Niccolò Machiavelli · Complete work
Chapter XII
Chapter XII of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Quante siano le spezie della milizia, e de’ soldati mercenari.
Avendo discorso particolarmente tutte le qualità di quelli Principati, de’ quali nel principio proposi di ragionare, e considerato in qualche parte le cagioni del bene e del male essere loro, e mostro i modi con li quali molti hanno cerco d’acquistargli e tenergli; mi resta ora a discorrere generalmente le offese e difese, che in ciascuno dei prenominati possono accadere. Noi abbiamo detto di sopra come ad un Principe è necessario avere li suoi fondamenti buoni; altrimente di necessità conviene che rovini. I principali fondamenti che abbino tutti gli Stati, così nuovi come vecchi o misti, sono le buone leggi e le buone armi; e perchè non possono essere buone leggi dove non sono buone armi, e, dove sono buone armi conviene che siano buone leggi; io lascerò indietro il ragionare delle leggi, e parlerò dell’armi. Dico adunque, che l’armi, con le quali un Principe difende il suo Stato, o le sono proprie, o le sono mercenarie, o ausiliarie, o miste. Le mercenarie ed ausiliari sono inutili e pericolose; e se uno tiene lo Stato suo fondato in su l’armi mercenarie, non starà mai fermo nè sicuro, perchè le sono disunite, ambiziose, e senza disciplina, infedeli, gagliarde tra gli amici, tra li nimici vili, non hanno timore di Dio, non fede con gli uomini, e tanto si differisce la rovina, quanto si differisce l’assalto; e nella pace siei spogliato da loro, nella guerra da’ nimici.
La cagione di questo è, che non hanno altro amore, nè altra cagione che le tenga in campo, che un poco di stipendio, il quale non è sufficiente a fare che e’ voglino morire per te. Vogliono bene essere tuoi soldati mentre che tu non fai guerra; ma come la guerra viene, o fuggirsi o andarsene. La qual cosa dovrei durar poca fatica a persuadere, perchè la rovina d’Italia non è ora causata da altra cosa, che per essere in spazio di molti anni riposatasi in sull’armi mercenarie, le quali feciono già per qualcuno qualche progresso, e parevano gagliarde tra loro; ma come venne il forestiero, elle mostrarono quello che l’erano. Onde è che a Carlo Re di Francia fu lecito pigliare Italia col gesto; e chi diceva che ne erano cagione i peccati nostri, diceva il vero; ma non erano già quelli che credeva, ma questi ch’io ho narrato. E perchè gli erano peccati di Principi, ne hanno patita la pena ancora loro. Io voglio dimostrare meglio la infelicità di queste armi.
I capitani mercenari o sono uomini eccellenti, o no; se sono, non te ne puoi fidare, perchè sempre aspirano alla grandezza propria o con l’opprimere te, che li siei padrone, o con l’opprimere altri fuora della tua intenzione; ma se non è il capitano virtuoso, ti rovina per l’ordinario. E se si risponde, che qualunque arà l’arme in mano, farà questo medesimo, o mercenario o no; replicherei, come l’armi hanno ad essere adoperate o da un Principe, o da una Repubblica; il Principe deve andare in persona, e fare lui l’ufficio del capitano; la Repubblica ha da mandare i suoi cittadini; e quando ne manda uno che non riesca valente, debbe cambiarlo; e quando sia, tenerlo con le leggi che non passi il segno. E per esperienza si vede i Principi soli, e le Repubbliche armate fare progressi grandissimi, e l’armi mercenarie non fare mai se non danno; e con più difficultà viene all’ubbidienza di un suo cittadino una Repubblica armata di armi proprie, che un’armata d’armi forestiere. Sterono Roma e Sparta molti secoli armate e libere. I Svizzeri sono armatissimi e liberissimi. Dell’armi mercenarie antiche, per esempio, ci sono li Cartaginesi, li quali furono per essere oppressi da loro soldati mercenari, finita la prima guerra co’ Romani, ancorachè i Cartaginesi avessero per capitani propri cittadini. Filippo Macedone fu fatto da’ Tebani, dopo la morte di Epaminonda, capitano della loro gente, e tolse loro, dopo la vittoria, la libertà. I Milanesi, morto il Duca Filippo, soldarono Francesco Sforza contro a’ Veniziani; il quale, superati li nimici a Caravaggio, si congiunse con loro per opprimere i Milanesi suoi padroni. Sforza suo padre, essendo soldato della Regina Giovanna di Napoli, la lasciò in un tratto disarmata, onde ella, per non perdere il Regno, fu costretta gettarsi in grembo al Re d’Aragona. E se i Viniziani e Fiorentini hanno accresciuto per l’addietro lo imperio loro con queste armi, e li loro capitani non se ne sono però fatti Principi, ma gli hanno difesi; rispondo, che gli Fiorentini in questo caso sono stati favoriti dalla sorte; perchè de’ capitani virtuosi, i quali potevano temere, alcuni non hanno vinto, alcuni hanno avuto opposizioni, altri hanno volto l’ambizione loro altrove. Quello che non vinse fu Giovanni Acuto, del quale, non vincendo, non si potea cognoscere la fede; ma ognuno confesserà, che, vincendo, stavano i Fiorentini a sua discrezione. Sforza ebbe sempre i Bracceschi contrari, che guardrono l’uno l’altro. Francesco volse l’ambizione sua in Lombardia. Braccio contro la Chiesa e il Regno di Napoli. Ma vegniamo a quello che è seguito poco tempo fa.
