Section 35

§ 35.

The imagination may perhaps be forgiven if it sometimes indulges in fantasy, that is, fails to remain cautiously within the bounds of experience. For at least such a free flight enlivens and strengthens it, and it will always be easier to restrain its boldness than to remedy its languor. But that the understanding, which ought to think, should instead fantasize, can never be forgiven it; for it alone provides all the help we have in setting limits, where necessary, to the imagination's extravagance.

Yet it begins this business most innocently and modestly. First it puts in order the elementary cognitions it possesses before all experience, but which must nevertheless always find their application in experience. Gradually it drops these restrictions—and what should prevent it, since the understanding has taken its principles quite freely from itself? Now it turns first to newly invented forces in nature, soon afterward to beings outside nature: in a word, to a world for whose construction we cannot lack building materials, since fertile invention supplies them in abundance, and experience, though it does not confirm them, never refutes them either. This is also why young thinkers are so fond of metaphysics in the true dogmatic manner, and often sacrifice to it their time and their otherwise useful talent.

But it is of no use to try to moderate those fruitless attempts of pure reason through all manner of reminders about the difficulty of solving such deeply hidden questions, complaints about the limits of our reason, and reductions of assertions to mere conjectures. For unless their impossibility has been clearly demonstrated, and reason's self-cognition becomes a true science, in which the field of its rightful use is distinguished from that of its empty and fruitless use with, so to speak, geometrical certainty, those vain endeavors will never be entirely put to rest.

§ 35.

We may perhaps forgive the imagination when it sometimes indulges in fantasies, that is, fails to stay carefully within the bounds of experience. At least such a free flight enlivens and strengthens it. It will always be easier to moderate its boldness than to remedy its weakness. But the understanding can never be forgiven for fantasizing instead of thinking, which is its task. For it alone provides all the help we have in setting limits to the imagination's fantasies where this is needed.

Yet it starts out very innocently and modestly. First it clarifies the elementary cognitions it possesses before all experience, but which must still always find its application in experience. Gradually it drops these restrictions. And what should stop it, since the understanding has drawn its principles quite freely from itself? Now it turns first to newly invented forces in nature, and soon afterward to beings outside nature. In short, it turns to a world for whose construction we cannot lack building materials. Fertile invention supplies them in abundance, and experience never refutes them, though it does not confirm them either. This is also why young thinkers so love metaphysics in the genuinely dogmatic manner, and often sacrifice their time and otherwise useful talents to it.

But it does no good to try to moderate these fruitless attempts of pure reason by all sorts of reminders about the difficulty of solving such deeply hidden questions, complaints about the limits of our reason, or reductions of assertions to mere conjectures. Unless their impossibility is clearly demonstrated, and reason's self-cognition becomes a true science, these vain efforts will never be fully stopped. In that science, the field of reason's correct use must be distinguished from that of its empty and fruitless use with, so to speak, geometrical certainty.