Poetics

[Bekker 1447a][Bekker 1447a line 8]Let us speak of the art of poetry, both in itself and in its various kinds: what power each kind possesses, how plots must be constructed[Bekker 1447a line 10]if the poetic work is to be successful, and further, of how many and what sorts of parts it consists; and likewise of all other matters belonging to the same inquiry. Let us begin, as is natural, first with first principles.

Epic poetry, then, and the poetry of tragedy, as well as comedy and dithyrambic poetry, and most of the art of flute-playing and of lyre-playing, all prove to be, taken as a whole, forms of imitation.[Bekker 1447a line 15]They differ from one another in three respects: either by imitating in different media, or by imitating different objects, or by imitating differently and not in the same manner.

For just as some people imitate many things by portraying them with colors and shapes—some through art,[Bekker 1447a line 20]others through practice—while others imitate through the voice, so too in all the arts just mentioned, imitation is produced in rhythm, language, and harmony, these being used either separately or in combination.

For example, flute-playing and lyre-playing employ harmony and rhythm alone, as do any[Bekker 1447a line 25]other arts that may possess the same power, such as the playing of pipes;

the art of dancers employs rhythm by itself, without harmony—for dancers too, through rhythms embodied in their movements, imitate characters, emotions, and actions.

But the art that employs bare language alone, and that which employs metrical language, whether[Bekker 1447b][Bekker 1447b line 8]combining different meters with one another or using some single kind of meter, have remained without a name down to the present day.

For we have no[Bekker 1447b line 10]common name to give to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues,

nor to imitations someone might produce in trimeters, elegiac couplets, or any other such meters.

People do, however, attach the word “poet” to the meter and call some “elegiac poets” and others “epic poets,” naming them poets not[Bekker 1447b line 15]according to their imitation, but applying the term indiscriminately according to their meter.

Indeed, even if writers set forth something medical or scientific in meter, people customarily call them poets. Yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except meter, and so it is right to call the former a poet, but the latter a natural philosopher rather than[Bekker 1447b line 20]a poet.

Likewise, even if someone were to produce an imitation by mixing every kind of meter, as Chaeremon did in his Centaur, a mixed rhapsody composed in all meters, he too must be called a poet. Let these matters, then, be distinguished in this way.

There are also some arts that employ all the[Bekker 1447b line 25]means already mentioned—I mean rhythm, melody, and meter—as do dithyrambic poetry and the poetry of nomes, tragedy, and comedy. They differ, however, in that some use all these means at once, while others use them in separate parts.

These, then, are what I call the differences among the arts in the media through which they produce their imitation.

[Bekker 1448a][Bekker 1448a line 1]Since those who imitate imitate people in action, and since these people must be either morally serious or morally base—for characters almost always conform to these distinctions alone, since all people differ in character through vice and virtue—they must represent people either as better than we are, or worse,[Bekker 1448a line 5]or such as we are, just as painters do.

Polygnotus portrayed people as better, Pauson as worse, and Dionysius as like ourselves.

It is clear that each of the imitative arts already mentioned will also exhibit these differences, and will be distinct by imitating different objects in this way.

For these dissimilarities can occur in dancing, flute-playing, and[Bekker 1448a line 10]lyre-playing,

and also in prose and unaccompanied verse. Thus Homer represents people as better, Cleophon as like ourselves, while Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Deiliad, represent them as worse.

The same is true of dithyrambs and[Bekker 1448a line 15]nomes, as Timotheus and Philoxenus might represent the †earth’s† Cyclopes.

It is through this very difference that tragedy is distinguished from comedy: the latter seeks to imitate people as worse than those of the present day, the former as better.

There is still a third difference among these arts: the manner in which one might imitate each of these objects.[Bekker 1448a line 20]For it is possible, using the same media and imitating the same objects, either to narrate—sometimes becoming another person, as Homer does, or speaking in one’s own person without changing—or to present all †those who imitate† as acting and engaged in action.

Imitation, then, consists in these three differences,[Bekker 1448a line 25]as we said at the beginning: the medium, the objects, and the manner.

Thus in one respect Sophocles would be the same kind of imitator as Homer, since both imitate morally serious people; but in another respect he would be the same as Aristophanes, since both imitate people acting and doing. Hence, some say, these works are called dramas, because they imitate people doing things.

For this reason[Bekker 1448a line 30]the Dorians lay claim to both tragedy and comedy—the Megarians here claim comedy, saying that it arose under the democracy established among them, as do the Megarians of Sicily, since the poet Epicharmus came from there and lived much earlier than Chionides and Magnes; and some of the Dorians[Bekker 1448a line 35]in the Peloponnese claim tragedy—making the words themselves their evidence.

They say that they call the outlying villages kōmai, whereas the Athenians call them dēmoi, and that comic performers were called kōmōdoi not from kōmazein, “to revel,” but because, being dishonored and driven from the city, they wandered from village to village.

[Bekker 1448b][Bekker 1448b line 1]They also say that they themselves use dran for “to do,” whereas the Athenians use prattein.

Let this suffice, then, concerning the differences in imitation, both how many there are and what they are.

Two causes appear to have given rise to the art of poetry as a whole,[Bekker 1448b line 5]and both are natural.

First, imitation is innate in human beings from childhood, and in this they differ from the other animals: the human being is the most imitative of them all and makes his first steps in learning through imitation. Second, everyone takes pleasure in imitations.

Evidence of this lies in what happens[Bekker 1448b line 10]in actual experience: although we look with pain upon the things themselves, we take pleasure in viewing the most exact images of them—for example, the forms of the most contemptible animals and of corpses.

The reason for this, too, is that learning gives the greatest pleasure not only to philosophers but equally to others, though they[Bekker 1448b line 15]partake of it only to a small degree.

For this reason people take pleasure in seeing images: as they contemplate them, they learn and infer what each thing is—for example, that this man is that one.

For if one happens not to have seen the subject before, the image will give pleasure not as an imitation, but because of its workmanship, its color, or some other cause of that kind.

[Bekker 1448b line 20]Since imitation, harmony, and rhythm are natural to us—and it is clear that meters are parts of rhythms—those who were by nature most gifted in these things gradually developed them from the beginning and brought poetry into being out of improvisations.

Poetry then divided according to the characters proper to its authors:[Bekker 1448b line 25]the more dignified represented noble actions and the actions of noble people, while the less elevated represented the actions of the base, at first composing invectives, just as the others composed hymns and encomia.

We cannot name any such poem by anyone before Homer, though it is likely that there were many;

but beginning with Homer[Bekker 1448b line 30]we can do so—for example, his Margites and other works of that kind. In these, because it was fitting, the iambic meter also appeared; hence it is now called “iambic,” because in this meter people lampooned one another.

And so, among the ancient poets, some became poets of heroic verse and others poets of iambics.

And just as Homer was preeminently the poet of serious subjects[Bekker 1448b line 35]—for he alone composed not merely well, but also dramatic imitations—so too he was the first to indicate the form of comedy, by dramatizing not invective but the ridiculous. For the Margites stands in an analogous relation: as the Iliad[Bekker 1449a][Bekker 1449a line 1]and the Odyssey stand to tragedies, so the Margites stands to comedies.

But once tragedy and comedy had appeared, those who were drawn toward either kind of poetry in accordance with their own natures became, in the one case, comic poets instead of writers of iambics,[Bekker 1449a line 5]and in the other, producers of tragedies instead of epic poets, because these forms were greater and more honored than the earlier ones. Whether tragedy has yet developed sufficiently in all its forms or not, and whether it is to be judged in itself or in relation to the theaters, is another question.

At any rate, having originated in improvisation[Bekker 1449a line 10]—both tragedy and comedy, tragedy from those who led the dithyramb, and comedy from those who led the phallic songs, which even now survive as established customs in many cities—tragedy gradually grew as poets developed whatever part of it became apparent.

And after undergoing many changes,[Bekker 1449a line 15]tragedy ceased changing once it had attained its own nature.

Aeschylus was the first to increase the number of actors from one to two; he reduced the role of the chorus and made dialogue take the leading part. Sophocles introduced three actors and scene-painting.

There was also the matter of magnitude: beginning with short plots and[Bekker 1449a line 20]ridiculous diction, because it developed out of the satyric form, tragedy acquired dignity only at a late stage; and its meter changed from the tetrameter to the iambic.

