken every care not to drive the great to desperation, and to satisfy the people and keep them content, for this is one of a Prince's most important concerns. Among the kingdoms well ordered and governed in our time is France. It has innumerable sound institutions on which the king's freedom and security depend, foremost among them the Parlement and its authority. The founder of that kingdom knew the ambition and insolence of the powerful and judged that a bit in their mouths was needed to restrain them. Knowing, on the other hand, the hatred of the people at large for the great, a hatred founded on fear, and wishing to protect the people, he did not want this to be the king's personal responsibility. He thus relieved the king of the burden he would incur with the great by favoring the common people, or with the common people by favoring the great. Instead he established a third judge who, without laying the burden on the king, would curb the great and support the lesser people. No arrangement could have been better or more prudent, or a greater source of security for the king and the kingdom. From this another useful principle follows: Princes should have others administer measures that bring blame, but should dispense favors themselves. I conclude once again that a Prince must respect the great, but must not make himself hated by the people.
To many, perhaps, the lives and deaths of several Roman emperors will seem to furnish examples contrary to my view: some of them lived honorably throughout and displayed great strength of character, yet lost the empire or were killed by their own men conspiring against them. To answer these objections I shall examine the qualities of certain emperors, showing that the causes of their ruin are consistent with what I have argued, and I shall also bring forward matters worth noting for readers of the history of those times. It will suffice to take all the emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus: Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus, Antoninus, his son Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. First it must be noted that, whereas other Princes have only the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people to contend with, the Roman emperors faced a third difficulty: they had to endure the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This was so difficult that it caused the ruin of many, since it was hard to satisfy both soldiers and people. The people love peace, and therefore love moderate Princes; the soldiers love a Prince of military spirit who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious. They wanted him to exercise these qualities upon the people so that they could receive double pay and indulge their greed and cruelty. Thus emperors who lacked, by nature or by skill, a reputation strong enough to hold both groups in check always came to ruin. Most of them, especially those who came to the principality as new men, recognized the difficulty of these opposing dispositions and chose to satisfy the soldiers, making little of the injury done to the people. This course was necessary: since Princes cannot avoid being hated by someone, they must first strive not to be hated by the people at large; when they cannot achieve this, they must use every means to escape the hatred of the more powerful groups. Thus the emperors who, being new, needed exceptional support attached themselves more readily to the soldiers than to the people. Whether this helped them, however, depended on whether the Prince knew how to maintain their respect.
For these reasons Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, all men of modest lives, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and kind, all met unhappy ends except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died in the highest honor, for he inherited the empire and did not have to owe it to either soldiers or people. Moreover, possessing many virtues that made him venerable, throughout his life he kept both groups within their proper bounds and was never hated or despised. Pertinax, however, was made emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who had grown accustomed to living without restraint under Commodus and could not endure the honorable life to which Pertinax wanted to bring them back. He thus earned their hatred; and when contempt for his age was added to that hatred, he fell at the very beginning of his rule. Here we must observe that hatred is earned by good deeds as well as bad ones. Therefore, as I said above, a Prince who wishes to preserve his state is often forced not to be good. When the group whose support you judge necessary to your survival—whether people, soldiers, or great men—is corrupt, you must follow its disposition and satisfy it; then good deeds become your enemies. But let us turn to Alexander. His goodness was such that among the praises bestowed on him is this: in the fourteen years he held the empire, he never put anyone to death without a trial. Nevertheless, because he was thought effeminate and a man who let his mother govern him, he fell into contempt; the army conspired against him and killed him.
If, by contrast, you examine the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them exceedingly cruel and rapacious. To satisfy the soldiers they spared the people no kind of injury; and all except Severus came to unhappy ends. Severus possessed such ability that, by keeping the soldiers his friends, he could always rule successfully, although he burdened the people. His qualities made him so remarkable in the eyes of soldiers and people alike that the latter stood in a kind of stunned amazement, while the former remained respectful and satisfied. And because the deeds of this new Prince were great, I want to show briefly how well he knew how to play the fox and the lion, whose natures, as I said above, a Prince must imitate.