Feciono i Fiorentini Paolo Vitelli loro capitano, uomo prudentissimo, e che di privata fortuna aveva presa riputazione grandissima. Se costui espugnava Pisa, veruno fia che nieghi come e’ conveniva a’ Fiorentini stare seco; perchè, se fusse diventato soldato de’ loro nemici, non avevano rimedio, e tenendolo, aveano ad ubbidirlo. I Viniziani, se si considera i progressi loro, si vedrà quelli sicuramente e gloriosamente avere operato, mentrechè feciono guerra loro propri, che fu avanti che si volgessino con l’imprese in terra, dove con li gentiluomini e con la plebe armata operarono virtuosamente; ma come cominciarono a combattere in terra, lasciarono questa virtù, e seguitarono i costumi d’Italia. E nel principio dell’augumento loro in terra, per non avere molto stato, e per essere in gran riputazione, non avevano da temere molto de’ loro capitani; ma come essi ampliarono, che fu sotto il Carmignuola, ebbono un saggio di questo errore; perchè, vedutolo virtuosissimo, battuto che ebbero sotto il suo governo il Duca di Milano, e cognoscendo dall’altra parte, come egli era freddo nella guerra, giudicarono non potere più vincere con lui, perchè non volevano, nè poteano licenziarlo, per non perdere ciò che avevano acquistato, ondechè furono necessitati, per assicurarsi, di ammazzarlo.
Hanno dipoi avuto per loro capitani Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Ruberto da S. Severino, il Conte di Pitigliano, e simili, con li quali avevano da temere della perdita, non del guadagno loro; come intervenne dipoi a Vailà, dove in una giornata perderono quello che in ottocento anni con tante fatiche avevano acquistato; perchè da queste armi nascono solo i lenti, tardi e deboli acquisti, e le subite e miracolose perdite. E perchè io sono venuto con questi esempi in Italia, la quale è stata governata già molti anni dall’armi mercenarie, le voglio discorrere più da alto; acciocchè veduta l’origine e progressi di esse, si possano meglio correggere. Avete da intendere come, tostochè in questi ultimi tempi, l’Imperio cominciò ad essere ributtato d’Italia, e che il Papa nel temporale vi prese più riputazione, si divise l’Italia in più Stati; perchè molte delle città grosse presono l’armi contro i loro nobili, li quali prima, favoriti dall’Imperadore, le tenevano oppresse, e la Chiesa le favoriva per darsi riputazione nel temporale; di molte altre i loro cittadini ne diventarono Principi. Ondechè, essendo venuta l’Italia quasi in mano della Chiesa, e di qualche Repubblica; ed essendo quelli Preti e quelli altri cittadini usi a non cognoscere l’armi, incominciarono a soldare forestieri. Il primo che dette riputazione a questa milizia, fu Alberigo da Como Romagnuolo. Dalla disciplina di costui discese, tra gli altri, Braccio e Sforza, che ne’ loro tempi furono arbitri d’Italia.
