Section 52c
Original German
§ 52c.
Nun liegt den zwei ersteren Antinomien, die ich mathematische nenne, weil sie sich mit der Hinzusetzung oder Theilung des Gleichartigen beschäftigen, ein solcher widersprechender Begriff zum Grunde; und daraus erkläre ich, wie es zugehe, daß Thesis sowohl als Antithesis bei beiden falsch sind.
Wenn ich von Gegenständen in Zeit und Raum rede, so rede ich nicht von Dingen an sich selbst, darum weil ich von diesen nichts weiß, sondern nur von Dingen in der Erscheinung, d. i. von der Erfahrung als einer besondern Erkenntnißart der Objecte, die dem Menschen allein vergönnt ist. Was ich nun im Raume oder in der Zeit denke, von dem muß ich nicht sagen: daß es an sich selbst, auch ohne diesen meinen Gedanken, im Raume und der Zeit sei; denn da würde ich mir selbst widersprechen, weil Raum und Zeit sammt den Erscheinungen in ihnen nichts an sich selbst und außer meinen Vorstellungen Existirendes, sondern selbst nur Vorstellungsarten sind, und es offenbar widersprechend ist, zu sagen, daß eine bloße Vorstellungsart auch außer unserer Vorstellung existire. Die Gegenstände also der Sinne existiren nur in der Erfahrung; dagegen auch ohne dieselbe oder vor ihr ihnen eine eigene, für sich bestehende Existenz zu geben, heißt so viel als sich vorstellen, Erfahrung sei auch ohne Erfahrung oder vor derselben wirklich.
Wenn ich nun nach der Weltgröße dem Raume und der Zeit nach frage, so ist es für alle meine Begriffe eben so unmöglich zu sagen, sie sei unendlich, als sie sei endlich. Denn keines von beiden kann in der Erfahrung enthalten sein, weil weder von einem unendlichen Raume oder unendlicher verflossener Zeit, noch der Begrenzung der Welt durch einen leeren Raum oder eine vorhergehende leere Zeit Erfahrung möglich ist; das sind nur Ideen. Also müßte diese auf die eine oder die andre Art bestimmte Größe der Welt in ihr selbst liegen, abgesondert von aller Erfahrung. Dieses widerspricht aber dem Begriffe einer Sinnenwelt, die nur ein Inbegriff der Erscheinung ist, deren Dasein und Verknüpfung nur in der Vorstellung, nämlich der Erfahrung, stattfindet, weil sie nicht Sache an sich, sondern selbst nichts als Vorstellungsart ist. Hieraus folgt, daß, da der Begriff einer für sich existirenden Sinnenwelt in sich selbst widersprechend ist, die Auflösung des Problems wegen ihrer Größe auch jederzeit falsch sein werde, man mag sie nun bejahend oder verneinend versuchen.
Eben dieses gilt von der zweiten Antinomie, die die Theilung der Erscheinungen betrifft. Denn diese sind bloße Vorstellungen, und die Theile existiren blos in der Vorstellung derselben, mithin in der Theilung, d. i. in einer möglichen Erfahrung, darin sie gegeben werden, und jene geht daher nur so weit, als diese reicht. Anzunehmen, daß eine Erscheinung, z. B. die des Körpers, alle Theile vor aller Erfahrung an sich selbst enthalte, zu denen nur immer mögliche Erfahrung gelangen kann, heißt: einer bloßen Erscheinung, die nur in der Erfahrung existiren kann, doch zugleich eine eigene, vor Erfahrung vorhergehende Existenz geben, oder zu sagen, daß bloße Vorstellungen da sind, ehe sie in der Vorstellungskraft angetroffen werden, welches sich widerspricht, und mithin auch jede Auflösung der mißverstandnen Aufgabe, man mag darin behaupten, die Körper bestehen an sich aus unendlich viel Theilen, oder einer endlichen Zahl einfacher Theile.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 52c.
Now just such a contradictory concept underlies the first two antinomies, which I call mathematical because they deal with adding or dividing the homogeneous; and from this I explain how it happens that both thesis and antithesis are false in each.
