Section 52b
Original German
§ 52b.
Man kann in der Metaphysik auf mancherlei Weise herumpfuschen, ohne eben zu besorgen, daß man auf Unwahrheit werde betreten werden. Denn wenn man sich nur nicht selbst widerspricht, welches in synthetischen, obgleich gänzlich erdichteten Sätzen gar wohl möglich ist: so können wir in allen solchen Fällen, wo die Begriffe, die wir verknüpfen, bloße Ideen sind, die gar nicht (ihrem ganzen Inhalte nach) in der Erfahrung gegeben werden können, niemals durch Erfahrung widerlegt werden. Denn wie wollten wir es durch Erfahrung ausmachen: ob die Welt von Ewigkeit her sei, oder einen Anfang habe; ob Materie ins Unendliche theilbar sei, oder aus einfachen Theilen bestehe? Dergleichen Begriffe lassen sich in keiner, auch der größtmöglichen Erfahrung geben, mithin die Unrichtigkeit des behauptenden oder verneinenden Satzes durch diesen Probirstein nicht entdecken.
Der einzige mögliche Fall, da die Vernunft ihre geheime Dialektik, die sie fälschlich für Dogmatik ausgiebt, wider ihren Willen offenbarte, wäre der, wenn sie auf einen allgemein zugestandnen Grundsatz eine Behauptung gründete und aus einem andern, eben so beglaubigten mit der größten Richtigkeit der Schlußart gerade das Gegentheil folgerte. Dieser Fall ist hier nun wirklich und zwar in Ansehung vier natürlicher Vernunftideen, woraus vier Behauptungen einerseits und eben so viel Gegenbehauptungen andererseits, jede mit richtiger Consequenz aus allgemein zugestandnen Grundsätzen entspringen und dadurch den dialektischen Schein der reinen Vernunft im Gebrauch dieser Grundsätze offenbaren, der sonst auf ewig verborgen sein müßte.
Hier ist also ein entscheidender Versuch, der uns nothwendig eine Unrichtigkeit entdecken muß, die in den Voraussetzungen der Vernunft verborgen liegt341.1. Von zwei einander widersprechenden Sätzen können nicht alle beide falsch sein, außer wenn der Begriff selbst widersprechend ist, der beiden zum Grunde liegt; z. B. die zwei Sätze: ein viereckichter Cirkel ist rund, und: ein viereckichter Cirkel ist nicht rund, sind beide falsch. Denn was den ersten betrifft, so ist es falsch, daß der genannte Cirkel rund sei, weil er viereckicht ist; es ist aber auch falsch, daß er nicht rund, d. i. eckicht, sei, weil er ein Cirkel ist. Denn darin besteht eben das logische Merkmal der Unmöglichkeit eines Begriffs, daß unter desselben Voraussetzung zwei widersprechende Sätze zugleich falsch sein würden, mithin, weil kein Drittes zwischen ihnen gedacht werden kann, durch jenen Begriff gar nichts gedacht wird.
341.1. Ich wünsche daher, daß der kritische Leser sich mit dieser Antinomie hauptsächlich beschäftige, weil die Natur selbst sie aufgestellt zu haben scheint, um die Vernunft in ihren dreisten Anmaßungen stutzig zu machen und zur Selbstprüfung zu nöthigen. Jeden Beweis, den ich für die Thesis sowohl als Antithesis gegeben habe, mache ich mich anheischig zu verantworten und dadurch die Gewißheit der unvermeidlichen Antinomie der Vernunft darzuthun. Wenn der Leser nun durch diese seltsame Erscheinung dahin gebracht wird, zu der Prüfung der dabei zum Grunde liegenden Voraussetzung zurückzugehen, so wird er sich gezwungen fühlen, die erste Grundlage aller Erkenntniß der reinen Vernunft mit mir tiefer zu untersuchen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 52b.
