Part II, Chapter XVIII, 1

OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION

A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of people agree and covenant, each with every other, that whoever is given by the majority the right to represent the person of them all—whether a man or an assembly—shall have every action and judgment of his authorized by everyone, those who voted for him no less than those who voted against him, as though each action and judgment were their own. Their purpose is to live in peace among themselves and be protected against others.

From the institution of a commonwealth flow all the rights and powers of the man or assembly upon whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the assembled people.

First, because they covenant, they are understood not to be bound by any previous covenant to do anything contrary to this one. Consequently, those who have already instituted a commonwealth, and are thus bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one representative, cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to obey anyone else in any matter without his permission. Subjects of a monarch therefore cannot, without his leave, cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude, or transfer their person from the one who bears it to another man or assembly. Each is bound to every other to own and be considered the author of everything their existing sovereign does or judges fit to do. If even one dissents, all the others would break their covenant with him, which is injustice. Moreover, each has given sovereignty to the one who bears their person; to depose him would therefore be to take what belongs to him, and would again be injustice. Furthermore, if someone attempting to depose his sovereign is killed or punished by him for the attempt, he is the author of his own punishment, since by the institution he authorizes everything his sovereign does. Since it is unjust for a person to do something for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is unjust on this count as well. Some have invoked a new covenant, made not with people but with God, to excuse disobedience to their sovereign. This too is unjust: no one covenants with God except through the mediation of someone who represents God's person, and none does so except God's lieutenant, who holds sovereignty under God. But this claim to a covenant with God is so obvious a lie, even to the consciences of those making it, that it reveals not only injustice but a base and cowardly disposition.

Secondly, since the right to bear the person of them all is given to the sovereign by their covenants with one another, not by any covenant he makes with them, there can be no breach of covenant on the sovereign's part. Consequently, no subject can claim to be released from subjection on the pretext that he has forfeited his right. It is plain that the person made sovereign makes no advance covenant with his subjects: he would have to covenant either with the entire multitude as one party, or separately with each individual. He cannot covenant with the multitude as one party, since they are not yet one person. And if he makes as many separate covenants as there are people, those covenants become void once he has sovereignty: whatever act any individual alleges as a breach is the act of that same individual and all the others, since it is done in the person and by the right of each of them. Moreover, if one or more allege a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution, while others, or even one other subject, or the sovereign himself, deny any such breach, there is no judge to settle the dispute. The matter returns to the sword, and each regains the right to protect himself by his own strength, contrary to the purpose for which they instituted the commonwealth. It is therefore futile to grant sovereignty on the basis of a prior covenant. The view that a monarch receives his power by covenant, that is, on condition, comes from failing to understand this simple truth: covenants, being only words and breath, have no power to bind, restrain, compel, or protect anyone except what they derive from the public sword—from the unfettered hands of the man or assembly holding sovereignty, whose actions are acknowledged by all and carried out with the united strength of all. Yet when an assembly is made sovereign, no one imagines such a covenant was made at its institution. No one is foolish enough to say, for example, that the people of Rome covenanted with the Romans to hold sovereignty on certain conditions, whose breach would allow the Romans lawfully to depose the Roman people. That people fail to recognize the same reasoning in a monarchy as in popular government arises from the ambition of some, who favor an assembly in which they hope to take part over a monarchy they cannot hope to enjoy.

Thirdly, because the majority has declared a sovereign by its votes, the dissenter must now consent with the rest: that is, he must be willing to acknowledge all the sovereign's actions, or else be justly destroyed by the rest. By voluntarily joining the assembled body, he made his will sufficiently clear, and so tacitly covenanted to abide by whatever the majority ordained. If he refuses, or protests against any of its decrees, he acts against his covenant and thus unjustly. Whether or not he belonged to the assembly, and whether or not his consent was sought, he must either submit to its decrees or be left in his former condition of war, where anyone may destroy him without injustice.

