Section 53
Original German
§ 53.
In der ersten Classe der Antinomie (der mathematischen) bestand die Falschheit der Voraussetzung darin: daß, was sich widerspricht (nämlich Erscheinung als Sache an sich selbst), als vereinbar in einem Begriffe vorgestellt würde. Was aber die zweite, nämlich dynamische, Classe der Antinomie betrifft, so besteht die Falschheit der Voraussetzung darin: daß, was vereinbar ist, als widersprechend vorgestellt wird, folglich, da im ersteren Falle alle beide einander entgegengesetzte Behauptungen falsch waren, hier wiederum solche, die durch bloßen Mißverstand einander entgegengesetzt werden, alle beide wahr sein können.
Die mathematische Verknüpfung nämlich setzt nothwendig Gleichartigkeit des Verknüpften (im Begriffe der Größe) voraus, die dynamische erfordert dieses keinesweges. Wenn es auf die Größe des Ausgedehnten ankommt, so müssen alle Theile unter sich und mit dem Ganzen gleichartig sein; dagegen in der Verknüpfung der Ursache und Wirkung kann zwar auch Gleichartigkeit angetroffen werden, aber sie ist nicht nothwendig; denn der Begriff der Causalität (vermittelst dessen durch Etwas etwas ganz davon Verschiedenes gesetzt wird) erfordert sie wenigstens nicht.
Würden die Gegenstände der Sinnenwelt für Dinge an sich selbst genommen und die oben angeführte Naturgesetze für Gesetze der Dinge an sich selbst, so wäre der Widerspruch unvermeidlich. Eben so wenn das Subject der Freiheit gleich den übrigen Gegenständen als bloße Erscheinung vorgestellt würde, so könnte eben so wohl der Widerspruch nicht vermieden werden; denn es würde eben dasselbe von einerlei Gegenstande in derselben Bedeutung zugleich bejaht und verneint werden. Ist aber Naturnothwendigkeit blos auf Erscheinungen bezogen und Freiheit blos auf Dinge an sich selbst, so entspringt kein Widerspruch, wenn man gleich beide Arten von Causalität annimmt oder zugiebt, so schwer oder unmöglich es auch sein möchte, die von der letzteren Art begreiflich zu machen.
In der Erscheinung ist jede Wirkung eine Begebenheit oder etwas, das in der Zeit geschieht; vor ihr muß nach dem allgemeinen Naturgesetze eine Bestimmung der Causalität ihrer Ursache (ein Zustand derselben) vorhergehen, worauf sie nach einem beständigen Gesetze folgt. Aber diese Bestimmung der Ursache zur Causalität muß auch etwas sein, was sich eräugnet oder geschieht; die Ursache muß angefangen haben zu handeln, denn sonst ließe sich zwischen ihr und der Wirkung keine Zeitfolge denken. Die Wirkung wäre immer gewesen, so wie die Causalität der Ursache. Also muß unter Erscheinungen die Bestimmung der Ursache zum Wirken auch entstanden und mithin eben so wohl als ihre Wirkung eine Begebenheit sein, die wiederum ihre Ursache haben muß u. s. w., und folglich Naturnothwendigkeit die Bedingung sein, nach welcher die wirkende Ursachen bestimmt werden. Soll dagegen Freiheit eine Eigenschaft gewisser Ursachen der Erscheinungen sein, so muß sie respective auf die letztere als Begebenheiten ein Vermögen sein, sie von selbst (sponte) anzufangen, d. i. ohne daß die Causalität der Ursache selbst anfangen dürfte und daher keines andern, ihren Anfang bestimmenden Grundes benöthigt wäre. Alsdann aber müßte die Ursache ihrer Causalität nach nicht unter Zeitbestimmungen ihres Zustandes stehen, d. i. gar nicht Erscheinung sein, d. i. sie müßte als ein Ding an sich selbst, die Wirkungen aber allein als Erscheinungen angenommen werden344.1. Kann man einen solchen Einfluß der Verstandeswesen auf Erscheinungen ohne Widerspruch denken, so wird zwar aller Verknüpfung der Ursache und Wirkung in der Sinnenwelt Naturnothwendigkeit anhängen, dagegen doch derjenigen Ursache, die selbst keine Erscheinung ist (obzwar ihr zum Grunde liegt), Freiheit zugestanden, Natur also und Freiheit eben demselben Dinge, aber in verschiedener Beziehung, einmal als Erscheinung, das andre Mal als einem Dinge an sich selbst, ohne Widerspruch beigelegt werden können.