At first poets used the tetrameter because the poetry was satyric and more closely associated with dancing; but once dialogue had developed, its own nature discovered the meter suited to it. For the iambic is the most[Bekker 1449a line 25]conversational of meters. Evidence of this is that

in conversation with one another we utter iambic lines very often, but hexameters only rarely and when departing from the harmony of ordinary speech.

There was also the increase in the number of episodes. As for all the other ways in which each element is said to have been embellished,[Bekker 1449a line 30]let what has been said suffice;

for it would perhaps be a great labor to recount each development individually.

Comedy, as we have said, is an imitation of people who are inferior, though not in respect of every kind of vice; rather, the ridiculous is one part of the ugly.For the ridiculous is[Bekker 1449a line 35]a kind of error and ugliness that is painless and not destructive; for example, the comic mask is something ugly and distorted, but without pain.Now the transformations of tragedy, and those through whom they came about, have not escaped notice; but comedy, because it was not[Bekker 1449b][Bekker 1449b line 1]taken seriously from the beginning, passed unnoticed. For it was only late that the archon granted a chorus to comic poets; before that, the performers were volunteers.Once comedy had already acquired certain forms of its own, those who are called its poets are remembered. But who introduced masks, or prologues, or[Bekker 1449b line 5]a plurality of actors, and other such things, is unknown.The making of plots originally came from Sicily;but among the Athenians, Crates was the first to abandon the iambic form and begin composing stories and plots of a general nature.Epic poetry, then, followed tragedy insofar as it is an imitation of serious subjects[Bekker 1449b line 10]in metrical language; but they differ in that epic employs a single meter and is narrative.They differ also in length: tragedy endeavors, as far as possible, to confine itself within a single circuit of the sun, or to exceed it only slightly, whereas epic poetry is unlimited in time and differs in this respect,although[Bekker 1449b line 15]at first poets did the same in tragedies as in epics.Some of their parts are the same, while others are peculiar to tragedy.Therefore, whoever knows what makes a tragedy good or bad also knows about epic poetry; for everything epic poetry possesses belongs to tragedy, but not everything belonging to tragedy is found in[Bekker 1449b line 20]epic poetry.

We shall speak later about the imitative art in hexameters and about comedy; but let us now speak about tragedy, taking up from what has already been said the definition that emerges of its essential nature.Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious,[Bekker 1449b line 25]complete, and of a certain magnitude, in language embellished with each kind of ornament used separately in the different parts, performed by actors and not through narration, accomplishing through pity and fear the catharsis of such emotions.By “embellished language” I mean language possessing rhythm and harmony;and by “each kind used separately,” I mean that some parts are accomplished through meter alone[Bekker 1449b line 30]and others, in turn, through song.Since those who perform the imitation do so by acting, the adornment of spectacle must first of necessity be one part of tragedy; next come song-making and diction, for these are the means through which they perform the imitation.By “diction” I mean the actual composition of the[Bekker 1449b line 35]metrical language, and by “song-making” that whose entire power is manifest.And since tragedy is an imitation of action, and action is performed by certain agents, who must necessarily possess certain qualities both of character and of thought—for it is through these that we also say[Bekker 1450a][Bekker 1450a line 1]actions possess certain qualities, and it is in accordance with these that everyone succeeds or fails—and since plot is the imitation of the action—for by “plot” I mean the[Bekker 1450a line 5]arrangement of the incidents—while character is that according to which we say that the agents possess certain qualities, and thought is found wherever speakers demonstrate something or declare a judgment,every tragedy must therefore have six parts, according to which the tragedy possesses its particular quality. These are plot, character, diction,[Bekker 1450a line 10]thought, spectacle, and song-making.The means by which they imitate constitute two parts; the manner in which they imitate, one; and the objects they imitate, three; beyond these there is nothing.†Not a few of them†, one might say, have made use of these forms; for †every work has spectacle†, as well as character, plot, diction, song, and thought.[Bekker 1450a line 15]The greatest of these is the arrangement of the incidents. For tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of actions and of life[Bekker 1450a line 20].Thus the agents do not act in order to imitate character; rather, they include character for the sake of the actions. Consequently, the incidents and the plot are the end of tragedy, and the end is the greatest thing of all.Moreover, without action there could be no tragedy, but without character[Bekker 1450a line 25]there could be.For the tragedies of most recent poets are without character, and in general many poets are of this sort, just as among painters Zeuxis stands in relation to Polygnotus: Polygnotus is a fine painter of character, whereas the painting of Zeuxis has no character at all.Again, if someone were to set down in succession speeches expressive of character and well made in diction[Bekker 1450a line 30]and thought, he would not accomplish what is the proper work of tragedy; a tragedy employing these elements less successfully, but possessing a plot and an arrangement of incidents, would accomplish it far better.Besides this, the chief means by which tragedy moves the soul are parts of the plot: reversals and[Bekker 1450a line 35]recognitions.A further sign is that those who undertake to compose tragedies attain precision in diction and character before they are able to arrange the incidents, as was true of nearly all the earliest poets.Plot, then, is the first principle and, as it were, the soul of tragedy; character holds second place(for the same is true[Bekker 1450b][Bekker 1450b line 1]in painting: if someone were to smear the most beautiful colors on a surface at random, he would not give as much pleasure as if he had drawn an image in outline).Tragedy is an imitation of action, and chiefly for the sake of the action, of the agents.Third comes thought. This[Bekker 1450b line 5]is the ability to say what is inherent in the circumstances and what is appropriate, which in speeches is the function of political and rhetorical art.The ancient poets made their characters speak politically; poets today make them speak rhetorically.Character is that which reveals choice, showing what sort of choice it is;[Bekker 1450b line 10]therefore those speeches possess no character[Bekker 1450b line 10a]in which there is nothing at all that the speaker chooses or avoids.Thought, however, is found in passages where speakers demonstrate that something is or is not the case, or make some general declaration.Fourth †among the words† is diction. By “diction,” as has been said before, I mean expression through words, which has the same force both in metrical compositions and[Bekker 1450b line 15]in prose speeches.Of the remaining parts, song-making is the greatest of the embellishments.Spectacle, though capable of moving the soul, is the least artistic and the least proper to the poetic art; for the power of tragedy exists even without public performance and actors. Moreover, in bringing spectacles to completion,[Bekker 1450b line 20]the art of the stage machinist has greater authority than that of the poets.

Now that these matters have been defined, let us next discuss what sort of arrangement the incidents ought to have, since this is both the first and the greatest element of tragedy.We have established that tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete and whole[Bekker 1450b line 25]and possesses a certain magnitude; for something may be whole and yet possess no magnitude.A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end.A beginning is that which does not itself necessarily follow something else, but after which something else naturally comes to be or occurs.An end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows something else,[Bekker 1450b line 30]either necessarily or for the most part, but after which there is nothing else.A middle is that which itself follows something else and has something else following it.Well-constructed plots, therefore, must neither begin at some chance point nor end at some chance point, but must employ the forms just described.Furthermore, since a beautiful thing—whether a living creature or any[Bekker 1450b line 35]whole composed of parts—must not only have those parts arranged in order but must also possess a magnitude that is not arbitrary, for beauty consists in magnitude and order,neither could a very tiny creature be beautiful, since our perception of it becomes confused when it occurs in a span of time nearly imperceptible, nor could an enormously large one be beautiful, since[Bekker 1451a][Bekker 1451a line 1]we could not perceive it all at once, and its unity and wholeness would escape the spectators’ view—as, for example, if there were a creature ten thousand stadia long.Thus, just as bodies and living creatures must possess magnitude, but a magnitude that can readily be taken in at a glance, so[Bekker 1451a line 5]plots must possess length, but a length that can readily be held in memory.The limit of length in relation to dramatic competitions and the spectators’ perception does not belong to the poetic art; for if a hundred tragedies had to compete, they would compete by the water clock, †as they say was sometimes done on other occasions†.But the limit determined by the very nature[Bekker 1451a line 10]of the action is this: provided that the sequence remains clear, the greater the length, the more beautiful the work will be in respect of magnitude. To give a simple definition, a magnitude is sufficient if, in the course of events occurring successively according to probability or necessity, a change comes about from misfortune to good fortune or from good fortune to misfortune.[Bekker 1451a line 15]That is a sufficient limit of magnitude.

