Section 49
Original German
§ 49.
Daß unseren äußeren Wahrnehmungen etwas Wirkliches außer uns nicht blos correspondire, sondern auch correspondiren müsse, kann gleichfalls niemals als Verknüpfung der Dinge an sich selbst, wohl aber zum Behuf der Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Dieses will so viel sagen: daß etwas auf empirische Art, mithin als Erscheinung im Raume außer uns sei, kann man gar wohl beweisen; denn mit andern Gegenständen als denen, die zu einer möglichen Erfahrung gehören, haben wir es nicht zu thun, eben darum weil sie uns in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden können und also für uns nichts sind. Empirisch außer mir ist das, was im Raume angeschaut wird; und da dieser sammt allen Erscheinungen, die er enthält, zu den Vorstellungen gehört, deren Verknüpfung nach Erfahrungsgesetzen eben sowohl ihre objective Wahrheit beweiset, als die Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen des innern Sinnes die Wirklichkeit meiner Seele (als eines Gegenstandes des innern Sinnes), so bin ich mir vermittelst der äußern Erfahrung eben sowohl der Wirklichkeit der Körper als äußerer Erscheinungen im Raume, wie vermittelst der innern Erfahrung des Daseins meiner Seele in der Zeit bewußt, die ich auch nur als einen Gegenstand des innern Sinnes durch Erscheinungen, die einen innern Zustand ausmachen, erkennen kann, und wovon mir das Wesen an sich selbst, das diesen Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegt, unbekannt ist. Der Cartesianische Idealism unterscheidet also nur äußere Erfahrung vom Traume und die Gesetzmäßigkeit als ein Kriterium der Wahrheit der erstern von der Regellosigkeit und dem falschen Schein des letztern. Er setzt in beiden Raum und Zeit als Bedingungen des Daseins der Gegenstände voraus und frägt nur, ob die Gegenstände äußerer Sinne wirklich im Raum anzutreffen seien, die wir darin im Wachen setzen, so wie der Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, die Seele, wirklich in der Zeit ist, d. i. ob Erfahrung sichere Kriterien der Unterscheidung von Einbildung bei sich führe. Hier läßt sich der Zweifel nun leicht heben, und wir heben ihn auch jederzeit im gemeinen Leben dadurch, daß wir die Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen in beiden nach allgemeinen Gesetzen der Erfahrung untersuchen, und können, wenn die Vorstellung äußerer Dinge damit durchgehends übereinstimmt, nicht zweifeln, daß sie nicht wahrhafte Erfahrung ausmachen sollten. Der materiale Idealism, da Erscheinungen als Erscheinungen nur nach ihrer Verknüpfung in der Erfahrung betrachtet werden, läßt also sich sehr leicht heben; und es ist eine eben so sichere Erfahrung, daß Körper außer uns (im Raume) existiren, als daß ich selbst nach der Vorstellung des innern Sinnes (in der Zeit) da bin. Denn der Begriff: außer uns, bedeutet nur die Existenz im Raume. Da aber das Ich in dem Satze: Ich bin, nicht blos den Gegenstand der innern Anschauung (in der Zeit), sondern das Subject des Bewußtseins, so wie Körper nicht blos die äußere Anschauung (im Raume), sondern auch das Ding an sich selbst bedeutet, was dieser Erscheinung zum Grunde liegt: so kann die Frage, ob die Körper (als Erscheinungen des äußern Sinnes) außer meinen Gedanken als Körper existiren, ohne alles Bedenken in der Natur verneint werden; aber darin verhält es sich gar nicht anders mit der Frage, ob ich selbst als Erscheinung des innern Sinnes (Seele nach der empirischen Psychologie) außer meiner Vorstellungskraft in der Zeit existire, denn diese muß eben so wohl verneint werden. Auf solche Weise ist alles, wenn es auf seine wahre Bedeutung gebracht wird, entschieden und gewiß. Der formale Idealism (sonst von mir transscendentale genannt) hebt wirklich den materiellen oder Cartesianischen auf. Denn wenn der Raum nichts als eine Form meiner Sinnlichkeit ist, so ist er als Vorstellung in mir eben so wirklich als ich selbst, und es kommt nur noch auf die empirische Wahrheit der Erscheinungen in demselben an. Ist das aber nicht, sondern der Raum und Erscheinungen in ihm sind etwas außer uns Existirendes, so können alle Kriterien der Erfahrung außer unserer Wahrnehmung niemals die Wirklichkeit dieser Gegenstände außer uns beweisen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 49.
