Section 18
Original German
§ 18.
Wir müssen denn also zuerst bemerken: daß, obgleich alle Erfahrungsurtheile empirisch sind, d. i. ihren Grund in der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung der Sinne haben, dennoch nicht umgekehrt alle empirische Urtheile darum Erfahrungsurtheile sind, sondern daß über das Empirische und überhaupt über das der sinnlichen Anschauung Gegebene noch besondere Begriffe hinzukommen müssen, die ihren Ursprung gänzlich a priori im reinen Verstande haben, unter die jede Wahrnehmung allererst subsumirt und dann vermittelst derselben in Erfahrung kann verwandelt werden.
Empirische Urtheile, sofern sie objective Gültigkeit haben, sind Erfahrungsurtheile; die aber, so nur subjectiv gültig sind, nenne ich bloße Wahrnehmungsurtheile. Die letztern bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, sondern nur der logischen Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmungen in einem denkenden Subject. Die erstern aber erfordern jederzeit über die Vorstellungen der sinnlichen Anschauung noch besondere, im Verstande ursprünglich erzeugte Begriffe, welche es eben machen, daß das Erfahrungsurtheil objectiv gültig ist.
Alle unsere Urtheile sind zuerst bloße Wahrnehmungsurtheile: sie gelten blos für uns, d. i. für unser Subject, und nur hinten nach geben wir ihnen eine neue Beziehung, nämlich auf ein Object, und wollen, daß es auch für uns jederzeit und eben so für jedermann gültig sein solle; denn wenn ein Urtheil mit einem Gegenstande übereinstimmt, so müssen alle Urtheile über denselben Gegenstand auch unter einander übereinstimmen, und so bedeutet die objective Gültigkeit des Erfahrungsurtheils nichts anders, als die nothwendige Allgemeingültigkeit desselben. Aber auch umgekehrt, wenn wir Ursache finden, ein Urtheil für nothwendig allgemeingültig zu halten (welches niemals auf der Wahrnehmung, sondern dem reinen Verstandesbegriffe beruht, unter dem die Wahrnehmung subsumirt ist), so müssen wir es auch für objectiv halten, d. i. daß es nicht blos eine Beziehung der Wahrnehmung auf ein Subject, sondern eine Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes ausdrücke; denn es wäre kein Grund, warum anderer Urtheile nothwendig mit dem meinigen übereinstimmen müßten, wenn es nicht die Einheit des Gegenstandes wäre, auf den sie sich alle beziehen, mit dem sie übereinstimmen und daher auch alle unter einander zusammenstimmen müssen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 18.
We must therefore first observe that although all judgments of experience are empirical—that is, grounded in the immediate perception of the senses—the converse does not hold: not all empirical judgments are therefore judgments of experience. Rather, beyond the empirical element, and in general beyond what is given to sensible intuition, special concepts must also be added. These have their origin entirely a priori in the pure understanding; every perception must first be subsumed under them, and can then, by their means, be transformed into experience. Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. The former, however, always require, beyond the representations of sensible intuition, special concepts originally generated in the understanding, which are precisely what make the judgment of experience objectively valid.
All our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception: they hold only for us, that is, for our subject. Only afterward do we give them a new relation, namely to an object, and intend that the judgment should hold for us at all times, and equally for everyone else. For if a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning that same object must also agree with one another; thus the objective validity of a judgment of experience means nothing other than its necessary universal validity. Conversely, if we find reason to regard a judgment as necessarily universally valid—which never rests on perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed—we must also regard it as objective: that is, as expressing not merely a relation of perception to a subject, but a property of the object. For there would be no reason why the judgments of others should necessarily agree with mine, were it not for the unity of the object to which they all refer, with which they agree, and through which they must therefore all agree with one another.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 18.
We must therefore first note the following. All judgments of experience are empirical: they are based on immediate sense perception. But the reverse does not follow. Not all empirical judgments are therefore judgments of experience. Something must be added to what is empirical, and generally to what is given in sensible intuition. This addition consists of special concepts that originate entirely a priori in pure understanding. Every perception must first be brought under them. Through them it can then be turned into experience. Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience. Those that have only subjective validity I call mere judgments of perception. The latter need no pure concept of the understanding. They need only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. The former, however, always require more than the representations of sensible intuition. They also require special concepts originally produced in the understanding. These are precisely what make the judgment of experience objectively valid.
All our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception. They hold only for us, that is, for our subject. Only afterward do we give them a new relation, namely to an object. We then intend the judgment to hold for us at all times and equally for everyone. For if a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments about that same object must also agree with one another. So the objective validity of a judgment of experience means nothing other than its necessary universal validity. But the reverse is also true. If we find reason to regard a judgment as necessarily valid for everyone, we must also regard it as objective. This never rests on perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is brought. To regard the judgment as objective is to hold that it expresses a feature of the object, not just a relation between the perception and a subject. For there would be no reason why other people's judgments must necessarily agree with mine, if not for the unity of the object to which they all refer. They agree with that object and must therefore all agree with one another as well.
About this section
Section 18 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 24 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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