Part I, Chapter XVI

OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS REPRESENTED

What a person is

A PERSON is someone “whose words or actions are considered either as his own or as representing the words or actions of another person, or of anything else to which they are attributed, whether in truth or in fiction.”

When considered as his own, he is called a natural person; when considered as representing another's words and actions, he is called a fictitious or artificial person.

The word person is Latin; the Greeks have Prosopon in its place, meaning face, while the Latin Persona means the disguise or outward appearance assumed by a person onstage, sometimes specifically the part that conceals the face, such as a mask or visor. From the stage the word has been extended to anyone who represents speech and action, in courts as well as theaters. A person is thus the same as an actor, both onstage and in ordinary conversation; to personate is to act or represent oneself or another. Someone who acts for another is said to bear that person's person, or act in his name. Cicero uses the word in this sense when he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis: I bear three persons, my own, my adversary's, and the judge's.” Such an actor is variously called, according to the occasion, a representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and so on.

Of artificial persons, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. In this case the person is the ACTOR, and the one who owns his words and actions is the AUTHOR; the actor then acts by authority. In speaking of goods and possessions we call someone an owner—in Latin Dominus, in Greek Kurios; in speaking of actions, we call him an author. As the right to possession is called dominion, so the right to perform an action is called AUTHORITY. Authority therefore always means a right to perform an act, and an act done by authority is done by commission or permission from the person to whom that right belongs.

It follows that when an actor makes a covenant by authority, he binds the author no less than if the author had made it himself, and subjects him just as fully to its consequences. Thus all I have said before (Chap. 14) about covenants between people in their natural capacity holds also when covenants are made through their actors, representatives, or procurators, insofar as they have been commissioned to act, but no further.

Therefore someone who makes a covenant with an actor or representative without knowing the extent of his authority does so at his own risk. No one is bound by a covenant he did not authorize, and consequently no one is bound by a covenant made against or beyond the authority he gave.

When an actor does something contrary to the Law of Nature at his author's command, and a previous covenant obliges him to obey, it is not the actor but the author who breaks the Law of Nature. Though the action is contrary to that law, it is not the actor's own; on the contrary, his refusal to perform it would violate the Law of Nature forbidding breach of covenant.

Someone who makes a covenant with an author through an actor without knowing the actor's authority, accepting only the actor's word, is no longer bound if that authority is not shown to him when he asks for it. A covenant made with the author is not valid without the author's confirming assurance. But if the contracting party knew in advance that he was to expect no assurance beyond the actor's word, the covenant is valid, for the actor has made himself the author. Thus when the authority is evident, the covenant binds the author, not the actor; when the authority is fictitious, it binds the actor alone, since there is no author but himself.

Few things are incapable of being represented through fiction. Inanimate things, such as a church, a hospital, or a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. Inanimate things cannot, however, be authors or give their actors authority. Yet those actors may be given authority to provide for the upkeep of such things by their owners or governors. Such things therefore cannot be personated before some civil government exists.

Likewise, children, fools, and people suffering madness who cannot use reason may be personated by guardians or curators, but while that condition lasts they can authorize none of the actions done for them, except insofar as they judge those actions reasonable once they recover the use of reason. During their incapacity, however, whoever has the right to govern them may give authority to the guardian. But again, this occurs only in a civil state, since before such a state there is no dominion over persons.

An idol, or mere invention of the mind, may be personated, as were the gods of the heathens. By officers appointed by the state, they were personated and held possessions, goods, and rights that people dedicated and consecrated to them from time to time. But idols cannot be authors, for an idol is nothing. Authority came from the state; therefore, before civil government was introduced, the gods of the heathens could not be personated.

The true God may be personated. He was personated first by Moses, who governed the Israelites—not his own people but God's—not in his own name with Hoc Dicit Moses, but in God's name with Hoc Dicit Dominus. Second, he was personated by the Son of Man, his own Son, our blessed Savior Jesus Christ, who came to bring back the Jews and bring all nations into his Father's Kingdom, not acting on his own behalf but sent by his Father. Third, he was personated by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the Apostles. This Holy Ghost was a Comforter who did not come of himself, but was sent and proceeded from them both.

A multitude of people becomes one person when represented by one person, provided every individual in that multitude consents. The unity of the representative, not the unity of those represented, makes the person one. The representative bears the person, and bears only one person: unity in a multitude can be understood in no other way.

Since a multitude is by nature not one but many, its members must be understood as many authors, not one, of everything their representative says or does in their name. Each gives their common representative authority individually and owns every action the representative performs if they give him unlimited authority. If instead they limit what he may represent and how far, none owns more of his acts than he commissioned him to perform.

If the representative consists of several people, the voice of the majority must be taken as the voice of them all. If, for example, the smaller number vote yes and the larger number vote no, more than enough negative votes cancel the positive votes, and the excess negative votes, left unanswered, are the representative's only voice.

A representative consisting of an even number, especially a small number, will often have an equal number of opposing votes and thus will often be mute and incapable of acting. Yet in some cases equal opposing votes can decide a question. In a case of conviction or acquittal, a tie acquits by failing to convict; it does not, conversely, convict by failing to acquit. Once a case has been heard, not to convict is to acquit; but it is not true that not to acquit is to convict. Likewise, when deciding whether to act at once or postpone action, equal votes mean that not voting for immediate execution amounts to a decision to defer it.

Or suppose there is an odd number, three or more, of persons or assemblies, and each has the authority by a negative vote to annul all the positive votes of the others. That body is not a representative, since people's differing opinions and interests often render it a mute person in matters of greatest consequence, unfit for many things and especially for governing a multitude in time of war.

There are two kinds of authors. The first is an author in the strict sense, whom I defined above as one who simply owns another's action. The second owns another's action or covenant conditionally: he undertakes to perform it if the other has failed to do so by a certain time. Such conditional authors are generally called SURETIES, in Latin Fidejussores and Sponsores; those guaranteeing a debt are particularly called Praedes, and those guaranteeing an appearance before a judge or magistrate Vades.

PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH

On persons, authors, and things represented

What a person is

A person is someone “whose words or actions are considered either his own or a representation of the words or actions of another person, or of anything else to which they are attributed, whether truly or in fiction.”

When the words and actions are his own, he is called a natural person. When they represent another's words and actions, he is called a fictional or artificial person.

The word person comes from Latin. The Greek equivalent is Prosopon, meaning “face,” while the Latin Persona means the disguise or outward appearance of a person portrayed onstage. Sometimes it means more specifically the part covering the face, such as a mask or visor. From theater, the word came to refer to anyone representing speech and action, in courts as well as theaters. A person, then, is an actor both onstage and in ordinary life. To personate is to act as or represent oneself or someone else. Someone acting for another is said to bear that person's identity or act in that person's name. Cicero uses it in this sense when he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three persons: my own, my opponent's, and the judge's.” Depending on the circumstances, such a person is called a representative, lieutenant, vicar, attorney, deputy, agent, actor, or something similar.

Some artificial persons have their words and actions accepted as their own by those they represent. The person acting is then the actor, while the one who accepts responsibility for the words and actions is the AUTHOR. The actor acts by authority. In speaking of goods and property, we call the person to whom they belong an owner, or Dominus in Latin and Kurios in Greek. In speaking of actions, we call the corresponding person an author. Just as the right to possess something is called ownership, the right to perform an action is called AUTHORITY. Authority always means the right to act. An act done by authority is done with a commission or permission from the person who holds that right.

It follows that when an actor makes a Covenant under an authority granted to him, he binds the author just as fully as the author would bind himself. He also makes the author subject to all its consequences. Everything said earlier (Chap. 14) about Covenants between people acting on their own behalf also applies to Covenants made by actors, representatives, or agents who have received authority from them. But it applies only within the limits of the authority given.

Anyone who makes a Covenant with an actor or representative without knowing what authority the actor has does so at his own risk. Nobody is bound by a Covenant he has not authorized, including a Covenant made against or beyond the authority he granted.

Suppose an actor is commanded by the author to do something against the Law of Nature, and an earlier Covenant obliges the actor to obey. In that case the author, not the actor, breaks the Law of Nature. The action may violate the law, but it is not the actor's own act. On the contrary, the actor would violate the Law of Nature against breaking Covenants if he refused to do it.

A person may make a Covenant with an author through an actor without knowing how much authority the actor has, relying only on the actor's word. If the authority is not demonstrated when requested, that person is no longer bound. A Covenant with the author is invalid without the author's confirmation. But if the person making the Covenant knew from the start that the actor's word was the only assurance available, the Covenant is valid, because in this case the actor makes himself its author. Thus, when the authority is clear, the Covenant binds the author rather than the actor. When the authority is made up, it binds only the actor, who is himself the only author.

Few things are incapable of being represented by fiction. A rector, director, or supervisor may represent an inanimate thing, such as a church, hospital, or bridge. But inanimate things cannot be authors and therefore cannot give actors authority. The owners or managers of such things can, however, authorize actors to obtain what is needed to maintain them. So such things cannot be represented before some form of civil government exists.

Likewise, guardians or caretakers may represent children, people lacking understanding, and people who have lost their reason. During that time, those people cannot authorize their guardians' actions unless, when they regain reason, they judge those actions reasonable. Still, while they lack reason, whoever has the right to govern them may authorize the guardian. Again, this is possible only in a civil society. Before one exists, nobody has authority over other persons.

An idol or something existing only in the imagination can be represented. The pagan gods were represented by officials appointed by the state. They held property, goods, and rights that people dedicated and consecrated to them over time. But idols cannot be authors, because an idol is nothing. The authority came from the state. Before civil government was established, the pagan gods could not be represented.

The true God can be represented. He was represented, first, by Moses, who governed the Israelites—God's people, not his own—in God's name. Moses said not Hoc Dicit Moses, “Thus says Moses,” but Hoc Dicit Dominus, “Thus says the Lord.” Second, he was represented by the son of man, his own Son, our blessed Savior Jesus Christ. Christ came to bring the Jews back and to bring all nations into his Father's Kingdome. He came not on his own behalf but because his Father sent him. Third, God was represented by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, who spoke and worked through the Apostles. The Holy Ghost did not come on his own but was sent and proceeded from both the Father and the Son.

A group of people becomes one person when one person or representative speaks and acts for them with the individual consent of every member. The unity of the representative, not of the people represented, makes the person one. The representative bears a single person's identity. There is no other way to understand unity in a group.

A group is naturally many people, not one. They must therefore be considered many authors, not one author, of everything their representative says or does in their name. Each person individually authorizes their shared representative and accepts responsibility for all his actions if the authority was unlimited. If they limit what he may do and how far he may represent them, each is responsible only for actions within the limits he authorized.

If the representative consists of several people, the majority's vote must count as the vote of the whole. Suppose the minority votes yes and the majority votes no. There are more than enough no votes to cancel the yes votes. The remaining no votes, unanswered, are therefore the representative's only decision.

A representative made up of an even number of people, especially a small number, will often divide equally between opposing votes. It can then make no decision or take no action. Yet in some cases an equal number of opposing votes does settle a question. In a trial, a tie means there is no conviction, and thus the accused is acquitted. It does not mean there is a conviction because the accused has not been affirmatively acquitted. Once a case has been heard, declining to convict means acquitting, but declining to acquit does not mean convicting. Likewise, if the question is whether to act immediately or delay, a tie that fails to approve immediate action decides in favor of delay.

Suppose the representative instead has an odd number, three or more, of members or assemblies, each with a veto that can cancel everyone else's votes in favor. This group is no representative either. People's differing views and interests frequently prevent it from deciding anything, including matters of great importance. It is unsuited to governing a group, especially during war, as well as to many other tasks.

There are two kinds of authors. The first is an author in the simple sense already defined: someone who accepts full responsibility for another's action. The second accepts another's action or Covenant only on a condition. He undertakes to perform if the other person has not done so by a specified time. These conditional authors are generally called guarantors, or Fidejussores and Sponsores in Latin. A guarantor of a debt is specifically called Praedes, and a guarantor of someone's appearance before a judge or magistrate is called Vades.

PART II. ON THE COMMON-WEALTH