Wir haben in uns ein Vermögen, welches nicht blos mit seinen subjectiv bestimmenden Gründen, welche die Naturursachen seiner Handlungen sind, in Verknüpfung steht und so fern das Vermögen eines Wesens ist, das selbst zu den Erscheinungen gehört, sondern auch auf objective Gründe, die blos Ideen sind, bezogen wird, so fern sie dieses Vermögen bestimmen können, welche Verknüpfung durch Sollen ausgedrückt wird. Dieses Vermögen heißt Vernunft; und so fern wir ein Wesen (den Menschen) lediglich nach dieser objectiv bestimmbaren Vernunft betrachten, kann es nicht als ein Sinnenwesen betrachtet werden, sondern die gedachte Eigenschaft ist die Eigenschaft eines Dinges an sich selbst, deren Möglichkeit, wie nämlich das Sollen, was doch noch nie geschehen ist, die Thätigkeit desselben bestimme und Ursache von Handlungen sein könne, deren Wirkung Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt ist, wir gar nicht begreifen können. Indessen würde doch die Causalität der Vernunft in Ansehung der Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt Freiheit sein, so fern objective Gründe, die selbst Ideen sind, in Ansehung ihrer als bestimmend angesehen werden. Denn ihre Handlung hinge alsdann nicht an subjectiven, mithin auch keinen Zeitbedingungen und also auch nicht vom Naturgesetze ab, das diese zu bestimmen dient, weil Gründe der Vernunft allgemein, aus Principien, ohne Einfluß der Umstände der Zeit oder des Orts Handlungen die Regel geben.
Was ich hier anführe, gilt nur als Beispiel zur Verständlichkeit und gehört nicht nothwendig zu unserer Frage, welche unabhängig von Eigenschaften, die wir in der wirklichen Welt antreffen, aus bloßen Begriffen entschieden werden muß.
Nun kann ich ohne Widerspruch sagen: alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen, so fern sie Erscheinungen sind (in irgend einer Erfahrung angetroffen werden), stehen unter der Naturnothwendigkeit; eben dieselbe Handlungen aber blos respective auf das vernünftige Subject und dessen Vermögen nach bloßer Vernunft zu handeln sind frei. Denn was wird zur Naturnothwendigkeit erfordert? Nichts weiter als die Bestimmbarkeit jeder Begebenheit der Sinnenwelt nach beständigen Gesetzen, mithin eine Beziehung auf Ursache in der Erscheinung, wobei das Ding an sich selbst, was zum Grunde liegt, und dessen Causalität unbekannt bleibt. Ich sage aber: das Naturgesetz bleibt, es mag nun das vernünftige Wesen aus Vernunft, mithin durch Freiheit Ursache der Wirkungen der Sinnenwelt sein, oder es mag diese auch nicht aus Vernunftgründen bestimmen. Denn ist das erste, so geschieht die Handlung nach Maximen, deren Wirkung in der Erscheinung jederzeit beständigen Gesetzen gemäß sein wird; ist das zweite, und die Handlung geschieht nicht nach Principien der Vernunft, so ist sie den empirischen Gesetzen der Sinnlichkeit unterworfen, und in beiden Fällen hängen die Wirkungen nach beständigen Gesetzen zusammen; mehr verlangen wir aber nicht zur Naturnothwendigkeit, ja mehr kennen wir an ihr auch nicht. Aber im ersten Falle ist Vernunft die Ursache dieser Naturgesetze und ist also frei, im zweiten Falle laufen die Wirkungen nach bloßen Naturgesetzen der Sinnlichkeit, darum weil die Vernunft keinen Einfluß auf sie ausübt: sie, die Vernunft, wird aber darum nicht selbst durch die Sinnlichkeit bestimmt (welches unmöglich ist) und ist daher auch in diesem Falle frei. Die Freiheit hindert also nicht das Naturgesetz der Erscheinungen, so wenig wie dieses der Freiheit des praktischen Vernunftgebrauchs, der mit Dingen an sich selbst als bestimmenden Gründen in Verbindung steht, Abbruch thut.
