Section 48
Original German
§ 48.
Wenn wir also aus dem Begriffe der Seele als Substanz auf Beharrlichkeit derselben schließen wollen, so kann dieses von ihr doch nur zum Behuf möglicher Erfahrung und nicht von ihr als einem Dinge an sich selbst und über alle mögliche Erfahrung hinaus gelten. Nun ist die subjective Bedingung aller unserer möglichen Erfahrung das Leben: folglich kann nur auf die Beharrlichkeit der Seele im Leben geschlossen werden, denn der Tod des Menschen ist das Ende aller Erfahrung, was die Seele als einen Gegenstand derselben betrifft, wofern nicht das Gegentheil dargethan wird, als wovon eben die Frage ist. Also kann die Beharrlichkeit der Seele nur im Leben des Menschen (deren Beweis man uns wohl schenken wird), aber nicht nach dem Tode (als woran uns eigentlich gelegen ist) dargethan werden und zwar aus dem allgemeinen Grunde, weil der Begriff der Substanz, so fern er mit dem Begriff der Beharrlichkeit als nothwendig verbunden angesehen werden soll, dieses nur nach einem Grundsatze möglicher Erfahrung und also auch nur zum Behuf derselben sein kann.335.1
335.1. Es ist in der That sehr merkwürdig, daß die Metaphysiker jederzeit so sorglos über den Grundsatz der Beharrlichkeit der Substanzen weggeschlüpft sind, ohne jemals einen Beweis davon zu versuchen; ohne Zweifel, weil sie sich, so bald sie es mit dem Begriffe Substanz anfingen, von allen Beweisthümern gänzlich verlassen sahen. Der gemeine Verstand, der gar wohl inne ward, daß ohne diese Voraussetzung keine Vereinigung der Wahrnehmungen in einer Erfahrung möglich sei, ersetzte diesen Mangel durch ein Postulat; denn aus der Erfahrung selbst konnte er diesen Grundsatz nimmermehr ziehen, theils weil sie die Materien (Substanzen) bei allen ihren Veränderungen und Auflösungen nicht so weit verfolgen kann, um den Stoff immer unvermindert anzutreffen, theils weil der Grundsatz Nothwendigkeit enthält, die jederzeit das Zeichen eines Princips a priori ist. Nun wandten sie diesen Grundsatz getrost auf den Begriff der Seele als einer Substanz an und schlossen auf eine nothwendige Fortdauer derselben nach dem Tode des Menschen (vornehmlich da die Einfachheit dieser Substanz, welche aus der Untheilbarkeit des Bewußtseins gefolgert ward, sie wegen des Unterganges durch Auflösung sicherte). Hätten sie die ächte Quelle dieses Grundsatzes gefunden, welches aber weit tiefere Untersuchungen erforderte, als sie jemals anzufangen Lust hatten, so würden sie gesehen haben: daß jenes Gesetz der Beharrlichkeit der Substanzen nur zum Behuf der Erfahrung stattfinde und daher nur auf Dinge, so fern sie in der Erfahrung erkannt und mit andern verbunden werden sollen, niemals aber von ihnen auch unangesehen aller möglichen Erfahrung, mithin auch nicht von der Seele nach dem Tode gelten könne.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 48.
If, then, we wish to infer the soul's permanence from its concept as substance, this can hold of it only for the sake of possible experience, not of it as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience. Now the subjective condition of all our possible experience is life. We can therefore infer only the permanence of the soul during life; for a human being's death is the end of all experience as regards the soul as an object of experience, unless the contrary is demonstrated—and that is precisely what is in question. Thus the soul's permanence can be demonstrated only during a human being's life—a proof we may surely be excused from giving—but not after death, which is what actually concerns us. The general ground for this is that the concept of substance, insofar as it is to be regarded as necessarily connected with the concept of permanence, can be so connected only according to a principle of possible experience, and thus only for the sake of experience.335.1
335.1. It is indeed very remarkable that metaphysicians have always slipped so heedlessly past the principle of the permanence of substances without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because, as soon as they began with the concept of substance, they found themselves wholly deserted by all grounds of proof. Common understanding, which was well aware that without this presupposition no unification of perceptions in one experience was possible, supplied the deficiency with a postulate. For it could never have drawn this principle from experience itself, partly because experience cannot follow materials (substances) through all their changes and dissolutions far enough to find the matter always undiminished, and partly because the principle contains necessity, which is always the mark of an a priori principle. They now confidently applied this principle to the concept of the soul as a substance and inferred its necessary continuance after a human being's death—especially since the simplicity of this substance, inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it against destruction through dissolution. Had they found the genuine source of this principle, which would have required far deeper investigations than they ever cared to begin, they would have seen that this law of the permanence of substances holds only for the sake of experience, and therefore can apply only to things insofar as they are to be cognized in experience and connected with others. It can never apply to them apart from all possible experience, and hence cannot apply to the soul after death.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 48.
Suppose, then, that we want to infer the soul's persistence from the concept of it as a substance. This can hold for the soul only for the purposes of possible experience. It cannot hold for the soul as a thing in itself, beyond all possible experience. Now life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience. We can therefore infer only that the soul persists during life. A person's death ends all experience as far as the soul as an object of experience is concerned, unless the opposite is demonstrated—and that is precisely what is in question. So we can demonstrate the soul's persistence only during a person's life, something no one will trouble us to prove. We cannot demonstrate it after death, which is what really matters to us. The general reason is this: insofar as the concept of substance is to be regarded as necessarily connected with the concept of persistence, this connection can rest only on a principle of possible experience, and so can hold only for the purposes of experience.335.1
335.1. It is really very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have always slipped past the principle that substances persist, without ever attempting to prove it. No doubt this was because, as soon as they started with the concept of substance, they found themselves wholly without grounds of proof. Common understanding clearly recognized that without this assumption perceptions could not be united in one experience. It made up for the lack by a postulate. For it could never draw this principle from experience itself. For one thing, experience cannot follow materials, or substances, through all their changes and dissolutions far enough to find that the matter always remains undiminished. For another, the principle contains necessity, which always marks an a priori principle. Metaphysicians now confidently applied this principle to the concept of the soul as a substance. They inferred that it must continue to exist after a person's death. They felt especially secure against its destruction through dissolution because of this substance's simplicity, which they inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness. If they had found the true source of this principle—something requiring far deeper investigations than they ever cared to begin—they would have seen the following. The law that substances persist holds only for the purposes of experience. It therefore applies only to things insofar as they are to be known in experience and connected with other things. It can never apply to them without regard to all possible experience, and thus cannot apply to the soul after death.
About this section
Section 48 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 56 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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