Section 46
Original German
§ 46.
I. Psychologische Ideen. (Kritik S. 341 u. f.)
Man hat schon längst angemerkt, daß uns an allen Substanzen das eigentliche Subject, nämlich das, was übrig bleibt, nachdem alle Accidenzen (als Prädicate) abgesondert worden, mithin das Substantiale selbst unbekannt sei, und über diese Schranken unsrer Einsicht vielfältig Klagen geführt. Es ist aber hiebei wohl zu merken, daß der menschliche Verstand darüber nicht in Anspruch zu nehmen sei, daß er das Substantiale der Dinge nicht kennt, d. i. für sich allein bestimmen kann, sondern vielmehr darüber, daß er es als eine bloße Idee gleich einem gegebenen Gegenstande bestimmt zu erkennen verlangt. Die reine Vernunft fordert, daß wir zu jedem Prädicate eines Dinges sein ihm zugehöriges Subject, zu diesem aber, welches nothwendiger Weise wiederum nur Prädicat ist, fernerhin sein Subject und so forthin ins Unendliche (oder so weit wir reichen) suchen sollen. Aber hieraus folgt, daß wir nichts, wozu wir gelangen können, für ein letztes Subject halten sollen, und daß das Substantiale selbst niemals von unserm noch so tief eindringenden Verstande, selbst wenn ihm die ganze Natur aufgedeckt wäre, gedacht werden könne: weil die specifische Natur unseres Verstandes darin besteht, alles discursiv, d. i. durch Begriffe, mithin auch durch lauter Prädicate zu denken, wozu also das absolute Subject jederzeit fehlen muß. Daher sind alle reale Eigenschaften, dadurch wir Körper erkennen, lauter Accidenzen, sogar die Undurchdringlichkeit, die man sich immer nur als die Wirkung einer Kraft vorstellen muß, dazu uns das Subject fehlt.
Nun scheint es, als ob wir in dem Bewußtsein unserer selbst (dem denkenden Subject) dieses Substantiale haben und zwar in einer unmittelbaren Anschauung; denn alle Prädicate des innern Sinnes beziehen sich auf das Ich als Subject, und dieses kann nicht weiter als Prädicat irgend eines andern Subjects gedacht werden. Also scheint hier die Vollständigkeit in der Beziehung der gegebenen Begriffe als Prädicate auf ein Subject nicht blos Idee, sondern der Gegenstand, nämlich das absolute Subject selbst, in der Erfahrung gegeben zu sein. Allein diese Erwartung wird vereitelt. Denn das Ich ist gar kein Begriff334.1, sondern nur Bezeichnung des Gegenstandes des innern Sinnes, so fern wir es durch kein Prädicat weiter erkennen; mithin kann es zwar an sich kein Prädicat von einem andern Dinge sein, aber eben so wenig auch ein bestimmter Begriff eines absoluten Subjects, sondern nur wie in allen andern Fällen die Beziehung der innern Erscheinungen auf das unbekannte Subject derselben. Gleichwohl veranlaßt diese Idee (die gar wohl dazu dient, als regulatives Princip alle materialistische Erklärungen der innern Erscheinungen unserer Seele gänzlich zu vernichten)334.1 durch einen ganz natürlichen Mißverstand ein sehr scheinbares Argument, um aus diesem vermeinten Erkenntniß von dem Substantiale unseres denkenden Wesens seine Natur, so fern die Kenntniß derselben ganz außer dem Inbegriff der Erfahrung hinaus fällt, zu schließen.
334.1. Wäre die Vorstellung der Apperception, das Ich, ein Begriff, wodurch irgend etwas gedacht würde, so würde es auch als Prädicat von andern Dingen gebraucht werden können, oder solche Prädicate in sich enthalten. Nun ist es nichts mehr als Gefühl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten Begriff und nur Vorstellung desjenigen, worauf alles Denken in Beziehung (relatione accidentis) steht.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 46.