Hiedurch wird also die praktische Freiheit, nämlich diejenige, in welcher die Vernunft nach objectiv-bestimmenden Gründen Causalität hat, gerettet, ohne daß der Naturnothwendigkeit in Ansehung eben derselben Wirkungen als Erscheinungen der mindeste Eintrag geschieht. Eben dieses kann auch zur Erläuterung desjenigen, was wir wegen der transscendentalen Freiheit und deren Vereinbarung mit Naturnothwendigkeit (in demselben Subjecte, aber nicht in einer und derselben Beziehung genommen) zu sagen hatten, dienlich sein. Denn was diese betrifft, so ist ein jeder Anfang der Handlung eines Wesens aus objectiven Ursachen respective auf diese bestimmende Gründe immer ein erster Anfang, obgleich dieselbe Handlung in der Reihe der Erscheinungen nur ein subalterner Anfang ist, vor welchem ein Zustand der Ursache vorhergehen muß, der sie bestimmt und selbst eben so von einer noch vorhergehenden bestimmt wird: so daß man sich an vernünftigen Wesen oder überhaupt an Wesen, so fern ihre Causalität in ihnen als Dingen an sich selbst bestimmt wird, ohne in Widerspruch mit Naturgesetzen zu gerathen, ein Vermögen denken kann, eine Reihe von Zuständen von selbst anzufangen. Denn das Verhältniß der Handlung zu objectiven Vernunftgründen ist kein Zeitverhältniß: hier geht das, was die Causalität bestimmt, nicht der Zeit nach vor der Handlung vorher, weil solche bestimmende Gründe nicht Beziehung der Gegenstände auf Sinne, mithin nicht auf Ursachen in der Erscheinung, sondern bestimmende Ursachen als Dinge an sich selbst, die nicht unter Zeitbedingungen stehen, vorstellen. So kann die Handlung in Ansehung der Causalität der Vernunft als ein erster Anfang, in Ansehung der Reihe der Erscheinungen aber doch zugleich als ein blos subordinirter Anfang angesehen und ohne Widerspruch in jenem Betracht als frei, in diesem (da sie blos Erscheinung ist) als der Naturnothwendigkeit unterworfen angesehen werden.
Was die vierte Antinomie betrifft, so wird sie auf die ähnliche Art gehoben, wie der Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst in der dritten. Denn wenn die Ursache in der Erscheinung nur von der Ursache der Erscheinungen, so fern sie als Ding an sich selbst gedacht werden kann, unterschieden wird, so können beide Sätze wohl neben einander bestehen, nämlich daß von der Sinnenwelt überall keine Ursache (nach ähnlichen Gesetzen der Causalität) stattfinde, deren Existenz schlechthin nothwendig sei, imgleichen andererseits, daß diese Welt dennoch mit einem nothwendigen Wesen als ihrer Ursache (aber von anderer Art und nach einem andern Gesetze) verbunden sei; welcher zwei Sätze Unverträglichkeit lediglich auf dem Mißverstande beruht, das, was blos von Erscheinungen gilt, über Dinge an sich selbst auszudehnen und überhaupt beide in einem Begriffe zu vermengen.
