Section 17
Original German
§ 17.
Das Formale der Natur in dieser engern Bedeutung ist also die Gesetzmäßigkeit aller Gegenstände der Erfahrung und, sofern sie a priori erkannt wird, die nothwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit derselben. Es ist aber eben dargethan: daß die Gesetze der Natur an Gegenständen, so fern sie nicht in Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, sondern als Dinge an sich selbst betrachtet werden, niemals a priori können erkannt werden. Wir haben es aber hier auch nicht mit Dingen an sich selbst (dieser ihre Eigenschaften lassen wir dahin gestellt sein), sondern blos mit Dingen als Gegenständen einer möglichen Erfahrung zu thun, und der Inbegriff derselben ist es eigentlich, was wir hier Natur nennen. Und nun frage ich, ob, wenn von der Möglichkeit einer Naturerkenntniß a priori die Rede ist, es besser sei, die Aufgabe so einzurichten: wie ist die nothwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit der Dinge als Gegenstände der Erfahrung, oder: wie ist die nothwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erfahrung selbst in Ansehung aller ihrer Gegenstände überhaupt a priori zu erkennen möglich?
Beim Lichte besehen, wird die Auflösung der Frage, sie mag auf die eine oder die andre Art vorgestellt sein, in Ansehung der reinen Naturerkenntniß (die eigentlich den Punkt der Quästion ausmacht) ganz und gar auf einerlei hinauslaufen. Denn die subjectiven Gesetze, unter denen allein eine Erfahrungserkenntniß von Dingen möglich ist, gelten auch von diesen Dingen als Gegenständen einer möglichen Erfahrung (freilich aber nicht von ihnen als Dingen an sich selbst, dergleichen aber hier auch in keine Betrachtung kommen). Es ist gänzlich einerlei, ob ich sage: ohne das Gesetz, daß, wenn eine Begebenheit wahrgenommen wird, sie jederzeit auf etwas, was vorhergeht, bezogen werde, worauf sie nach einer allgemeinen Regel folgt, kann niemals ein Wahrnehmungsurtheil für Erfahrung gelten; oder ob ich mich so ausdrücke: alles, wovon die Erfahrung lehrt, daß es geschieht, muß eine Ursache haben.
Es ist indessen doch schicklicher, die erstere Formel zu wählen. Denn da wir wohl a priori und vor allen gegebenen Gegenständen eine Erkenntniß derjenigen Bedingungen haben können, unter denen allein eine Erfahrung in Ansehung ihrer möglich ist, niemals aber, welchen Gesetzen sie ohne Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung an sich selbst unterworfen sein mögen, so werden wir die Natur der Dinge a priori nicht anders studiren können, als daß wir die Bedingungen und allgemeine (obgleich subjective) Gesetze erforschen, unter denen allein ein solches Erkenntniß als Erfahrung (der bloßen Form nach) möglich ist, und darnach die Möglichkeit der Dinge als Gegenstände der Erfahrung bestimmen; denn würde ich die zweite Art des Ausdrucks wählen und die Bedingungen a priori suchen, unter denen Natur als Gegenstand der Erfahrung möglich ist, so würde ich leichtlich in Mißverstand gerathen können und mir einbilden, ich hätte von der Natur als einem Dinge an sich selbst zu reden, und da würde ich fruchtlos in endlosen Bemühungen herumgetrieben werden, für Dinge, von denen mir nichts gegeben ist, Gesetze zu suchen.
Wir werden es also hier blos mit der Erfahrung und den allgemeinen und a priori gegebenen Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit zu thun haben und daraus die Natur als den ganzen Gegenstand aller möglichen Erfahrung bestimmen. Ich denke, man werde mich verstehen, daß ich hier nicht die Regeln der Beobachtung einer Natur, die schon gegeben ist, verstehe, die setzen schon Erfahrung voraus; also nicht, wie wir (durch Erfahrung) der Natur die Gesetze ablernen können, denn diese wären alsdann nicht Gesetze a priori und gäben keine reine Naturwissenschaft; sondern wie die Bedingungen a priori von der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung zugleich die Quellen sind, aus denen alle allgemeine Naturgesetze hergeleitet werden müssen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 17.
