Section 26
Original German
§ 26.
Obgleich die dritte aus der Natur des Verstandes selbst nach kritischer Methode gezogene Tafel der Grundsätze eine Vollkommenheit an sich zeigt, darin sie sich weit über jede andre erhebt, die von den Sachen selbst auf dogmatische Weise, obgleich vergeblich, jemals versucht worden ist, oder nur künftig versucht werden mag: nämlich daß sie alle synthetische Grundsätze a priori vollständig enthält und nach einem Princip, nämlich dem Vermögen zu Urtheilen überhaupt, welches das Wesen der Erfahrung in Absicht auf den Verstand ausmacht, ausgeführt worden, so daß man gewiß sein kann, es gebe keine dergleichen Grundsätze mehr (eine Befriedigung, die die dogmatische Methode niemals verschaffen kann), so ist dieses doch bei weitem noch nicht ihr größtes Verdienst.
Man muß auf den Beweisgrund Acht geben, der die Möglichkeit dieser Erkenntniß a priori entdeckt und alle solche Grundsätze zugleich auf eine Bedingung einschränkt, die niemals übersehen werden muß, wenn sie nicht mißverstanden und im Gebrauche weiter ausgedehnt werden soll, als der ursprüngliche Sinn, den der Verstand darin legt, es haben will: nämlich daß sie nur die Bedingungen möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt enthalten, so fern sie Gesetzen a priori unterworfen ist. So sage ich nicht: daß Dinge an sich selbst eine Größe, ihre Realität einen Grad, ihre Existenz Verknüpfung der Accidenzen in einer Substanz u. s. w. enthalte; denn das kann niemand beweisen, weil eine solche synthetische Verknüpfung aus bloßen Begriffen, wo alle Beziehung auf sinnliche Anschauung einerseits und alle Verknüpfung derselben in einer möglichen Erfahrung andererseits mangelt, schlechterdings unmöglich ist. Die wesentliche Einschränkung der Begriffe also in diesen Grundsätzen ist: daß alle Dinge nur als Gegenstände der Erfahrung unter den genannten Bedingungen nothwendig a priori stehen.
Hieraus folgt denn zweitens auch eine specifisch eigenthümliche Beweisart derselben: daß die gedachte Grundsätze auch nicht geradezu auf Erscheinungen und ihr Verhältniß, sondern auf die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, wovon Erscheinungen nur die Materie, nicht aber die Form ausmachen, d. i. auf objectiv- und allgemeingültige synthetische Sätze, worin sich eben Erfahrungsurtheile von bloßen Wahrnehmungsurtheilen unterscheiden, bezogen werden. Dieses geschieht dadurch: daß die Erscheinungen als bloße Anschauungen, welche einen Theil von Raum und Zeit einnehmen, unter dem Begriff der Größe stehen, welcher das Mannigfaltige derselben a priori nach Regeln synthetisch vereinigt; daß, so fern die Wahrnehmung außer der Anschauung auch Empfindung enthält, zwischen welcher und der Null, d. i. dem völligen Verschwinden derselben, jederzeit ein Übergang durch Verringerung stattfindet, das Reale der Erscheinungen einen Grad haben müsse, so fern sie nämlich selbst keinen Theil von Raum oder Zeit einnimmt309.1, aber doch der Übergang zu ihr von der leeren Zeit oder Raum nur in der Zeit möglich ist; mithin, obzwar Empfindung als die Qualität der empirischen Anschauung in Ansehung dessen, worin sie sich specifisch von andern Empfindungen unterscheidet, niemals a priori erkannt werden kann, sie dennoch in einer möglichen Erfahrung überhaupt als Größe der Wahrnehmung intensiv von jeder andern gleichartigen unterschieden werden könne; woraus denn die Anwendung der Mathematik auf Natur in Ansehung der sinnlichen Anschauung, durch welche sie uns gegeben wird, zuerst möglich gemacht und bestimmt wird.
Am meisten aber muß der Leser auf die Beweisart der Grundsätze, die unter dem Namen der Analogien der Erfahrung vorkommen, aufmerksam sein. Denn weil diese nicht, so wie die Grundsätze der Anwendung der Mathematik auf Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, die Erzeugung der Anschauungen, sondern die Verknüpfung ihres Daseins in einer Erfahrung betreffen, diese aber nichts anders als die Bestimmung der Existenz in der Zeit nach nothwendigen Gesetzen sein kann, unter denen sie allein objectiv-gültig, mithin Erfahrung ist: so geht der Beweis nicht auf die synthetische Einheit in der Verknüpfung der Dinge an sich selbst, sondern der Wahrnehmungen und zwar dieser nicht in Ansehung ihres Inhalts, sondern der Zeitbestimmung und des Verhältnisses des Daseins in ihr nach allgemeinen Gesetzen. Diese allgemeinen Gesetze enthalten also die Nothwendigkeit der Bestimmung des Daseins in der Zeit überhaupt (folglich nach einer Regel des Verstandes a priori), wenn die empirische Bestimmung in der relativen Zeit objectiv-gültig, mithin Erfahrung sein soll. Mehr kann ich hier als in Prolegomenen nicht anführen, als nur daß ich dem Leser, welcher in der langen Gewohnheit steckt, Erfahrung für eine blos empirische Zusammensetzung der Wahrnehmungen zu halten, und daher daran gar nicht denkt, daß sie viel weiter geht, als diese reichen, nämlich empirischen Urtheilen Allgemeingültigkeit giebt und dazu einer reinen Verstandeseinheit bedarf, die a priori vorhergeht, empfehle: auf diesen Unterschied der Erfahrung von einem bloßen Aggregat von Wahrnehmungen wohl Acht zu haben und aus diesem Gesichtspunkte die Beweisart zu beurtheilen.
