Section 28
Original German
§ 28.
Ob ich also gleich von einer solchen Verknüpfung der Dinge an sich selbst, wie sie als Substanz existiren oder als Ursache wirken oder mit andern (als Theile eines realen Ganzen) in Gemeinschaft stehen können, nicht den mindesten Begriff habe, noch weniger aber dergleichen Eigenschaften an Erscheinungen als Erscheinungen denken kann (weil jene Begriffe nichts, was in den Erscheinungen liegt, sondern was der Verstand allein denken muß, enthalten), so haben wir doch von einer solchen Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen in unserm Verstande und zwar in Urtheilen überhaupt einen dergleichen Begriff, nämlich: daß Vorstellungen in einer Art Urtheile als Subject in Beziehung auf Prädicate, in einer anderen als Grund in Beziehung auf Folge und in einer dritten als Theile, die zusammen ein ganzes mögliches Erkenntniß ausmachen, gehören. Ferner erkennen wir a priori: daß, ohne die Vorstellung eines Objects in Ansehung eines oder des andern dieser Momente als bestimmt anzusehen, wir gar keine Erkenntniß, die von dem Gegenstande gelte, haben könnten; und wenn wir uns mit dem Gegenstande an sich selbst beschäftigten, so wäre kein einziges Merkmal möglich, woran ich erkennen könnte, daß er in Ansehung eines oder des andern gedachter Momente bestimmt sei, d. i. unter den Begriff der Substanz oder der Ursache oder (im Verhältniß gegen andere Substanzen) unter den Begriff der Gemeinschaft gehöre; denn von der Möglichkeit einer solchen Verknüpfung des Daseins habe ich keinen Begriff. Es ist aber auch die Frage nicht, wie Dinge an sich, sondern wie Erfahrungserkenntniß der Dinge in Ansehung gedachter Momente der Urtheile überhaupt bestimmt sei, d. i. wie Dinge als Gegenstände der Erfahrung unter jene Verstandesbegriffe können und sollen subsumirt werden. Und da ist es klar, daß ich nicht allein die Möglichkeit, sondern auch die Nothwendigkeit, alle Erscheinungen unter diese Begriffe zu subsumiren, d. i. sie zu Grundsätzen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung zu brauchen, vollkommen einsehe.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 28.
Thus, although I have not the slightest concept of such a connection of things in themselves—how they can exist as substance, act as cause, or stand in community with others as parts of a real whole—and still less can I think such properties in appearances as appearances (since those concepts contain nothing that lies in appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think), we nevertheless have such a concept of a connection of representations in our understanding, specifically in judgments in general. Namely, in one kind of judgment representations stand as subject in relation to predicates; in another, as ground in relation to consequence; and in a third, as parts that together make up a whole possible cognition. Further, we cognize a priori that unless we regard the representation of an object as determined with respect to one or another of these moments, we can have no cognition at all that holds of the object. If we were occupied with the object in itself, however, not a single mark would be possible by which I could cognize that it was determined with respect to one or another of the moments just mentioned: that is, that it fell under the concept of substance, or of cause, or, in relation to other substances, under the concept of community. For I have no concept of the possibility of such a connection of existence. But the question is not how things in themselves are determined, but how experiential cognition of things is determined with respect to these moments of judgments in general: that is, how things as objects of experience can and must be subsumed under those concepts of the understanding. Here it is clear that I fully comprehend not only the possibility but also the necessity of subsuming all appearances under these concepts: that is, of using them as principles of the possibility of experience.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 28.
So I have not the slightest concept of such a connection of things in themselves: how they can exist as substances, act as causes, or stand in community with others as parts of a real whole. Still less can I think of properties of this kind in appearances as appearances. For these concepts contain nothing that lies in appearances, but only what the understanding must think. Yet we do have a concept of such a connection of representations in our understanding, specifically in judgments in general. In one kind of judgment, representations stand as subject in relation to predicates. In another, they stand as ground in relation to consequence. In a third, they are parts that together make up a whole possible cognition. Further, we know a priori that we could have no cognition that holds of an object unless we regarded the representation of that object as determined with respect to one or another of these functions. If we were dealing with the object in itself, however, no mark would be available by which I could recognize it as determined with respect to any of these functions. That is, I could not recognize it as coming under the concept of substance or cause, or, in relation to other substances, under the concept of community. For I have no concept of how such a connection of existence is possible. But the question is not how things in themselves are determined with respect to these functions of judgments in general. It is how experiential cognition of things is so determined. That is, how can and must things as objects of experience be brought under these concepts of the understanding? Here it is clear that I fully understand not only the possibility but also the necessity of bringing all appearances under these concepts. In other words, I understand using these concepts as principles of the possibility of experience.
About this section
Section 28 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 35 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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