The formal aspect of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the lawfulness of all objects of experience and, insofar as it is cognized a priori, their necessary lawfulness. But we have just shown that the laws of nature can never be cognized a priori in objects insofar as these are considered not in relation to possible experience, but as things in themselves. Here, however, we are not concerned with things in themselves—we leave their properties undecided—but only with things as objects of a possible experience; and it is properly their sum total that we here call nature. I now ask whether, when the possibility of an a priori cognition of nature is at issue, it is better to frame the problem this way: how is it possible to cognize a priori the necessary lawfulness of things as objects of experience? Or this way: how is it possible to cognize a priori the necessary lawfulness of experience itself with respect to all its objects in general?
On closer examination, the answer to the question, however it is framed, will come to precisely the same thing as regards pure cognition of nature, which is the real point at issue. For the subjective laws under which alone an experiential cognition of things is possible also hold for those things as objects of a possible experience—though certainly not for them as things in themselves, which are not under consideration here. It is entirely the same whether I say: without the law that, whenever an event is perceived, it must always be referred to something preceding it, upon which it follows according to a universal rule, no judgment of perception can ever count as experience; or whether I express myself this way: everything that experience teaches us to occur must have a cause.
Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to choose the former formulation. For we can indeed have cognition, a priori and prior to all given objects, of the conditions under which alone an experience of them is possible, but never of the laws to which they may be subject in themselves, without reference to possible experience. We can therefore study the nature of things a priori only by investigating the conditions and universal (though subjective) laws under which alone such cognition is possible as experience, in respect of its mere form, and by then determining accordingly the possibility of things as objects of experience. For if I chose the second mode of expression and sought the a priori conditions under which nature is possible as an object of experience, I could easily fall into a misunderstanding and imagine that I was speaking of nature as a thing in itself. I would then be driven fruitlessly through endless efforts to seek laws for things of which nothing is given to me.
Here, then, we shall concern ourselves solely with experience and the universal, a priori given conditions of its possibility, and from these determine nature as the entire object of all possible experience. I trust it will be understood that I do not mean here the rules for observing a nature already given: these already presuppose experience. Thus I do not mean how we can learn nature's laws from it through experience, for these would then not be a priori laws and would yield no pure natural science. I mean, rather, how the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all universal laws of nature must be derived.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 17.
The formal aspect of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the lawfulness of all objects of experience. Insofar as we know it a priori, it is their necessary lawfulness. But we have just shown that we can never know the laws of nature a priori in objects considered not in relation to possible experience, but as things in themselves. Here, however, we are not dealing with things in themselves. We leave their properties undecided. We are dealing only with things as objects of possible experience. Their sum is what we actually call nature here. Now I ask: when the issue is the possibility of knowing nature a priori, which way of putting the problem is better? Should we ask how it is possible to know a priori the necessary lawfulness of things as objects of experience? Or should we ask how it is possible to know a priori the necessary lawfulness of experience itself with respect to all its objects in general?
On closer examination, the answer comes to exactly the same thing either way, as far as pure cognition of nature is concerned. That is the actual point of the question. For the subjective laws that alone make experiential cognition of things possible also apply to these things as objects of possible experience. Of course, they do not apply to them as things in themselves, but those are not under consideration here. The following two statements mean exactly the same thing. One says: a judgment of perception can never count as experience without the law that, whenever an event is perceived, it must always be related to something earlier which it follows according to a universal rule. The other says: everything that experience teaches us happens must have a cause.
Still, it is more appropriate to choose the first formulation. We can know a priori, before any objects are given, the conditions that alone make experience of them possible. But we can never know what laws they may be subject to in themselves, apart from possible experience. So there is only one way to study the nature of things a priori. We must investigate the conditions and universal, though subjective, laws under which alone such cognition is possible as experience, as far as its mere form is concerned. Then we must determine from these the possibility of things as objects of experience. If instead I chose the second way of putting it, and sought the a priori conditions under which nature is possible as an object of experience, I could easily fall into a misunderstanding. I could imagine that I was speaking about nature as a thing in itself. I would then be driven into endless, fruitless efforts to find laws for things about which nothing has been given to me.
So here we will deal only with experience and the universal conditions, given a priori, that make it possible. From these we will determine nature as the complete object of all possible experience. I think it will be clear that I do not mean rules for observing a nature that is already given. Those already presuppose experience. The question is not how we can learn nature's laws from it through experience. Those would not be a priori laws and would yield no pure natural science. The question is how the a priori conditions that make experience possible are also the sources from which all universal laws of nature must be derived.
About this section
Section 17 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 23 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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