One can bungle metaphysics in all sorts of ways without having much to fear from being caught in a falsehood. For so long as we do not contradict ourselves—which is quite possible in synthetic propositions even when they are entirely invented—we can never be refuted by experience in any case where the concepts we connect are mere ideas that cannot, in their full content, be given in experience at all. For how could we decide through experience whether the world has existed from eternity or had a beginning; whether matter is divisible to infinity or consists of simple parts? Such concepts cannot be given in any experience, even the greatest possible; hence this touchstone cannot reveal the incorrectness of either the affirmative or the negative proposition.
The only possible case in which reason would reveal against its will its secret dialectic, which it falsely passes off as dogmatics, would be if it grounded an assertion on a universally accepted principle and, from another equally accredited principle, inferred precisely the opposite with the utmost correctness of inference. This case is now actual here, and indeed in regard to four natural ideas of reason, from which four assertions on one side and as many counterassertions on the other arise, each as a correct consequence of universally accepted principles. They thereby reveal the dialectical illusion of pure reason in the use of these principles, which would otherwise have to remain hidden forever.
Here, then, is a decisive test that must necessarily disclose an error hidden in reason's presuppositions.341.1 Of two mutually contradictory propositions, both cannot be false unless the concept underlying both is itself contradictory. For example, the two propositions "a square circle is round" and "a square circle is not round" are both false. As regards the first, it is false that the circle in question is round, because it is square; but it is also false that it is not round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For the logical mark of a concept's impossibility consists precisely in this: on the presupposition of that concept, two contradictory propositions would be false at once. Thus, since no third possibility can be thought between them, nothing at all is thought through that concept.
341.1. I therefore wish the critical reader to concern themselves chiefly with this antinomy, because nature itself seems to have set it up to make reason pause in its bold pretensions and compel it to examine itself. I undertake to answer for every proof I have given, both of the thesis and of the antithesis, and thereby to demonstrate the certainty of reason's unavoidable antinomy. If this strange phenomenon now leads the reader back to examine the presupposition underlying it, they will feel compelled to join me in investigating more deeply the first foundation of all cognition of pure reason.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 52b.
People can dabble in metaphysics in all sorts of ways without much fear of being caught saying something false. They need only avoid contradicting themselves, which is quite possible in synthetic propositions even when these are entirely made up. Whenever the concepts we connect are mere ideas that cannot be given in experience in their full content, experience can never refute us. For how could experience settle whether the world has existed from eternity or had a beginning? How could it settle whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Concepts like these cannot be given in any experience, even the greatest possible experience. This test therefore cannot reveal the falsity of either the affirmative or the negative proposition.
There is only one possible case in which reason would unwillingly reveal its hidden dialectic, which it falsely presents as dogmatic knowledge. It would have to base a claim on a universally accepted principle, and then infer the exact opposite from another equally accepted principle, using a completely correct form of inference. This case actually occurs here, with four natural ideas of reason. Four claims on one side, and as many counterclaims on the other, arise by valid inference from universally accepted principles. They thereby reveal the dialectical illusion of pure reason in its use of these principles—an illusion that would otherwise have to remain hidden forever.
Here, then, is a decisive test. It must reveal to us an error hidden in reason's assumptions.341.1 Two contradictory propositions cannot both be false unless the concept underlying both is itself contradictory. For example, these two propositions are both false: a square circle is round; and a square circle is not round. In the first case, it is false that the circle in question is round, because it is square. But it is also false that it is not round—that is, that it is angular—because it is a circle. This is precisely the logical mark of an impossible concept: assuming it would make two contradictory propositions false at the same time. Since no third possibility can be thought between them, nothing at all is thought through that concept.
341.1. I therefore want critical readers to give their main attention to this antinomy. Nature itself seems to have set it up to make reason pause in its bold pretensions and force it to examine itself. I undertake to defend every proof I have given for both the thesis and the antithesis, and thereby to demonstrate with certainty that reason's antinomy is unavoidable. If this strange phenomenon leads readers back to examine the assumption underlying it, they will feel compelled to join me in investigating more deeply the first foundation of all cognition of pure reason.
About this section
Section 52b is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 61 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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