Section 29
Original German
§ 29.
Um einen Versuch an Humes problematischem Begriff (dieser seiner crux metaphysicorum), nämlich dem Begriffe der Ursache, zu machen, so ist mir erstlich vermittelst der Logik die Form eines bedingten Urtheils überhaupt, nämlich ein gegebenes Erkenntniß als Grund und das andere als Folge zu gebrauchen, a priori gegeben. Es ist aber möglich, daß in der Wahrnehmung eine Regel des Verhältnisses angetroffen wird, die da sagt, daß auf eine gewisse Erscheinung eine andere (obgleich nicht umgekehrt) beständig folgt; und dieses ist ein Fall, mich des hypothetischen Urtheils zu bedienen und z. B. zu sagen: wenn ein Körper lange gnug von der Sonne beschienen ist, so wird er warm. Hier ist nun freilich noch nicht eine Nothwendigkeit der Verknüpfung, mithin der Begriff der Ursache. Allein ich fahre fort und sage: wenn obiger Satz, der blos eine subjective Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmungen ist, ein Erfahrungssatz sein soll, so muß er als nothwendig und allgemeingültig angesehen werden. Ein solcher Satz aber würde sein: Sonne ist durch ihr Licht die Ursache der Wärme. Die obige empirische Regel wird nunmehr als Gesetz angesehen und zwar nicht als geltend blos von Erscheinungen, sondern von ihnen zum Behuf einer möglichen Erfahrung, welche durchgängig und also nothwendig gültige Regeln bedarf. Ich sehe also den Begriff der Ursache als einen zur bloßen Form der Erfahrung nothwendig gehörigen Begriff und dessen Möglichkeit als einer synthetischen Vereinigung der Wahrnehmungen in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt sehr wohl ein: die Möglichkeit eines Dinges überhaupt aber als einer Ursache sehe ich gar nicht ein und zwar darum, weil der Begriff der Ursache ganz und gar keine den Dingen, sondern nur der Erfahrung anhängende Bedingung andeutet, nämlich daß diese nur eine objectiv-gültige Erkenntniß von Erscheinungen und ihrer Zeitfolge sein könne, so fern die vorhergehende mit der nachfolgenden nach der Regel hypothetischer Urtheile verbunden werden kann.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 29.
To make a trial with Hume's problematic concept—his crux metaphysicorum—namely the concept of cause: first, through logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general is given to me a priori, namely the use of one given cognition as ground and another as consequence. Now it is possible to find in perception a rule of relation stating that one appearance constantly follows a certain other appearance, though not conversely. This is a case for employing the hypothetical judgment and saying, for example: if a body has been exposed to the sun long enough, it grows warm. Here, to be sure, there is as yet no necessity of connection, and hence no concept of cause. But I proceed and say: if the foregoing proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, it must be regarded as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be: the sun, through its light, is the cause of the warmth. The foregoing empirical rule is now regarded as a law, and as holding not merely of appearances, but of them for the sake of a possible experience, which requires rules that hold throughout and therefore necessarily. Thus I can very well comprehend the concept of cause as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as a synthetic unification of perceptions in a consciousness in general. But I cannot at all comprehend the possibility of a thing in general as a cause, precisely because the concept of cause indicates no condition attaching to things, but only one attaching to experience: namely, that experience can be an objectively valid cognition of appearances and their succession in time only insofar as the preceding appearance can be connected with the following one according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 29.
Let us try this out on Hume's problematic concept, the concept of cause—his crux metaphysicorum, or stumbling block for metaphysicians. First, logic gives me a priori the form of a conditional judgment in general: to use one given cognition as the ground and another as the consequence. Now perception may present a rule of relation saying that one appearance constantly follows a certain other appearance, though not the reverse. This is a case for using a hypothetical judgment. For example: if a body is exposed to the sun long enough, it becomes warm. Of course, this does not yet contain a necessity of connection, and therefore not the concept of cause. But I go further and say: if that proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, it must be regarded as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be: the sun, through its light, is the cause of heat. The empirical rule above is now regarded as a law. It holds not merely of appearances, but of appearances for the purpose of a possible experience. Such experience requires rules that hold without exception and therefore necessarily. So I understand very well the concept of cause as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience. I also understand its possibility as a synthetic unification of perceptions in a consciousness in general. But I do not understand at all how a thing in general is possible as a cause. The reason is that the concept of cause indicates no condition belonging to things, but only one belonging to experience. Namely, experience can be objectively valid cognition of appearances and their succession in time only insofar as the preceding appearance can be connected with the following one according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.
About this section
Section 29 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 36 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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