Fourthly, since by this institution every subject is the author of every action and judgment of the sovereign instituted, nothing the sovereign does can injure any of his subjects, nor should any subject accuse him of injustice. One who acts on another's authority does no injury by that act to the one whose authority he bears. By the institution of a commonwealth, every individual authorizes everything the sovereign does. Thus whoever complains of injury from his sovereign complains of something he himself has authorized and should accuse no one but himself—indeed, not even himself of injury, since it is impossible to injure oneself. Those who hold sovereign power can certainly commit iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper sense.

Fifthly, and as a consequence of the preceding point, no holder of sovereign power can justly be put to death or otherwise punished by his subjects. Since each subject is the author of his sovereign's actions, in punishing him he would punish another for acts committed by himself.

And since the purpose of this institution is the peace and defense of all, and whoever has a right to an end has a right to the means, the man or assembly holding sovereignty has the right to judge both the means of peace and defense and the things that obstruct or disturb them. He may do whatever he thinks necessary, both beforehand, to preserve peace and security by preventing discord at home and hostility from abroad, and afterward, when peace and security have been lost, to restore them. Therefore:

Sixthly, sovereignty includes the right to judge which opinions and doctrines oppose peace and which promote it; consequently, to decide on what occasions, to what extent, and on what subjects people may be trusted to speak before multitudes; and to decide who shall examine the doctrines in books before publication. Human actions spring from opinions, and governing opinions well is what makes the good government of actions possible, for peace and concord. Although truth alone should matter in doctrine, this does not conflict with regulating doctrine for the sake of peace: a doctrine hostile to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can violate the Law of Nature. It is true that in a commonwealth where the negligence or incompetence of governors and teachers has allowed false doctrines to gain general acceptance over time, the opposing truths may be widely resented. But even the most sudden and violent intrusion of a new truth never breaks the peace; sometimes it merely wakes a war already present. People so weakly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are already at war. Their condition is not peace but only a cease-fire born of mutual fear, and they live, as it were, forever on the verge of battle. The holder of sovereign power must therefore judge opinions and doctrines, or appoint all those who judge them, as a measure necessary to peace and to the prevention of discord and civil war.

Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution

A Commonwealth is instituted when a group of people agrees by covenant, each with every other, to authorize a representative. The majority chooses a man or assembly of men to represent everyone. Each person, whether they voted for or against that choice, agrees to authorize every action and judgment of that man or assembly as if it were their own. They do this so that they can live peacefully with one another and be protected from other people.

From this institution of a Commonwealth come all the rights and powers of the person or persons who receive sovereign power by the consent of the assembled people.

First, because they make this covenant, we must understand that no earlier covenant binds them to anything inconsistent with it. Once people have instituted a Commonwealth, their covenant binds them to accept the actions and judgments of one representative. So they cannot lawfully make another covenant among themselves to obey anyone else in any matter without that representative's permission. Subjects of a monarch therefore cannot cast off monarchy without his consent and return to the disorder of a divided crowd. Nor can they transfer their collective person from the man who represents it to another man or assembly. Every person has agreed with every other person to accept and be regarded as the author of everything their existing sovereign does or judges appropriate. If even one person dissented, the others would break their covenant with that person. That would be unjust. Each has also given sovereignty to the person who represents them. To depose him would be to take what belongs to him, which would again be unjust. Further, if someone tries to depose his sovereign and the sovereign kills or punishes him for it, that person is the author of his own punishment. By the institution, he is the author of everything his sovereign does. It is unjust to do anything for which one may be punished by one's own authority, so he is unjust on this ground too. Some people claim that a new covenant made with God, rather than with other people, excuses their disobedience to their sovereign. That too is unjust. No one can covenant with God except through someone who represents God; only God's lieutenant, who holds sovereignty under God, can do that. This claimed covenant with God is so plainly a lie, even to the people making the claim, that it shows not just injustice but a base and cowardly character.

Second, the right to represent everyone is given to the sovereign by the people's covenants with one another, not by a covenant between the sovereign and any of them. So the sovereign cannot break that covenant, and no subject can claim that a supposed forfeiture has released them from subjection. Clearly, someone who becomes sovereign makes no covenant with his subjects beforehand. He would have to make it either with the entire multitude as one party or separately with each person. He cannot make it with the whole multitude as one party, because they are not yet one person. If he makes separate covenants with each person, those covenants become void once he has sovereignty. Any action that one of them alleges to be a breach is also that person's action and everyone else's, because it was done in their name and by each one's authority. Besides, suppose some subjects claim that the sovereign broke a covenant made at his institution, while other subjects, or even just one other subject, or the sovereign himself, deny it. There is then no judge to decide the dispute. They return to fighting, and everyone regains the right to defend themselves by their own strength. That defeats their purpose in establishing the Commonwealth. It is therefore pointless to grant sovereignty on the basis of a prior covenant. The belief that a monarch receives power by covenant, or on conditions, comes from failing to understand a simple truth. Covenants are only words and breath. Their ability to bind, restrain, compel, or protect anyone comes entirely from the public sword: the unrestricted power of the man or assembly holding sovereignty. Everyone acknowledges that sovereign's actions, which are carried out by the combined strength of all. Yet when an assembly becomes sovereign, no one imagines such a covenant was made when it was instituted. No one would be foolish enough to say, for example, that the People of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold sovereignty on certain conditions and that the Romans could lawfully depose the Roman People if those conditions were not met. Some fail to see that the reasoning is the same for monarchy as for popular government because of ambition. They favor government by an assembly in which they hope to take part, rather than monarchy, which they have no hope of holding.

Third, because the majority has declared a sovereign by voting for one, anyone who disagreed must now agree with the rest. That means accepting responsibility for all the sovereign's actions; otherwise the others may justly destroy the dissenter. By voluntarily joining the people assembled, a person sufficiently showed a willingness, and so silently covenanted, to abide by whatever the majority decided. Refusing to do so, or protesting any of its decrees, violates that covenant and is therefore unjust. Whether a person joined the assembly or not, and whether their consent was requested or not, they must either submit to its decrees or be left in the state of war they occupied before. In that state anyone could destroy them without committing an injustice.

Fourth, by this institution every subject is the author of all the instituted sovereign's actions and judgments. So nothing the sovereign does can wrong any of his subjects, and none of them should accuse him of injustice. Someone who acts on another's authority cannot wrong the person who authorized the act. Every person in a Commonwealth is the author of everything its sovereign does. A person who complains of injury by the sovereign therefore complains about an action of their own. They should blame no one but themselves, and cannot even blame themselves for doing themselves an injury, because it is impossible to injure oneself. Those who hold sovereign power may indeed do wrong in a moral sense, but they cannot commit injustice or injury in the strict sense.

Fifth, as a result, no person holding sovereign power can justly be executed or punished in any other way by their subjects. Since every subject is the author of the sovereign's actions, a subject who punishes the sovereign punishes someone else for actions the subject committed.

The aim of instituting a Commonwealth is the peace and defense of all its people. Whoever has a right to an end has a right to the means. So any man or assembly holding sovereignty has the right to judge what brings about peace and defense and what obstructs or disturbs them. The sovereign may do whatever he thinks necessary to preserve peace and security in advance by preventing domestic conflict and foreign attack, and to restore them after they are lost. Consequently:

Sixth, sovereignty includes the right to judge which opinions and doctrines threaten peace and which support it. It also includes deciding when, how far, and on what subjects people may be trusted to speak to crowds, and who will examine the doctrines in every book before publication. People's actions grow out of their opinions. Governing opinions well is therefore necessary to govern people's actions toward peace and harmony. In questions of doctrine, we should consider only truth. But the regulation of doctrine for the sake of peace does not conflict with truth. A doctrine opposed to peace can no more be true than peace and harmony can violate the Law of Nature. Admittedly, in a Commonwealth where negligent or unskilled governors and teachers have allowed false doctrines to gain general acceptance over time, the opposing truths may offend people generally. But even the quickest and roughest introduction of a new truth never breaks the peace; sometimes it only awakens a war already present. People who are so weakly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are already at war. What they have is not peace but a ceasefire caused by mutual fear; they live continually as though on the verge of battle. It is therefore the sovereign's responsibility to judge opinions and doctrines, or appoint all their judges. This is necessary to preserve peace and prevent conflict and civil war.