Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIII of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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De’ soldati ausiliari, misti, e propri.
L’armi ausiliarie, che sono le altre armi inutili, sono quando si chiama un potente, che con l’armi sue ti venga ad aiutare e difendere, come fece ne’ prossimi tempi Papa Iulio, il quale avendo visto nell’impresa di Ferrara la trista prova delle sue armi mercenarie, si volse alle ausiliari, e convenne con Ferrando Re di Spagna, che con le sue genti ed eserciti dovesse aiutarlo. Queste armi possono essere utili e buone per loro medesime, ma sono per chi le chiama sempre dannose; perchè perdendo rimani disfatto, vincendo resti loro prigione. E ancora che di questi esempi ne sieno piene l’antiche istorie; nondimanco io non mi voglio partire da questo esempio di Papa Iulio II, quale è ancora fresco, il partito del quale non potè essere manco considerato, per volere Ferrara, mettendosi tutto nelle mani d’uno forestiere. Ma la sua buona fortuna fece nascere una terza causa, acciò non cogliesse il frutto della sua mala elezione; perchè, essendo gli ausiliari suoi rotti a Ravenna, e surgendo gli Svizzeri che cacciarono i vincitori fuora d’ogni opinione e sua, e d’altri, venne a non rimanere prigione degli inimici, essendo fugati, nè degli ausiliari suoi, avendo vinto con altre armi, che con le loro.
I Fiorentini essendo al tutto disarmati condussero diecimila Francesi a Pisa per espugnarla; per il qual partito portarono più pericolo che in qualunque tempo de’ travagli loro. Lo Imperadore di Costantinopoli, per opporsi alli suoi vicini, mise in Grecia diecimila Turchi, li quali, finita la guerra, non se ne volsero partire; il che fu principio della servitù della Grecia con gl’infedeli. Colui adunque che vuole non poter vincere, si vaglia di queste armi, perchè sono molto più pericolose, che le mercenarie; perchè in queste è la rovina fatta, sono tutte unite, tutte volte all’obbedienza di altri; ma nelle mercenarie, ad offenderti, vinto che elle hanno, bisogna più tempo, e maggiore occasione, non essendo tutte un corpo, ed essendo trovate e pagate da te, nelle quali un terzo che tu facci capo, non può pigliare subito tanta autorità che ti offenda. Insomma nelle mercenarie è più pericolosa la ignavia, nelle ausiliarie la virtù. Un Principe pertanto savio sempre ha fuggito queste arme, e voltosi alle proprie, e ha voluto piuttosto perdere con le sue, che vincere con l’altrui, giudicando non vera vittoria quella che con l’armi d’altri si acquistasse. Io non dubiterò mai di allegare Cesare Borgia, e le sue azioni.
Questo Duca entrò in Romagna con le armi ausiliarie, conducendovi tutte genti Francesi, e con quelle prese Imola e Furlì; ma, non li parendo poi tali arme sicure, si volse alle mercenarie, giudicando in quelle manco pericolo, e soldò gli Orsini e Vitelli; le quali poi nel maneggiare trovando dubbie, infedeli, e pericolose, le spense e volsesi alle proprie. E puossi facilmente vedere che differenza sia tra l’una e l’altra di queste armi, considerato che differenza fu dalla riputazione del Duca quando aveva gli Orsini e Vitelli, e quando rimase con gli soldati suoi, e sopra di sè stesso, e si troverà sempre accresciuta; nè mai fu stimato assai, se non quando ciascuno vide che egli era intero possessore delle sue armi. Io non mi volevo partire dagli esempi Italiani e freschi: pure non voglio lasciare indietro Ierone Siracusano, essendo uno de’ sopra nominati da me. Costui, come di già dissi, fatto dalli Siracusani capo degli eserciti, cognobbe subito quella milizia mercenaria non essere utile, per essere conduttori fatti come li nostri Italiani, e parendoli non gli potere tenere nè lasciare, gli fece tutti tagliare a pezzi; dipoi fece guerra con l’armi sue, e non con l’altrui. Voglio ancora ridurre a memoria una figura del Testamento Vecchio fatta a questo proposito.