A plot is not unified, as some suppose, merely because it concerns a single person. For many—indeed, infinitely many—things happen to one person, and some of these possess no unity; likewise, one person performs many actions from which no single action results.Therefore all those poets seem[Bekker 1451a line 20]to have erred who composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, and other poems of that kind. They suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the plot concerning him must also be one.But Homer, who excels in other respects as well, seems to have perceived this point correctly, whether through art or through natural talent. In composing the Odyssey,[Bekker 1451a line 25]he did not include everything that happened to Odysseus—for example, his being wounded on Parnassus and his pretending to be mad at the mustering of the army—since, when either one of these events occurred, it was neither necessary nor probable that the other should occur. Instead, he constructed the Odyssey around a single action of the kind we have described, and likewise the Iliad.[Bekker 1451a line 30]Therefore, just as in the other imitative arts a single imitation is the imitation of a single object, so too the plot, since it is the imitation of an action, must imitate one action, and that a whole. Its incidents must be so arranged that if any one part is moved or removed, the whole is disturbed and displaced; for anything whose presence[Bekker 1451a line 35]or absence makes no perceptible difference is no part of the whole.

It is also evident from what has been said that the poet’s task is not to tell what has happened, but what might happen—what is possible according to probability or necessity.For the[Bekker 1451b][Bekker 1451b line 1]historian and the poet differ not in speaking in verse or without verse—for the works of Herodotus could be put into verse, and they would be no less a history in verse than without verse—but in this: the one tells what has[Bekker 1451b line 5]happened, the other what might happen.For this reason poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history; for poetry speaks more of universals, history of particulars.By a universal I mean what sort of things a certain sort of person will say or do according to probability or necessity, which is[Bekker 1451b line 10]what poetry aims at, though it assigns names to the persons; by a particular, what Alcibiades did or what befell him.In comedy this has by now become evident: the poets construct the plot through probable events and then assign whatever names happen to occur to them, instead of composing, as the iambic poets do, about the particular[Bekker 1451b line 15]individual.In tragedy, however, they adhere to names that have actually existed. The reason is that what is possible is credible: we do not yet believe that things which have not happened are possible, whereas it is evident that things which have happened are possible, since they would not have happened if they had been impossible.Nevertheless, even among tragedies, in some there is only one[Bekker 1451b line 20]or two familiar names, while the rest are invented; and in some there is none, as in Agathon’s Antheus; for in that play both the events and the names are alike invented, yet it delights no less.Thus one should not insist absolutely on adhering to the traditional stories around which tragedies are[Bekker 1451b line 25]constructed. Indeed, it is ridiculous to insist on this, since even familiar stories are familiar only to a few, yet nevertheless delight everyone.It is clear from this, then, that the poet must be a maker of plots rather than of verses, insofar as he is a poet by virtue of imitation, and what he imitates is actions.And even if he happens[Bekker 1451b line 30]to compose about events that have actually occurred, he is no less a poet; for nothing prevents some actual events from being such as might probably have occurred, and it is in virtue of this that he is their poet.Of simple plots and actions, the episodic are the worst. I call a plot episodic when the[Bekker 1451b line 35]episodes follow one another with neither probability nor necessity.Such plots are made by bad poets through their own fault, and by good poets on account of the actors; for in composing pieces for competition and stretching the plot beyond its capacity,[Bekker 1452a][Bekker 1452a line 1]they are often compelled to distort the sequence of events.But since imitation is not[Bekker 1452a line 2]only of a complete action but also of fearful and pitiable events, and these occur most of all when they come about contrary to expectation yet because of one another,the marvelous[Bekker 1452a line 5]will be greater in this way than if the events arise spontaneously or by chance; for even among chance events, those appear most marvelous that seem to have happened as if by design. Thus the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the man responsible for Mitys’s death by falling upon him while he was looking at it; for such events seem[Bekker 1452a line 10]not to occur at random.It follows, therefore, that plots of this kind must be the finer ones.

Some plots are simple and others complex; for the actions of which plots are imitations are themselves, from the outset, of these kinds.By a simple action I mean one which,[Bekker 1452a line 15]being continuous and unified as defined above, undergoes its change of fortune without reversal or recognition;and by a complex action, one in which the change of fortune is accompanied by recognition or reversal, or both.These must arise from the very construction of the plot, so that they result from the preceding events[Bekker 1452a line 20]either by necessity or according to probability; for there is a great difference between one thing happening because of another and happening merely after it.

A reversal is a change by which the action turns into its opposite, as has been said; and this, as we maintain, must occur according to probability or necessity.For example, in the[Bekker 1452a line 25]Oedipus, the messenger comes intending to cheer Oedipus and free him from his fear concerning his mother, but by revealing who Oedipus was, he produces the opposite effect.And in the Lynceus, Lynceus is being led away to die, while Danaus follows to kill him; but as a result of what has happened, it comes about that Danaus dies and Lynceus is saved.Recognition,[Bekker 1452a line 30]as the name itself indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, leading either to friendship or to enmity among persons destined for good or bad fortune.The finest recognition is that which occurs simultaneously with reversal, as does the recognition in the Oedipus.There are, of course, other kinds of recognition; for, as has been said, recognition can occur in relation to inanimate objects and things of[Bekker 1452a line 35]any sort, and it is possible to recognize whether someone has or has not done something.But the recognition most integral to the plot and most integral to the action is the one described above; for such recognition and reversal will produce either pity[Bekker 1452b][Bekker 1452b line 1]or fear—the kinds of actions of which tragedy is assumed to be an imitation—since both bad and good fortune will also result from such events.Since recognition is the recognition of certain persons, some recognitions involve only one person recognizing the other, when it is already clear who the other[Bekker 1452b line 5]is; but at other times both must recognize each other. Thus Iphigenia is recognized by Orestes through the sending of the letter, but another recognition is required for Orestes to be recognized by Iphigenia.Two parts of the plot, then, are these: reversal[Bekker 1452b line 10]and recognition. A third is suffering. Reversal and recognition have now been discussed;suffering is an action that causes destruction or pain, such as deaths in full view, agonies, woundings, and things of that kind.

The parts of tragedy that must be employed as its constituent forms[Bekker 1452b line 15]we have discussed before; but according to quantity and the separate sections into which it is divided, they are these: prologue, episode, exode, and choral portion,the choral portion being divided into parode and stasimon.These are common to all tragedies, while songs from the stage and dirges are peculiar to some.The prologue is an entire part of a tragedy preceding the chorus’s[Bekker 1452b line 20]entrance-song;an episode is an entire part of a tragedy between complete choral songs;the exode is an entire part of a tragedy after which there is no choral song;of the choral portion, the parode is the chorus’s first complete utterance;the stasimon is a choral song without anapests or trochees;and the dirge is a lament shared by the chorus and those upon the[Bekker 1452b line 25]stage.The parts of tragedy that must be employed as its constituent forms we have discussed before; but according to quantity and the separate sections into which it is divided, they are these.

