Section 47
Original German
§ 47.
Dieses denkende Selbst (die Seele) mag nun aber auch als das letzte Subject des Denkens, was selbst nicht weiter als Prädicat eines andern Dinges vorgestellt werden kann, Substanz heißen: so bleibt dieser Begriff doch gänzlich leer und ohne alle Folgen, wenn nicht von ihm die Beharrlichkeit als das, was den Begriff der Substanzen in der Erfahrung fruchtbar macht, bewiesen werden kann.
Die Beharrlichkeit kann aber niemals aus dem Begriffe einer Substanz als eines Dinges an sich, sondern nur zum Behuf der Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Dieses ist bei der ersten Analogie der Erfahrung hinreichend dargethan worden (Kritik S. 182); und will man sich diesem Beweise nicht ergeben, so darf man nur den Versuch selbst anstellen, ob es gelingen werde, aus dem Begriffe eines Subjects, was selbst nicht als Prädicat eines andern Dinges existirt, zu beweisen, daß sein Dasein durchaus beharrlich sei, und daß es weder an sich selbst, noch durch irgend eine Naturursache entstehen oder vergehen könne. Dergleichen synthetische Sätze a priori können niemals an sich selbst, sondern jederzeit nur in Beziehung auf Dinge als Gegenstände einer möglichen Erfahrung bewiesen werden.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 47.
Now this thinking self (the soul), as the ultimate subject of thought, which cannot itself be represented in turn as the predicate of another thing, may indeed be called substance. Yet this concept remains entirely empty and without consequences unless permanence can be proved of it, as that which makes the concept of substances fruitful in experience.
But permanence can never be proved from the concept of a substance as a thing in itself, only for the sake of experience. This has been sufficiently demonstrated in the first analogy of experience (Critique, p. 182); and anyone unwilling to accept that proof need only try for themselves whether it is possible, from the concept of a subject that does not itself exist as the predicate of another thing, to prove that its existence is absolutely permanent, and that it can neither arise nor perish, either of itself or through any natural cause. Such synthetic a priori propositions can never be proved in themselves, but always only in relation to things as objects of a possible experience.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 47.
We may call this thinking self, the soul, a substance, since it is the final subject of thinking and cannot itself be represented as a predicate of another thing. Yet this concept remains completely empty and has no consequences unless we can prove that the self persists. Persistence is what makes the concept of substances fruitful in experience.
But persistence can never be proved from the concept of a substance as a thing in itself. It can be proved only for the purposes of experience. This was sufficiently demonstrated in the first analogy of experience (Kritik S. 182). Anyone unwilling to accept that proof need only try it for themselves. Starting with the concept of a subject that does not itself exist as the predicate of another thing, can they prove that its existence is absolutely persistent? Can they prove that it can neither arise nor pass away, either on its own or through any natural cause? Such synthetic a priori propositions can never be proved in themselves. They can be proved only in relation to things as objects of possible experience.
About this section
Section 47 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 55 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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