When Severus recognized the weakness of the emperor Julianus, he persuaded the army he commanded in Slavonia that they ought to march on Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, whom the imperial guard had killed. Under this pretext, without showing that he aspired to the empire, he led the army against Rome and reached Italy before news of his departure arrived. On reaching Rome he was elected emperor by a frightened Senate, and Julianus was killed. After this beginning Severus still faced two obstacles to making himself master of the entire state: one in Asia, where Niger, commander of the Asian armies, had had himself proclaimed emperor; the other in the west, where Albinus also aspired to the empire. Judging it dangerous to declare himself the enemy of both, he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that, having been elected emperor by the Senate, he wished to share that dignity with him. He sent him the title of Caesar and, by a decree of the Senate, made him his colleague; Albinus accepted all this as genuine. But after Severus had defeated and killed Niger and pacified the east, he returned to Rome and complained before the Senate that Albinus, showing little gratitude for the benefits he had received, had treacherously tried to kill him. Severus was therefore compelled, he said, to punish his ingratitude. He then sought Albinus out in France and took both his state and his life. Whoever examines Severus's actions closely will find him a most ferocious lion and a most cunning fox; he will see that Severus was feared and revered by all, yet not hated by the armies. Nor will he be surprised that a new man was able to hold so great an empire, for his immense reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might have conceived on account of his plunder. But Antoninus, his son, was himself a man of extraordinary qualities. He had excellent traits that made him admirable in the eyes of the people and dear to the soldiers: he was a military man, able to endure every hardship, disdainful of delicate food and every other luxury. This made him beloved by all the armies. Nevertheless, his savagery and cruelty were so great and so unheard of—for after many individual killings he put to death a large part of the people of Rome and the entire population of Alexandria—that he became an object of intense hatred throughout the world. Even those around him began to fear him, and he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. It should be noted that Princes cannot avoid deaths of this kind, which result from the resolve of a determined and relentless mind: anyone who does not care whether he dies can carry out such a killing. Yet a Prince need fear such deaths less, for they are exceedingly rare. He must take care only not to do grave injury to any of those who serve him and whom he keeps near him in the service of his principality. Antoninus had done just that: he had put a brother of that centurion to death with contempt, threatened the centurion daily, and nevertheless kept him as a bodyguard. It was a reckless course, bound to bring ruin, as it did. But let us turn to Commodus. He had every opportunity to keep the empire, having inherited it as the son of Marcus: he needed only to follow in his father's footsteps to satisfy both people and soldiers. But he had a cruel and brutal nature, and in order to exercise his rapacity upon the people he set out to indulge the armies and let them live without restraint. At the same time he failed to uphold his dignity, often descending into the theaters to fight gladiators and doing other utterly base things, unworthy of the imperial majesty. He became contemptible in the eyes of the soldiers; hated on one side and despised on the other, he was conspired against and killed.
It remains to describe the qualities of Maximinus. He was a most warlike man. When the armies had grown weary of the softness of Alexander, whom I discussed above, and Alexander had been killed, they elected Maximinus to the empire. He did not hold it for long, because two things made him hated and despised. The first was his very low origin: he had tended sheep in Thrace. This was common knowledge everywhere and brought him into great contempt in everyone's eyes. The second was that, having delayed going to Rome at the beginning of his principality to take possession of the imperial seat, he acquired a reputation for extreme cruelty: through his prefects he had committed many acts of cruelty in Rome and throughout the empire. Thus the whole world was stirred to indignation by the lowliness of his birth and, on the other hand, to hatred by fear of his ferocity. First Africa, then the Senate together with the entire people of Rome, and all Italy, conspired against him. His own army joined them: while besieging Aquileia, it met with difficulty taking the city, grew weary of his cruelty, and, seeing that he had so many enemies, feared him less and killed him. I do not wish to discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julianus, who, being wholly contemptible, were quickly extinguished; instead I shall come to the conclusion of this argument. I say that the Princes of our own time face less difficulty in having to satisfy the soldiers exceptionally in their government. Although soldiers must receive some consideration, the matter is soon settled, since none of these Princes has armies bound over many years to the government and administration of the provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire were. If it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers had more power than the people. Now it is more necessary for all Princes, except the Turk and the Sultan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people have more power. I except the Turk because he always keeps about him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horsemen, upon whom the security and strength of his kingdom depend; he must keep them his friends, setting aside every other consideration for the people. The Sultan's kingdom is similar: being wholly in the hands of the soldiers, it too requires him to keep them his friends without regard for the people. You should note that the Sultan's state differs from all other principalities. It resembles the Christian papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary or a new principality. The heirs and rulers who succeed a dead Prince are not his children, but the man elected to that office by those authorized to choose him. Since this order has stood for a long time, it cannot be called a new principality, for it has none of the difficulties belonging to new principalities. Though the Prince is new, the institutions of the state are old and prepared to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.