309.1. Die Wärme, das Licht ꝛc. sind im kleinen Raume (dem Grade nach) eben so groß, als in einem großen; eben so die innere Vorstellungen, der Schmerz, das Bewußtsein überhaupt nicht kleiner dem Grade nach, ob sie eine kurze oder lange Zeit hindurch dauern. Daher ist die Größe hier in einem Punkte und in einem Augenblicke eben so groß als in jedem noch so großen Raume oder Zeit. Grade sind also größer, aber nicht in der Anschauung, sondern der bloßen Empfindung nach oder auch der Größe des Grundes einer Anschauung und können nur durch das Verhältniß von 1 zu 0, d. i. dadurch daß eine jede derselben durch unendliche Zwischengrade bis zum Verschwinden, oder von der Null durch unendliche Momente des Zuwachses bis zu einer bestimmten Empfindung in einer gewissen Zeit erwachsen kann, als Größen geschätzt werden (quantitas qualitatis est gradus).
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 26.
The third table, that of principles, drawn by the critical method from the nature of the understanding itself, displays a perfection that raises it far above any other ever attempted, or that may yet be attempted, dogmatically from the things themselves, though always in vain. It contains all synthetic a priori principles in their completeness, and has been developed according to a single principle: the faculty of judging in general, which constitutes the essence of experience with respect to the understanding. We can therefore be certain that there are no further principles of this kind—a satisfaction the dogmatic method can never provide. Yet this is far from being its greatest merit.
We must attend to the ground of proof that reveals the possibility of this a priori cognition, and at the same time restricts all such principles to a condition that must never be overlooked, if it is not to be misunderstood and extended in use beyond the original meaning the understanding gives it: namely, that these principles contain only the conditions of possible experience in general, insofar as it is subject to a priori laws. Thus I do not say that things in themselves contain a magnitude, their reality a degree, their existence a connection of accidents in a substance, and so on. For no one can prove this, since such a synthetic connection from mere concepts, where all reference to sensible intuition on the one hand, and all connection of it in a possible experience on the other, are lacking, is simply impossible. The essential restriction of the concepts in these principles is therefore this: that all things stand necessarily a priori under the stated conditions only as objects of experience.
From this, second, follows their specifically distinctive manner of proof: the principles in question are not referred directly to appearances and their relation, but to the possibility of experience, of which appearances constitute only the matter, not the form—that is, to objectively and universally valid synthetic propositions, in which precisely judgments of experience differ from mere judgments of perception. This is accomplished as follows. Appearances, as mere intuitions that occupy a part of space and time, stand under the concept of magnitude, which synthetically unites their manifold a priori according to rules. Insofar as perception contains sensation as well as intuition, and a transition through diminution always takes place between sensation and zero—that is, its complete disappearance—the real in appearances must have a degree. For sensation itself occupies no part of space or time,309.1 yet the transition to it from empty time or space is possible only in time. Consequently, although sensation as the quality of empirical intuition can never be cognized a priori with respect to that in which it differs specifically from other sensations, it can nevertheless, in a possible experience in general, be distinguished intensively, as a magnitude of perception, from every other sensation of the same kind. This first makes possible and determines the application of mathematics to nature with respect to the sensible intuition through which nature is given to us.
Above all, however, the reader must attend to the manner of proof of the principles that bear the name analogies of experience. Unlike the principles for applying mathematics to natural science in general, these concern not the generation of intuitions, but the connection of their existence in one experience. This can be nothing other than the determination of existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone it is objectively valid, and hence experience. The proof therefore concerns not synthetic unity in the connection of things in themselves, but of perceptions, and these not with respect to their content, but with respect to their determination in time and the relation of existence in time according to universal laws. These universal laws thus contain the necessity of determining existence in time in general—and consequently according to an a priori rule of the understanding—if the empirical determination in relative time is to be objectively valid, and hence experience. Here, in prolegomena, I can offer no more than this recommendation to the reader who has long been accustomed to regard experience as a merely empirical combination of perceptions, and therefore never considers that it goes much further than they reach: namely, that it gives empirical judgments universal validity, and for this requires a pure unity of the understanding that precedes them a priori. I recommend paying close attention to this distinction between experience and a mere aggregate of perceptions, and judging the manner of proof from this standpoint.
