Section 30
Original German
§ 30.
Daher haben auch die reine Verstandesbegriffe ganz und gar keine Bedeutung, wenn sie von Gegenständen der Erfahrung abgehen und auf Dinge an sich selbst (noumena) bezogen werden wollen. Sie dienen gleichsam nur, Erscheinungen zu buchstabiren, um sie als Erfahrung lesen zu können; die Grundsätze, die aus der Beziehung derselben auf die Sinnenwelt entspringen, dienen nur unserm Verstande zum Erfahrungsgebrauch; weiter hinaus sind es willkürliche Verbindungen ohne objective Realität, deren Möglichkeit man weder a priori erkennen, noch ihre Beziehung auf Gegenstände durch irgend ein Beispiel bestätigen, oder nur verständlich machen kann, weil alle Beispiele nur aus irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung entlehnt, mithin auch die Gegenstände jener Begriffe nirgend anders, als in einer möglichen Erfahrung angetroffen werden können.
Diese vollständige, obzwar wider die Vermuthung des Urhebers ausfallende Auflösung des Humischen Problems rettet also den reinen Verstandesbegriffen ihren Ursprung a priori und den allgemeinen Naturgesetzen ihre Gültigkeit als Gesetzen des Verstandes, doch so, daß sie ihren Gebrauch nur auf Erfahrung einschränkt, darum weil ihre Möglichkeit blos in der Beziehung des Verstandes auf Erfahrung ihren Grund hat; nicht aber so, daß sie sich von Erfahrung, sondern daß Erfahrung sich von ihnen ableitet, welche ganz umgekehrte Art der Verknüpfung Hume sich niemals einfallen ließ.
Hieraus fließt nun folgendes Resultat aller bisherigen Nachforschungen: „Alle synthetische Grundsätze a priori sind nichts weiter als Principien möglicher Erfahrung“ und können niemals auf Dinge an sich selbst, sondern nur auf Erscheinungen als Gegenstände der Erfahrung bezogen werden. Daher auch reine Mathematik sowohl als reine Naturwissenschaft niemals auf irgend etwas mehr als bloße Erscheinungen gehen können und nur das vorstellen, was entweder Erfahrung überhaupt möglich macht, oder was, indem es aus diesen Principien abgeleitet ist, jederzeit in irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung muß vorgestellt werden können.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 30.
Hence the pure concepts of the understanding have no meaning whatsoever if they depart from objects of experience and seek to refer to things in themselves (noumena). They serve, as it were, only to spell out appearances so that we can read them as experience. The principles arising from their reference to the world of sense serve our understanding only for use in experience. Beyond that, they are arbitrary combinations without objective reality, whose possibility we cannot cognize a priori, and whose reference to objects we cannot confirm, or even make intelligible, through any example. For all examples can be borrowed only from some possible experience, and consequently the objects of those concepts can be found nowhere else than in a possible experience.
This complete solution of Hume's problem, though contrary to its author's expectation, thus preserves for the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding. Yet it does so by restricting their use to experience, because their possibility is grounded solely in the relation of the understanding to experience—not in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them. This completely reversed kind of connection never occurred to Hume.
From this follows the result of all our investigations so far: “All synthetic a priori principles are nothing more than principles of possible experience,” and can never be referred to things in themselves, but only to appearances as objects of experience. Hence pure mathematics and pure natural science alike can never concern anything more than mere appearances, and represent only what either makes experience in general possible, or, being derived from these principles, must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 30.
So pure concepts of the understanding also have no meaning at all if they leave objects of experience behind and try to refer to things in themselves (noumena). They serve, so to speak, only to spell out appearances so that we can read them as experience. The principles that arise from relating these concepts to the world of sense serve our understanding only for use in experience. Beyond that, they are arbitrary combinations without objective reality. We can neither know their possibility a priori nor confirm their relation to objects through any example, or even make it understandable. For all examples can be drawn only from some possible experience. So the objects of those concepts, too, can be found nowhere but in a possible experience.
This complete solution of Hume's problem, though it runs against what its author expected, therefore preserves the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding. It also preserves the validity of universal laws of nature as laws of the understanding. But it does so by restricting their use to experience, because their possibility is grounded solely in the understanding's relation to experience. It does not derive them from experience. Instead, it derives experience from them. This completely reversed way of connecting them never occurred to Hume.
The result of all our investigations so far is therefore this: “All synthetic a priori principles are nothing more than principles of possible experience.” They can never refer to things in themselves, but only to appearances as objects of experience. So pure mathematics and pure natural science can never concern anything more than mere appearances either. They represent only what makes experience in general possible, or what is derived from these principles and must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience.
About this section
Section 30 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 37 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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