But to return to our subject, I say that anyone who considers the preceding argument will see that either hatred or contempt caused the ruin of the emperors I have named. He will also understand why, although some acted in one way and others in the opposite way, one in each case met a fortunate end and the others unfortunate ends. For Pertinax and Alexander, being new Princes, found it useless and harmful to try to imitate Marcus, who held an inherited principality; likewise it was ruinous for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to imitate Severus, since they lacked the ability needed to follow in his footsteps. Therefore a new Prince in a principality cannot imitate Marcus's actions, nor need he imitate those of Severus. Rather, he must take from Severus the qualities needed to establish his state, and from Marcus those that are fitting and glorious for preserving a state already established and secure.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
Why a Prince Must Avoid Being Despised and Hated
I have discussed the most important of the qualities mentioned above. I want to cover the others briefly under this general rule: a Prince must avoid anything that makes people hate him or look down on him. I have said some of this already. As long as he avoids those things, he has done his part and need not fear blame for his other faults. Above all, as I said, people hate a Prince who takes their property or their women. He must leave both alone. Most people are content if no one takes their property or their honor. He then has only the ambitions of a few people to deal with, and these can be held in check easily and in many ways. People look down on a Prince if they think he is changeable, frivolous, soft, cowardly, or unable to make up his mind. He should avoid these traits as carefully as he would avoid a reef. He should make his actions show greatness, courage, seriousness, and strength. In his private dealings with his subjects, he should make his decisions final. He must build a reputation that keeps anyone from thinking they can trick him or push him around. A Prince with that reputation is highly respected. It is hard to plot against a respected Prince or attack him, as long as people know he is capable and his own subjects respect him. A Prince has two things to fear: his subjects at home and powerful outsiders abroad. He protects himself from the outsiders with good weapons and good allies. If he has good weapons, he will always have good allies. As long as affairs abroad are stable, affairs at home will be stable too, unless a conspiracy upsets them. Even if trouble breaks out abroad, a Prince who is prepared and has lived as I have advised can withstand any assault if he does not give up. That is what Nabis of Sparta did, as I said before. But when there is no trouble abroad, he must fear secret plots among his subjects. He can do much to protect himself by avoiding hatred and contempt and keeping the people satisfied with him. As I have explained at length, this is essential. One of a Prince's strongest defenses against conspiracies is not being hated or looked down on by the people as a whole. A conspirator always thinks the people will be pleased when the Prince dies. If he thinks instead that they will be offended, he will not dare to act. The conspirators already face endless difficulties. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies but few successes. A conspirator cannot act alone, and he can recruit only people he thinks are unhappy with the Prince. But as soon as he tells one unhappy person what he intends, he gives that person a way to get what he wants: by reporting the plot, the person can expect all kinds of rewards. One choice offers a sure gain; the other is uncertain and dangerous. Only an exceptionally loyal friend or a stubborn enemy of the Prince will keep faith with the conspirator. Put simply, the conspirator is surrounded by fear, distrust, and the prospect of punishment. All this frightens him. The Prince, by contrast, is protected by the authority of the principality, the laws, his friends, and the defenses of the state. Add the goodwill of the people, and no one will be reckless enough to plot against him. Usually a conspirator fears what will happen before the deed. In this case he must also fear what happens afterward. Once he has committed the crime, the people will be his enemy, and he will have nowhere to hide. I could give countless examples, but I will give just one from the time of our fathers.
Messer Annibale Bentivogli, grandfather of the present Messer Annibale, ruled Bologna. The Canneschi plotted against him and killed him. His only surviving heir was Messer Giovanni, still a baby. Immediately after the murder, the people rose up and killed every one of the Canneschi. This happened because the Bentivogli family was so well liked in Bologna at the time. The people's loyalty was so strong that, when Annibale died and no one was left to govern the state, they acted on a report that a Bentivogli son lived in Florence. Until then he had been thought to be a blacksmith's son. The Bolognese went to Florence to fetch him and gave him control of their city. He governed it until Messer Giovanni was old enough to take charge. My conclusion is that a Prince has little to fear from conspiracies when the people like him. If they are hostile and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. Well-run states and wise Princes have taken great care not to drive the powerful to desperation, while also satisfying the people and keeping them content. This is one of the most important things a Prince must do. France is among the well-run kingdoms of our time. It has many sound institutions that protect the king's freedom and safety. Foremost among them is the Parliament and its authority. The man who organized that kingdom knew how ambitious and unruly the powerful were. He judged that they needed a restraint to keep them in line. He also knew that ordinary people hated the powerful because they feared them, and he wanted to protect the people. He did not want the king personally responsible for this, since favoring the people would put him at odds with the powerful, while favoring the powerful would put him at odds with the people. So he set up a third party, a judge who could restrain the powerful and support the less powerful without placing the burden on the king. Nothing could have been better or wiser, or done more to secure the king and his kingdom. This gives us another important lesson: Princes should have others carry out decisions that will bring blame, and take credit themselves for acts of generosity. I say again that a Prince must respect the powerful without making the people hate him.
