Section 16
Original German
§ 16.
Noch nimmt das Wort Natur eine andre Bedeutung an, die nämlich das Object bestimmt, indessen daß in der obigen Bedeutung sie nur die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Bestimmungen des Daseins der Dinge überhaupt andeutete. Natur also, materialiter betrachtet, ist der Inbegriff aller Gegenstände der Erfahrung. Mit dieser haben wir es hier nur zu thun, da ohnedem Dinge, die niemals Gegenstände einer Erfahrung werden können, wenn sie nach ihrer Natur erkannt werden sollten, uns zu Begriffen nöthigen würden, deren Bedeutung niemals in concreto (in irgend einem Beispiele einer möglichen Erfahrung) gegeben werden könnte, und von deren Natur wir uns also lauter Begriffe machen müßten, deren Realität, d. i. ob sie wirklich sich auf Gegenstände beziehen, oder bloße Gedankendinge sind, gar nicht entschieden werden könnte. Was nicht ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung sein kann, dessen Erkenntniß wäre hyperphysisch, und mit dergleichen haben wir hier gar nicht zu thun, sondern mit der Naturerkenntniß, deren Realität durch Erfahrung bestätigt werden kann, ob sie gleich a priori möglich ist und vor aller Erfahrung hervorgeht.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 16.
The word nature also takes on another meaning, one that determines the object, whereas in the meaning given above it indicated only the lawfulness of the determinations of the existence of things in general. Nature, then, considered materialiter, is the sum total of all objects of experience. This alone concerns us here. For if things that can never become objects of experience were to be cognized as to their nature, they would compel us to employ concepts whose meaning could never be given in concreto (in any example of a possible experience). Of their nature, therefore, we would have to form nothing but concepts whose reality—that is, whether they actually refer to objects or are mere things of thought—could not be decided at all. Cognition of what cannot be an object of experience would be hyperphysical. Here we are not concerned with anything of that kind, but with cognition of nature whose reality can be confirmed through experience, even though it is possible a priori and precedes all experience.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 16.
The word nature has another meaning as well. This meaning identifies the object, whereas the earlier meaning indicated only the lawfulness of the determinations of the existence of things in general. Nature, then, considered in terms of its matter, is the sum of all objects of experience. This is all we are concerned with here. Besides, to know the nature of things that can never become objects of experience would require concepts whose meaning could never be given concretely, in any example of possible experience. We would therefore have to form concepts of their nature whose reality could not be decided at all. That is, we could not decide whether they really refer to objects or are merely things we think up. Knowledge of anything that cannot be an object of experience would be beyond physics. We are not concerned with anything of that kind here. We are concerned with cognition of nature whose reality can be confirmed through experience, even though it is possible a priori and precedes all experience.
About this section
Section 16 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 22 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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