Section 36
Original German
§ 36.
Wie ist Natur selbst möglich?
Diese Frage, welche der höchste Punkt ist, den transscendentale Philosophie nur immer berühren mag, und zu welchem sie auch als ihrer Grenze und Vollendung geführt werden muß, enthält eigentlich zwei Fragen.
Erstlich: Wie ist Natur in materieller Bedeutung, nämlich der Anschauung nach, als der Inbegriff der Erscheinungen; wie ist Raum, Zeit und das, was beide erfüllt, der Gegenstand der Empfindung, überhaupt möglich? Die Antwort ist: vermittelst der Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnlichkeit, nach welcher sie auf die ihr eigenthümliche Art von Gegenständen, die ihr an sich selbst unbekannt und von jenen Erscheinungen ganz unterschieden sind, gerührt wird. Die Beantwortung ist in dem Buche selbst in der transscendentalen Ästhetik, hier aber in den Prolegomenen durch die Auflösung der ersten Hauptfrage gegeben worden.
Zweitens: Wie ist Natur in formeller Bedeutung, als der Inbegriff der Regeln, unter denen alle Erscheinungen stehen müssen, wenn sie in einer Erfahrung als verknüpft gedacht werden sollen, möglich? Die Antwort kann nicht anders ausfallen als: sie ist nur möglich vermittelst der Beschaffenheit unseres Verstandes, nach welcher alle jene Vorstellungen der Sinnlichkeit auf ein Bewußtsein nothwendig bezogen werden, und wodurch allererst die eigenthümliche Art unseres Denkens, nämlich durch Regeln, und vermittelst dieser die Erfahrung, welche von der Einsicht der Objecte an sich selbst ganz zu unterscheiden ist, möglich ist. Diese Beantwortung ist in dem Buche selbst in der transscendentalen Logik, hier aber in den Prolegomenen in dem Verlauf der Auflösung der zweiten Hauptfrage gegeben worden.
Wie aber diese eigenthümliche Eigenschaft unsrer Sinnlichkeit selbst, oder die unseres Verstandes und der ihm und allem Denken zum Grunde liegenden nothwendigen Apperception möglich sei, läßt sich nicht weiter auflösen und beantworten, weil wir ihrer zu aller Beantwortung und zu allem Denken der Gegenstände immer wieder nöthig haben.
Es sind viele Gesetze der Natur, die wir nur vermittelst der Erfahrung wissen können; aber die Gesetzmäßigkeit in Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen, d. i. die Natur überhaupt, können wir durch keine Erfahrung kennen lernen, weil Erfahrung selbst solcher Gesetze bedarf, die ihrer Möglichkeit a priori zum Grunde liegen.
Die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt ist also zugleich das allgemeine Gesetz der Natur, und die Grundsätze der erstern sind selbst die Gesetze der letztern. Denn wir kennen Natur nicht anders als den Inbegriff der Erscheinungen, d. i. der Vorstellungen in uns, und können daher das Gesetz ihrer Verknüpfung nirgend anders als von den Grundsätzen der Verknüpfung derselben in uns, d. i. den Bedingungen der nothwendigen Vereinigung in einem Bewußtsein, welche die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung ausmacht, hernehmen.
Selbst der Hauptsatz, der durch diesen ganzen Abschnitt ausgeführt worden, daß allgemeine Naturgesetze a priori erkannt werden können, führt schon von selbst auf den Satz: daß die oberste Gesetzgebung der Natur in uns selbst, d. i. in unserm Verstande, liegen müsse, und daß wir die allgemeinen Gesetze derselben nicht von der Natur vermittelst der Erfahrung, sondern umgekehrt die Natur ihrer allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeit nach blos aus den in unserer Sinnlichkeit und dem Verstande liegenden Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung suchen müssen; denn wie wäre es sonst möglich, diese Gesetze, da sie nicht etwa Regeln der analytischen Erkenntniß, sondern wahrhafte synthetische Erweiterungen derselben sind, a priori zu kennen? Eine solche und zwar nothwendige Übereinstimmung der Principien möglicher Erfahrung mit den Gesetzen der Möglichkeit der Natur kann nur aus zweierlei Ursachen stattfinden: entweder diese Gesetze werden von der Natur vermittelst der Erfahrung entlehnt, oder umgekehrt, die Natur wird von den Gesetzen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt abgeleitet und ist mit der bloßen allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeit der letzteren völlig einerlei. Das erstere widerspricht sich selbst, denn die allgemeinen Naturgesetze können und müssen a priori (d. i. unabhängig von aller Erfahrung) erkannt und allem empirischen Gebrauche des Verstandes zum Grunde gelegt werden; also bleibt nur das zweite übrig.319.1
Wir müssen aber empirische Gesetze der Natur, die jederzeit besondere Wahrnehmungen voraussetzen, von den reinen oder allgemeinen Naturgesetzen, welche, ohne daß besondere Wahrnehmungen zum Grunde liegen, blos die Bedingungen ihrer nothwendigen Vereinigung in einer Erfahrung enthalten, unterscheiden; und in Ansehung der letztern ist Natur und mögliche Erfahrung ganz und gar einerlei; und da in dieser die Gesetzmäßigkeit auf der nothwendigen Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen in einer Erfahrung (ohne welche wir ganz und gar keinen Gegenstand der Sinnenwelt erkennen können), mithin auf den ursprünglichen Gesetzen des Verstandes beruht, so klingt es zwar anfangs befremdlich, ist aber nichts desto weniger gewiß, wenn ich in Ansehung der letztern sage: der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze (a priori) nicht aus der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor.
