Section 27
Original German
§ 27.
Hier ist nun der Ort, den Humischen Zweifel aus dem Grunde zu heben. Er behauptete mit Recht: daß wir die Möglichkeit der Causalität, d. i. der Beziehung des Daseins eines Dinges auf das Dasein von irgend etwas anderem, was durch jenes nothwendig gesetzt werde, durch Vernunft auf keine Weise einsehen. Ich setze noch hinzu: daß wir eben so wenig den Begriff der Subsistenz, d. i. der Nothwendigkeit, darin einsehen, daß dem Dasein der Dinge ein Subject zum Grunde liege, das selbst kein Prädicat von irgend einem anderen Dinge sein könne, ja sogar daß wir uns keinen Begriff von der Möglichkeit eines solchen Dinges machen können (obgleich wir in der Erfahrung Beispiele seines Gebrauchs aufzeigen können), imgleichen daß eben diese Unbegreiflichkeit auch die Gemeinschaft der Dinge betreffe, indem gar nicht einzusehen ist, wie aus dem Zustande eines Dinges eine Folge auf den Zustand ganz anderer Dinge außer ihm und so wechselseitig könne gezogen werden, und wie Substanzen, deren jede doch ihre eigene, abgesonderte Existenz hat, von einander und zwar nothwendig abhängen sollen. Gleichwohl bin ich weit davon entfernt, diese Begriffe als blos aus der Erfahrung entlehnt und die Nothwendigkeit, die in ihnen vorgestellt wird, als angedichtet und für bloßen Schein zu halten, den uns eine lange Gewohnheit vorspiegelt; vielmehr habe ich hinreichend gezeigt, daß sie und die Grundsätze aus denselben a priori vor aller Erfahrung fest stehen und ihre ungezweifelte objective Richtigkeit, aber freilich nur in Ansehung der Erfahrung haben.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 27.
Here is the place to remove Hume's doubt from its very foundation. He rightly maintained that through reason we can in no way comprehend the possibility of causality: that is, the relation of the existence of one thing to the existence of something else necessarily posited by it. I add that we have just as little insight into the concept of subsistence: that is, into the necessity that the existence of things be grounded in a subject that cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing. Indeed, we cannot even form a concept of the possibility of such a thing, although we can point to examples of its use in experience. Likewise, this very same incomprehensibility concerns the community of things. For we cannot at all comprehend how, from the state of one thing, an inference can be drawn to the state of entirely different things outside it, and reciprocally; or how substances, each of which has its own separate existence, are to depend on one another, and necessarily so. Nevertheless, I am far from regarding these concepts as merely borrowed from experience, and the necessity represented in them as invented and as a mere illusion conjured up by long habit. Rather, I have sufficiently shown that these concepts, and the principles drawn from them, stand firm a priori before all experience and have their undoubted objective correctness—though, to be sure, only with respect to experience.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 27.
This is the place to remove Hume's doubt at its root. He rightly maintained that reason gives us no way to understand the possibility of causality. That is, we cannot understand the relation of the existence of one thing to the existence of something else that is necessarily posited by it. I would add that we can no more understand the concept of subsistence: the necessity that the existence of things have an underlying subject that cannot itself be a predicate of anything else. Indeed, we cannot even form a concept of the possibility of such a thing, although we can point to examples of the concept's use in experience. The same incomprehensibility also applies to the community of things. We cannot understand at all how the state of one thing allows an inference to the state of entirely different things outside it, and reciprocally. Nor can we understand how substances, each of which has its own separate existence, are supposed to depend on one another, and necessarily so. Yet I am far from regarding these concepts as merely borrowed from experience. Nor do I regard the necessity represented in them as invented, a mere illusion that long habit presents to us. Instead, I have sufficiently shown that these concepts, and the principles drawn from them, are established a priori before all experience. They have unquestionable objective correctness, though admittedly only in relation to experience.
About this section
Section 27 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 34 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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