Offerendosi David a Saul di andare a combattere con Golia provocatore Filisteo, Saul, per dargli animo, l’armò dell’armi sue, le quali come David ebbe indosso, ricusò, dicendo, con quelle non si potere ben valere di sè stesso; e però voleva trovare il nimico con la sua fromba, e con il suo coltello. In somma l’armi d’altri o le ti cascono di dosso, o elle ti pesano, e le ti stringono. Carlo VII padre del Re Luigi XI avendo con la sua fortuna e virtù libera la Francia dagl’Inglesi, cognobbe questa necessità di armarsi d’armi proprie, e ordinò nel suo regno l’ordinanza delle genti di arme e delle fanterie. Dipoi il Re Luigi suo figliuolo spense quella de’ fanti, e cominciò a soldare Svizzeri; il quale errore seguitato dagli altri, è, come si vede ora in fatto, cagione de’ pericoli di quel Regno. Perchè, avendo dato riputazione a’ Svizzeri, ha invilito tutte l’armi sue, perchè le fanterie ha spento in tutto, e le sue genti d’arme ha obbligate all’arme d’altri, perchè essendo assuefatti a militare con Svizzeri, non pare loro di poter vincere senza essi.
Di qui nasce, che gli Francesi contro a’ Svizzeri non bastano, e senza i Svizzeri contro ad altri non provano. Sono adunque stati gli eserciti di Francia misti, parte mercenari, e parte propri; le quali armi e tutte insieme sono molto migliori, che le semplici mercenarie, o le semplici ausiliarie, e molto inferiori alle proprie. E basti l’esempio detto, perchè il Regno di Francia sarebbe insuperabile, se l’ordine di Carlo era accresciuto, o preservato. Ma la poca prudenza degli uomini comincia una cosa, che per sapere allora di buono non manifesta il veleno che v’è sotto, come io dissi di sopra delle febbri etiche. Pertanto se colui che è in un Principato, non cognosce i mali se non quando che nascono, non è veramente savio; e questo è dato a pochi. E se si considerasse la prima rovina dell’Imperio Romano, si troverà essere stato solo il cominciare a soldare i Goti; perchè da quel principio cominciarono ad enervare le forze dell’Imperio Romano; e tutta quella virtù, che si levava da lui, si dava a loro. Conchiudo adunque, che, senza avere arme proprie, nessuno Principato è sicuro; anzi tutto obligato alla fortuna, non avendo virtù che nell’avversità lo difenda. E fu sempre opinione e sentenzia degli uomini savi, che niente sia così infermo ed instabile, come è la fama della potenza non fondata nelle forze proprie. E l’arme proprie sono quelle che sono composte di sudditi o di cittadini, o di creati tuoi; tutte l’altre sono o mercenarie, o ausiliari. E il modo ad ordinare l’arme proprie sarà facile a trovare, se si discorreranno gli ordini sopra nominati da me; e se si vedrà come Filippo, padre di Alessandro Magno, e come molte Repubbliche e Principi si sono armati ed ordinati; a’ quali ordini io mi rimetto al tutto.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops
Auxiliary forces, the other kind of useless arms, are those supplied when you call on a powerful ruler to come with his own troops to aid and defend you. Pope Julius did this recently: having seen how badly his mercenaries performed in the campaign against Ferrara, he turned to auxiliaries and arranged for Ferdinand, King of Spain, to help him with his men and armies. Such forces may be useful and good in themselves, but they are always harmful to the one who calls them in: if they lose, you are ruined; if they win, you are their prisoner. And although ancient histories abound in examples, I will stay with this still-fresh case of Pope Julius II. No decision could have shown less judgment than his desire to gain Ferrara by placing himself entirely in a foreigner's hands. But his good fortune brought about a third outcome, so that he did not reap the fruit of his bad choice. His auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna; then the Swiss appeared and drove the victors off, to the astonishment of the pope and everyone else. Thus he was left a prisoner neither of his enemies, who had fled, nor of his auxiliaries, since the victory was won by forces other than theirs.