Some might think the lives and deaths of several Roman emperors contradict what I have said. They may point to an emperor who lived well throughout his life and showed great strength of character, yet lost the empire or was killed in a plot by his own men. To answer these objections, I will discuss some emperors and show that the causes of their downfall agree with my argument. I will also point out some things worth noting for anyone who reads the history of that period. I will take the emperors who ruled from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus: Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antoninus, his son Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. First, note that while other Princes have only to deal with the ambitions of the powerful and the unruliness of the people, Roman emperors faced a third problem: the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This was so hard to manage that it brought down many emperors. It was difficult to satisfy both soldiers and people. The people wanted peace and therefore liked moderate Princes. The soldiers wanted a Prince with a warrior's spirit, someone aggressive, cruel, and greedy. They wanted him to behave this way toward the people so that they could get double pay and satisfy their own greed and cruelty. As a result, emperors who lacked the natural ability or the skill to earn enough respect to keep both groups in check always fell. Most of them, especially those who had just come to power, saw that these groups wanted different things. They chose to satisfy the soldiers and cared little about the harm done to the people. They had to make a choice. A Prince cannot avoid being hated by someone. He should first try not to be hated by the people as a whole. If he cannot manage that, he must do all he can to avoid the hatred of the more powerful group. So new emperors who needed special support generally favored the soldiers over the people. Whether that helped them depended on whether they could keep the soldiers' respect.
This explains why Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, who all lived modestly, loved justice, rejected cruelty, and were humane and kind, all came to a bad end except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died greatly honored. He inherited the empire and owed his position to neither soldiers nor people. He also had many qualities that made people respect him. Throughout his life he kept both groups within their limits and was never hated or despised. Pertinax, on the other hand, became emperor against the soldiers' wishes. They had grown used to living without restraint under Commodus. They could not bear the honest way of life Pertinax wanted them to return to. He earned their hatred, and because he was old, they also looked down on him. He fell at the very beginning of his rule. This shows that good actions can earn hatred just as bad actions can. As I said above, a Prince who wants to keep his state is often forced to act badly. If the group he needs for his survival, whether it is the people, soldiers, or powerful men, is corrupt, he must go along with what it wants and satisfy it. In that case, good actions will work against him. Consider Alexander. He was so good that among the things praised about him was this: in the fourteen years he held the empire, he never had anyone killed without a trial. Yet people thought him soft and believed he let his mother govern him. Because they looked down on him, the army plotted against him and killed him.
Now look at the opposite kind of rulers: Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maximinus. They were extremely cruel and greedy. To satisfy the soldiers they stopped at no kind of injury to the people. All but Severus came to a bad end. Severus had so much ability that, by keeping the soldiers on his side, he ruled successfully even though he placed heavy burdens on the people. His qualities made such an impression on soldiers and people alike that the people were left almost stunned, while the soldiers respected him and were content. His actions were remarkable for a new Prince. I want to show briefly how well he played the fox and the lion, whose ways, as I said earlier, a Prince must learn to use.
