Chapter 25

Concerning problems and their solutions—the number and nature of the forms from which they arise—the matter may become clear if considered as follows.Since the poet is an imitator, like a painter or any other maker of images, he must always imitate one of three[Bekker 1460b line 10]kinds of things: either things as they were or are, or things as people say and believe them to be, or things as they ought to be.These things are conveyed in language, which includes rare words, metaphors, and many modifications of expression;for we allow poets these liberties. Besides this, correctness is not the same in politics and in poetry, nor in any other[Bekker 1460b line 15]art and in poetry.Within poetry itself, error is of two kinds: one intrinsic, the other incidental.For if the poet chose to imitate... but failed through incapacity, the error belongs to poetry itself; but if his original conception was incorrect—as when he represents a horse advancing both right legs together—or if the error concerns some particular art,[Bekker 1460b line 20]such as medicine or any other art whatsoever, it does not belong to poetry in itself.Accordingly, objections raised in problems must be examined and answered from these considerations. First, those that concern the art itself: the poet has represented impossibilities and therefore has erred.But the representation is correct if it attains the end of the art itself—for the[Bekker 1460b line 25]end has been stated—if in this way it makes either that passage or some other passage more striking. An example is the pursuit of Hector.If, however, the end could have been attained either better or no less well in accordance with the relevant art, the error is not justified; for, if possible, there should be no error at all in any respect.Again, to which class does the[Bekker 1460b line 30]error belong: errors intrinsic to the art, or errors incidental to something else? For it is a lesser error not to know that a female deer has no antlers than to portray one inartistically.Besides, if the objection is that the representation is not true, perhaps it is nevertheless as it ought to be. Thus Sophocles said that he himself portrayed people as they ought to be, whereas Euripides portrayed them as they are; this is[Bekker 1460b line 35]the answer to make.But if the representation accords with neither, the answer may be that this is what people say, as in stories about the gods;for perhaps it is neither better to speak of them in this way nor true, but the case may be[Bekker 1461a][Bekker 1461a line 1]as Xenophanes held; nevertheless, this is what people say.Other things may perhaps not be better, but were in fact so, as in the passage about the weapons: “Their spears stood upright upon their butt-spikes”; for that was then the custom, as it still is among the Illyrians.As to whether something has been well or badly[Bekker 1461a line 5]said or done by someone, one must consider not only the deed or statement itself and whether it is noble or base, but also the person who acts or speaks, the person to whom, the time, the means, and the purpose—for example, whether it was done to bring about a greater good or to avert a greater evil.Problems concerning[Bekker 1461a line 10]expression must be resolved by attending to the language. Thus the rare word in “first the mules”: perhaps he does not mean the mules but the sentinels. And of Dolon, “who indeed was ill-favored in appearance,” the meaning is not that his body was misshapen, but that his face was ugly, for the Cretans use “fair-formed” to mean “fair-faced.” So too,[Bekker 1461a line 15]“mix it stronger” does not mean “mix it unmixed,” as though for drunkards, but “mix it more quickly.”Another expression is metaphorical, as in “All the gods and mortal men slept through the night”; yet at the same time he says, “Whenever he looked toward the Trojan plain, he marveled at the din of flutes and pipes.” Here “all” is used metaphorically in place of “many,”[Bekker 1461a line 20]for “all” is a kind of multitude. And “alone without a share” is metaphorical, for what is best known is called the only one.Other problems are resolved by accentuation, as Hippias of Thasos resolved “We grant him the glory of attaining” and “part of which does not decay in rain.”Others are resolved by division, as in Empedocles: “At once things mortal grew that formerly had learned[Bekker 1461a line 25]to be immortal, and things unmixed that formerly were mixed.”Others arise from ambiguity: “More of the night has passed,” for “more” is ambiguous.Others are resolved by customary usage. People call mixed wine “wine,” and hence the phrase “a greave of newly wrought tin”; and they call those who work iron “bronzesmiths,” and hence Ganymede is said[Bekker 1461a line 30]to pour wine for Zeus, though the gods do not drink wine. This last expression, however, may also be metaphorical.Whenever a word seems to signify something