What one should aim at and what one should avoid in constructing plots, and from what source the effect proper to tragedy will arise,[Bekker 1452b line 30]would next, after what has now been said, have to be explained.Since, then, the structure of the finest tragedy must be not simple but complex, and must imitate events that arouse fear and pity—for this is peculiar to this kind of imitation—it is evident, first, that virtuous men should not be shown[Bekker 1452b line 35]passing from good fortune to bad; for this is neither fearful nor pitiable, but morally repugnant;nor should wicked men pass from bad fortune to good, for this is the most untragic outcome of all: it has none of the requisite qualities, since it neither appeals to human sympathy[Bekker 1453a][Bekker 1453a line 1]nor arouses pity or fear;nor, again, should an utterly depraved man fall from good fortune into bad. Such a structure might appeal to human sympathy, but it would arouse neither pity nor fear; for pity concerns one who suffers undeservedly, while fear concerns one like ourselves—[Bekker 1453a line 5]pity, then, concerns the undeserving sufferer, and fear one like ourselves—so that what happens will be neither pitiable nor fearful.There remains, therefore, the man between these extremes. Such a man is one who is distinguished neither by virtue and justice nor one who falls into misfortune through vice and depravity, but through[Bekker 1453a line 10]some error; and he is one of those who enjoy great reputation and prosperity, such as Oedipus and Thyestes and the illustrious men descended from houses like theirs.A well-constructed plot, therefore, must have a single rather than a double outcome, as some maintain, and the change must be not from misfortune to good fortune, but the reverse,[Bekker 1453a line 15]from good fortune to misfortune, not through depravity but through a great error on the part of one such as has been described, or of someone better rather than worse.What actually occurs is also evidence of this. At first, poets recounted whatever plots came to hand; but now the finest tragedies are composed around a few houses—for example,[Bekker 1453a line 20]around Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and all others to whom it has fallen either to suffer or to commit terrible deeds.The finest tragedy according to the principles of the art, then, arises from this kind of structure.Therefore those who reproach Euripides because he does this[Bekker 1453a line 25]in his tragedies and because many of them end in misfortune are themselves in error. For this, as has been said, is correct;and the strongest evidence is that, on the stage and in dramatic competitions, such tragedies, if successfully executed, appear the most tragic; and Euripides, even if he does not manage other matters well, nevertheless[Bekker 1453a line 30]appears the most tragic of the poets.Second best is the structure that some call the best: one that has a double structure, like the Odyssey, and ends with opposite outcomes for the better and the worse characters.It is thought to be best because of the weakness of theatrical audiences; for poets follow the spectators and compose[Bekker 1453a line 35]according to their wishes.But this is not the pleasure proper to tragedy; it belongs rather to comedy. There, even those who are bitterest enemies in the plot—Orestes and Aegisthus, for example—depart at the end as friends, and no one dies at anyone’s hand.

[Bekker 1453b][Bekker 1453b line 1]Fear and pity may, then, arise from the spectacle, but they may also arise from the very structure of the events, which is the better way and the mark of a superior poet.For the plot should be so constructed that, even without seeing the action, anyone who[Bekker 1453b line 5]hears the events as they occur will shudder and feel pity because of what happens—as one would on hearing the plot of Oedipus.To produce this effect through spectacle is less artistic and requires lavish production.Those who use spectacle to produce not[Bekker 1453b line 9]the fearful but only the monstrous[Bekker 1453b line 10]have nothing in common with tragedy; for one should not seek every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but only the pleasure proper to it.Since the poet must produce through imitation the pleasure that comes from pity and fear, it is clear that this effect must be embodied in the events.Let us determine, then, what kinds of incidents appear terrible or pitiable among the[Bekker 1453b line 15]events that occur. Such actions must necessarily take place between friends, between enemies, or between those who are neither.If enemy acts against enemy, there is nothing pitiable either in the deed or in the intention, except in the suffering considered by itself;nor is there if the parties are neither friends nor enemies.But when these[Bekker 1453b line 20]sufferings arise within bonds of affection—for example, when brother kills brother, son kills father, mother kills son, or son kills mother, or is about to do so, or commits some other such deed—these are the situations one must seek.The traditional stories cannot be broken apart—I mean, for example, that Clytemnestra was killed by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon—[Bekker 1453b line 25]but the poet must exercise his own invention and make good use of what tradition has handed down. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by “good use.”The deed may be done, as the ancient poets represented it, by characters who know and recognize what they are doing, just as Euripides made Medea kill her children;or they may[Bekker 1453b line 30]commit the deed without knowing the horror of what they do, and afterward recognize the bond of affection, as in Sophocles’ Oedipus. There the deed lies outside the drama; within the tragedy itself, examples are Astydamas’ Alcmaeon and Telegonus in the Wounded Odysseus.There is, besides these, a third possibility:[Bekker 1453b line 35]someone who is about to commit an irreparable deed in ignorance may recognize the victim before committing it.Beyond these there is no other possibility. The deed must either be done or not done, and the agent must either know or not know.Of these possibilities, to be about to act with full knowledge and then not act is the worst: it is morally repugnant and not tragic, since no suffering occurs. Therefore no one[Bekker 1454a][Bekker 1454a line 1]constructs a scene this way, except rarely—as, in Antigone, Haemon does with Creon.To perform the deed knowingly is second worst.Better is to perform it in ignorance and recognize the victim afterward; for then there is no moral repugnance, and the recognition is startling.Best of all[Bekker 1454a line 5]is the last possibility. I mean, for example, that in Cresphontes Merope is about to kill her son but does not kill him, recognizing him instead; in Iphigenia the sister is about to kill her brother; and in Helle the son, when about to surrender his mother, recognizes her.This is why, as was said long ago, tragedies concern only a few[Bekker 1454a line 10]families. For poets, in their search, discovered how to produce this effect in their plots not by art but by chance; they are therefore compelled to resort to those houses in which such sufferings occurred.Enough, then, has been said about the structure of events and what sort of plots[Bekker 1454a line 15]there ought to be.

With regard to character, there are four things one should aim at. The first and foremost is that the characters be good.A character will be present if, as has been said, speech or action reveals a certain moral choice, whatever it may be; and the character will be good if the choice[Bekker 1454a line 20]is good.Goodness is possible in every class: even a woman may be good, and so may a slave, although perhaps the former is inferior and the latter wholly base.The second aim is propriety. A character may be brave, but it is not fitting for a woman to be brave or formidable in the same way as a man.The third is likeness. This is different[Bekker 1454a line 25]from making the character good and fitting, as described above.The fourth is consistency. Even if the person who provides the subject for the imitation is inconsistent, and such a character is assumed, the character must nevertheless be consistently inconsistent.An example of needless baseness of character is Menelaus in Orestes;of[Bekker 1454a line 30]the unbecoming and inappropriate, the lament of Odysseus in Scylla and the speech of Melanippe;and of inconsistency, Iphigenia at Aulis, for the suppliant Iphigenia bears no resemblance to the woman she becomes afterward.In character, just as in the structure of events, one must always seek either necessity or probability,[Bekker 1454a line 35]so that it is necessary or probable for a person of a certain kind to say or do things of a certain kind, and necessary or probable that this event should follow that one.It is therefore clear that the resolutions of plots must also arise from the[Bekker 1454b][Bekker 1454b line 1]plot itself, and not from a machine, as in Medea and in the episode of the departure by ship in the Iliad.A machine should be used for matters outside the drama: either events that occurred before it and that no human being could know, or later events that[Bekker 1454b line 5]require foretelling and announcement; for we grant to the gods the power to see all things.Nothing irrational should occur within the events; but if it does, it must lie outside the tragedy, as does the irrational element in Sophocles’ Oedipus.Since tragedy is an imitation of people better than ourselves, poets should imitate good[Bekker 1454b line 10]portrait painters; for these artists, while rendering the distinctive form and making their subjects recognizable, paint them more beautiful than they are. So too the poet, when imitating people who are irascible, easygoing, or possess other such traits of character, should make them, while remaining such people, noble—†an example of harshness is Achilles, whom Homer too made good†.[Bekker 1454b line 15]These principles, then, must be preserved, and in addition those effects that depart from the perceptions necessarily attendant upon the poetic art; for errors can often be made in these matters also. Enough has been said about them in the published discussions.

