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Thomas Hobbes · Complete work

Part I, Chapter XV, 2

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Original 17th-century English

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, “That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest.” For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

A sixth Law of Nature is this, “That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it.” For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh is, “That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow.” Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this Precept, “That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another.” The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, “That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature.” The breach of this Precept is Pride.

On this law, dependeth another, “That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest.” As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.

Also “If a man be trusted to judge between man and man,” it is a precept of the Law of Nature, “that he deale Equally between them.” For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons, Prosopolepsia.

And from this followeth another law, “That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right.” For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, “That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot.” For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

It is also a Law of Nature, “That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct.” For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, “That they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.”

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;” which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.

A fifth Law of Nature is accommodation: “Everyone must strive to accommodate himself to others.” To understand this, we may observe that people differ in their fitness for society because their passions differ, much as stones brought together to build a structure differ. A stone whose rough, irregular shape takes more space from others than it fills itself, and whose hardness makes it difficult to smooth, obstructs the building and is discarded by the builders as useless and troublesome. Likewise, someone who, through a rough disposition, insists on retaining things that are superfluous to himself but necessary to others, and whose stubborn passions cannot be corrected, must be left behind or expelled from society as a burden to it. For everyone is presumed, not only by right but by natural necessity, to do all he can to obtain what he needs for his preservation. A person who opposes that effort for the sake of superfluities is responsible for the war that follows and therefore acts against the fundamental Law of Nature, which commands us to seek peace. Those who observe this law may be called sociable (the Latins call them Commodi); their opposites are stubborn, unsociable, perverse, and intractable.

A sixth Law of Nature is this: “When those who have offended in the past repent and offer assurance for the future, they ought to be pardoned.” Pardon is simply the granting of peace. To grant it to those who persist in hostility is not peace but fear; yet to deny it to those who offer assurance for the future shows an aversion to peace and is therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh is: “In taking revenge, that is, repaying evil for evil, people must regard not the magnitude of the evil done in the past but the magnitude of the good to follow.” This forbids us to punish for any purpose other than correcting the offender or guiding others. The law follows from the preceding one, which commands pardon upon assurance for the future. Moreover, revenge that takes no account of the example set or of future benefit is a triumph, a glorying in another's suffering that serves no end—for an end must always be something yet to come. Glorying to no end is vainglory and contrary to reason; hurting without reason tends to bring about war, against the Law of Nature, and is commonly called cruelty.

Because every sign of hatred or contempt provokes a fight, to the point that most people would rather risk their lives than leave themselves unavenged, we may set down this eighth precept as a Law of Nature: “No one must declare hatred or contempt for another by deed, word, expression, or gesture.” Breach of this law is commonly called insult.

The question of who is the better person has no place in the condition of mere nature, where, as shown before, everyone is equal. The inequality now present was introduced by civil laws. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, makes the claim that some are naturally more fit to command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he took himself to be on account of his philosophy), and others to serve (meaning those with strong bodies who were not philosophers like him). He treats the distinction between master and servant as if it arose from differences of intelligence rather than human consent. This is contrary not only to reason but to experience: very few people are so foolish that they would not rather govern themselves than be governed by others. Nor do those who consider themselves wise always, or often, or almost ever win when they contend by force with people who distrust their own wisdom. If nature has made people equal, we must acknowledge that equality; and even if nature has made them unequal, people who believe themselves equal will make peace only on equal terms, so equality must still be admitted. I therefore give as the ninth Law of Nature: “Everyone must acknowledge every other person as his equal by nature.” Breach of this precept is pride.

On this law depends another: “When entering into terms of peace, no one must demand to keep for himself a right he is unwilling to let all others keep.” All who seek peace must lay down certain Rights of Nature, that is, give up the liberty to do whatever they please. Yet for life they must retain certain rights: to govern their own bodies, to enjoy air, water, movement, routes from place to place, and everything else without which they cannot live, or live well. If, in making peace, people demand for themselves what they would refuse others, they violate the preceding law commanding acknowledgment of natural equality, and thus the Law of Nature. Those who observe this law are called modest, and those who break it arrogant. The Greeks call its violation pleonexia, the desire for more than one's share.

Also, “If someone is trusted to judge between one person and another,” the Law of Nature commands “that he deal equally with them.” Otherwise their disputes can be settled only by war. A partial judge therefore does all he can to deter people from using judges and arbitrators, and consequently, contrary to the fundamental Law of Nature, becomes a cause of war.

Observance of this law is called equity, from the equal distribution to each person of what belongs to him by reason, and, as I said before, distributive justice. Its violation is called favoritism, Prosopolepsia.

Another law follows: “Things that cannot be divided must be enjoyed in common, if possible, without limit if their quantity permits it, and otherwise in proportion to the number of those entitled to them.” Any other distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.

Some things can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. In such cases the Law of Nature prescribing equity requires “that the entire right, or else the first possession where use alternates, be determined by lot.” Equal distribution is required by the Law of Nature, and no other means of equal distribution can be imagined.

There are two sorts of lot: arbitrary and natural. An arbitrary lot is one agreed upon by the competing parties. A natural lot is either birthright, which the Greeks call Kleronomia, meaning given by lot, or first possession.

Therefore, things that can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided should be awarded to the first possessor, and in some cases to the firstborn, as acquired by lot.

It is also a Law of Nature “that all who mediate peace be granted safe passage.” The law commanding peace as the end commands mediation as the means, and safe passage is the means to mediation.

Even when people are entirely willing to observe these laws, questions may arise about someone's action: first, whether it was done at all, a question of fact; second, if it was done, whether it violated the law, a question of right. Unless the disputing parties mutually covenant to abide by another's judgment, they remain as far from peace as ever. The person to whose judgment they submit is called an arbitrator. It is therefore a Law of Nature “that people in dispute submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator.”

Since everyone is presumed to act for his own benefit, no one is a suitable arbitrator in his own case. Even if he were perfectly suitable, equity gives each party an equal benefit; if one is allowed to be judge, the other must be allowed as well, leaving the dispute—and the cause of war—unresolved, against the Law of Nature.

For the same reason, no one should be admitted as arbitrator in a case if one party's victory would evidently bring him more profit, honor, or pleasure than the other's. For he has taken a bribe, unavoidable though it may be, and no one can be obliged to trust him. Thus the dispute and the condition of war remain, contrary to the Law of Nature.

In a dispute of fact, when there is no other evidence, the judge must give neither party more credence than the other, but must credit a third person, or a third and fourth, or more. Otherwise the matter remains undecided and is left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Laws of Nature that prescribe peace as the means by which people living in multitudes preserve themselves, and they alone concern the doctrine of civil society. Other things, such as drunkenness and all other kinds of intemperance, tend to destroy particular individuals and may therefore be counted among the things forbidden by the Law of Nature; but they need not be mentioned and are not sufficiently relevant here.

This deduction of the Laws of Nature may seem too subtle for everyone to notice, most people being too busy finding food and the rest too inattentive to understand. But to leave no one an excuse, the laws have been compressed into one easy formula intelligible even to the simplest mind: “Do not do to another what you would not want done to yourself.” To learn the Laws of Nature, one need only take actions by others that seem too weighty when weighed against one's own and put them on the opposite side of the balance, with one's own actions in their place, so that one's passions and self-love add nothing to the weight. Then none of these Laws of Nature will fail to appear entirely reasonable.

But they take effect only when there is security. The Laws of Nature oblige in foro interno, that is, they bind us to desire their observance; but they do not always oblige in foro externo, that is, to put them into action. Someone who remained modest and accommodating and fulfilled every promise at a time and place where no one else did would only make himself others' prey and bring about his certain ruin. This would be contrary to the foundation of all Laws of Nature, which aim at nature's preservation. Conversely, someone who observes these laws toward a person who does not observe them himself seeks not peace but war, and consequently the violent destruction of his own nature.

Any law that binds in foro interno can be broken not only by an act contrary to it but also by an act that agrees with it, if the agent believes the act contrary to it. For though his action in this case accords with the law, his intention does not, and where the obligation is in foro interno, that is a breach.

The Laws of Nature are immutable and eternal. Injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, inequity, favoritism, and the rest can never become lawful. War can never preserve life while peace destroys it.

These same laws are easy to observe because they require only desire and effort—by which I mean sincere and constant effort. Since they demand nothing beyond endeavor, whoever endeavors to fulfill them does fulfill them; and whoever fulfills the law is just.

Knowledge of them is the true and only moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is nothing other than knowledge of good and evil in human intercourse and society. Good and evil name our appetites and aversions, which vary with people's different dispositions, customs, and doctrines. People differ in their judgments not only of what pleases or displeases taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight, but also of what accords with or offends reason in ordinary life. Indeed, the same person differs from himself at different times, praising at one time and calling good what he later condemns and calls evil. Hence disputes, controversies, and at last war arise. So long as people remain in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil. Yet everyone agrees that peace is good, and therefore that the paths or means to peace—which, as I showed earlier, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the other Laws of Nature—are good: that is, moral virtues, while their opposing vices are evil. Knowledge of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; hence the true doctrine of the Laws of Nature is the true moral philosophy. Yet writers on moral philosophy, though they recognize these same virtues and vices, fail to see where their goodness lies, or that they are praised as the means of peaceful, sociable, and comfortable life. They place virtue in a moderate degree of passion, as if courage depended on the degree rather than the cause of daring, or generosity on the size rather than the purpose of a gift.

People commonly call these dictates of reason laws, but improperly: they are only conclusions or theorems concerning what aids their preservation and defense. A law, properly speaking, is the word of someone with a right to command others. But if we consider these same theorems as delivered in the word of God, who has the right to command everything, then they are properly called laws.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS REPRESENTED

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion). Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.

A fifth Law of Nature is accommodation: “Everyone must try to get along with others.” To understand this, consider that people's different Passions make them differently suited to living together, much as building stones have different shapes. A rough, irregular stone may take up more room than it fills. If it is too hard to smooth and blocks the work, builders throw it away as useless and troublesome. Likewise, someone may stubbornly insist on keeping things he does not need but others do need. If his Passions are too stubborn to correct, society must leave him out or cast him out as a burden. Everyone is assumed to try, both by right and by natural necessity, to obtain what is needed to survive. Someone who obstructs that effort for the sake of things he does not need is responsible for the resulting war. He thus violates the fundamental Law of Nature, which commands us to seek peace. Those who follow this law may be called sociable (the Latin word is Commodi); those who break it, stubborn, unsociable, difficult, and unmanageable.

A sixth Law of Nature says: “If those who have wronged someone repent and ask to be forgiven, he must forgive them once they give assurances about their future conduct.” Forgiveness is an offer of peace. Offering it to people who remain hostile does not create peace but shows fear. Refusing it to those who offer assurances for the future shows hostility to peace and is therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh law says: “In taking revenge—that is, returning harm for harm—people must consider not how great the past wrong was but how much good the response will bring in the future.” Thus we must not punish for any purpose other than correcting the offender or guiding others. This law follows from the previous one, which requires forgiveness when there is security about future conduct. Revenge taken without regard for its example or future benefit is simply triumph over another person's suffering. It achieves nothing, since an aim is always something to come. Taking pride in something that achieves nothing is empty pride and contrary to reason. Inflicting harm without reason leads to war, violates the Law of Nature, and is commonly called cruelty.

Every sign of hatred or contempt provokes a fight. Most people would rather risk their lives than leave such an insult unanswered. So an eighth Law of Nature says: “Nobody may show hatred or contempt for another person by action, words, facial expression, or gesture.” Breaking this law is commonly called an insult.

In the purely natural condition, it makes no sense to ask who is the better person. As I showed earlier, all people are equal. The inequality we now find was introduced by civil laws. In the first book of his Politics, Aristotle bases his teaching on the claim that some people are naturally more fit to command—the wise, such as he thought himself because he was a philosopher—while others are naturally fit to serve, having strong bodies but no philosophical wisdom. This treats master and servant as products of different intelligence rather than human agreement. It contradicts both reason and experience. Very few people are so foolish that they would prefer to be governed by others rather than govern themselves. And when those who consider themselves wise fight those less confident of their own wisdom, the self-declared wise do not always win, or even often win, or win almost ever. If nature made people equal, we must acknowledge that equality. Even if nature made them unequal, people who regard themselves as equal will accept peace only on equal terms. We must therefore recognize equality. My ninth Law of Nature is: “Everyone must acknowledge everyone else as his equal by nature.” Breaking this rule is pride.

Another law follows: “When negotiating peace, nobody may demand to keep a right that he is not willing to let everyone else keep.” All who seek peace must give up some Rights of Nature, meaning their freedom to do anything they wish. But people must keep certain rights in order to live: the right to control their own bodies, to use air and water, to move and travel from place to place, and to have everything else needed to live or live well. If someone negotiating peace claims something for himself that he would deny to others, he violates the preceding rule of natural equality and thus the Law of Nature. Those who follow this rule are called modest; those who break it are arrogant. The Greeks call the violation pleonexia, meaning wanting more than one's share.

Another rule of the Law of Nature says: “If someone is trusted to judge a dispute between people, he must treat them equally.” Otherwise their disputes can be settled only by war. A biased judge does what he can to discourage people from using judges and arbitrators. Against the fundamental Law of Nature, he thus causes war.

Following this law means distributing to each person equally what reason says belongs to him. This is called equity, and, as I have said, distributive justice. Breaking it is favoring certain people, or Prosopolepsia.

Another law follows: “Things that cannot be divided must be shared if possible, without limits if there is enough for everyone; otherwise they must be shared in proportion to the number of people with rights to them.” Any other distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.

Some things can neither be divided nor shared. The Law of Nature that requires equity then says: “Give the entire right, or the first turn if use can alternate, by lot.” Equal distribution is required by the Law of Nature, and there is no other imaginable way to distribute such things equally.

There are two kinds of lot: arbitrary and natural. An arbitrary lot is one agreed on by those competing. A natural lot is either inheritance by the firstborn—called Kleronomia in Greek, which means “given by lot”—or taking possession first.

Things that cannot be shared or divided should therefore go to whoever possesses them first, and in some cases to the firstborn, as though awarded by lot.

It is also a Law of Nature that “everyone who acts as a mediator for peace must be given safe conduct.” The law that commands peace as the goal also commands mediation as a means to that goal, and safe conduct is needed for mediation.

Even when people are willing to obey these laws, they can still dispute an action. They can ask, first, whether it happened, and second, if it did, whether it broke the law. The first is a question of fact, the second a question of right. Unless the parties agree by Covenant to accept someone else's decision, they remain as far from peace as ever. This other person, whose decision they accept, is an arbitrator. It is therefore a Law of Nature that “people in a dispute submit their claims to an arbitrator's judgment.”

Since everyone is assumed to act for his own benefit, nobody is a suitable arbitrator in his own case. Even if he were otherwise well suited, equity gives each party an equal advantage. If one party may judge, the other must be allowed to judge too. Then the dispute, and the cause of war, remain, contrary to the Law of Nature.

For the same reason, nobody should act as arbitrator in a case if one party's victory will plainly bring him more profit, honor, or pleasure than the other's. He has received a bribe, even if he could not avoid it, and nobody is obliged to trust him. The dispute and the state of war thus remain, contrary to the Law of Nature.

In a dispute about facts, a judge must not believe one party more than the other without further evidence. He must believe a third person, or a third and fourth, or more. Otherwise the question remains unsettled and is left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These Laws of Nature prescribe peace as a way to preserve groups of people. Only these laws belong to the study of civil society. Other behaviors, such as drunkenness and every other form of excess, can destroy individual people. They may therefore also count among things the Law of Nature forbids. But they need not be listed here and are not sufficiently relevant to this subject.

This reasoning about the Laws of Nature may seem too subtle for everyone to grasp. Most people are too busy finding food, and the rest too inattentive. But nobody needs an excuse for failing to understand, because these laws can be reduced to a single easy rule that even someone with little understanding can grasp: “Do not do to another person what you would not want done to yourself.” To learn the Laws of Nature, all one must do is compare other people's actions with one's own. If their actions seem worse, imagine switching their places on the scales with one's own, so that one's own Passions and self-love add no weight. Every Law of Nature will then seem reasonable.

The Laws of Nature bind us inwardly, to want them to be put into practice. But they bind us outwardly, to act on them, only when there is security. Someone who is modest, cooperative, and faithful to every promise when nobody else is will make himself easy prey and ensure his own ruin. That would violate the basis of every Law of Nature, which is self-preservation. Conversely, someone who follows these laws toward a person who does not follow them seeks war rather than peace, and so risks his own violent destruction.

Any law that binds us inwardly can be broken not only by an action against it but also by an action that follows it, if the person believes that action breaks it. The outward act may comply, but the person's inward intention does not.

The Laws of Nature are unchanging and eternal. Injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, unfairness, favoritism, and the rest can never become lawful. War can never preserve life while peace destroys it.

These laws are easy to follow because they require only a desire and an effort to comply—an honest, steady effort. Someone who makes that effort fulfills them, and someone who fulfills the law is just.

Knowledge of these laws is the true and only moral philosophy. Moral philosophy studies good and evil in human relationships and society. Good and evil name what we desire and avoid, and these differ with people's temperaments, customs, and beliefs. People disagree not just about what pleases or displeases their senses of taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight. They also disagree about what agrees with reason in ordinary life. The same person changes his mind over time, praising as good at one time what he condemns as evil at another. From this come disagreements, disputes, and finally war. While people remain in the purely natural condition, a state of war, each person's own desires measure good and evil. Yet everyone agrees that peace is good. They must also agree that its means—justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the other Laws of Nature described above—are good. These are the moral virtues, while their opposites are evil vices. The study of virtues and vices is moral philosophy. So the true teaching of the Laws of Nature is true moral philosophy. Writers on moral philosophy recognize the same virtues and vices, but they do not see why the virtues are good or why people praise them as ways to live peacefully, sociably, and comfortably. Instead, they place virtue in a moderate degree of Passion, as though courage depended on how much someone dared rather than why he dared, or generosity on the size of a gift rather than the reason for it.

People commonly call these rules of reason laws, but that is not quite accurate. They are conclusions, or principles, about what helps people preserve and defend themselves. Strictly speaking, a law is the word of someone who has the right to command others. But if we consider these same principles as expressed in the word of God, who has the right to command everything, then they are properly called laws.

CHAPTER XVI. ON PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS REPRESENTED

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