Section 34
Original German
§ 34.
Es waren also zwei wichtige, ja ganz unentbehrliche, obzwar äußerst trockene Untersuchungen nöthig, welche Krit. Seite 137 ꝛc. und 235 ꝛc. angestellt worden, durch deren erstere gezeigt wurde, daß die Sinne nicht die reine Verstandesbegriffe in concreto, sondern nur das Schema zum Gebrauche derselben an die Hand geben, und der ihm gemäße Gegenstand nur in der Erfahrung (als dem Producte des Verstandes aus Materialien der Sinnlichkeit) angetroffen werde. In der zweiten Untersuchung (Krit. S. 235) wird gezeigt: daß ungeachtet der Unabhängigkeit unsrer reinen Verstandesbegriffe und Grundsätze von Erfahrung, ja selbst ihrem scheinbarlich größeren Umfange des Gebrauchs dennoch durch dieselbe außer dem Felde der Erfahrung gar nichts gedacht werden könne, weil sie nichts thun können, als blos die logische Form des Urtheils in Ansehung gegebener Anschauungen bestimmen; da es aber über das Feld der Sinnlichkeit hinaus ganz und gar keine Anschauung giebt, jenen reinen Begriffen es ganz und gar an Bedeutung fehle, indem sie durch kein Mittel in concreto können dargestellt werden, folglich alle solche Noumena zusammt dem Inbegriff derselben, einer intelligibeln316.1 Welt, nichts als Vorstellungen einer Aufgabe sind, deren Gegenstand an sich wohl möglich, deren Auflösung aber nach der Natur unseres Verstandes gänzlich unmöglich ist, indem unser Verstand kein Vermögen der Anschauung, sondern blos der Verknüpfung gegebener Anschauungen in einer Erfahrung ist, und daß diese daher alle Gegenstände für unsere Begriffe enthalten müsse, außer ihr aber alle Begriffe, da ihnen keine Anschauung unterlegt werden kann, ohne Bedeutung sein werden.
316.1. Nicht (wie man sich gemeiniglich ausdrückt) intellectuellen Welt. Denn intellectuell sind die Erkenntnisse durch den Verstand, und dergleichen gehen auch auf unsere Sinnenwelt; intelligibel aber heißen Gegenstände, so fern sie blos durch den Verstand vorgestellt werden können und auf die keine unserer sinnlichen Anschauungen gehen kann. Da aber doch jedem Gegenstande irgend eine mögliche Anschauung entsprechen muß, so würde man sich einen Verstand denken müssen, der unmittelbar Dinge anschauete; von einem solchen aber haben wir nicht den mindesten Begriff, mithin auch nicht von den Verstandeswesen, auf die er gehen soll.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 34.
Two important, indeed wholly indispensable, though extremely dry investigations were therefore needed. These were undertaken in the Critique, pages 137 ff. and 235 ff. The first showed that the senses supply not the pure concepts of the understanding in concreto, but only the schema for their use, and that the object corresponding to it is found only in experience, as the product the understanding makes from materials of sensibility. The second investigation (Critique, p. 235) shows that despite the independence of our pure concepts and principles of the understanding from experience, and even their apparently wider range of use, nothing at all can be thought through them outside the field of experience. For they can do nothing but determine the logical form of judgment with respect to given intuitions. But since beyond the field of sensibility there is no intuition whatsoever, those pure concepts lack all meaning, because there is no means of presenting them in concreto. Consequently, all such noumena, together with their sum total, an intelligible316.1 world, are nothing but representations of a problem whose object may well be possible in itself, but whose solution is wholly impossible given the nature of our understanding. For our understanding is no faculty of intuition, but only of connecting given intuitions in one experience; experience must therefore contain all objects for our concepts, while outside it all concepts will be without meaning, since no intuition can be placed under them.
316.1. Not, as is commonly said, an intellectual world. For cognitions through the understanding are intellectual, and these also concern our world of sense; but objects are called intelligible insofar as they can be represented solely through the understanding and none of our sensible intuitions can concern them. Yet since some possible intuition must correspond to every object, one would have to think of an understanding that immediately intuited things. But of such an understanding we have not the slightest concept, and hence none either of the beings of the understanding it is supposed to concern.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 34.
Two important, indeed indispensable, though extremely dry investigations were therefore needed. They are carried out in the Critique, page 137 and following, and page 235 and following. The first showed that the senses do not provide pure concepts of the understanding in concrete form. They provide only the schema for using them. The object corresponding to that schema is found only in experience, as the understanding's product from the materials of sensibility. The second investigation (Critique, p. 235) shows the following. Despite the independence of our pure concepts and principles of the understanding from experience, and even their apparently wider range of use, nothing at all can be thought through them outside the field of experience. For they can do no more than determine the logical form of judgment with respect to given intuitions. But beyond the field of sensibility there is no intuition at all. Those pure concepts therefore lack all meaning, since there is no way to present them concretely. Consequently, all such noumena, together with their sum, an intelligible316.1 world, are nothing but representations of a problem. Its object may well be possible in itself, but its solution is entirely impossible given the nature of our understanding. For our understanding is not a capacity for intuition. It is only a capacity for connecting given intuitions in one experience. Experience must therefore contain all the objects for our concepts. Outside it, all concepts will be without meaning, since no intuition can be supplied as their basis.
316.1. Not an intellectual world, as people usually put it. For cognitions through the understanding are intellectual, and these also concern our world of sense. But objects are called intelligible insofar as they can be represented only through the understanding, and none of our sensible intuitions can refer to them. Yet some possible intuition must correspond to every object. So we would have to think of an understanding that intuited things immediately. We have not the slightest concept of such an understanding, and therefore none of the beings of the understanding that it is supposed to concern.
About this section
Section 34 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 41 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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