What recognition is has been stated earlier. As for the kinds[Bekker 1454b line 20]of recognition, the first is the least artistic and the one poets use most often from lack of invention: recognition through signs.Some of these are congenital, such as the lance-mark borne by the Earthborn,or stars like those Carcinus uses in Thyestes; others are acquired, and of these some are on the body, such as scars, while others are external, such as[Bekker 1454b line 25]necklaces and, in Tyro, the recognition by means of the cradle.These signs too may be used either better or worse. Odysseus, for example, was recognized by his scar in one way by his nurse and in another by the swineherds;for recognitions introduced merely to establish identity are less artistic, as are all others of that kind, while those arising from a reversal, as[Bekker 1454b line 30]in the Washing, are better.Second are recognitions contrived by the poet, and therefore inartistic. For example, in Iphigenia Orestes reveals that he is Orestes: she is recognized through the letter, but he himself says what the poet wishes him to say rather than what[Bekker 1454b line 35]the plot requires.This therefore comes close to the error just mentioned, since he could have brought some tokens with him. Another example is the voice of the shuttle in Sophocles’ Tereus.The third kind is recognition through memory, when the sight[Bekker 1455a][Bekker 1455a line 1]of something awakens awareness, as in Dicaeogenes’ Cyprians, where the man wept upon seeing the painting; and in the tale told to Alcinous, where Odysseus, hearing the lyre-player and remembering, shed tears, and thus they were recognized.The fourth kind is recognition through inference, as in the Libation Bearers:[Bekker 1455a line 5]someone resembling me has arrived; no one resembles me except Orestes; therefore Orestes has arrived. There is also the recognition concerning Iphigenia proposed by Polyidus the sophist; for he said it was natural that Orestes should infer that, since his sister had been sacrificed, it was now his own fate to be sacrificed. And in Theodectes’ Tydeus, the inference is that, having come in hopes of finding his son, he himself[Bekker 1455a line 10]perishes. Another example occurs in the Daughters of Phineus: when they saw the place, they inferred their fate, that they were destined to die there, for there too they had been exposed as infants.There is also a composite recognition arising from false inference on the audience’s part, as in Odysseus the[Bekker 1455a line 14]False Messenger. For the ability to string the bow, when no one else[Bekker 1455a line 14a]could, is a contrivance and an assumption made by the poet,[Bekker 1455a line 14b]even if Odysseus said he would recognize the bow, which he had not[Bekker 1455a line 15]seen; but to make the recognition occur through this, on the supposition that he would be recognized by that means, is false inference.The best recognition of all is that which arises from the events themselves, when the startling disclosure comes about through probable incidents, as in Sophocles’ Oedipus and in Iphigenia; for it is probable that she would wish to entrust a letter. Such recognitions[Bekker 1455a line 20]alone dispense with contrived signs and necklaces.Second best are those that arise from inference.

In constructing plots and working them out in language, one should set them before one’s eyes as vividly as possible; for by seeing them thus with the greatest clarity, as though present at the very[Bekker 1455a line 25]events themselves, one would discover what is fitting and be least likely to overlook contradictions.Evidence of this is the fault found with Carcinus. His Amphiaraus was returning from the temple—a detail that escaped the poet because he did not visualize the scene—but on the stage the play failed when the spectators took offense at it.So far as possible, one should also work out the action through one’s own gestures;[Bekker 1455a line 30]for, given the same natural capacities, those who are themselves in the grip of emotion are the most convincing: the man who is distressed conveys distress, and the man who is angry conveys anger, with the greatest truth.Hence poetry belongs to the naturally gifted or to the mad; for the former are readily adaptable, while the latter are transported out of themselves.As for stories, whether inherited or invented, the poet should first[Bekker 1455b][Bekker 1455b line 1]set them out for himself in general outline, and only then introduce episodes and expand them.What I mean by viewing the general outline may be illustrated by the Iphigenia: a certain maiden was sacrificed and vanished unobserved by those who had sacrificed her; she was established in another country, where[Bekker 1455b line 5]it was the custom to sacrifice strangers to the goddess, and she held this priesthood. Some time later it happened that the priestess’s brother came there—the fact that the god’s oracle commanded him to go there, and the purpose for which it did so, lie outside the plot. But when he arrived, was seized, and was about to be sacrificed, he revealed his identity, whether in the manner[Bekker 1455b line 10]of Euripides or as Polyidus devised it, saying, as probability required, that it was apparently fated not only that his sister should be sacrificed but that he too should be; and from this comes his deliverance.After this, once the characters have been given names, the poet should introduce the episodes;but he must see that the episodes are appropriate, as in the case of Orestes, where there are the madness through which he was captured and the[Bekker 1455b line 15]deliverance through purification.In dramas, then, the episodes are brief, whereas epic is lengthened by them.For the story of the Odyssey is not long: a man is abroad for many years, kept under watch by Poseidon and left entirely alone; moreover, affairs at home are in such a state that his[Bekker 1455b line 20]property is being consumed by suitors and his son is being plotted against. He himself arrives after being storm-tossed, reveals his identity to certain persons, and attacks: he is saved, and destroys his enemies.This, then, is the essential story; all the rest consists of episodes.

Every tragedy consists partly of complication and partly of resolution.[Bekker 1455b line 25]The events outside the play, and often some of those within it, form the complication; the remainder is the resolution.By complication I mean everything from the beginning up to and including the last point from which the action passes into good fortune or bad fortune; by resolution, everything from the beginning of that change to the end.Thus, in Theodectes’ Lynceus,[Bekker 1455b line 30]the complication comprises the events already accomplished, the seizure of the child, and then the seizure of the parents themselves; the resolution extends from the accusation of murder to the end.There are four kinds of tragedy—for the parts were also said to be that many:the complex, which consists wholly of reversal and recognition;the tragedy of suffering, such as the plays about[Bekker 1456a][Bekker 1456a line 1]Ajax and Ixion;the tragedy of character, such as the Women of Phthia and Peleus;and the fourth, †the spectacular†, such as the Phorcides, Prometheus, and all plays set in Hades.One should therefore strive above all to include every kind, but if that is impossible, then the most important and the greatest number—especially[Bekker 1456a line 5]because of the way poets are now maliciously criticized. Since there have been good poets in each individual kind, the critics expect a single poet to surpass each of them in his particular excellence.Nothing defines one tragedy as different from or the same as another so properly as the plot; that is, tragedies are the same when their complication and resolution are the same.Many poets construct the complication well[Bekker 1456a line 10]but resolve it badly;yet both must always be brought off with mastery.One must remember what has often been said and not make a tragedy into an epic structure—by “epic” I mean one containing many stories—as one would do, for example, by taking the whole plot of the Iliad.In epic, because of its length, the parts assume their proper magnitude; but[Bekker 1456a line 15]in dramas the result falls far short of expectation.The proof is that all who have dramatized the entire sack of Troy rather than separate portions of it, as Euripides did, or the whole story of Niobe rather than treating it as Aeschylus did, either fail outright or fare badly in the competition; indeed, Agathon failed for this reason alone.But in reversals and in simple actions, poets attain the effect they desire with marvelous skill;[Bekker 1456a line 20]for this is both tragic and satisfying to human feeling.This occurs when a clever but wicked man is deceived, like Sisyphus, or when a brave but unjust man is defeated.And this is also probable, as Agathon says; for it is probable that many things should happen[Bekker 1456a line 25]contrary to probability.The chorus, too, must be regarded as one of the actors; it must be a part of the whole and share in the action, not as in Euripides but as in Sophocles.In the other poets, the songs belong no more to the plot at hand than to another tragedy; hence their choruses sing interludes, Agathon having been the first[Bekker 1456a line 30]to introduce this practice. Yet what difference is there between singing interludes and fitting a speech from one play into another, or even an entire episode?

The other kinds have now been discussed; it remains to speak of diction and thought.What concerns thought may[Bekker 1456a line 35]be left to the treatises on rhetoric, since it belongs more properly to that field of inquiry.Thought includes everything that must be produced through speech.Its parts are proof and refutation, the arousing of emotions—such as[Bekker 1456b][Bekker 1456b line 1]pity, fear, anger, and all similar emotions—and, further, the effects of magnitude and smallness.It is clear that in the events themselves one must employ the same forms of thought whenever it is necessary to produce effects of pity, terror, magnitude, or probability.There is, however, this[Bekker 1456b line 5]difference: the events must appear as they are without explicit exposition, whereas the effects conveyed in speech must be produced by the speaker and arise through the speech. For what would be the speaker’s function if the required effect were apparent in itself and did not result from the speech?Of matters concerning diction, one field of inquiry consists of the forms of utterance.[Bekker 1456b line 10]Knowledge of these belongs to the art of acting and to whoever possesses authoritative mastery of that art—for example, what is a command, a prayer, a narration, a threat, a question, an answer, and anything else of this kind.For no criticism worthy[Bekker 1456b line 15]of serious attention can be brought against the poetic art on the grounds of knowing or not knowing these things. For who could suppose there to be the error that Protagoras censures when he says that the poet, thinking he is uttering a prayer, issues a command in the words, “Sing, goddess, of the wrath”?For to bid someone do or not do something, he says, is a command.Let this matter therefore be set aside, since it belongs to another art and not to poetics.

[Bekker 1456b line 20]The parts of diction as a whole are these: letter, syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, inflection, and phrase.A letter is an indivisible sound—not every such sound, but one from which a compound sound naturally arises; for animals also make indivisible sounds, none of which I call a letter.The parts of a letter[Bekker 1456b line 25]are vowel, semivowel, and mute. A vowel is that which has an audible sound without any contact of the vocal organs; a semivowel is that which has an audible sound with such contact, as S and R; and a mute is that which, with such contact, has no sound by itself, but becomes audible in combination[Bekker 1456b line 30]with letters that have some sound, as G and D.These differ according to the shapes and positions of the mouth, aspiration and absence of aspiration, length and shortness, and further according to acute, grave, and intermediate pitch; the detailed study of these matters belongs to metrics.A syllable[Bekker 1456b line 35]is a composite sound without meaning, formed from a mute and a letter having sound; for GR without A is †a syllable, and† so is GR with A, as in GRA. But the study of the differences among these also belongs to metrics.A conjunction is a sound without meaning which neither[Bekker 1457a][Bekker 1457a line 1]prevents nor produces a single significant sound from several sounds, and which naturally stands either at the ends or in the middle, but which it is not fitting to place by itself at the beginning of a phrase—for example, men, ētoi, and de; or it is a sound without meaning which, from several sounds[Bekker 1457a line 5]that each have meaning, naturally produces a single significant sound.An article is a sound without meaning that marks the beginning, end, or division of a phrase, such as amphi, peri, and the others; or it is a sound without meaning which neither prevents nor produces a single significant sound from several sounds, and which naturally stands[Bekker 1457a line 10]both at the ends and in the middle.A noun is a composite significant sound without reference to time, no part of which has meaning by itself; for in compound nouns we do not use a part as though it also had meaning in itself: for example, in Theodorus, dorus has no meaning.A verb is a composite significant sound with reference[Bekker 1457a line 15]to time, no part of which has meaning by itself, just as with nouns. For “man” or “white” does not signify when, whereas “walks” or “has walked” signifies in addition, respectively, present time and past time.An inflection is a form of a noun or verb: one kind signifies “of this” or “to this”[Bekker 1457a line 20]and the like; another signifies one or many, as “men” or “man”; another follows the forms of delivery, such as question or command—for “Did he walk?” and “Walk!” are inflections of a verb according to these forms.A phrase is a composite significant sound, some parts of which signify something by themselves(for not every phrase is composed of verbs and nouns, as, for example, the[Bekker 1457a line 25]definition of man is not; a phrase may exist without verbs, though it will always have some part that signifies something), as “Cleon” in “Cleon walks.”A phrase is one in two ways: either because it signifies one thing, or because it is composed of several parts joined together. Thus the Iliad is[Bekker 1457a line 30]one by conjunction, while the definition of man is one by signifying one thing.

The kinds of noun are these: one is simple—and by simple I mean one not composed of significant elements, such as “earth”—and another is compound.Of the latter, one kind is composed of a significant and an insignificant element, though the latter is not significant within the[Bekker 1457a line 33a]noun; another is composed of significant elements.A noun may also be triple, quadruple, or[Bekker 1457a line 35]multiple, as are many Massaliot names,[Bekker 1457b][Bekker 1457b line 1]such as Hermocaicoxanthus...Every noun is either ordinary, a foreign word, a metaphor, an ornament, a coined word, a lengthened word, a curtailed word, or an altered word.By ordinary I mean the word used by each people,and by foreign the word used by others; hence it is clear that the same word can be both[Bekker 1457b line 5]foreign and ordinary, though not for the same people: “sigynon” is ordinary among the Cypriots but foreign to us.Metaphor is the application of an alien noun, either from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy.By transfer from genus to[Bekker 1457b line 10]species I mean, for example, “Here stands my ship”; for lying at anchor is a kind of standing.From species to genus: “Truly ten thousand noble deeds has Odysseus wrought”; for ten thousand is many, and the poet has used it here in place of “many.”From species to species, for example, “drawing off his life with bronze” and “cutting with the long-edged bronze”; here[Bekker 1457b line 15]he has called drawing off “cutting,” and cutting “drawing off,” since both are forms of taking something away.By analogy I mean when the second stands to the first as the fourth stands to the third; one may then speak of the fourth instead of the second, or of the second instead of the fourth.And sometimes they add to the substituted term that to which[Bekker 1457b line 20]the term replaced is related. I mean, for example, that the cup stands to Dionysus as the shield stands to Ares; one may therefore call the cup “the shield of Dionysus” and the shield “the cup of Ares.”Or old age stands to life as evening stands to day; one may therefore call evening “the old age of day,” or, as[Bekker 1457b line 25]Empedocles does, call old age “the evening of life” or “the sunset of life.”In some analogies one of the corresponding terms has no established name, yet the expression may nevertheless be formed in the same way. For example, casting forth seed is called “sowing,” while the sun’s casting forth its flame has no name; but this action stands to the sun as sowing stands to seed, and hence the phrase “sowing the god-created[Bekker 1457b line 30]flame.”This kind of metaphor may also be used in another way: after applying the alien term, one may deny one of the attributes proper to it;for example, one might call the shield not “the cup of Ares” but “the wineless cup”...A coined word is one not used at all by any people but established by the poet himself; for some words appear to be of this sort, such as[Bekker 1457b line 35]“sprouters” for horns and “supplicator” for priest.A lengthened[Bekker 1458a][Bekker 1458a line 1]or curtailed word is produced in the former case when a vowel longer than the proper one is used or a syllable is inserted, and in the latter when some part of the word is removed.Examples of lengthening are polēos for poleōs and Pēlēïadeō for Pēleidou; examples of curtailment are[Bekker 1458a line 5]kri, dō, and “the sight of both becomes one.”An altered word is produced when part of the ordinary word is retained and part newly made, as in “on the rightward breast” instead of “on the right breast.”Of nouns themselves, some are masculine, some feminine, and some intermediate.Masculine nouns are those ending in N, R, and S,[Bekker 1458a line 10]and in letters compounded with S—of which there are two, PS and X. Feminine nouns are those ending, among the vowels, in those that are always long,such as Ē and Ō, and, among vowels capable of being lengthened, in A.Thus the number of endings in which masculine and feminine nouns terminate is equal; for PS and X are compound letters.No noun ends in a mute consonant, nor in[Bekker 1458a line 15]a short vowel.Only three end in I: meli, kommi, peperi. Five end in U. Intermediate nouns end in these vowels and in N and S.

The excellence of diction is to be clear without being commonplace.Diction composed of ordinary nouns is indeed the clearest, but[Bekker 1458a line 20]it is commonplace; examples are the poetry of Cleophon and that of Sthenelus.Diction is elevated and departs from the everyday when it employs unfamiliar forms; by unfamiliar I mean the foreign word, metaphor, lengthening, and everything that departs from the ordinary.But if anyone makes all his diction of this sort, the result will be either a riddle or[Bekker 1458a line 25]a barbarism: if composed of metaphors, a riddle; if of foreign words, a barbarism.For the essence of a riddle is to join actual things together while saying what is impossible. This cannot be done by combining other kinds of nouns, but it can be done by metaphor, as in “I saw a man welding bronze with fire[Bekker 1458a line 30]upon a man,” and similar expressions.Diction composed of foreign words is a barbarism.These elements must therefore be blended in some fashion. The foreign word, metaphor, ornament, and the other forms already mentioned[Bekker 1458a line 34]will keep the diction from being everyday and commonplace, while the ordinary word will secure its clarity.No small contribution[Bekker 1458b][Bekker 1458b line 1]to making diction clear without making it everyday comes from the lengthenings, curtailments, and alterations of nouns. Because such a form differs from the ordinary and departs from customary usage, it will keep the diction from being everyday; because it[Bekker 1458b line 5]shares in customary usage, it will remain clear.Thus those who censure this manner of speech and ridicule the poet are wrong, as was the elder Euclides, who said that it was easy to compose verse if one were allowed to lengthen words as much as one pleased, and who made iambic verses in the diction itself: “I saw Epichares[Bekker 1458b line 10]walking Marathonward,” and “not † having grown old † on his hellebore.”To make one’s use of this method conspicuous is, of course, ridiculous; but due measure is the common rule for every part of diction.For one would produce the same effect by using metaphors, foreign words, and the other forms improperly and deliberately[Bekker 1458b line 15]for comic effect.How great a difference appropriate usage makes may be observed in epic verse by substituting ordinary nouns within the meter.And with the foreign word, metaphors, and the other forms as well, anyone who replaces them with ordinary nouns will see that what we say is true. For example, Aeschylus and Euripides composed the same[Bekker 1458b line 20]iambic line, but Euripides changed only a single noun, substituting a foreign word for the customary ordinary one; the one line appears noble, the other paltry. Aeschylus wrote in his Philoctetes, “the ulcer that eats the flesh of my foot,”while Euripides replaced “eats” with “feasts upon.” And in[Bekker 1458b line 25]“Now, being small and worthless and unseemly,”if someone were to replace the words with ordinary ones and say, “Now, being little and weak and ugly”;and for “setting down an unseemly stool and a meager table,”[Bekker 1458b line 30]“setting down a wretched stool and a little table”;and for “the shores roar,” “the shores cry out.”Ariphrades also ridiculed the tragedians because they used expressions that no one would employ in conversation, such as “from the halls away” instead of “away from the halls,” and “of thee,” and “I him,” and[Bekker 1459a][Bekker 1459a line 1]“Achilles about” instead of “about Achilles,” and all other expressions of that kind.Because they are not among the ordinary forms, all such expressions keep diction from being everyday; but he did not understand this.It is a great thing to use each of the forms already mentioned[Bekker 1459a line 5]appropriately, compound nouns and foreign words included, but by far the greatest thing is to be master of metaphor.This alone cannot be learned from another and is a sign of natural genius; for to make good metaphors is to perceive likeness.Among nouns, compound forms are especially suited to dithyrambs,[Bekker 1459a line 10]foreign words to heroic verse, and metaphors to iambic verse.In heroic verse all the forms mentioned are useful; but because iambic verse imitates speech as closely as possible, the nouns appropriate to it are those one might also use in prose: the ordinary noun, metaphor, and ornament.[Bekker 1459a line 15]Let what has been said suffice, then, concerning tragedy and imitation through action.