319.1. Crusius allein wußte einen Mittelweg: daß nämlich ein Geist, der nicht irren noch betrügen kann, uns diese Naturgesetze ursprünglich eingepflanzt habe. Allein da sich doch oft auch trügliche Grundsätze einmischen, wovon das System dieses Mannes selbst nicht wenig Beispiele giebt, so sieht es bei dem Mangel sicherer Kriterien, den ächten Ursprung von dem unächten zu unterscheiden, mit dem Gebrauche eines solchen Grundsatzes sehr mißlich aus, indem man niemals sicher wissen kann, was der Geist der Wahrheit oder der Vater der Lügen uns eingeflößt haben möge.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 36.
How is nature itself possible?
This question, which is the highest point transcendental philosophy can ever touch, and to which it must also be led as its limit and completion, actually contains two questions.
First: How is nature possible in the material sense, namely with respect to intuition, as the sum total of appearances? How are space, time, and what fills them both—the object of sensation—possible in general? The answer is: through the constitution of our sensibility, according to which it is affected, in its own distinctive way, by objects that are unknown to it in themselves and entirely distinct from those appearances. This answer was given in the book itself in the transcendental aesthetic, and here in the Prolegomena through the solution of the first main question.
Second: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the sum total of the rules under which all appearances must stand if they are to be thought as connected in one experience? The answer can only be this: it is possible solely through the constitution of our understanding, according to which all those representations of sensibility are necessarily referred to one consciousness. Through this alone, our distinctive way of thinking—namely through rules—and by means of these, experience, which must be entirely distinguished from insight into objects in themselves, become possible. This answer was given in the book itself in the transcendental logic, and here in the Prolegomena in the course of solving the second main question.
But how this distinctive property of our sensibility itself is possible, or that of our understanding and of the necessary apperception underlying it and all thinking, admits of no further solution or answer, because we always need them in turn for every answer and for all thinking about objects.
There are many laws of nature that we can know only through experience. But the lawfulness in the connection of appearances, that is, nature in general, can be learned from no experience, because experience itself requires such laws, which underlie its possibility a priori.
The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature, and the principles of the former are themselves the laws of the latter. For we know nature only as the sum total of appearances, that is, of representations in us, and can therefore take the law of their connection from nowhere but the principles of their connection in us: that is, from the conditions of their necessary unification in one consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience.
Even the main proposition developed throughout this entire part—that universal laws of nature can be cognized a priori—already leads of itself to the proposition that nature's supreme legislation must lie within ourselves, that is, in our understanding. We must seek its universal laws not from nature through experience, but conversely, nature in its universal lawfulness solely from the conditions of the possibility of experience lying in our sensibility and understanding. For how else would it be possible to know these laws a priori, since they are not rules of analytic cognition, but genuine synthetic extensions of it? Such an agreement, and a necessary one, between the principles of possible experience and the laws of the possibility of nature can arise from only two causes: either these laws are borrowed from nature through experience, or conversely, nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general, and is completely identical with the mere universal lawfulness of experience. The former contradicts itself, for universal laws of nature can and must be cognized a priori—that is, independently of all experience—and laid at the foundation of every empirical use of the understanding. Thus only the second alternative remains.319.1
But we must distinguish empirical laws of nature, which always presuppose particular perceptions, from pure or universal laws of nature, which, without any particular perceptions as their basis, contain merely the conditions for their necessary unification in one experience. With respect to the latter, nature and possible experience are entirely one and the same. And since in experience lawfulness rests on the necessary connection of appearances in one experience—without which we can cognize no object at all of the world of sense—and hence on the original laws of the understanding, it sounds strange at first, yet is nonetheless certain, when I say with respect to these universal laws: the understanding does not draw its laws (a priori) from nature, but prescribes them to it.
