Section 31
Original German
§ 31.
Und so hat man denn einmal etwas Bestimmtes, und woran man sich bei allen metaphysischen Unternehmungen, die bisher kühn gnug, aber jederzeit blind über alles ohne Unterschied gegangen sind, halten kann. Dogmatische Denker haben sich es niemals einfallen lassen, daß das Ziel ihrer Bemühungen so kurz sollte ausgesteckt werden, und selbst diejenige nicht, die, trotzig auf ihre vermeinte gesunde Vernunft, mit zwar rechtmäßigen und natürlichen, aber zum bloßen Erfahrungsgebrauch bestimmten Begriffen und Grundsätzen der reinen Vernunft auf Einsichten ausgingen, für die sie keine bestimmte Grenzen kannten, noch kennen konnten, weil sie über die Natur und selbst die Möglichkeit eines solchen reinen Verstandes niemals entweder nachgedacht hatten oder nachzudenken vermochten.
Mancher Naturalist der reinen Vernunft (darunter ich den verstehe, welcher sich zutraut, ohne alle Wissenschaft in Sachen der Metaphysik zu entscheiden) möchte wohl vorgeben, er habe das, was hier mit so viel Zurüstung, oder, wenn er lieber will, mit weitschweifigem pedantischen Pompe vorgetragen worden, schon längst durch den Wahrsagergeist seiner gesunden Vernunft nicht blos vermuthet, sondern auch gewußt und eingesehen: „daß wir nämlich mit aller unserer Vernunft über das Feld der Erfahrungen nie hinaus kommen können“. Allein da er doch, wenn man ihm seine Vernunftprincipien allmählig abfrägt, gestehen muß, daß darunter viele sind, die er nicht aus Erfahrung geschöpft hat, die also von dieser unabhängig und a priori gültig sind, wie und mit welchen Gründen will er denn den Dogmatiker und sich selbst in Schranken halten, der sich dieser Begriffe und Grundsätze über alle mögliche Erfahrung hinaus bedient, darum eben weil sie unabhängig von dieser erkannt werden. Und selbst er, dieser Adept der gesunden Vernunft, ist so sicher nicht, ungeachtet aller seiner angemaßten, wohlfeil erworbenen Weisheit, unvermerkt über Gegenstände der Erfahrung hinaus in das Feld der Hirngespinste zu gerathen. Auch ist er gemeiniglich tief gnug drin verwickelt, ob er zwar durch die populäre Sprache, da er alles blos für Wahrscheinlichkeit, vernünftige Vermuthung oder Analogie ausgiebt, seinen grundlosen Ansprüchen einigen Anstrich giebt.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 31.
Thus at last we have something definite to hold to in all metaphysical undertakings, which until now have swept boldly enough, but always blindly, over everything without distinction. It never occurred to dogmatic thinkers that the goal of their efforts should be set within such narrow bounds. Nor did it occur even to those who, defiantly trusting their supposed sound reason, used concepts and principles of pure reason that were indeed legitimate and natural, but intended merely for use in experience, to pursue insights for which they knew no definite limits, nor could know any, since they had never reflected, or been able to reflect, on the nature and even the possibility of such a pure understanding.
Many a naturalist of pure reason—by which I mean someone who trusts himself to decide questions of metaphysics without any science—might well claim that what has been presented here with so much preparation, or, if he prefers, with such long-winded pedantic pomp, was something he had long since not merely suspected, but known and understood through the prophetic spirit of his sound reason: “that with all our reason we can never pass beyond the field of experiences.” Yet if one gradually questions him about his principles of reason, he must admit that among them are many he has not drawn from experience, and that are therefore independent of it and valid a priori. How, then, and on what grounds will he keep within bounds the dogmatist, and himself, who employs these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience precisely because they are cognized independently of it? Even he, this adept of sound reason, is not so secure, despite all his pretended wisdom so cheaply acquired, against slipping unnoticed beyond objects of experience into the realm of fantasies. Indeed, he is usually entangled deeply enough in it, though he gives his groundless claims a certain gloss through popular language, presenting everything as mere probability, reasonable conjecture, or analogy.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 31.
At last, then, we have something definite to hold on to in all metaphysical undertakings. Up to now these have ventured boldly enough, but always blindly, over everything without distinction. Dogmatic thinkers never imagined that the goal of their efforts would be set within such narrow bounds. Nor did those who defiantly relied on what they supposed was their sound reason. They used concepts and principles of pure reason that were legitimate and natural, but intended only for use in experience, to pursue insights for which they knew no definite limits and could know none. For they had never reflected, or been able to reflect, on the nature or even the possibility of such a pure understanding.
Many a self-taught practitioner of pure reason—by this I mean someone who trusts himself to decide questions of metaphysics without any science—might well claim that he had long since done more than suspect what has been set out here with so much preparation, or, if he prefers, with such long-winded, pedantic display. Through the prophetic spirit of his sound reason, he had already known and understood it: “With all our reason, we can never go beyond the field of experiences.” But if one gradually asks him to state his principles of reason, he must admit that many were not drawn from experience. They are therefore independent of experience and valid a priori. How, then, and on what grounds, will he keep the dogmatist and himself within bounds? The dogmatist uses these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience precisely because they are known independently of it. And even he himself, this expert in sound reason, is not so safe from slipping unnoticed beyond objects of experience into the realm of fantasies, despite all the wisdom he claims to have gained so cheaply. In fact, he is usually deeply entangled in it. He merely gives his groundless claims a plausible appearance through popular language, presenting everything as only probability, reasonable conjecture, or analogy.
About this section
Section 31 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 38 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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