As for narrative imitation in meter, it is clear that the plots, as in tragedies, must be constructed dramatically and centered upon a single action, whole and complete,[Bekker 1459a line 20]having a beginning, middle, and end, so that, like a single whole living creature, it may produce its proper pleasure.Their structures must not resemble histories, in which one must present not a single action but a single period of time: everything that happened during it to one person or to several, each event bearing only a chance relation to the others.For just[Bekker 1459a line 25]as the sea battle at Salamis and the battle of the Carthaginians in Sicily occurred at the same time without contributing to the same end, so too in successive periods one event sometimes follows another without any single end resulting from them.Yet nearly all poets[Bekker 1459a line 30]do this.Therefore, as we have already said, in this respect also Homer may appear divinely inspired beside the others, because he did not attempt to make the whole war his subject, though it had a beginning and an end. The plot would have been excessively large and not readily comprehensible at a single view; or, if he had moderated its length, it would have been intricate through its variety.[Bekker 1459a line 35]As it is, he took one part and used many of the remaining events as episodes, such as the Catalogue of Ships and other episodes with which he diversifies the poem.The other poets, however, compose about one man,[Bekker 1459b][Bekker 1459b line 1]one period, and one action with many parts, as did the authors of the Cypria and the Little Iliad.Consequently, from the Iliad and the Odyssey only one tragedy, or at most two, can be made from each, while many can be made from the Cypria and from the Little[Bekker 1459b line 5]Iliad.

Furthermore, epic poetry must have the same kinds as tragedy: it must be either simple or complex, ethical or[Bekker 1459b line 10]pathetic.Its parts also are the same, apart from song and spectacle; for it requires reversals, recognitions, and scenes of suffering, and its thought and diction must be excellent.Homer employed all these, both first and adequately. Each of his poems is so constituted: the Iliad is simple[Bekker 1459b line 15]and pathetic, while the Odyssey is complex—for recognition runs throughout it—and ethical; and besides these merits, he has surpassed everyone in diction and thought.Epic differs from tragedy, however, in the length of its structure and in its meter.For its length, the limit already stated is sufficient: one must be able to take in the beginning[Bekker 1459b line 20]and the end together. This would be possible if the structures were shorter than those of the ancient poets but extended to the length of the number of tragedies presented at a single hearing.Epic poetry possesses a considerable means peculiar to itself for enlarging its scope. In tragedy it is impossible to imitate many parts of the action occurring[Bekker 1459b line 25]simultaneously, but only the part enacted upon the stage by the actors; in epic poetry, because it is narrative, many parts may be represented as being accomplished at the same time, and if they are relevant, they increase the poem’s bulk.Thus epic has this advantage for attaining grandeur, varying the experience of the[Bekker 1459b line 30]hearer, and enriching the poem with dissimilar episodes; for sameness, by quickly producing satiety, causes tragedies to fail.Experience has shown the heroic meter to be appropriate. For if anyone were to compose narrative imitation in some other meter, or in several meters, the result would plainly be unsuitable.The heroic is the most stately and[Bekker 1459b line 35]weighty of meters; hence it especially admits foreign words and metaphors, since narrative imitation also surpasses the others in elevation.The iambic and the tetrameter,[Bekker 1460a][Bekker 1460a line 1]by contrast, are meters of movement, the one suited to dancing and the other to action.It would be still more incongruous if someone mixed them, as Chaeremon did.Therefore no one has composed a long structure in any meter other than the heroic; rather, as we have said, nature herself teaches the poet to choose what is appropriate to it.[Bekker 1460a line 5]Homer deserves praise for many other things, and especially because he alone among poets does not fail to understand what the poet himself ought to do.The poet himself should speak as little as possible, since it is not by speaking in his own person that he is an imitator. Other poets remain personally before us throughout and imitate only a few things, and those seldom; but Homer, after a brief[Bekker 1460a line 10]preamble, immediately introduces a man, a woman, or some other character—and never one without character, but always one possessing it.The marvelous should certainly be introduced into tragedies, but the irrational, which is the chief source of the marvelous, is more admissible in[Bekker 1460a line 13]epic poetry because the agent is not before our eyes.For the circumstances surrounding[Bekker 1460a line 15]the pursuit of Hector would appear ridiculous onstage: the others standing still and not joining the pursuit, while Achilles signals them back; but in epic verse the absurdity passes unnoticed.And the marvelous is pleasurable. The proof is that everyone adds something when telling a story, in the belief that he is pleasing his audience.Homer above all has taught the other poets how falsehoods should be told.[Bekker 1460a line 20]The method is false inference. People suppose that whenever, if one thing exists or occurs, another exists or occurs, then if the latter exists, the former must also exist or occur; but this is false. Therefore, if the first thing is false, but if it existed some other thing would necessarily exist or occur, the poet should add that other thing. Because we know the latter to be true,[Bekker 1460a line 25]our mind falsely infers that the first is true as well. An example is the episode of the Washing.One should prefer probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities.Plots should not be constructed from irrational parts; ideally, they should contain nothing irrational, but failing that, the irrationality should lie outside the plot, as with Oedipus’ ignorance of how Laius died, and not within the drama, as in the Electra with those who report the Pythian games, or in the Mysians with the speechless man who comes from Tegea to Mysia.[Bekker 1460a line 30]Thus it is ridiculous to say that otherwise the plot would be destroyed; for such plots should not be constructed in the first place. † But if the poet does introduce such a thing, and it appears that it could occur more reasonably, even an absurdity †For it would become[Bekker 1460a line 35]clear that even the irrational circumstances in the Odyssey surrounding Odysseus’ being put ashore would not have been tolerable[Bekker 1460b][Bekker 1460b line 1]if an inferior poet had composed them; but as it is, the poet uses his other excellences to conceal the absurdity by making it pleasurable.Diction should be elaborated especially in the inactive passages, where neither character nor thought is present; for excessively brilliant[Bekker 1460b line 5]diction in turn obscures both character and thought.

