Section 32
Original German
§ 32.
Schon von den ältesten Zeiten der Philosophie her haben sich Forscher der reinen Vernunft außer den Sinnenwesen oder Erscheinungen (phaenomena), die die Sinnenwelt ausmachen, noch besondere Verstandeswesen (noumena), welche eine Verstandeswelt ausmachen sollten, gedacht, und da sie (welches einem noch unausgebildeten Zeitalter wohl zu verzeihen war) Erscheinung und Schein für einerlei hielten, den Verstandeswesen allein Wirklichkeit zugestanden.
In der That, wenn wir die Gegenstände der Sinne wie billig als bloße Erscheinungen ansehen, so gestehen wir hiedurch doch zugleich, daß ihnen ein Ding an sich selbst zum Grunde liege, ob wir dasselbe gleich nicht, wie es an sich beschaffen sei, sondern nur seine Erscheinung, d. i. die Art, wie unsre Sinnen von diesem unbekannten Etwas afficirt werden, kennen. Der Verstand also, eben dadurch daß er Erscheinungen annimmt, gesteht auch das Dasein von Dingen an sich selbst zu, und so fern können wir sagen, daß die Vorstellung solcher Wesen, die den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegen, mithin bloßer Verstandeswesen nicht allein zulässig, sondern auch unvermeidlich sei.
Unsere kritische Deduction schließt dergleichen Dinge (noumena) auch keinesweges aus, sondern schränkt vielmehr die Grundsätze der Ästhetik dahin ein, daß sie sich ja nicht auf alle Dinge erstrecken sollen, wodurch alles in bloße Erscheinung verwandelt werden würde, sondern daß sie nur von Gegenständen einer möglichen Erfahrung gelten sollen. Also werden hiedurch Verstandeswesen zugelassen, nur mit Einschärfung dieser Regel, die gar keine Ausnahme leidet: daß wir von diesen reinen Verstandeswesen ganz und gar nichts Bestimmtes wissen, noch wissen können, weil unsere reine Verstandesbegriffe sowohl als reine Anschauungen auf nichts als Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung, mithin auf bloße Sinnenwesen gehen, und, so bald man von diesen abgeht, jenen Begriffen nicht die mindeste Bedeutung mehr übrig bleibt.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 32.
Since the earliest days of philosophy, investigators of pure reason have thought, besides beings of sense or appearances (phaenomena), which make up the world of sense, of special beings of the understanding (noumena), which were supposed to make up a world of the understanding. And since they took appearance and illusion to be the same—a mistake readily pardonable in an age still undeveloped—they granted actuality to beings of the understanding alone.
In fact, if we rightly regard the objects of the senses as mere appearances, we thereby admit at the same time that a thing in itself underlies them, although we do not know it as it is in itself, but know only its appearance: that is, the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Thus the understanding, precisely by admitting appearances, also admits the existence of things in themselves. To that extent we can say that the representation of such beings, which underlie appearances, and hence of mere beings of the understanding, is not only permissible but unavoidable.
Our critical deduction in no way excludes such things (noumena), but rather restricts the principles of the aesthetic so that they must not extend to all things—which would transform everything into mere appearance—but must hold only of objects of a possible experience. Beings of the understanding are thus admitted, but with emphasis on this rule, which allows no exception: that of these pure beings of the understanding we know, and can know, absolutely nothing determinate. For our pure concepts of the understanding, as well as our pure intuitions, concern nothing but objects of possible experience, and hence mere beings of sense; and as soon as we depart from these, not the slightest meaning remains for those concepts.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 32.
Since the earliest days of philosophy, investigators of pure reason have thought of special beings of the understanding (noumena), in addition to sensible beings or appearances (phaenomena), which make up the world of sense. These beings of the understanding were supposed to make up a world of the understanding. Because these thinkers treated appearance and illusion as the same thing—a mistake we can readily forgive in an age not yet fully developed—they granted reality only to beings of the understanding.
In fact, if we rightly regard objects of the senses as mere appearances, we also admit that a thing in itself underlies them. We do not know what this thing is like in itself. We know only its appearance, that is, the way our senses are affected by this unknown something. So the understanding, precisely by accepting appearances, also admits the existence of things in themselves. To that extent we can say that representing beings of this kind, which underlie appearances and are therefore mere beings of the understanding, is not only permissible but unavoidable.
Our critical deduction does not exclude such things (noumena) at all. Instead, it restricts the principles of the aesthetic: they must not extend to all things, which would turn everything into mere appearance. They must hold only of objects of possible experience. Beings of the understanding are therefore admitted, but with this rule firmly stressed, without any exception: we know, and can know, absolutely nothing definite about these pure beings of the understanding. For our pure concepts of the understanding, as well as our pure intuitions, concern nothing but objects of possible experience, and therefore mere sensible beings. As soon as we leave these behind, those concepts no longer retain the slightest meaning.
About this section
Section 32 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 39 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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