309.1. Heat, light, etc., are just as great in a small space, in degree, as in a large one; likewise inner representations, pain, and consciousness in general are no smaller in degree whether they last a short or a long time. Thus magnitude here is just as great at a point and in an instant as in any space or time, however large. Degrees, then, are greater not in intuition, but in mere sensation, or in the magnitude of the ground of an intuition. They can be estimated as magnitudes only through the relation of 1 to 0: that is, because each can diminish through infinitely many intermediate degrees until it disappears, or grow from zero through infinitely many moments of increase to a determinate sensation within a certain time (quantitas qualitatis est gradus).
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 26.
The third table, the table of principles, was drawn from the nature of the understanding itself by the critical method. It has a completeness that puts it far above any table ever attempted, though in vain, by the dogmatic method starting from the things themselves, or any that might be attempted in the future. It contains all synthetic a priori principles without exception. It was worked out from one principle: the capacity to judge in general, which makes up the essence of experience as far as the understanding is concerned. So we can be certain that there are no more principles of this kind. The dogmatic method can never give us this satisfaction. Still, this is far from the table's greatest merit.
We must attend to the ground of proof. It reveals how this a priori cognition is possible. At the same time, it restricts all these principles to a condition that must never be overlooked. Otherwise the principles will be misunderstood and used beyond the original meaning the understanding gives them. This condition is that they contain only the conditions of possible experience in general, insofar as experience is subject to a priori laws. So I do not say that things in themselves have a magnitude, that their reality has a degree, or that their existence involves the connection of accidents in a substance, and so on. No one can prove this. For such a synthetic connection from mere concepts is absolutely impossible when there is no relation to sensible intuition on the one hand, and no connection of those intuitions in a possible experience on the other. The essential restriction on the concepts in these principles is therefore this: all things necessarily stand a priori under the stated conditions only as objects of experience.
A second consequence is a distinctive way of proving these principles. The principles in question are not related directly to appearances and their relation to one another. They are related to the possibility of experience, of which appearances make up only the matter, not the form. That is, they are related to objectively and universally valid synthetic propositions. This is precisely what distinguishes judgments of experience from mere judgments of perception. The proof works as follows. Appearances, as mere intuitions that occupy a part of space and time, stand under the concept of magnitude. This concept synthetically unites their manifold content a priori according to rules. Further, perception contains sensation as well as intuition. There is always a transition by decrease between a sensation and zero, that is, its complete disappearance. So what is real in appearances must have a degree. Sensation itself occupies no part of space or time,309.1 yet the transition to it from empty time or space is possible only in time. Thus sensation, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never be known a priori with respect to what specifically distinguishes it from other sensations. Nevertheless, in a possible experience in general, as an intensive magnitude of perception, it can be distinguished from every other sensation of the same kind. This first makes possible and determines the application of mathematics to nature with respect to the sensible intuition through which nature is given to us.
Above all, however, the reader must attend to the way the principles called analogies of experience are proved. Unlike the principles for applying mathematics to natural science in general, these do not concern the production of intuitions. They concern the connection of their existence in one experience. This connection can only be the determination of existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone it is objectively valid and therefore experience. So the proof concerns not synthetic unity in the connection of things in themselves, but synthetic unity in the connection of perceptions. And it concerns these not in terms of their content, but in terms of their determination in time and the relation of existence within time according to universal laws. These universal laws therefore contain the necessity of determining existence in time in general, and thus according to an a priori rule of the understanding, if the empirical determination in relative time is to be objectively valid and therefore experience. In a work of prolegomena I cannot say more here. I can only offer a recommendation to the reader who has long been used to treating experience as a merely empirical combination of perceptions. Such a reader does not even consider that experience goes much further than perceptions can reach. It gives empirical judgments universal validity and, for that purpose, requires a pure unity of the understanding that precedes it a priori. I recommend paying close attention to this difference between experience and a mere collection of perceptions, and judging the method of proof from this point of view.
309.1. Heat, light, and so on are just as great in degree in a small space as in a large one. Likewise, inner representations, pain, and consciousness in general are no smaller in degree whether they last a short time or a long one. So here the magnitude at a point and at an instant is just as great as in a space or time of any size. Degrees are therefore greater not in terms of intuition, but in terms of mere sensation, or in terms of the magnitude of the ground of an intuition. They can be estimated as magnitudes only through the relation of 1 to 0. That is, each can decrease through infinitely many intermediate degrees until it disappears, or grow from zero through infinitely many increments to a determinate sensation within a certain time (quantitas qualitatis est gradus: the quantity of a quality is its degree).
About this section
Section 26 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 33 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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