Severus saw that the emperor Julian was weak. He commanded an army in the region of Slavonia, and he persuaded it to march on Rome to avenge Pertinax, who had been killed by the imperial guard. Using that cause as a cover and giving no sign that he wanted the empire for himself, he marched his army toward Rome. He reached Italy before anyone knew he had set out. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate chose him as emperor out of fear, and Julian was killed. Severus then faced two obstacles to taking over the whole state. In Asia, Niger, commander of the Asian armies, had himself proclaimed emperor. In the west, Albinus also wanted the empire. Severus thought it dangerous to declare himself an enemy of both men at once, so he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that, as the Senate had made him emperor, he wanted to share that rank with him. He sent Albinus the title of Caesar and, by a decision of the Senate, made him his colleague. Albinus accepted all this as genuine. After Severus had defeated and killed Niger and settled affairs in the east, he returned to Rome. There he complained to the Senate that Albinus had shown no gratitude for the favors he had received. Severus claimed Albinus had treacherously tried to kill him, so he now had to punish this ingratitude. He then went after Albinus in France and took both his state and his life. Anyone who examines Severus's actions carefully will find a fierce lion and a very cunning fox. He was feared and respected by everyone without being hated by his armies. It is no wonder that a man new to power could hold so great an empire: his immense reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might have felt because he took so much from them. His son Antoninus also had exceptional qualities. The people admired him, and the soldiers liked him. He was a soldier himself, able to endure any hardship and disdainful of fine food and every other comfort. That won him the affection of all the armies. But his savagery and cruelty were extraordinary. After many individual killings, he killed a large part of the people of Rome and all the people of Alexandria. He became hated throughout the world. Even the people around him began to fear him, and a centurion killed him in the middle of his army. A Prince cannot prevent every such death. A determined person who does not care about dying can kill him. Still, he should worry less about such attacks because they are extremely rare. What he must do is avoid seriously wronging anyone he relies on or keeps close to him in the service of his principality. Antoninus had done exactly that. He had killed the centurion's brother in a humiliating way and threatened the centurion every day, yet kept him as a bodyguard. This was a reckless decision, and it ruined him. Now consider Commodus. Keeping the empire would have been easy for him because he had inherited it as the son of Marcus. He only needed to follow his father's example to satisfy both people and soldiers. But he had a cruel, brutal nature. To be free to take what he wanted from the people, he cultivated the armies and let the soldiers do as they pleased. At the same time he lowered his standing by often going into theaters to fight gladiators, and by doing other degrading things unworthy of imperial rank. The soldiers came to look down on him. Hated by one group and despised by the other, he was killed in a conspiracy.
It remains to describe Maximinus. He was a very warlike man. The armies had grown tired of Alexander's softness, which I discussed above. After Alexander was killed, they chose Maximinus as emperor. He did not hold the empire for long, because two things made people hate him and look down on him. First, he came from a very low background: he had tended sheep in Thrace. Everyone knew this, and it made people despise him. Second, when he first became Prince, he put off going to Rome to take possession of the imperial seat. His prefects meanwhile committed many acts of cruelty in Rome and elsewhere in the empire. This gave him a reputation for extreme cruelty. The whole world was stirred up by contempt for his low birth and hatred born of fear of his ferocity. First Africa, then the Senate and all the people of Rome, and then all Italy plotted against him. His own army joined them. It was besieging Aquileia and having trouble capturing it. The soldiers were sick of his cruelty. Seeing that he had so many enemies, they feared him less and killed him. I will not discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julian. They were held in such contempt that they were quickly destroyed. Instead I will bring this discussion to a close. Princes today have less trouble with the need to give their soldiers special satisfaction. They must still pay some attention to the soldiers, but the problem does not last long. No Prince today has armies long established together in the government and administration of provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire were. Back then the soldiers had to be satisfied more than the people because they were more powerful than the people. Today every Prince except the Turk and the Sultan must satisfy the people more than the soldiers, because the people are more powerful. I make an exception for the Turk because he always keeps twelve thousand infantrymen and fifteen thousand horsemen near him. The safety and strength of his kingdom depend on them. He must therefore keep them loyal, even if he has to put every concern about the people aside. The Sultan's kingdom is similar. It is entirely in the soldiers' hands, so he too must keep them loyal without regard for the people. Notice that the Sultan's state differs from all other principalities. It resembles the Christian papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary or a new principality. The dead Prince's children do not inherit it and become its rulers. Instead, those who have the authority elect someone to the office. Because this arrangement is long established, it cannot be called a new principality. It does not have any of the difficulties of a new one. Even though the Prince is new, the state's institutions are old and are ready to receive him as if he were their hereditary ruler.
To return to my point: anyone who considers the discussion above will see that hatred or contempt caused the fall of the emperors I have named. They will also understand why one emperor could act in a certain way and succeed, while others who did the same came to a bad end, even though some emperors acted in the opposite way. Pertinax and Alexander were new Princes. It was useless and harmful for them to try to copy Marcus, who had inherited his principality. Likewise, it was ruinous for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to copy Severus. They lacked the ability needed to follow his example. A new Prince in a principality, then, cannot copy what Marcus did, but he need not copy everything Severus did either. He should take from Severus what he needs to establish his state, and from Marcus what is fitting and honorable when preserving a state that is already established and secure.