Part II, Chapter XVII

OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

The ultimate cause, end, or purpose for which people, who naturally love liberty and dominion over others, place themselves under the restraint we see in Common-wealths is their foresight of their own preservation and a more contented life. They seek to escape that miserable condition of war which, as I have shown, necessarily follows from natural human passions when no visible power keeps them in awe and binds them by fear of punishment to perform their covenants and observe the Laws of Nature set out in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

For the Laws of Nature—justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would have them do to us—are, by themselves and without the terror of some power enforcing them, contrary to our natural passions, which carry us toward partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. Covenants without the sword are only words, powerless to secure anyone. Thus, notwithstanding the Laws of Nature, which each person observes when he wishes to and can do so safely, if no power has been established, or none great enough to secure us, everyone will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and ingenuity for protection against everyone else. Wherever people have lived in small families, robbing and plundering one another has been a trade. Far from being held contrary to the Law of Nature, it won greater honor the greater the spoils; the only rules they followed were rules of honor, refraining from cruelty and leaving people their lives and tools for farming. As small families did then, so cities and kingdoms now—merely larger families—enlarge their dominions for their own security, pleading every sort of danger, fearing invasion or assistance to invaders, and doing all they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors by open force and secret arts. In the absence of any other protection, they do so justly, and are remembered with honor in later ages.

Nor does joining a small number of people provide this security. With small numbers, a small addition to either side creates an advantage in strength great enough to bring victory and thus encourage invasion. The multitude in which we may trust for security is not fixed by any definite number but measured against the enemy we fear. It is sufficient when the enemy's advantage is not so clear and conspicuous as to determine the outcome of war and move him to attack.

No matter how large a multitude may be, if each person's actions are governed by individual judgments and appetites, they can expect no defense or protection, either against a common enemy or against injuries from one another. Divided in their opinions about how best to use their strength, they hinder rather than help one another and reduce their strength to nothing through mutual opposition. Thus a very few who act together can easily subdue them; and, even in the absence of a common enemy, they make war on one another for their private interests. If we could suppose a great multitude to observe justice and the other Laws of Nature by mutual consent without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might just as well suppose all mankind to do so. Then no civil government or Common-wealth would exist or be needed, since peace would prevail without subjection.

Nor does the security people wish to enjoy throughout their lives arise merely because they are governed and directed by a single judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war. Though they win a victory by united effort against a foreign enemy, afterward, when they either have no common enemy or one faction regards as a friend someone the other regards as an enemy, their divergent interests must dissolve their union and plunge them back into war with one another.

It is true that certain living creatures, such as bees and ants, live together socially and are therefore numbered by Aristotle among political creatures. Yet they have no guidance but their individual judgments and appetites, and no speech through which one can tell another what he thinks best for their common benefit. Someone may therefore ask why humankind cannot do the same. I answer:

First, people continually compete for honor and dignity, while these creatures do not. Among people this produces envy and hatred, and ultimately war; not so among those creatures.

Second, among those creatures the common good does not differ from the private good; by pursuing their own good, as they naturally do, they also secure the common benefit. But human joy consists in comparison with others, and a person can relish nothing that is not outstanding.

Third, since these creatures do not possess reason as people do, they do not see, or imagine that they see, any fault in the management of their common affairs. Among people, however, many consider themselves wiser and more capable of governing the public than their fellows. One seeks reform and innovation in one direction, another in a different direction, and so they bring it into disorder and civil war.

Fourth, though these creatures have voices with which to communicate their desires and other feelings, they lack the art of words by which some people portray good as evil and evil as good, magnify or diminish the apparent size of good and evil, and at their pleasure stir discontent and disturb the peace.

Fifth, creatures without reason cannot distinguish injury from damage, and therefore take no offense at their fellows as long as they are comfortable. A human being, by contrast, is most troublesome when most comfortable: it is then that he likes to display his wisdom and criticize the actions of those governing the Common-wealth.