Concerning problems and their solutions—the number and nature of the forms from which they arise—the matter may become clear if considered as follows.Since the poet is an imitator, like a painter or any other maker of images, he must always imitate one of three[Bekker 1460b line 10]kinds of things: either things as they were or are, or things as people say and believe them to be, or things as they ought to be.These things are conveyed in language, which includes rare words, metaphors, and many modifications of expression;for we allow poets these liberties. Besides this, correctness is not the same in politics and in poetry, nor in any other[Bekker 1460b line 15]art and in poetry.Within poetry itself, error is of two kinds: one intrinsic, the other incidental.For if the poet chose to imitate... but failed through incapacity, the error belongs to poetry itself; but if his original conception was incorrect—as when he represents a horse advancing both right legs together—or if the error concerns some particular art,[Bekker 1460b line 20]such as medicine or any other art whatsoever, it does not belong to poetry in itself.Accordingly, objections raised in problems must be examined and answered from these considerations. First, those that concern the art itself: the poet has represented impossibilities and therefore has erred.But the representation is correct if it attains the end of the art itself—for the[Bekker 1460b line 25]end has been stated—if in this way it makes either that passage or some other passage more striking. An example is the pursuit of Hector.If, however, the end could have been attained either better or no less well in accordance with the relevant art, the error is not justified; for, if possible, there should be no error at all in any respect.Again, to which class does the[Bekker 1460b line 30]error belong: errors intrinsic to the art, or errors incidental to something else? For it is a lesser error not to know that a female deer has no antlers than to portray one inartistically.Besides, if the objection is that the representation is not true, perhaps it is nevertheless as it ought to be. Thus Sophocles said that he himself portrayed people as they ought to be, whereas Euripides portrayed them as they are; this is[Bekker 1460b line 35]the answer to make.But if the representation accords with neither, the answer may be that this is what people say, as in stories about the gods;for perhaps it is neither better to speak of them in this way nor true, but the case may be[Bekker 1461a][Bekker 1461a line 1]as Xenophanes held; nevertheless, this is what people say.Other things may perhaps not be better, but were in fact so, as in the passage about the weapons: “Their spears stood upright upon their butt-spikes”; for that was then the custom, as it still is among the Illyrians.As to whether something has been well or badly[Bekker 1461a line 5]said or done by someone, one must consider not only the deed or statement itself and whether it is noble or base, but also the person who acts or speaks, the person to whom, the time, the means, and the purpose—for example, whether it was done to bring about a greater good or to avert a greater evil.Problems concerning[Bekker 1461a line 10]expression must be resolved by attending to the language. Thus the rare word in “first the mules”: perhaps he does not mean the mules but the sentinels. And of Dolon, “who indeed was ill-favored in appearance,” the meaning is not that his body was misshapen, but that his face was ugly, for the Cretans use “fair-formed” to mean “fair-faced.” So too,[Bekker 1461a line 15]“mix it stronger” does not mean “mix it unmixed,” as though for drunkards, but “mix it more quickly.”Another expression is metaphorical, as in “All the gods and mortal men slept through the night”; yet at the same time he says, “Whenever he looked toward the Trojan plain, he marveled at the din of flutes and pipes.” Here “all” is used metaphorically in place of “many,”[Bekker 1461a line 20]for “all” is a kind of multitude. And “alone without a share” is metaphorical, for what is best known is called the only one.Other problems are resolved by accentuation, as Hippias of Thasos resolved “We grant him the glory of attaining” and “part of which does not decay in rain.”Others are resolved by division, as in Empedocles: “At once things mortal grew that formerly had learned[Bekker 1461a line 25]to be immortal, and things unmixed that formerly were mixed.”Others arise from ambiguity: “More of the night has passed,” for “more” is ambiguous.Others are resolved by customary usage. People call mixed wine “wine,” and hence the phrase “a greave of newly wrought tin”; and they call those who work iron “bronzesmiths,” and hence Ganymede is said[Bekker 1461a line 30]to pour wine for Zeus, though the gods do not drink wine. This last expression, however, may also be metaphorical.Whenever a word seems to signify something contradictory, one must also consider how many meanings it may bear in the passage in question. Thus, in “there the bronze spear was checked,” one must ask in how many ways “was checked there” can be understood—in this way or that, according to what[Bekker 1461a line 35]one would most naturally suppose, rather than in the directly contrary sense.Or the matter may be as[Bekker 1461b][Bekker 1461b line 1]Glaucon says: some people irrationally assume something beforehand, then pass judgment on it themselves and draw conclusions from it; and, treating the poet as though he had said what they suppose, they censure him if it contradicts their own opinion.This is what has happened in the matter of Icarius. People suppose that he was a Spartan;[Bekker 1461b line 5]it is therefore considered absurd that Telemachus did not meet him when he came to Lacedaemon. But perhaps the facts are as the Cephallenians say: they claim that Odysseus married among them and that the man’s name was Icadius, not Icarius; and the problem is † likely † due to an error.In general, what is impossible must be referred either to the requirements of[Bekker 1461b line 10]poetry, to the ideal, or to accepted belief.For the purposes of poetry, a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility;... people may not be such as Zeuxis painted them, but he painted them better; for the model ought to surpass reality.As for irrationalities, they must be referred to what people say; and it may also be answered that sometimes a thing is not irrational,[Bekker 1461b line 15]for it is probable that improbable things will happen.Statements that appear contradictory must be examined as refutations are in argument: whether the same thing is said of the same subject and in the same respect, so that one must consider †the man himself† either in relation to what he himself says or to what an intelligent person would assume.But criticism for irrationality and moral baseness is justified when, without any necessity,[Bekker 1461b line 20]the poet makes use of the irrational, as Euripides does with Aegeus, or of moral baseness, as in the character of Menelaus in the Orestes.Objections, then, are brought under five heads: things are censured as impossible, irrational, harmful, contradictory, or contrary to correctness in the relevant art. The solutions must be sought among the[Bekker 1461b line 25]distinctions already stated; they are twelve in number.

One might raise the question whether epic or tragic imitation is superior.For if the less vulgar art is superior, and such an art is always the one addressed to the better class of spectators, it is perfectly clear that the art which imitates everything is vulgar;for performers assume that the audience will not understand unless[Bekker 1461b line 30]they themselves add something, and so they indulge in excessive movement, like bad flute players, who roll about when they must imitate the throwing of a discus and drag the chorus leader around when they play Scylla.Tragedy, then, is said to have this character, just as the older actors judged their successors. Mynniscus, for example,[Bekker 1461b line 35]called Callippides an ape because he overacted so excessively, and a similar opinion was held of[Bekker 1462a][Bekker 1462a line 1]Pindarus. As these later actors stand in relation to their predecessors, so the whole art of tragedy is said to stand in relation to epic.Epic, then, is said to address cultivated spectators, who have no need of gestures, whereas tragedy addresses an inferior audience; if, therefore, tragedy is vulgar, it would clearly be the worse art.First,[Bekker 1462a line 5]the charge is directed not against the poetic art but against the art of acting, since it is possible to overelaborate gestures even when reciting epic, as Sosistratus did, and when singing lyric poetry, as Mnasitheus of Opus used to do.Second, not every kind of movement is to be condemned, unless dancing too is to be condemned, but only the movement of inferior performers—the fault for which Callippides was criticized and for which others are criticized[Bekker 1462a line 10]today, on the ground that they imitate women who are not freeborn.Moreover, tragedy accomplishes its proper effect even without movement, just as epic does; for its quality is evident from the reading. If, then, tragedy is superior in other respects, it need not possess this defect.Further, tragedy has everything that epic has(for it can even employ epic[Bekker 1462a line 15]meter), and in addition it has no small element in music, through which its pleasures are rendered most vividly;it also possesses vividness both in reading and in performance;moreover, the end of its imitation is attained within a shorter compass[Bekker 1462b][Bekker 1462b line 1]—for what is more concentrated is more pleasurable than what is diluted over a long span of time. I mean, for example, what the effect would be if one were to put Sophocles’ Oedipus into as many lines as the Iliad.Furthermore, the imitation of the epic poets has less unity—a sign of this is that several[Bekker 1462b line 5]tragedies can be made from any one of their imitations. Thus, if they construct a single plot, it will either appear curtailed if presented briefly, or, if extended to match the length proper to the meter, it will appear diluted. I mean the case in which the poem is composed of several actions,as the Iliad and the Odyssey contain many such parts, each of which[Bekker 1462b line 10]has magnitude in itself. And yet these poems are constructed as well as possible and are, to the greatest possible extent, imitations of a single action.If, then, tragedy surpasses epic in all these respects, and also in fulfilling the function of the art—for the two arts must produce not just any pleasure, but the pleasure already specified—it is evident that tragedy would be superior, since it attains its[Bekker 1462b line 15]end more fully than epic.Concerning tragedy and epic, then—their natures, their forms and parts, how many these are and how they differ, the causes of artistic success or failure, and objections and their solutions—let this much suffice....