319.1. Crusius alone knew a middle way: that a spirit who can neither err nor deceive originally implanted these laws of nature in us. Yet since deceptive principles also often intrude, of which this man's own system supplies not a few examples, and since there are no secure criteria for distinguishing the genuine origin from the spurious, the use of such a principle is a very precarious matter. For we can never know with certainty what the spirit of truth or the father of lies may have instilled in us.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 36.
How is nature itself possible?
This question is the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach. It must also be led to this point as its boundary and completion. The question actually contains two questions.
First: How is nature possible in the material sense, that is, in terms of intuition, as the sum of appearances? How are space, time, and what fills them both—the object of sensation—possible at all? The answer is: through the constitution of our sensibility. According to this constitution, sensibility is affected in its own distinctive way by objects that are unknown to it in themselves and entirely different from those appearances. The answer is given in the book itself in the transcendental aesthetic, and here in the Prolegomena through the solution of the first main question.
Second: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the sum of the rules under which all appearances must stand if they are to be thought as connected in one experience? The answer can only be this: nature is possible only through the constitution of our understanding. According to this constitution, all those representations of sensibility are necessarily related to one consciousness. This first makes possible our distinctive way of thinking, namely through rules, and through these rules, experience. Experience must be clearly distinguished from insight into objects in themselves. This answer is given in the book itself in the transcendental logic, and here in the Prolegomena in the course of solving the second main question.
But how this distinctive property of our sensibility itself is possible cannot be further resolved or answered. Nor can we explain how the distinctive property of our understanding is possible, or the necessary apperception underlying it and all thinking. For we always need these again for every answer and for all thinking about objects.
There are many laws of nature that we can know only through experience. But no experience can teach us the lawfulness in the connection of appearances, that is, nature in general. For experience itself requires laws that underlie its possibility a priori.
So the possibility of experience in general is also the universal law of nature, and the principles of the former are themselves the laws of the latter. For we know nature only as the sum of appearances, that is, of representations in us. We can therefore obtain the law of their connection only from the principles of their connection in us. That is, we obtain it from the conditions of their necessary unification in one consciousness, which makes experience possible.
Even the main proposition developed throughout this section—that universal laws of nature can be known a priori—already leads by itself to a further proposition. The highest legislation for nature must lie in ourselves, that is, in our understanding. We must not seek nature's universal laws from nature through experience. Instead, we must seek nature, with respect to its universal lawfulness, solely from the conditions that make experience possible and that lie in our sensibility and understanding. Otherwise, how would it be possible to know these laws a priori? They are not rules of analytic cognition, but genuine synthetic extensions of cognition. Such an agreement, and a necessary one, between the principles of possible experience and the laws that make nature possible can have only two causes. Either these laws are borrowed from nature through experience, or, conversely, nature is derived from the laws that make experience in general possible and is completely identical with experience's mere universal lawfulness. The first option contradicts itself. For universal laws of nature can and must be known a priori, that is, independently of all experience, and must underlie every empirical use of the understanding. So only the second option remains.319.1
But we must distinguish empirical laws of nature, which always presuppose particular perceptions, from pure or universal laws of nature. These latter laws are not based on particular perceptions. They contain only the conditions for the necessary unification of perceptions in one experience. With respect to these latter laws, nature and possible experience are exactly the same. In experience, lawfulness rests on the necessary connection of appearances in one experience. Without that connection we could know no object of the world of sense at all. So this lawfulness rests on the original laws of the understanding. Therefore, though it sounds strange at first, it is nonetheless certain when I say, with respect to these latter laws: the understanding does not draw its laws (a priori) from nature, but prescribes them to nature.
319.1. Crusius alone knew of a middle way: a spirit that can neither err nor deceive originally implanted these laws of nature in us. But deceptive principles often get mixed in as well, and this man's own system provides quite a few examples. We lack reliable criteria for distinguishing a genuine origin from a spurious one. So using such a principle is a very doubtful business. We can never know for certain what the spirit of truth, or the father of lies, may have instilled in us.
About this section
Section 36 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 43 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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