contradictory, one must also consider how many meanings it may bear in the passage in question. Thus, in “there the bronze spear was checked,” one must ask in how many ways “was checked there” can be understood—in this way or that, according to what[Bekker 1461a line 35]one would most naturally suppose, rather than in the directly contrary sense.Or the matter may be as[Bekker 1461b][Bekker 1461b line 1]Glaucon says: some people irrationally assume something beforehand, then pass judgment on it themselves and draw conclusions from it; and, treating the poet as though he had said what they suppose, they censure him if it contradicts their own opinion.This is what has happened in the matter of Icarius. People suppose that he was a Spartan;[Bekker 1461b line 5]it is therefore considered absurd that Telemachus did not meet him when he came to Lacedaemon. But perhaps the facts are as the Cephallenians say: they claim that Odysseus married among them and that the man’s name was Icadius, not Icarius; and the problem is † likely † due to an error.In general, what is impossible must be referred either to the requirements of[Bekker 1461b line 10]poetry, to the ideal, or to accepted belief.For the purposes of poetry, a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility;... people may not be such as Zeuxis painted them, but he painted them better; for the model ought to surpass reality.As for irrationalities, they must be referred to what people say; and it may also be answered that sometimes a thing is not irrational,[Bekker 1461b line 15]for it is probable that improbable things will happen.Statements that appear contradictory must be examined as refutations are in argument: whether the same thing is said of the same subject and in the same respect, so that one must consider †the man himself† either in relation to what he himself says or to what an intelligent person would assume.But criticism for irrationality and moral baseness is justified when, without any necessity,[Bekker 1461b line 20]the poet makes use of the irrational, as Euripides does with Aegeus, or of moral baseness, as in the character of Menelaus in the Orestes.Objections, then, are brought under five heads: things are censured as impossible, irrational, harmful, contradictory, or contrary to correctness in the relevant art. The solutions must be sought among the[Bekker 1461b line 25]distinctions already stated; they are twelve in number.

As for problems and their solutions—how many kinds there are and what they are—the matter would become clear if considered in the following way.Since the poet is a maker of representations, just like a painter or any other maker of images, he must always represent one of the[Bekker 1460b line 10]three possibilities: either things as they were or are, things as people say and believe they are, or things as they ought to be.These things are expressed in language that includes rare words, metaphors, and many modifications of language;for we allow poets these devices. Besides this, correctness is not the same in politics and in poetry, or in any[Bekker 1460b line 15]other art and in poetry.Within poetry itself, error is of two kinds: one is intrinsic to it, and the other is incidental.For if the poet undertook the representation... but lacked the ability, the error belongs to poetry itself; but if the choice was incorrect—for example, representing a horse advancing both right legs at once—or if the error concerns some particular art,[Bekker 1460b line 20]such as medicine or any other art whatever, it is not intrinsic to poetry.Accordingly, criticisms raised in problems must be examined and resolved on the basis of these distinctions. First, those directed against the art itself: something impossible has been represented, and that is an error;but it is correct if it achieves the end of the art itself—for the[Bekker 1460b line 25]end has been stated—if in this way it makes either that part itself or some other part more astonishing. An example is the pursuit of Hector.If, however, the end could have been achieved better, or no less well, in accordance with the relevant art, then it is not correct; for wherever possible, there ought to be no error at all.Furthermore, to which class does the[Bekker 1460b line 30]error belong: errors against the art itself, or errors incidental to it because they concern something else? For it is a lesser error not to know that a female deer has no antlers than to represent one in an inimitable way.Besides these points, if something is criticized for not being true, the solution may be that it is perhaps as it ought to be, just as Sophocles said that he himself represented people as they ought to be, while Euripides represented them as they are. That is[Bekker 1460b line 35]how the problem should be resolved.But if it is neither as it ought to be nor as it is, the solution may be that this is what people say, as with stories about the gods;for perhaps it