I. Psychological Ideas. (Critique, p. 341 ff.)
It has long been observed that in all substances the actual subject—that which remains after all accidents, as predicates, have been separated off, and thus the substantial itself—is unknown to us; and there have been many complaints about these limits to our insight. But we should note here that the human understanding is not to be called to account for not knowing the substantial in things, that is, for being unable to determine it by itself, but rather for demanding to cognize it determinately, although it is a mere idea, as though it were a given object. Pure reason demands that for every predicate of a thing we seek the subject belonging to it; and for this subject, which in turn is necessarily only a predicate, we seek its subject, and so on to infinity, or as far as we can reach. But it follows that we must regard nothing we can reach as an ultimate subject, and that the substantial itself can never be thought by our understanding, however deeply it penetrates, even if all of nature were laid open to it. For the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, through concepts, and thus through nothing but predicates, for which the absolute subject must therefore always be lacking. Hence all the real properties through which we cognize bodies are merely accidents, even impenetrability, which we must always represent to ourselves only as the effect of a force for which we lack the subject.
Now it seems as though in our consciousness of ourselves (the thinking subject) we possess this substantial, and indeed in an immediate intuition. For all predicates of inner sense refer to the I as subject, and this can no longer be thought as the predicate of any other subject. Here, then, completeness in the reference of given concepts as predicates to a subject seems to be not merely an idea: the object, namely the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this expectation is frustrated. For the I is not a concept at all,334.1 but only a designation of the object of inner sense insofar as we do not cognize it further through any predicate. Thus, although in itself it cannot be a predicate of another thing, neither can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject; rather, as in all other cases, it can only be the reference of inner appearances to their unknown subject. Nevertheless, through a wholly natural misunderstanding, this idea—which serves very well, as a regulative principle, to destroy entirely all materialistic explanations of the inner appearances of our soul334.1—gives rise to a highly plausible argument for inferring, from this supposed cognition of the substantial in our thinking being, its nature insofar as knowledge of that nature lies wholly beyond the compass of experience.
334.1. If the representation of apperception, the I, were a concept through which anything were thought, it could also be used as a predicate of other things, or contain such predicates within itself. But it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the slightest concept, and only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (relatione accidentis).
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 46.
I. Psychological ideas. (Kritik S. 341 u. f.)
People noticed long ago that in every substance the actual subject remains unknown to us: what is left when all accidents, as predicates, have been removed. In other words, the substantial itself is unknown. They have often complained about these limits to our insight. But we should note carefully what the human understanding can be blamed for here. It is not that it fails to know the substantial in things—that is, to determine it by itself. Rather, it wants determinate knowledge of what is a mere idea, as though it were a given object. Pure reason requires us to seek, for every predicate of a thing, the subject belonging to it. For this subject, which is necessarily only a predicate in turn, we must seek its subject, and continue to infinity, or as far as we can reach. But it follows that we should regard nothing we can reach as a final subject. The substantial itself can never be thought by our understanding, however deeply it penetrates, even if all of nature were revealed to it. For the distinctive nature of our understanding is to think everything discursively: through concepts, and thus entirely through predicates. The absolute subject must therefore always be missing. So all the real properties through which we know bodies are merely accidents, even impenetrability. We must always represent that as the effect of a force whose subject is missing for us.
Now it seems that in our consciousness of ourselves, the thinking subject, we have this substantial—and have it in an immediate intuition. For all predicates of inner sense refer to the I as their subject. And this I cannot in turn be thought as a predicate of any other subject. Here, then, completeness in relating the given concepts as predicates to a subject seems not merely to be an idea. The object, the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this expectation is disappointed. The I is not a concept at all.334.1 It is only a designation for the object of inner sense, insofar as no predicate gives us any further knowledge of it. So it cannot itself be a predicate of another thing. But neither can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject. As in all other cases, it is only the relation of inner appearances to their unknown subject. Still, through a quite natural misunderstanding, this idea gives rise to a very plausible argument. The idea is well suited, as a regulative principle, to destroy completely all materialistic explanations of our soul's inner appearances.334.1 But the argument uses this supposed knowledge of the substantial in our thinking being to infer its nature, insofar as knowledge of that nature lies entirely outside the whole range of experience.
334.1. If the representation of apperception, the I, were a concept through which anything was thought, it could also be used as a predicate of other things, or would contain such predicates. As it is, it is nothing more than a feeling of existence, without the slightest concept. It is only a representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (relatione accidentis).
About this section
Section 46 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 54 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.