344.1. Die Idee der Freiheit findet lediglich in dem Verhältnisse des Intellectuellen als Ursache zur Erscheinung als Wirkung statt. Daher können wir der Materie in Ansehung ihrer unaufhörlichen Handlung, dadurch sie ihren Raum erfüllt, nicht Freiheit beilegen, obschon diese Handlung aus innerem Princip geschieht. Eben so wenig können wir für reine Verstandeswesen, z. B. Gott, so fern seine Handlung immanent ist, keinen Begriff von Freiheit angemessen finden. Denn seine Handlung, obzwar unabhängig von äußeren bestimmenden Ursachen, ist dennoch in seiner ewigen Vernunft, mithin der göttlichen Natur bestimmt. Nur wenn durch eine Handlung etwas anfangen soll, mithin die Wirkung in der Zeitreihe, folglich der Sinnenwelt anzutreffen sein soll (z. B. Anfang der Welt), da erhebt sich die Frage, ob die Causalität der Ursache selbst auch anfangen müsse, oder ob die Ursache eine Wirkung anheben könne, ohne daß ihre Causalität selbst anfängt. Im ersteren Falle ist der Begriff dieser Causalität ein Begriff der Naturnothwendigkeit, im zweiten der Freiheit. Hieraus wird der Leser ersehen, daß, da ich Freiheit als das Vermögen eine Begebenheit von selbst anzufangen erklärte, ich genau den Begriff traf, der das Problem der Metaphysik ist.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 53.
In the first class of antinomy, the mathematical, the falsity of the presupposition consisted in representing what is contradictory—namely appearance as a thing in itself—as compatible within one concept. In the second, or dynamical, class of antinomy, however, the falsity of the presupposition consists in representing what is compatible as contradictory. Consequently, whereas in the first case both opposed assertions were false, here, by contrast, assertions opposed to each other through mere misunderstanding can both be true.
Mathematical connection necessarily presupposes homogeneity in what is connected, in the concept of magnitude; dynamical connection by no means requires this. When the magnitude of something extended is at issue, all its parts must be homogeneous with one another and with the whole. In the connection of cause and effect, by contrast, homogeneity may indeed also be found, but it is not necessary; for the concept of causality, through which something entirely different is posited by something, at least does not require it.
If the objects of the world of sense were taken for things in themselves, and the laws of nature cited above for laws of things in themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. Likewise, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the other objects, as mere appearance, the contradiction could no more be avoided; for the very same thing would be both affirmed and denied of one and the same object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred solely to appearances, and freedom solely to things in themselves, no contradiction arises even if both kinds of causality are assumed or admitted, however difficult or impossible it might be to make the latter kind comprehensible.
In appearance, every effect is an event, or something that happens in time. According to the universal law of nature, a determination of the causality of its cause—a state of that cause—must precede it, upon which it follows according to a constant law. But this determination of the cause to causality must also be something that occurs or happens: the cause must have begun to act, for otherwise no succession in time could be thought between it and the effect. The effect would always have existed, just like the causality of the cause. Thus, among appearances, the determination of the cause to act must also have arisen, and must therefore, just like its effect, be an event that must in turn have its cause, and so on. Natural necessity must consequently be the condition according to which efficient causes are determined. If, on the other hand, freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances, then in relation to these appearances as events it must be a capacity to begin them of itself (sponte), that is, without the causality of the cause itself having to begin, and hence without its needing any other ground to determine its beginning. But in that case the cause, with regard to its causality, would have to stand outside temporal determinations of its state; that is, it could not be an appearance at all. It would have to be assumed as a thing in itself, and only its effects as appearances.344.1 If such an influence of beings of the understanding on appearances can be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in the world of sense. Yet freedom can be conceded to the cause that is itself no appearance, although it underlies appearance; thus nature and freedom can be attributed without contradiction to the very same thing, but in different relations: in the one case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself.