The Florentines, being wholly unarmed, brought ten thousand Frenchmen against Pisa to take it; by this decision they ran a greater risk than at any other time in their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbors, brought ten thousand Turks into Greece. When the war ended, they refused to leave: this was the beginning of Greece's subjection to the infidels. Let anyone who wants to ensure that he cannot win make use of such forces. They are far more dangerous than mercenaries, for with auxiliaries ruin is already complete: they are all united, all accustomed to obey another. Mercenaries, by contrast, need more time and a greater opportunity to injure you after they have won. They do not form a single body; you have recruited and paid them, and an outsider whom you put in command cannot immediately gain enough authority to turn them against you. In short, with mercenaries the greater danger is cowardice; with auxiliaries it is courage. A wise Prince, therefore, has always avoided these forces and turned to his own. He has preferred to lose with his own troops rather than win with another's, judging that a victory gained with another's arms is no true victory. I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions.
The duke entered Romagna with auxiliary forces, bringing in French troops alone, and with them took Imola and Forlì. But when he came to think these forces unsafe, he turned to mercenaries, judging them less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Later, finding these men uncertain, disloyal, and dangerous to handle, he destroyed them and turned to troops of his own. One can readily see the difference between these kinds of forces by comparing the duke's standing when he had the Orsini and Vitelli with his standing when he relied on his own soldiers and on himself. It grew continually, and he was never held in such esteem as when everyone saw that he had full command of his own troops. I had not meant to leave recent Italian examples, but I cannot omit Hiero of Syracuse, whom I named earlier. As I have said, when the Syracusans made him commander of their armies, he immediately recognized the uselessness of their mercenaries, whose captains were much like our Italian ones. Since he thought he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, he had them all cut to pieces. Thereafter he made war with his own arms, not with another's. I also want to recall an image from the Old Testament that bears on this point.
When David offered to fight Goliath, the Philistine champion, Saul armed him with his own armor to give him courage. But once David had put it on, he refused it, saying that he could not use his own strength properly in it; he wished instead to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In short, another's armor either falls from your shoulders or weighs you down and constricts you. Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, having freed France from the English by his fortune and ability, recognized the need to arm himself with troops of his own and established companies of cavalry and infantry in his kingdom. His son King Louis later disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss soldiers. That error, followed by his successors, is the cause, as events now show, of the dangers facing the kingdom. By raising the Swiss to such esteem he has diminished all his own forces: he abolished the infantry altogether and made his cavalry dependent on foreign troops, for they are so used to fighting alongside the Swiss that they think they cannot win without them.
Thus the French cannot stand against the Swiss, and without the Swiss they do not venture against others. The armies of France have therefore been mixed, partly mercenary and partly native. Taken together these troops are far better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but far inferior to native troops. The example is enough: the kingdom of France would be invincible if Charles's system had been strengthened, or even preserved. But men's lack of foresight leads them to begin an undertaking whose immediate benefits conceal the poison beneath, as I said earlier of wasting fevers. Therefore a man who rules a principality but recognizes its dangers only when they arise is not truly wise; and few have such foresight. If we consider the first cause of the Roman Empire's ruin, we shall find it was simply the decision to hire the Goths. From that beginning the empire's strength began to waste away; all the power it lost passed to them. I conclude, then, that no principality is secure without troops of its own. On the contrary, it is wholly at the mercy of fortune, having no strength to defend it in adversity. Wise men have always held that nothing is so frail and unstable as a reputation for power unsupported by one's own forces. Native forces consist of your subjects, your citizens, or men dependent on you; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. The means of organizing native forces will be easy to discover by examining the arrangements I have discussed above, and by seeing how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and Princes armed and organized themselves. To those arrangements I refer the reader entirely.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
On Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Forces
Auxiliary troops are the other useless kind of troops. You use them when you call on a powerful ruler to come and help defend you with his own forces. Pope Julius did this recently. After his hired troops performed badly in the campaign against Ferrara, he turned to auxiliaries. He arranged for Ferdinand, King of Spain, to help him with his men and armies. Such troops may be good and useful in themselves, but they always harm the person who calls them in. If they lose, you are defeated. If they win, you become their prisoner. Ancient histories are full of examples, but I will stay with this recent one of Pope Julius II. His decision could hardly have been less careful: to get Ferrara, he put himself entirely in a foreign ruler's hands. His good fortune, however, brought about a third outcome, so he did not suffer the result of his bad choice. His auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, but the Swiss then appeared and drove off the victors, against everyone's expectations, including his own. He was not taken prisoner by his enemies, because they were driven away, or by his auxiliaries, because the victory came from forces other than theirs.