is neither better to speak of them in this way nor true, but perhaps the matter is[Bekker 1461a][Bekker 1461a line 1]as Xenophanes held; nevertheless, this is what people say.Other things are perhaps not better, but that was how they were—for example, what is said about the weapons: “their spears stood upright on their butt-spikes.” That was the custom then, just as it still is among the Illyrians.As for whether something has been said or done well or not well,[Bekker 1461a line 5]one must not consider only the deed or statement itself and ask whether it is good or bad. One must also consider the person acting or speaking, the person addressed, the time, the means, and the purpose—for example, whether it was done to bring about a greater good or to prevent a greater evil.Some problems must be resolved by looking at the[Bekker 1461a line 10]language. For example, a rare word may explain “the mules first”: perhaps he does not mean the mules but the guards. And concerning Dolon, “who was indeed bad in appearance,” he does not mean that his body was misshapen but that his face was ugly, since the Cretans use “well-formed” to mean “handsome-faced.” Likewise, “mix it[Bekker 1461a line 15]stronger” does not mean “undiluted,” as though for drunkards, but “faster.”Another expression is metaphorical. For example, “Now all the gods and men slept throughout the night,” though at the same time he says, “Indeed, whenever he looked out over the Trojan plain, he marveled at the noise of flutes and pipes.” Here “all” is used metaphorically instead of “many,”[Bekker 1461a line 20]since the whole is a kind of multitude. “She alone had no share” is also metaphorical, since what is best known is called the only one.Some problems are resolved by accentuation, as Hippias of Thasos resolved “we grant him the glory of attaining his prayer” and “one part of which does not rot in the rain.”Others are resolved by division, as in Empedocles: “At once mortal things grew that previously had learned to be immortal, and things previously unmixed were mixed.”[Bekker 1461a line 25]Others are resolved by ambiguity: “More of the night has passed,” since “more” is ambiguous.Others are resolved by customary usage. People call mixed wine “wine,” which gives rise to “a greave of newly wrought tin”; and they call those who work iron “bronzesmiths,” which gives rise to the statement that[Bekker 1461a line 30]Ganymede pours wine for Zeus, though the gods do not drink wine. This, however, might also be metaphorical.Whenever a word seems to signify a contradiction, one must examine how many meanings it could have in the passage. For example, in “there the bronze spear was stopped,” one must ask in how many ways “being stopped there” is possible:in this way or in that way, according to[Bekker 1461a line 35]the interpretation one would most naturally adopt—by taking the directly opposite meaning;or, as[Bekker 1461b][Bekker 1461b line 1]Glaucon says, some people first make an unreasonable assumption, then pass judgment on it themselves and draw conclusions from it; and they criticize the poet as though he had said what they merely think he said, if it conflicts with their own belief.This has happened in the case of Icarius. People suppose that he was a Spartan;[Bekker 1461b line 5]therefore they find it strange that Telemachus did not meet him when he went to Sparta. But perhaps the matter is as the Cephallenians say: they claim that Odysseus married among them and that the name was Icadius, not Icarius; and the problem is probably † due to an error †.In general, what is impossible must be referred either to the requirements of[Bekker 1461b line 10]poetry, to what is better, or to accepted belief.For the purposes of poetry, a convincing impossibility is preferable to something unconvincing but possible;... for people to be such as Zeuxis painted them, but it is better; for the model ought to surpass reality.As for things alleged to be irrational: they must be dealt with in this way, and also by pointing out that sometimes they are not irrational;[Bekker 1461b line 15]for it is likely that unlikely things will happen.Statements that appear contradictory must be examined in the same way as refutations in argument: whether the same thing is asserted, in relation to the same thing, and in the same sense. Accordingly, one must consider either what † he himself † says or what a sensible person would assume.Criticism for irrationality and badness is justified when, without any[Bekker 1461b line 20]necessity, the poet makes use of the irrational, as Euripides does with Aegeus, or of badness, as he does with the character of Menelaus in the Orestes.Criticisms, then, are made on the basis of five kinds of fault: things are called impossible, irrational, harmful, contradictory, or contrary to technical correctness. The solutions must be sought among the[Bekker 1461b line 25]distinctions already stated. There are twelve of them.