We possess within us a faculty that is connected not only with its subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural causes of its actions, and in this respect is the faculty of a being that itself belongs among appearances. It is also referred to objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as they can determine this faculty—a connection expressed by ought. This faculty is called reason; and insofar as we consider a being, a human being, solely according to this objectively determinable reason, it cannot be regarded as a sensible being. Rather, the property in question is the property of a thing in itself. We cannot at all comprehend its possibility: how, namely, the ought, which has never yet happened, could determine its activity and be the cause of actions whose effect is appearance in the world of sense. Nevertheless, the causality of reason with regard to effects in the world of sense would be freedom, insofar as objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, are regarded as determining it. For its action would then depend on no subjective conditions, hence on no temporal conditions either, and thus not on the law of nature that serves to determine these. For grounds of reason give actions their rule universally, from principles, without the influence of circumstances of time or place.
What I offer here serves only as an example to aid understanding, and does not necessarily belong to our question, which must be decided from mere concepts, independently of properties we encounter in the actual world.
Now I can say without contradiction: all actions of rational beings, insofar as they are appearances, encountered in any experience, stand under natural necessity; yet these very same actions, considered solely in relation to the rational subject and its capacity to act from reason alone, are free. For what is required for natural necessity? Nothing more than the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws, hence a relation to a cause in appearance, while the underlying thing in itself and its causality remain unknown. But I say: the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the cause of effects in the world of sense from reason, hence through freedom, or whether it does not determine these effects from rational grounds. In the first case, the action occurs according to maxims whose effect in appearance will always accord with constant laws; in the second, where the action does not occur according to principles of reason, it is subject to the empirical laws of sensibility. In both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws; but we demand nothing more for natural necessity, and indeed know nothing more about it. In the first case, however, reason is the cause of these laws of nature and is therefore free; in the second, the effects proceed according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason exercises no influence on them. But reason is not itself thereby determined by sensibility—which is impossible—and is therefore free in this case as well. Freedom thus does not hinder the natural law of appearances, any more than this law impairs the freedom of reason's practical use, which stands in connection with things in themselves as determining grounds.
In this way practical freedom—namely the freedom in which reason has causality according to objectively determining grounds—is preserved without the slightest detriment to natural necessity with regard to these very same effects as appearances. This can also serve to explain what we had to say about transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity, taken in the same subject but not in one and the same relation. For as regards this freedom, every beginning of a being's action from objective causes is always a first beginning relative to these determining grounds, although the very same action in the series of appearances is only a subordinate beginning, which must be preceded by a state of the cause that determines it and is itself likewise determined by a still earlier state. Thus we can think, without contradicting laws of nature, of a capacity in rational beings—or in beings generally insofar as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves—to begin a series of states spontaneously. For the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a temporal relation: here what determines causality does not precede the action in time, because such determining grounds represent not a relation of objects to the senses, hence not to causes in appearance, but determining causes as things in themselves, which do not stand under temporal conditions. Thus the action can be regarded as a first beginning with respect to the causality of reason, yet at the same time as a merely subordinate beginning with respect to the series of appearances; and without contradiction it can be regarded in the former respect as free, and in the latter, where it is mere appearance, as subject to natural necessity.
As for the fourth antinomy, it is removed in a way similar to the conflict of reason with itself in the third. For if only the cause in appearance is distinguished from the cause of appearances, insofar as this can be thought as a thing in itself, both propositions can very well stand together: that nowhere in the world of sense is there a cause, according to similar laws of causality, whose existence is absolutely necessary; and, on the other hand, that this world is nevertheless connected with a necessary being as its cause, but of another kind and according to another law. The incompatibility of these two propositions rests solely on the misunderstanding of extending to things in themselves what holds only of appearances, and of generally confusing both in one concept.