The Florentines had no forces of their own at all. They brought ten thousand French troops to Pisa to take it by force. This decision put them in greater danger than at any other time in their troubles. The emperor of Constantinople brought ten thousand Turks into Greece to resist his neighbors. When the war ended, the Turks refused to leave. That was the beginning of Greece's enslavement to the unbelievers. So anyone who wants to make victory impossible should use such forces. They are far more dangerous than hired troops. With auxiliaries, your ruin is already certain: they are united and all obey someone else. Hired troops, even after winning, need more time and a better opportunity to turn against you. They are not one united body; you recruited and paid them yourself. A third party whom you put in command cannot immediately gain enough power over them to harm you. In short, the chief danger of hired troops is their lack of drive, while the chief danger of auxiliaries is their ability. A wise Prince has therefore always avoided both and relied on his own troops. He would rather lose with his own troops than win with someone else's, since he does not regard a victory gained by another's forces as a real victory. I will not hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and what he did.
The Duke entered Romagna with auxiliary forces, bringing in an entire French army. With them he took Imola and Forlì. But when those troops no longer seemed safe to him, he turned to hired troops, which he judged less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Then he found them unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous in action. He destroyed them and turned to troops of his own. The difference between these forces is easy to see if we compare the Duke's standing when he had the Orsini and Vitelli with his standing when he depended on his own soldiers and himself. His standing kept rising, but he was not highly regarded until everyone saw that he had full control of his own forces. I meant to stick to recent Italian examples, but I do not want to leave out Hiero of Syracuse, whom I mentioned earlier. As I said, the Syracusans made him commander of their armies. He quickly realized that their hired forces were no use, because their captains were like the Italian captains of our own day. He thought he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, so he had them all cut to pieces. After that he fought with his own troops, not someone else's. I also want to recall a story from the Old Testament that makes the same point.
When David offered to fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger, Saul tried to encourage him by giving him his own armor. But once David had put it on, he refused it. He said he could not fight well in it, and chose to face the enemy with his sling and knife instead. In short, someone else's arms either fall off you, weigh you down, or bind you too tightly. Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, freed France from the English through his good fortune and ability. He recognized the need for forces of his own and established units of cavalry and infantry in his kingdom. His son King Louis then disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss soldiers. This mistake was repeated by later rulers. As we can now see, it is the cause of the kingdom's dangers. By building up the Swiss reputation, Louis weakened all his own forces. He eliminated the infantry altogether and made his cavalry dependent on foreign troops. They became so used to fighting alongside the Swiss that they believed they could not win without them.
That is why the French cannot stand up to the Swiss, and without the Swiss they do not prove themselves against anyone else. French armies have thus been mixed: part hired troops and part their own. Taken together, these forces are much better than hired troops alone or auxiliaries alone, but far worse than forces entirely their own. This example is enough: the kingdom of France would be unbeatable if Charles's military system had been maintained or expanded. But people lack foresight. They start something that tastes good at first and fail to notice the poison underneath, as I said earlier about lingering fevers. So a ruler who recognizes the troubles of his principality only when they arise is not truly wise; few people have the wisdom to recognize them sooner. If we look at the first cause of the Roman Empire's decline, we will find that it was simply the decision to hire the Goths. From then on, the empire's forces began to weaken, and all the strength it lost went to the Goths. I conclude, then, that no principality is safe without its own troops. Instead it depends entirely on fortune, having no strength of its own to defend it when trouble comes. Wise people have always held that nothing is as weak or unstable as a reputation for power that is not grounded in one's own forces. Your own troops are those made up of your subjects, your citizens, or men you have trained and brought up. All others are hired troops or auxiliaries. It will be easy to work out how to organize your own forces if you consider the systems I have mentioned above and look at how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and Princes armed and organized their forces. I refer you entirely to those examples.