That something actual outside us not only corresponds, but must correspond, to our outer perceptions can likewise never be proved as a connection of things in themselves, though it can be proved for the sake of experience. This means that we can very well prove that something is outside us in an empirical manner, and thus as an appearance in space. For we are concerned with no objects other than those belonging to a possible experience, precisely because other objects cannot be given to us in any experience and are therefore nothing for us. What is intuited in space is empirically outside me. And since space, together with all the appearances it contains, belongs to representations whose connection according to laws of experience proves their objective truth just as the connection of the appearances of inner sense proves the actuality of my soul as an object of inner sense, I am, through outer experience, just as conscious of the actuality of bodies as outer appearances in space as I am, through inner experience, of the existence of my soul in time. I can cognize this soul, too, only as an object of inner sense through appearances that constitute an inner state, while its essence in itself, underlying these appearances, remains unknown to me. Cartesian idealism thus distinguishes only outer experience from dreaming, and lawfulness, as a criterion of the truth of the former, from the disorder and deceptive illusion of the latter. In both, it presupposes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects, and asks only whether the objects of the outer senses are actually to be found in the space in which we place them while awake, just as the object of inner sense, the soul, is actually in time; that is, whether experience carries with it reliable criteria for distinguishing it from imagination. Here the doubt is easily removed, and in ordinary life we always remove it by examining the connection of appearances in both according to universal laws of experience. If the representation of outer things agrees throughout with these laws, we cannot doubt that they constitute genuine experience. Material idealism can thus very easily be removed when appearances, as appearances, are considered only according to their connection in experience; and it is just as certain an experience that bodies exist outside us (in space) as that I myself exist according to the representation of inner sense (in time). For the concept outside us means only existence in space. But since the I in the proposition I am means not merely the object of inner intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, just as body means not merely outer intuition (in space), but also the thing in itself that underlies this appearance, the question whether bodies, as appearances of outer sense, exist as bodies outside my thoughts can be denied without any hesitation in the study of nature. Yet the matter is no different with the question whether I myself, as an appearance of inner sense—the soul according to empirical psychology—exist in time outside my power of representation; for this must likewise be denied. In this way everything, once brought to its true meaning, is settled and certain. Formal idealism, which I have elsewhere called transcendental idealism, actually abolishes material or Cartesian idealism. For if space is nothing but a form of my sensibility, then as a representation it is just as actual in me as I myself am, and only the empirical truth of the appearances in it remains at issue. But if that is not so, and space and the appearances in it are something existing outside us, then all the criteria of experience can never prove the actuality of these objects outside us, apart from our perception.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 49.
We likewise cannot prove, as a connection between things in themselves, that something real outside us not only corresponds to our outer perceptions but must correspond to them. We can, however, prove it for the purposes of experience. This means that we can indeed prove that something exists outside us in an empirical way, as an appearance in space. For we are not concerned with objects other than those belonging to a possible experience. Such other objects cannot be given to us in any experience, and for that very reason are nothing for us. What is intuited in space is empirically outside me. Space, together with all the appearances it contains, belongs to our representations. Their connection according to laws of experience proves their objective truth just as the connection of appearances of inner sense proves the reality of my soul as an object of inner sense. Through outer experience, then, I am just as conscious of the reality of bodies as outer appearances in space as I am, through inner experience, of my soul's existence in time. I can know this soul only as an object of inner sense, through appearances that make up an inner state. Its being in itself, which underlies these appearances, remains unknown to me. Cartesian idealism thus distinguishes outer experience from dreams, and the law-governed character of experience, as a criterion of its truth, from the disorder and deceptive illusion of dreams. In both cases it assumes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects. It asks only whether the objects of the outer senses that we place in space when awake are really to be found there, just as the object of inner sense, the soul, really is in time. In other words, does experience carry reliable criteria for distinguishing it from imagination? This doubt is easy to remove. We do so constantly in ordinary life by examining the connection of appearances in both according to general laws of experience. If the representation of outer things agrees throughout with these laws, we cannot doubt that such representations make up genuine experience. Material idealism is therefore very easy to remove when appearances are considered, as appearances, only in terms of their connection in experience. It is just as certain in experience that bodies exist outside us, in space, as that I myself exist according to the representation of inner sense, in time. For the concept outside us means only existence in space. But the I in the proposition I am means not just the object of inner intuition, in time, but the subject of consciousness. Similarly, a body means not just outer intuition, in space, but also the thing in itself underlying this appearance. So we can unhesitatingly answer no when asked whether bodies, as appearances of outer sense, exist as bodies outside my thoughts in nature. But the same holds for the question whether I myself, as an appearance of inner sense—the soul in empirical psychology—exist in time outside my power of representation. That question must also be answered no. In this way, everything is settled and certain once it is given its true meaning. Formal idealism, which I have also called transcendental idealism, actually removes material or Cartesian idealism. For if space is nothing but a form of my sensibility, then as a representation in me it is just as real as I myself am. All that remains at issue is the empirical truth of the appearances in it. But if this is not so, and space and its appearances are something existing outside us, then no criteria of experience can ever prove the reality of these objects outside us, apart from our perception.
About this section
Section 49 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 57 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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