344.1. The idea of freedom applies solely in the relation of the intellectual as cause to appearance as effect. Hence we cannot attribute freedom to matter with regard to its ceaseless action by which it fills its space, even though this action occurs from an inner principle. Nor can we find an appropriate concept of freedom for pure beings of the understanding, for example God, insofar as his action is immanent. For his action, although independent of external determining causes, is nevertheless determined in his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature. Only when something is to begin through an action, and the effect is therefore to be found in the temporal series, hence in the world of sense—for example, the beginning of the world—does the question arise whether the causality of the cause must itself also begin, or whether the cause can initiate an effect without its causality itself beginning. In the first case, the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity; in the second, of freedom. From this the reader will see that, in explaining freedom as the capacity to begin an event of itself, I hit precisely upon the concept that is the problem of metaphysics.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 53.
In the first, mathematical class of antinomy, the false assumption consisted in representing something contradictory—appearance as a thing in itself—as compatible in one concept. In the second, dynamical class, the false assumption consists in representing compatible things as contradictory. In the first case, both opposing claims were false. Here, by contrast, the claims that are opposed only through a misunderstanding can both be true.
A mathematical connection necessarily assumes that what is connected is of the same kind, under the concept of magnitude. A dynamical connection does not require this at all. When the magnitude of something extended is at issue, all its parts must be of the same kind as one another and as the whole. In the connection of cause and effect, however, the two may be of the same kind, but need not be. The concept of causality, through which something posits something entirely different from itself, at least does not require it.
If objects of the world of sense were taken for things in themselves, and the natural laws mentioned above for laws of things in themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. Likewise, if the subject of freedom were represented as a mere appearance, like the other objects, the contradiction could not be avoided. For the very same thing would be affirmed and denied at once of the same object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred only to appearances, and freedom only to things in themselves, no contradiction arises when we accept or allow both kinds of causality. This holds however difficult or impossible it may be to make causality of the latter kind comprehensible.
In appearance, every effect is an event, or something that occurs in time. According to the universal law of nature, a determination of its cause's causality—a state of that cause—must precede it. The effect follows that state according to a constant law. But this determination of the cause to causality must also be something that occurs or happens. The cause must have begun to act. Otherwise we could not think of a succession in time between it and the effect. The effect would always have existed, just like the cause's causality. Among appearances, then, the determination of a cause to act must also have arisen. Like its effect, it must therefore be an event that in turn must have its cause, and so on. Natural necessity must consequently be the condition according to which efficient causes are determined. If, on the other hand, freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances, then in relation to those appearances as events, it must be a capacity to begin them spontaneously (sponte). That is, the cause's own causality would not have to begin, and so would need no other ground determining its beginning. But in that case the cause, in its causality, would not be subject to temporal determinations of its state. It would not be an appearance at all. We would have to take it as a thing in itself, and only its effects as appearances.344.1 If we can think without contradiction of such an influence of beings of the understanding on appearances, then natural necessity will indeed belong to every connection of cause and effect in the world of sense. Yet freedom can be allowed to the cause that is not itself an appearance, though it underlies appearance. Nature and freedom can thus be attributed without contradiction to the very same thing, but in different respects: once as appearance, and once as a thing in itself.
We have a faculty within us that is connected not just with its subjectively determining grounds, the natural causes of its actions. In that respect it is the faculty of a being that itself belongs among appearances. But it is also referred to objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as they can determine this faculty. This connection is expressed by ought. The faculty is called reason. Insofar as we consider a being, a human being, solely in terms of this objectively determinable reason, we cannot regard it as a being of sense. Rather, this property belongs to a thing in itself. We cannot at all comprehend how such a property is possible: how the ought, something that has never yet happened, can determine its activity and cause actions whose effect is an appearance in the world of sense. Still, reason's causality in relation to its effects in the world of sense would be freedom, insofar as objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, are regarded as determining that causality. For its action would then not depend on subjective conditions, and thus not on conditions of time or on the natural law that serves to determine them. Grounds of reason give actions their rule universally, from principles, without the influence of circumstances of time or place.
What I introduce here is only an example to make the matter intelligible. It is not a necessary part of our question. That question must be decided from mere concepts, independently of properties we find in the actual world.
I can now say without contradiction: all actions of rational beings, insofar as they are appearances found in any experience, are subject to natural necessity. But these very same actions are free when considered only in relation to the rational subject and its capacity to act from reason alone. For what does natural necessity require? Nothing more than that every event in the world of sense can be determined according to constant laws, and thus has a relation to a cause in appearance. The underlying thing in itself and its causality remain unknown. But I say that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being causes effects in the world of sense from reason, and thus through freedom, or does not determine them from rational grounds. In the first case, the action follows maxims whose effect in appearance will always conform to constant laws. In the second case, where the action does not follow principles of reason, it is subject to the empirical laws of sensibility. In both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws. We require nothing more for natural necessity; indeed, we know nothing more about it. But in the first case reason is the cause of these natural laws, and is therefore free. In the second case, the effects follow the mere natural laws of sensibility because reason exerts no influence on them. Yet reason is not itself thereby determined by sensibility, which is impossible, and so is free in this case too. Freedom therefore does not obstruct the natural law of appearances. Nor does that law impair the freedom of the practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves as determining grounds.
This saves practical freedom: the freedom in which reason has causality according to objectively determining grounds. It does so without the slightest harm to natural necessity in relation to those very same effects as appearances. This can also help clarify what we had to say about transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity in the same subject, though not considered in one and the same respect. For with regard to transcendental freedom, whenever a being begins an action from objective causes, this is always a first beginning in relation to those determining grounds. Yet in the series of appearances the same action is only a subordinate beginning. A state of the cause must precede it and determine it, and that state is itself likewise determined by a still earlier one. Thus, without contradicting natural laws, we can think of a capacity to begin a series of states spontaneously in rational beings, or in beings generally insofar as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves. For the relation of an action to objective grounds of reason is not a temporal relation. Here, what determines causality does not precede the action in time. Such determining grounds do not represent a relation of objects to the senses, and so do not represent causes in appearance. They represent determining causes as things in themselves, which are not subject to conditions of time. So the action can be regarded as a first beginning in relation to reason's causality, yet at the same time as a merely subordinate beginning in relation to the series of appearances. Without contradiction it can be considered free in the first respect, and subject to natural necessity in the second, where it is mere appearance.
The fourth antinomy is resolved in a similar way to reason's conflict with itself in the third. We need only distinguish the cause in appearance from the cause of appearances, insofar as the latter can be thought as a thing in itself. Both propositions can then stand together. Nowhere in the world of sense is there a cause, under similar laws of causality, whose existence is absolutely necessary. Yet, on the other hand, this world is connected with a necessary being as its cause, though of a different kind and under a different law. These two propositions seem incompatible only because of a misunderstanding: what holds merely for appearances is extended to things in themselves, and the two are generally mixed together in a single concept.
344.1. The idea of freedom applies only to the relation of the intellectual, as cause, to appearance, as effect. We therefore cannot attribute freedom to matter in its ceaseless activity of filling its space, even though this activity proceeds from an inner principle. Nor can we find a suitable concept of freedom for pure beings of the understanding—for example, God—insofar as their action is immanent. For although his action is independent of externally determining causes, it is still determined in his eternal reason, and thus in the divine nature. Only when something is to begin through an action, and its effect is therefore to be found in the series of time and hence in the world of sense—for example, the world's beginning—does the question arise: must the cause's causality itself also begin, or can the cause initiate an effect without its causality itself beginning? In the first case, the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity; in the second, of freedom. Readers will see from this that, when I defined freedom as the capacity to begin an event spontaneously, I captured precisely the concept that poses the problem for metaphysics.
About this section
Section 53 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 63 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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