Dopo questi vennero tutti gli altri, che fino a’ nostri tempi hanno governato l’armi d’Italia; ed il fine delle lor virtù è stato, che quella è stata corsa da Carlo, predata da Luigi, forzata da Ferrando, e vituperata da’ Svizzeri. L’ordine che loro hanno tenuto, è stato, prima per dare riputazione a loro propri, aver tolto riputazione alle fanterie. Feciono questo, perchè essendo senza Stato, e in su la industria, i pochi fanti non davano loro riputazione, e li assai non potevano nutrire; e però si ridussero a’ cavalli, dove con numero sopportabile erano nutriti e onorati; ed erano le cose ridotte in termine, che in un esercito di ventimila soldati non si trovavano duemila fanti. Avevano, oltre a questo, usato ogni industria per levar via a sè, e a’ soldati la fatica e la paura, non s’ammazzando nelle zuffe, ma pigliandosi prigioni e senza taglia. Non traevano di notte alle terre, quelli delle terre non traevano di notte alle tende, non facevano intorno al campo nè steccato nè fossa, non campeggiavano il verno. E tutte queste cose erano permesse ne’ loro ordini militari, e trovate da loro per fuggire, come è detto, e la fatica ed i pericoli; tantochè essi hanno condotta Italia schiava e vituperata.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication for fidelity, Machiavelli’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
How Many Kinds of Armed Forces There Are, and of Mercenary Soldiers
Having discussed in detail all the kinds of principalities I proposed to consider at the outset, examined to some extent the causes of their prosperity and adversity, and shown the ways in which many have sought to acquire and hold them, I must now discuss more generally the means of attack and defense that can arise in any of the states mentioned above. I have said already that a Prince must have sound foundations; otherwise he must inevitably fall. The principal foundations of every state, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. Since there can be no good laws where there are no good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave the laws aside and speak of arms. I say, then, that the forces with which a Prince defends his state are either his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous. If a man bases the security of his state on mercenary forces, he will never stand firm or be secure: they are divided, ambitious, undisciplined, and unfaithful, bold among friends and cowardly before enemies; they have no fear of God and keep no faith with men. Disaster is postponed only as long as the attack is postponed; in peace you are plundered by them, and in war by your enemies.
The reason is that they have no affection, and no other reason to keep them in the field, beyond a little pay, which is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers while you are not at war; but when war comes, they flee or depart. It should take little effort to persuade anyone of this, since the ruin of Italy today has no other cause than her reliance for so many years on mercenary arms. At one time these forces made some progress for some rulers, and among themselves they appeared formidable; but when the foreigner came, they showed what they were. Thus Charles, king of France, was allowed to seize Italy with a stroke of chalk. Whoever said our sins were the cause spoke the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined: they were the ones I have described. And because they were the sins of Princes, the Princes too have paid the penalty. I wish to show more clearly the wretchedness of these forces.
Mercenary captains are either men of great ability or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, for they always aspire to greatness of their own, whether by oppressing you, their employer, or by oppressing others contrary to your wishes. If a captain has no ability, he generally ruins you. If someone replies that anyone with arms in his hands will do the same, mercenary or not, I would answer that arms must be wielded either by a Prince or by a republic. The Prince must go in person and perform the duties of a captain himself; the republic must send its own citizens. When it sends one who proves incapable, it should replace him; when he proves capable, it should restrain him by law from overstepping his bounds. Experience shows that Princes commanding in person and republics with their own armed forces achieve great things, whereas mercenary forces never bring anything but harm. A republic armed with its own forces is much less likely to fall under the power of one of its citizens than a republic armed with foreign forces. Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are exceedingly well armed and exceedingly free. Among ancient examples of mercenary forces are the Carthaginians: after their first war with the Romans, they nearly fell to their own mercenary soldiers, even though Carthaginian citizens commanded them. After the death of Epaminondas, the Thebans made Philip of Macedon captain of their forces, and after his victory he took away their freedom. When Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians; after defeating the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined forces with them to oppress his Milanese employers. His father Sforza, in the service of Queen Giovanna of Naples, suddenly left her defenseless, so that, to keep her kingdom, she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the king of Aragon. If the Venetians and Florentines have expanded their dominions in the past with such forces, and their captains have defended them instead of making themselves Princes, I reply that in this matter the Florentines were favored by fortune. Among the capable captains they might have feared, some failed to win victories, some met with rivals, and others turned their ambition elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto was one who failed to win; as he won no victories, his loyalty could not be tested. But everyone will admit that, had he won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always faced the captains of Braccio's faction, each keeping watch on the other. Francesco directed his ambition toward Lombardy; Braccio directed his against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us turn to what happened more recently.
The Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of exceptional judgment who had risen from private station to the highest renown. Had he taken Pisa, no one would deny that the Florentines would have had to submit to him: if he had entered the service of their enemies, they would have had no remedy, while if they kept him, they would have had to obey him. As for the Venetians, consider their successes and you will see that they acted securely and gloriously while they made war with their own people, before they turned to campaigns on land. With their nobles and an armed populace they fought with ability; but when they began to fight on land, they abandoned this virtue and adopted the customs of Italy. At the start of their expansion on land, they had little territory and a great reputation, and had little to fear from their captains. But as they expanded under Carmagnola, they had a taste of this mistake. They saw that he was a most capable man after they had defeated the duke of Milan under his command; but when they realized, on the other hand, that he had grown sluggish in the war, they judged that they could win no more with him. Yet they did not wish to dismiss him, nor could they do so without losing what they had gained; and so, to protect themselves, they were compelled to kill him.
After him they had as captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and men like them, with whom they had to fear losses, not gains. This happened later at Vailà, where in a single day they lost what they had acquired through eight hundred years of toil. From these forces come only slow, belated, feeble gains, and sudden, astonishing losses. Since these examples have brought me to Italy, which for many years has been ruled by mercenary forces, I wish to discuss them from farther back, so that, once their origin and development are understood, they may more readily be corrected. You must understand that, when in more recent times the Empire began to be driven back from Italy and the Pope gained greater standing there in temporal affairs, Italy split into many states. Many great cities took up arms against their nobles, who had previously held them down with the emperor's support; the Church aided the cities to increase its own temporal standing. In many other cities, citizens became Princes. As Italy fell largely into the hands of the Church and of certain republics, and as priests and other citizens had no knowledge of arms, they began to hire foreigners. The first to bring this kind of soldiery into repute was Alberigo da Como, a man of Romagna. Among those trained in his methods were Braccio and Sforza, who in their day held Italy's fate in their hands.
After these men came all the others who have commanded Italy's armies down to our own times. The final result of their prowess has been that Italy was overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, assaulted by Ferdinand, and disgraced by the Swiss. Their method was first to deprive infantry of its standing in order to raise their own. They did this because they had no states of their own and lived by their trade: a small number of foot soldiers brought them no prestige, and they could not maintain a large number. So they turned to cavalry, where a manageable number of men could be supported and honored. Matters reached the point where in an army of twenty thousand soldiers there were not two thousand foot soldiers. Moreover, they used every device to spare themselves and their soldiers hardship and danger: in battle they did not kill one another, but took prisoners without demanding ransom. They did not fire upon towns at night, nor did those in the towns fire upon their camps at night. They built neither palisades nor ditches around their camps, and they did not take the field in winter. All this was permitted by their military rules, which they devised, as I have said, to escape hardship and danger. Thus they have brought Italy into servitude and disgrace.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the Italian text of all 26 chapters and the dedication.
Kinds of Armed Forces and Mercenary Soldiers
I have now looked closely at all the kinds of principality that I set out to discuss at the start. I have considered some of the reasons they prosper or fail, and shown how many rulers have tried to gain and hold them. What remains is to discuss, in general, the ways each of these principalities can attack and defend itself. I have already said that a Prince must have sound foundations. Otherwise he is bound to fall. The chief foundations of every state, whether new, old, or partly new, are good laws and good arms. There cannot be good laws where there are no good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws. So I will leave the laws aside and discuss the arms. The forces a Prince uses to defend his state are either his own, mercenaries, auxiliaries, or a mixture. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a ruler bases his state on mercenary forces, he will never be stable or safe. They lack unity, seek their own advancement, and have no discipline or loyalty. They are brave among friends and cowardly before enemies. They do not fear God or keep faith with people. Your ruin is delayed only until an attack is delayed. In peacetime they rob you; in war your enemies do.
The reason is that a small wage is the only thing that makes them willing to serve in the field. It is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are happy to be your soldiers as long as you are not at war. But as soon as war comes, they run away or leave. It should take little effort to convince anyone of this. Italy's ruin today has no other cause than its long reliance on mercenary troops. Those troops once made some gains for a few rulers and looked brave when facing each other. But when a foreigner arrived, they showed what they really were. That is why Charles, king of France, was able to take Italy with a piece of chalk. People who said that our sins were to blame spoke the truth. But the sins were not the ones they imagined. They were the ones I have described. Since these were the sins of princes, those princes have also paid the price. I want to show more clearly how harmful these forces are.
