Section 19
Original German
§ 19.
Es sind daher objective Gültigkeit und nothwendige Allgemeingültigkeit (für jedermann) Wechselbegriffe, und ob wir gleich das Object an sich nicht kennen, so ist doch, wenn wir ein Urtheil als gemeingültig und mithin nothwendig ansehen, eben darunter die objective Gültigkeit verstanden. Wir erkennen durch dieses Urtheil das Object (wenn es auch sonst, wie es an sich selbst sein möchte, unbekannt bliebe) durch die allgemeingültige und nothwendige Verknüpfung der gegebenen Wahrnehmungen; und da dieses der Fall von allen Gegenständen der Sinne ist, so werden Erfahrungsurtheile ihre objective Gültigkeit nicht von der unmittelbaren Erkenntniß des Gegenstandes (denn diese ist unmöglich), sondern blos von der Bedingung der Allgemeingültigkeit der empirischen Urtheile entlehnen, die, wie gesagt, niemals auf den empirischen, ja überhaupt sinnlichen Bedingungen, sondern auf einem reinen Verstandesbegriffe beruht. Das Object bleibt an sich selbst immer unbekannt; wenn aber durch den Verstandesbegriff die Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen, die unsrer Sinnlichkeit von ihm gegeben sind, als allgemeingültig bestimmt wird, so wird der Gegenstand durch dieses Verhältniß bestimmt, und das Urtheil ist objectiv.
Wir wollen dieses erläutern: daß das Zimmer warm, der Zucker süß, der Wermuth widrig sei299.1, sind blos subjectiv gültige Urtheile. Ich verlange gar nicht, daß ich es jederzeit oder jeder andre es eben so wie ich finden soll; sie drücken nur eine Beziehung zweier Empfindungen auf dasselbe Subject, nämlich mich selbst und auch nur in meinem diesmaligen Zustande der Wahrnehmung, aus und sollen daher auch nicht vom Objecte gelten; dergleichen nenne ich Wahrnehmungsurtheile. Eine ganz andere Bewandtniß hat es mit dem Erfahrungsurtheile. Was die Erfahrung unter gewissen Umständen mich lehrt, muß sie mich jederzeit und auch jedermann lehren, und die Gültigkeit derselben schränkt sich nicht auf das Subject oder seinen damaligen Zustand ein. Daher spreche ich alle dergleichen Urtheile als objectiv gültige aus; als z. B. wenn ich sage, die Luft ist elastisch, so ist dieses Urtheil zunächst nur ein Wahrnehmungsurtheil, ich beziehe zwei Empfindungen in meinen Sinnen nur auf einander. Will ich, es soll Erfahrungsurtheil heißen, so verlange ich, daß diese Verknüpfung unter einer Bedingung stehe, welche sie allgemein gültig macht. Ich will also, daß ich jederzeit und auch jedermann dieselbe Wahrnehmung unter denselben Umständen nothwendig verbinden müsse.
299.1. Ich gestehe gern, daß diese Beispiele nicht solche Wahrnehmungsurtheile vorstellen, die jemals Erfahrungsurtheile werden könnten, wenn man auch einen Verstandesbegriff hinzu thäte, weil sie sich blos aufs Gefühl, welches jederman als blos subjectiv erkennt und welches also niemals dem Object beigelegt werden darf, beziehen und also auch niemals objectiv werden können; ich wollte nur vor der Hand ein Beispiel von dem Urtheile geben, was blos subjectiv gültig ist und in sich keinen Grund zur nothwendigen Allgemeingültigkeit und dadurch zu einer Beziehung aufs Object enthält. Ein Beispiel der Wahrnehmungsurtheile, die durch hinzugesetzten Verstandesbegriff Erfahrungsurtheile werden, folgt in der nächsten Anmerkung.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 19.
Objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are therefore interchangeable concepts. Although we do not know the object in itself, when we regard a judgment as universally valid and hence necessary, it is precisely its objective validity that we mean. Through this judgment we cognize the object—even if it otherwise remains unknown as it may be in itself—through the universally valid and necessary connection of the given perceptions. Since this is the case with all objects of the senses, judgments of experience will derive their objective validity not from immediate cognition of the object (for this is impossible), but solely from the condition for the universal validity of empirical judgments. As has been said, this condition never rests on empirical, or indeed on any sensible, conditions, but on a pure concept of the understanding. The object in itself always remains unknown; but when the connection of the representations it gives to our sensibility is determined as universally valid through the concept of the understanding, the object is determined through this relation, and the judgment is objective.
Let us make this clear: that the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood disagreeable299.1—these are merely subjectively valid judgments. I do not at all demand that I should always find it so, or that everyone else should find it as I do. They express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and only in my present state of perception; they are therefore not intended to hold of the object. I call such judgments judgments of perception. A judgment of experience is quite another matter. What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must teach me at all times, and everyone else as well; its validity is not confined to the subject or to the subject's state at the time. I therefore pronounce all such judgments to be objectively valid. For example, when I say that air is elastic, this judgment is initially only a judgment of perception: I merely relate two sensations in my senses to one another. If I intend it to be called a judgment of experience, I demand that this connection stand under a condition that makes it universally valid. Thus I require that I, at all times, and everyone else too, must necessarily connect the same perception under the same circumstances.
299.1. I readily admit that these examples do not present judgments of perception that could ever become judgments of experience, even if a concept of the understanding were added. For they refer merely to feeling, which everyone recognizes as merely subjective and which therefore must never be ascribed to the object; thus they can never become objective. For the moment I wished only to give an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid and contains in itself no ground for necessary universal validity and thereby for a relation to the object. An example of judgments of perception that become judgments of experience through the addition of a concept of the understanding follows in the next note.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 19.
Objective validity and necessary universal validity for everyone are therefore interchangeable concepts. Although we do not know the object in itself, when we regard a judgment as universally valid and therefore necessary, this is exactly what we mean by its objective validity. Through this judgment we know the object by the universally valid and necessary connection of the given perceptions, even if the object otherwise remains unknown as it may be in itself. This holds for all objects of the senses. So judgments of experience do not get their objective validity from immediate cognition of the object, which is impossible. They get it only from the condition that makes empirical judgments universally valid. As we have said, this condition never rests on empirical conditions, or even on sensible conditions in general. It rests on a pure concept of the understanding. The object in itself always remains unknown. But suppose the concept of the understanding determines the connection of the representations that the object gives to our sensibility as universally valid. Then the object is determined through this relation, and the judgment is objective.
Let us make this clear. Judgments that the room is warm, sugar is sweet, or wormwood is unpleasant299.1 have only subjective validity. I do not require that I should always find things this way, or that everyone else should find them as I do. They express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and only in my present state of perception. They are therefore not meant to hold of the object. I call judgments like these judgments of perception. A judgment of experience is quite different. What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must teach me at all times and teach everyone else too. Its validity is not restricted to the subject or to the subject's state at that time. So I state all such judgments as objectively valid. For example, suppose I say that air is elastic. At first this is only a judgment of perception. I am merely relating two sensations in my senses to one another. If I want it to be called a judgment of experience, I require that this connection stand under a condition that makes it universally valid. I therefore intend that I, at all times, and everyone else too, must necessarily connect the same perception under the same circumstances.
299.1. I readily admit that these examples do not represent judgments of perception that could ever become judgments of experience, even if a concept of the understanding were added. They refer only to feeling. Everyone recognizes feeling as merely subjective, so it can never be attributed to the object. These judgments can therefore never become objective either. For now I only wanted to give an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid. Such a judgment contains no ground for necessary universal validity, and so none for a relation to the object. The next note gives an example of judgments of perception that become judgments of experience through the addition of a concept of the understanding.
About this section
Section 19 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 25 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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