When I speak of objects in time and space, I am not speaking of things in themselves, because I know nothing of them, but only of things in appearance—that is, of experience as a particular kind of cognition of objects, the only kind granted to human beings. Of what I think in space or in time, I must not say that in itself, even without this thought of mine, it is in space and time. For then I would contradict myself, because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are not something existing in itself and outside my representations, but are themselves only modes of representation; and it is plainly contradictory to say that a mere mode of representation also exists outside our representation. Objects of the senses thus exist only in experience; to give them, by contrast, an existence of their own, subsisting by itself even without experience or before it, means as much as to represent experience as actual even without or before experience.
If I now ask about the magnitude of the world in space and time, it is, for all my concepts, just as impossible to say that it is infinite as that it is finite. For neither can be contained in experience, because no experience is possible either of an infinite space or of an infinitely elapsed time, or of the world's limitation by an empty space or by a preceding empty time. These are only ideas. Thus this magnitude of the world, determined in one way or the other, would have to lie in the world itself, apart from all experience. But this contradicts the concept of a world of sense, which is only a totality of appearance, whose existence and connection occur only in representation, namely experience, because it is not a thing in itself but itself nothing but a mode of representation. It follows that, since the concept of a world of sense existing by itself is self-contradictory, any solution to the problem of its magnitude will always be false, whether attempted affirmatively or negatively.
The very same holds of the second antinomy, which concerns the division of appearances. For these are mere representations, and the parts exist only in the representation of them, hence in the division—that is, in a possible experience in which they are given—and the division therefore goes only as far as this experience reaches. To assume that an appearance, for example that of a body, contains in itself, before all experience, all the parts that any possible experience can ever reach, means giving a mere appearance, which can exist only in experience, an existence of its own that precedes experience; or saying that mere representations exist before they are encountered in the power of representation. This is self-contradictory, and so too is every solution of the misunderstood problem, whether one asserts that bodies in themselves consist of infinitely many parts or of a finite number of simple parts.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 52c.
A contradictory concept of this kind underlies the first two antinomies. I call these mathematical because they concern the addition or division of things of the same kind. This explains how both the thesis and the antithesis in each are false.
When I speak of objects in time and space, I am not speaking of things in themselves, since I know nothing of them. I speak only of things in appearance: of experience as the particular way of knowing objects that alone is available to human beings. When I think of something in space or time, I must not say that it is in space and time in itself, even without this thought of mine. That would contradict myself. Space and time, together with the appearances in them, are not something existing in themselves and outside my representations. They are themselves only ways of representing. And it is plainly contradictory to say that a mere way of representing also exists outside our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only in experience. To give them an existence of their own, subsisting by itself even without or before experience, is to represent experience as actual without or before experience.
If I now ask about the world's magnitude in space and time, it is just as impossible, by all my concepts, to say that it is infinite as to say that it is finite. Neither can be contained in experience. Experience of an infinite space or an infinitely elapsed time is impossible. So is experience of the world's limitation by an empty space or a preceding empty time. These are only ideas. The world's magnitude, determined in either way, would therefore have to belong to the world in itself, apart from all experience. But this contradicts the concept of a world of sense. Such a world is only a totality of appearances, whose existence and connection occur only in representation, namely experience. It is not a thing in itself, but nothing more than a way of representing. It follows that the concept of a world of sense existing on its own is self-contradictory. Any attempted solution to the problem of its magnitude will therefore be false, whether it takes an affirmative or a negative form.
The same holds for the second antinomy, which concerns the division of appearances. Appearances are mere representations. Their parts exist only in the representation of them, and thus in their division: in a possible experience in which they are given. Division therefore extends only as far as that experience extends. Suppose we assume that an appearance, such as that of a body, contains in itself, before all experience, every part that any possible experience could ever reach. We are then giving a mere appearance, which can exist only in experience, an existence of its own prior to experience. In other words, we are saying that mere representations exist before they are found in the power of representation. This is self-contradictory. So is every solution to this misunderstood problem, whether it claims that bodies in themselves consist of infinitely many parts or of a finite number of simple parts.
About this section
Section 52c is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 62 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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