Mercenary commanders are either capable men or they are not. If they are capable, you cannot trust them. They always seek power for themselves, either by crushing you, their employer, or by crushing others against your wishes. If a commander lacks ability, he will usually ruin you. Someone may answer that any person who commands troops, mercenary or not, will do the same thing. I would reply that armed forces must be commanded either by a Prince or by a republic. A Prince should go himself and act as commander. A republic should send its own citizens. If the citizen it sends proves incompetent, it should replace him. If he proves capable, it should use laws to prevent him from going too far. Experience shows that princes who command their own forces and republics with their own armed citizens make great gains. Mercenary forces only do harm. A republic armed with its own troops is much less likely to fall under the rule of one of its citizens than a republic armed with foreign troops. Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are very well armed and very free. For an old example of mercenary forces, consider the Carthaginians. After their first war with the Romans ended, their mercenary soldiers nearly overpowered them, even though the Carthaginians had put their own citizens in command. After Epaminondas died, the Thebans appointed Philip of Macedon to command their army. After winning, he took away their freedom. When Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza to fight the Venetians. Once he had beaten the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined them to crush the Milanese, who had employed him. Sforza's father was employed by Queen Joanna of Naples. He suddenly left her without an army. To avoid losing her kingdom, she had to place herself in the hands of the king of Aragon. It may be said that the Venetians and Florentines have expanded their territories with mercenary forces in the past, and that their commanders defended them instead of making themselves princes. My answer is that the Florentines were lucky in this respect. Among the able commanders they had reason to fear, some did not win, some faced rivals, and others pursued their ambitions elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto did not win. Since he did not win, no one could find out whether he was loyal. But everyone will admit that if he had won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always had the followers of Braccio against him; each side kept an eye on the other. Francesco turned his ambition toward Lombardy, and Braccio toward the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us turn to something that happened recently.
The Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their commander. He was an extremely shrewd man who had risen from a private position to great renown. If he had captured Pisa, no one can deny that the Florentines would have had to stick with him. Had he gone over to their enemies as a soldier, they would have had no way to stop him. If they kept him, they would have had to obey him. Look at the Venetians' gains. They acted safely and gloriously as long as they fought with their own troops. This was before they began campaigning on land. Their nobles and armed common people fought with skill. But when they started fighting on land, they gave up this strength and adopted the customs of the rest of Italy. At the start of their expansion on land, they had little territory and a strong reputation, so they had little to fear from their commanders. But when they expanded their territory under Carmignuola, they saw their mistake. They recognized his great ability after defeating the duke of Milan under his command. On the other hand, they saw that he was reluctant to fight, and decided that they could not win any more with him. They did not want to dismiss him, and could not do so without losing what they had gained. To protect themselves, therefore, they felt compelled to kill him.
Their later commanders included Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Ruberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and others like them. With such men, they had to fear losses rather than hope for gains. That is what happened later at Vailà. In one day they lost what they had gained with so much effort over eight hundred years. These forces bring only slow, late, and feeble gains, but sudden and astonishing losses. Since these examples have led me to Italy, which has long been governed by mercenary forces, I want to go further back into their history. Once we see where these forces came from and how they developed, we can better correct the problem. You should understand that in more recent times, when the Empire began to be driven out of Italy and the pope gained more worldly influence there, Italy split into many states. Many large cities took up arms against their nobles. Those nobles had previously kept them under control with the emperor's support, while the Church supported the cities to increase its own worldly standing. In many other cities, citizens became princes. So Italy came largely into the hands of the Church and a few republics. Priests and these other citizens were not used to warfare, and they began hiring foreigners. The first to give this kind of military service a reputation was Alberigo da Como, a man of Romagna. Braccio and Sforza were among those trained in his methods, and in their time they held Italy's fate in their hands.
After them came all the other commanders who have led Italy's armies down to our day. The final result of their skill is that Charles has overrun Italy, Louis has plundered it, Ferdinand has assaulted it, and the Swiss have humiliated it. Their method was, first, to lower the standing of infantry so that their own standing would rise. They did this because they had no states of their own and depended on their trade. A small number of foot soldiers brought them no prestige, while they could not afford to support a large number. So they turned to cavalry, which brought them pay and honor in manageable numbers. It reached the point where an army of twenty thousand soldiers had fewer than two thousand foot soldiers. They also did everything they could to spare themselves and their troops hard work and danger. In battle they did not kill one another, but took one another prisoner without demanding ransom. They did not attack towns at night, and townspeople did not attack their camps at night. They built neither fences nor ditches around their camps, and did not campaign in winter. Their military rules allowed all this. They invented those rules, as I have said, to escape hard work and danger. In this way they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace.