Part II, Chapter XVIII, 2

Seventhly, sovereignty includes the entire power to prescribe the rules by which each person may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may perform without interference from his fellow subjects. This is what people call property. Before the establishment of sovereign power, as has already been shown, everyone had a right to everything, which necessarily causes war. Property, being necessary to peace and dependent on sovereign power, is therefore an act of that power for the sake of public peace. These rules of property, of mine and yours, and of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, in subjects' actions are the civil laws: the laws particular to each commonwealth. The name civil law is now confined, however, to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, whose laws, when it ruled a great part of the world, were the civil law in those regions.

Eighthly, sovereignty includes the right of judicature: to hear and decide all disputes arising over law, whether civil or natural, or over fact. Without decisions in disputes, one subject has no protection against injury by another; the laws concerning mine and yours are useless; and each person retains, through his natural and necessary desire for self-preservation, the right to protect himself by his private strength. That is the condition of war and runs counter to the purpose for which every commonwealth is instituted.

Ninthly, sovereignty includes the right to make war and peace with other nations and commonwealths: to judge when such action serves the public good, how large a force must be raised, armed, and paid for that purpose, and how much money must be levied on the subjects to cover its expenses. For the power that defends the people lies in their armies, and an army's strength lies in the union of its forces under one command. That command therefore belongs to the instituted sovereign, since command of the armed forces, without any further institution, makes its holder sovereign. Thus, whoever is made general of an army, the holder of sovereign power is always commander-in-chief.

Tenthly, sovereignty includes the choice of all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, in both peace and war. Since the sovereign is charged with securing the end—the common peace and defense—he is understood to have the power to use whatever means he thinks best for the task.

Eleventhly, the sovereign is entrusted with the power to reward any subject with riches or honor, and to punish any subject in body, in money, or by disgrace, according to the law he has previously made; or, if there is no law on the matter, according to whatever he judges will best encourage service to the commonwealth or deter disservice to it.

Lastly, consider the value people naturally set upon themselves, the respect they expect from others, and the little value they set on others. From these attitudes continually arise rivalry, quarrels, factions, and finally war, destroying one another and weakening their strength against a common enemy. There must therefore be laws of honor, and a public standard for valuing those who have served or are capable of serving the commonwealth well, together with power in someone's hands to enforce these laws. But it has already been shown that not only the commonwealth's entire armed force but also the judgment of all disputes belongs to sovereignty. It follows that the sovereign also has the right to confer titles of honor, to assign every person's rank and dignity, and to prescribe the signs of respect people must give one another in public or private gatherings.

These rights constitute the essence of sovereignty and are the marks by which one may discern the man or assembly in whom sovereign power resides. They cannot be shared or separated. The power to coin money, to dispose of the property and persons of infant heirs, to have first choice in markets, and all other prerogatives granted by statute may be transferred by the sovereign while he retains the power to protect his subjects. But if he transfers command of the armed forces, he retains the power of judgment in vain, lacking the means to enforce the laws. If he gives away the power to raise money, the armed forces are useless; if he gives away the government of doctrine, fear of spirits will frighten people into rebellion. Consider any one of these rights, and it becomes immediately clear that possession of all the others is powerless to preserve peace and justice, the purpose for which commonwealths are instituted. Of such a division it is said, “A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand”; for unless sovereignty is divided first, there can be no division into opposing armies. Had most people in England not first come to believe that these powers were divided among the King, the Lords, and the House of Commons, they would never have divided and fallen into this civil war: first those who differed over politics, and afterward those who disagreed over religious liberty. These events have so instructed people concerning sovereign right that few in England now fail to see that these rights are inseparable. They will be generally recognized when peace next returns, and will remain so until the sufferings are forgotten, but no longer—unless ordinary people are taught better than they have been up to now.

Because these rights are essential and inseparable, it necessarily follows that whatever words appear to grant any of them away, the grant is void unless sovereign power itself is expressly renounced and the grantees no longer call the grantor sovereign. For once he has granted all he can, if we grant sovereignty back to him, everything is restored with it, inseparably attached.

Since this great authority is indivisible and inseparable from sovereignty, there is little basis for the view that sovereign kings, though Singulis Majores, greater in power than each subject, are nevertheless Universis Minores, less powerful than all their subjects together. If by “all together” they do not mean the collective body acting as one person, then “all together” and “each one” mean the same thing, and the claim is absurd. If they mean all together as one person—a person whom the sovereign bears—then the power of all together is identical with the sovereign's power, and the claim is again absurd. People see this absurdity perfectly well when sovereignty belongs to an assembly of the people, but fail to see it in a monarchy, although sovereign power is the same wherever it resides.

The sovereign's honor, like his power, must also exceed that of any or all of the subjects. Sovereignty is the fountain of honor. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are its creations. As servants are equal, and without honor, in their master's presence, so subjects are in the presence of the sovereign. Although some shine more brightly than others when out of his sight, before him they shine no more than stars before the sun.

Someone may object that subjects are in a miserable condition, exposed to the desires and other unruly passions of whoever wields such unlimited power. Those living under a monarch commonly blame monarchy, while those living under a democracy or another sovereign assembly attribute every hardship to that form of commonwealth. Yet the power is the same in every form that is capable of protecting its subjects. They fail to consider that the human condition can never be without some hardship, and that the greatest hardship the people as a whole could suffer under any form of government is barely perceptible beside the misery and terrible calamities of civil war, or the lawless condition of people without masters, subject to neither laws nor a coercive power to hold back their hands from robbery and revenge. Nor do they consider that the greatest burdens imposed by sovereign rulers do not arise from any pleasure or gain rulers expect from harming or weakening their subjects, upon whose vigor their own strength depends. Rather, because the subjects are unwilling to contribute to their own defense, their rulers must collect what they can from them in peacetime, so that when an emergency or sudden need arises they will have the means to resist or take advantage of their enemies. For all people are naturally equipped with remarkable magnifying glasses—their passions and self-love—through which every small payment appears a great grievance. But they lack the perspective lenses—moral and civil science—needed to see from afar the miseries awaiting them that such payments alone can avert.

Seventh, sovereignty includes full power to set the rules that tell each person what goods they may enjoy and what actions they may take without interference from other subjects. This is what people call property. Before sovereign power was established, as I have shown, everyone had a right to everything, and that necessarily caused war. Property is needed for peace and depends on sovereign power. So establishing it is an act of that power for the sake of public peace. These rules about what is mine and yours, and about what is good, bad, lawful, and unlawful for subjects to do, are the civil laws. That means the particular laws of each Commonwealth, though the term “civil law” is now limited to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome. Rome once ruled much of the world, so its laws were the civil law in these regions at that time.

Eighth, sovereignty includes the right to judge: to hear and settle all disputes about civil or natural law or about matters of fact. Without a decision on disputes, one subject has no protection against injury by another. The laws distinguishing mine from yours are useless. Each person, driven by the natural need to preserve their life, keeps the right to defend themselves by their own strength. That is the state of war, the opposite of the purpose for which every Commonwealth is established.

Ninth, sovereignty includes the right to make war and peace with other nations and Commonwealths. This includes judging when war or peace serves the public good, how large an armed and paid force to assemble for the purpose, and how much money to raise from subjects to pay its expenses. The power to defend the people lies in their armies. An army's strength depends on bringing its forces together under one command. The instituted sovereign holds that command, because whoever commands the military, without any further act of institution, is sovereign. So whoever is appointed general of an army, the holder of sovereign power is always the supreme commander.

Tenth, sovereignty includes the choice of all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers in peace and in war. Since the sovereign is responsible for the goal of common peace and defense, he must also have the power to use whatever means he judges best to meet that responsibility.

Eleventh, the sovereign has the power to reward any subject with wealth or honor, and to punish them physically, financially, or by public disgrace. He does this according to a law he has already made. If there is no such law, he does it as he judges most useful for encouraging service to the Commonwealth or discouraging actions against it.

Finally, consider how highly people naturally value themselves, how much respect they expect from others, and how little they value other people. This continually leads to rivalry, quarrels, factions, and ultimately war. They destroy one another and weaken themselves against a common enemy. So there must be laws governing honor, a public measure of the worth of those who have served the Commonwealth well or are able to serve it well, and someone with the force to enforce those laws. I have already shown that control of all the Commonwealth's armed forces and judgment of all disputes belong to sovereignty. The sovereign must therefore also award titles of honor, decide each person's rank and dignity, and determine what signs of respect people should show one another in public or private gatherings.

These rights make up the essence of sovereignty. They are the signs that show which man or assembly holds sovereign power. They cannot be shared or separated. A sovereign can transfer the power to mint money, to manage the property and persons of heirs who are children, to buy goods before others in markets, and every other privilege granted by statute, while retaining the power to protect subjects. But if he transfers control of the armed forces, his right to judge is useless because he cannot enforce the laws. If he gives up the power to raise money, the armed forces are useless. If he gives up control of doctrines, fear of spirits will frighten people into rebellion. Consider any one of these rights and it becomes clear that keeping all the others will not preserve peace and justice, the goal for which Commonwealths are established. It is this division of power that the saying refers to: “A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand.” Unless power is divided first, opposing armies cannot form. If most people in England had not first accepted the idea that these powers were divided among the King, the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people would never have split into sides and fallen into this civil war. The division began among people who disagreed about politics and then spread to those who disagreed about religious liberty. These conflicts have taught people so much about sovereign rights that few in England now fail to see that the rights are inseparable. People will generally acknowledge this when peace returns. They will continue to do so until they forget their suffering, but no longer than that, unless ordinary people are taught better than they have been so far.

Because these rights are essential and inseparable, a grant that appears to give any one of them away is void unless the sovereign explicitly gives up sovereign power itself and those receiving the grant no longer call the giver sovereign. However many rights he grants, if we grant sovereignty back to him, all those rights return with it, since they are inseparably attached to it.

This great authority cannot be divided or separated from sovereignty. There is therefore little basis for the claim that sovereign kings, though Singulis Majores, or more powerful than each subject individually, are Universis Minores, or less powerful than all subjects together. If “all together” means anything other than the entire body united as one person, it means the same as “every one,” and the claim is absurd. But if “all together” means one person, whom the sovereign represents, then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign's power. The claim is again absurd. People recognize this absurdity when sovereignty belongs to an assembly of the people, but not when it belongs to a monarch, even though sovereign power is the same whoever holds it.

The sovereign's honor, like his power, should be greater than that of any subject or of all subjects together. Sovereignty is the source of honor. The sovereign creates the titles of Lord, Earl, Duke, and Prince. Just as servants are equal and have no honor when their master is present, subjects stand equally before the sovereign. Some may shine more brightly than others when he is away, but in his presence they shine no more than stars in the light of the sun.

Someone may object that subjects are in a miserable position because they are exposed to the desires and other uncontrolled passions of whoever holds such unlimited power. People under a monarch usually blame monarchy for this. People under a democracy or another sovereign assembly blame their form of Commonwealth for every inconvenience. Yet sovereign power is the same in every form of government that is strong enough to protect its people. Such critics forget that human life always involves some hardship. Even the worst general hardship people can suffer under any form of government is barely noticeable next to the misery and terrible disasters of civil war, or life without a master, without laws and a power able to stop people from robbery and revenge. They also forget that the heaviest burdens sovereign governors impose do not come from any pleasure or profit they expect from harming or weakening their subjects: their own strength depends on the subjects' strength. Rather, subjects resist paying for their own defense, so governors must collect what they can during peacetime. Then they have resources to resist their enemies or take advantage of an opportunity if a sudden need arises. By nature, everyone has powerful magnifying glasses—their passions and self-love—which make every small payment look like a huge burden. But they lack the long-distance glasses of moral and civil knowledge, which would let them see the approaching misery that such payments prevent.

Chapter XIX. Of the Different Kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and Succession to Sovereign Power