Last, the agreement of these creatures is natural, while that of people comes only by covenant and is therefore artificial. No wonder, then, that something besides a covenant is needed to make their agreement constant and lasting: a common power to keep them in awe and direct their actions toward the common benefit.

The only way to establish a common power able to defend them from foreign invasion and injuries inflicted by one another, and so to secure them that they may sustain themselves through their own industry and the fruits of the earth and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength on one man or on one assembly of people. By a majority of voices that person or assembly can bring all their wills into one will. In other words, they must appoint one man or assembly to bear their person, and each must own and acknowledge himself the author of everything the bearer of their person does or causes to be done in matters concerning their common peace and safety. In these matters each must submit his will to that person's will and his judgment to that person's judgment. This is more than consent or concord: it is the real unity of them all in one and the same person, formed by every person's covenant with every other, as if each said to every other: “I authorize this man, or this assembly of people, and surrender to him my right to govern myself, on condition that you surrender your right to him and authorize all his actions in the same way.” This done, the multitude united in one person is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather—to speak more reverently—of that mortal god to whom, under the immortal God, we owe our peace and defense. By the authority each person in the Common-wealth has given him, he commands so much power and strength that their terror enables him to shape all their wills toward peace at home and mutual aid against enemies abroad.

In him lies the essence of the Common-wealth, which may be defined as “one person whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have each made themselves the author, so that he may use the strength and resources of them all as he thinks expedient for their peace and common defense.”

The bearer of this person is called the SOVEREIGN and is said to hold sovereign power; everyone else is his SUBJECT.

Sovereign power may be attained in two ways. One is by natural force, as when a man makes his children and their children submit to his government because he can destroy them if they refuse, or subdues enemies by war and grants them their lives on condition that they submit to his will. The other is when people voluntarily agree among themselves to submit to some man or assembly, trusting him to protect them against everyone else. The latter may be called a political Common-wealth, or a Common-wealth by institution; the former, a Common-wealth by acquisition. I shall speak first of a Common-wealth by institution.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION

On the causes, formation, and definition of a Common-wealth

People naturally love freedom and power over others. Why, then, do they accept the restraints they live under in a Common-wealth? Their ultimate aim is to protect themselves and live more comfortably. They want to escape the miserable state of war that, as I have shown, necessarily follows from people's natural Passions when no visible power keeps them in check. Without that power, fear of punishment cannot make them keep their Covenants or obey the Laws of Nature set out in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

The Laws of Nature include justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in short, treating others as we would want them to treat us. By themselves, without fear of a power that will enforce them, these laws run against our natural Passions, which lead us to favoritism, pride, revenge, and the like. Covenants without the sword are only words and give nobody any security. So even though the Laws of Nature exist, if there is no established power, or none strong enough to protect us, everyone will and may rightfully rely on his own strength and skill to guard against others. A person obeys the Laws of Nature when he wants to obey them and can safely do so. Wherever people have lived in small family groups, robbing and plundering one another has been their occupation. They did not think it broke the Law of Nature; the greater the spoils, the greater the honor. The only rules they followed were rules of honor: do not be cruel, and leave people their lives and their tools for farming. Cities and kingdoms today are like larger families. Just as small families acted then, these states expand their territories for security. They claim threats of attack, invasion, or help to invaders as reasons. With no other protection, they rightly do all they can to conquer or weaken their neighbors, openly by force or secretly by cunning. Later generations remember them with honor for it.

Joining together in a small group does not provide security. A small addition to either side can create such a large difference in strength that it decides the battle and encourages an attack. The number needed to give us confidence in our safety is not fixed. It depends on the size of the enemy we fear. We have enough people when the enemy's advantage is not so plain and decisive that it encourages him to attack.

Even a very large group cannot expect protection from a shared enemy or from its own members' injuries if its members act according to their individual judgments and desires. They disagree about the best use of their combined strength. Instead of helping one another, they get in one another's way, and their conflicts reduce their strength to nothing. Then even a few people acting together can easily conquer them. When there is no shared enemy, they fight one another over their private interests. If we could suppose that a large group would all follow justice and the other Laws of Nature without a common power to restrain them, we could suppose the same of all humanity. There would then be no civil government or Common-wealth, and no need for one: people would have peace without a ruler.

For the lasting security people want throughout their lives, it is not enough to place themselves under one leadership for a limited time, such as one battle or one war. A united effort might win against a foreign enemy. But afterward they may have no shared enemy, or some may regard a person as an enemy whom others regard as a friend. Their differing interests will then split them apart and lead them back into war with one another.

It is true that some living creatures, such as bees and ants, live together peacefully. Aristotle therefore classifies them as political creatures. Yet each creature follows only its own judgment and desires, without speech to tell others what it thinks will benefit the group. Someone might ask why human beings cannot live together the same way. My answer is this:

First, people constantly compete for honor and rank, while these creatures do not. This competition produces envy and hatred among people, and eventually war. It does not do so among these creatures.

Second, these creatures' common good does not differ from their private good. In seeking their own good, they benefit the whole group. People, however, find pleasure in comparing themselves with others and are satisfied only when they stand out.

Third, these creatures do not reason as people do. They see no faults, and do not even think they see faults, in how their shared affairs are managed. Many people, by contrast, think they are wiser and better able to run public affairs than others. Each tries to change things in a different way. Their efforts divide the community and bring civil war.

Fourth, these creatures use sounds to tell one another what they want and feel. But they lack the skill with words that lets some people present good as evil and evil as good, or make goods and evils appear greater or smaller than they are. People can use that skill whenever they like to stir up dissatisfaction and disturb the peace.

Fifth, creatures without reason cannot tell the difference between an injury and a loss. As long as they are comfortable, they do not quarrel with one another. People, on the other hand, are most troublesome when most comfortable. That is when they like to display their wisdom and criticize how the Common-wealth is governed.

Finally, these creatures agree together by nature, but people agree only by Covenant, which is an artificial arrangement. It is no surprise that people need something more than a Covenant to keep their agreement stable and lasting. They need a common power to keep them in check and guide their actions toward the shared good.

There is only one way to create a common power strong enough to defend people against foreign invasion and one another's injuries, so that they can support themselves through their work and the fruits of the earth and live contentedly. They must give all their power and strength to one person or to one assembly. That person or assembly can bring their different wishes into one decision through a majority vote. In other words, they must appoint one person or assembly to represent them. Every person must accept responsibility as the author of whatever the representative does, or has done, in matters of common peace and safety. Each must submit his will and judgment to the representative's will and judgment. This is more than consent or agreement. It makes them all into a single real person through a Covenant that each makes with every other, as if each said to each: “I authorize this person, or this assembly, to govern me, and give him my right to govern myself, on the condition that you give him the same right and authorize everything he does as I do.” Once this is done, the group united into one person is called a COMMON-WEALTH, or CIVITAS in Latin. This is how that great LEVIATHAN comes into being—or, to speak with more respect, that mortal God to which, under the immortal God, we owe our peace and defense. Every individual in the Common-wealth gives this representative authority. As a result, he can command so much power and strength that the fear of it enables him to direct everyone's will toward peace at home and mutual help against enemies abroad.

The representative is the essence of the Common-wealth, which may be defined as “one person whose acts every member of a great group has made himself the author through mutual Covenants, so that this person may use the strength and resources of them all as he thinks best for their peace and common defense.”

The one who represents this person is called the SOVERAIGNE and is said to hold Soveraigne Power. Everyone else is his SUBJECT.

Soveraigne Power can be gained in two ways. One is by natural force: someone may make his children and their children submit to his rule because he can destroy them if they refuse. Or he may conquer enemies in war and spare their lives on the condition that they obey him. The other way is for people to agree freely among themselves to submit to one person or assembly because they trust that representative to protect them from everyone else. The second may be called a political Common-wealth, or a Common-wealth by institution. The first is a Common-wealth by acquisition. I will discuss a Common-wealth by institution first.

CHAPTER XVIII. ON THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION