Section 20
Original German
§ 20.
Wir werden daher Erfahrung überhaupt zergliedern müssen, um zu sehen, was in diesem Product der Sinne und des Verstandes enthalten und wie das Erfahrungsurtheil selbst möglich sei. Zum Grunde liegt die Anschauung, deren ich mir bewußt bin, d. i. Wahrnehmung (perceptio), die blos den Sinnen angehört. Aber zweitens gehört auch dazu das Urtheilen (das blos dem Verstande zukommt). Dieses Urtheilen kann nun zwiefach sein: erstlich, indem ich blos die Wahrnehmungen vergleiche und in einem Bewußtsein meines Zustandes, oder zweitens, da ich sie in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt verbinde. Das erstere Urtheil ist blos ein Wahrnehmungsurtheil und hat so fern nur subjective Gültigkeit, es ist blos Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmungen in meinem Gemüthszustande ohne Beziehung auf den Gegenstand. Daher ist es nicht, wie man gemeiniglich sich einbildet, zur Erfahrung gnug, Wahrnehmungen zu vergleichen und in einem Bewußtsein vermittelst des Urtheilens zu verknüpfen; dadurch entspringt keine Allgemeingültigkeit und Nothwendigkeit des Urtheils, um deren willen es allein objectiv gültig und Erfahrung sein kann.
Es geht also noch ein ganz anderes Urtheil voraus, ehe aus Wahrnehmung Erfahrung werden kann. Die gegebene Anschauung muß unter einem Begriff subsumirt werden, der die Form des Urtheilens überhaupt in Ansehung der Anschauung bestimmt, das empirische Bewußtsein der letzteren in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt verknüpft und dadurch den empirischen Urtheilen Allgemeingültigkeit verschafft; dergleichen Begriff ist ein reiner Verstandesbegriff a priori, welcher nichts thut, als blos einer Anschauung die Art überhaupt zu bestimmen, wie sie zu Urtheilen dienen kann. Es sei ein solcher Begriff der Begriff der Ursache, so bestimmt er die Anschauung, die unter ihm subsumirt ist, z. B. die der Luft in Ansehung des Urtheilens überhaupt, nämlich daß der Begriff der Luft in Ansehung der Ausspannung in dem Verhältniß der Antecedens zum Consequens in einem hypothetischen Urtheile diene. Der Begriff der Ursache ist also ein reiner Verstandesbegriff, der von aller möglichen Wahrnehmung gänzlich unterschieden ist und nur dazu dient, diejenige Vorstellung, die unter ihm enthalten ist, in Ansehung des Urtheilens überhaupt zu bestimmen, mithin ein allgemeingültiges Urtheil möglich zu machen.
Nun wird, ehe aus einem Wahrnehmungsurtheil ein Urtheil der Erfahrung werden kann, zuerst erfordert: daß die Wahrnehmung unter einem dergleichen Verstandesbegriffe subsumirt werde; z. B. die Luft gehört unter den Begriff der Ursache, welche das Urtheil über dieselbe in Ansehung der Ausdehnung als hypothetisch bestimmt.301.1 Dadurch wird nun nicht diese Ausdehnung als blos zu meiner Wahrnehmung der Luft in meinem Zustande, oder in mehrern meiner Zustände, oder in dem Zustande der Wahrnehmung anderer gehörig, sondern als dazu nothwendig gehörig vorgestellt; und das Urtheil: die Luft ist elastisch, wird allgemeingültig und dadurch allererst Erfahrungsurtheil, daß gewisse Urtheile vorhergehen, die die Anschauung der Luft unter den Begriff der Ursache und Wirkung subsumiren und dadurch die Wahrnehmungen nicht blos respective auf einander in meinem Subjecte, sondern in Ansehung der Form des Urtheilens überhaupt (hier der hypothetischen) bestimmen und auf solche Art das empirische Urtheil allgemeingültig machen.
Zergliedert man alle seine synthetische Urtheile, so fern sie objectiv gelten, so findet man, daß sie niemals aus bloßen Anschauungen bestehen, die blos, wie man gemeiniglich dafür hält, durch Vergleichung in einem Urtheil verknüpft worden, sondern daß sie unmöglich sein würden, wäre nicht über die von der Anschauung abgezogene Begriffe noch ein reiner Verstandesbegriff hinzugekommen, unter dem jene Begriffe subsumirt und so allererst in einem objectiv gültigen Urtheile verknüpft worden. Selbst die Urtheile der reinen Mathematik in ihren einfachsten Axiomen sind von dieser Bedingung nicht ausgenommen. Der Grundsatz: die gerade Linie ist die kürzeste zwischen zwei Punkten, setzt voraus, daß die Linie unter den Begriff der Größe subsumirt werde, welcher gewiß keine bloße Anschauung ist, sondern lediglich im Verstande seinen Sitz hat und dazu dient, die Anschauung (der Linie) in Absicht auf die Urtheile, die von ihr gefällt werden mögen, in Ansehung der Quantität derselben, nämlich der Vielheit, (als iudicia plurativa)302.1 zu bestimmen, indem unter ihnen verstanden wird, daß in einer gegebenen Anschauung vieles Gleichartige enthalten sei.
301.1. Um ein leichter einzusehendes Beispiel zu haben, nehme man folgendes: wenn die Sonne den Stein bescheint, so wird er warm. Dieses Urtheil ist ein bloßes Wahrnehmungsurtheil und enthält keine Nothwendigkeit, ich mag dieses noch so oft und andere auch noch so oft wahrgenommen haben; die Wahrnehmungen finden sich nur gewöhnlich so verbunden. Sage ich aber: die Sonne erwärmt den Stein, so kommt über die Wahrnehmung noch der Verstandesbegriff der Ursache hinzu, der mit dem Begriff des Sonnenscheins den der Wärme nothwendig verknüpft, und das synthetische Urtheil wird nothwendig allgemeingültig, folglich objectiv, und aus einer Wahrnehmung in Erfahrung verwandelt.
302.1. So wollte ich lieber die Urtheile genannt wissen, die man in der Logik particularia nennt. Denn der letztere Ausdruck enthält schon den Gedanken, daß sie nicht allgemein sind. Wenn ich aber von der Einheit (in einzelnen Urtheilen) anhebe und so zur Allheit fortgehe, so kann ich noch keine Beziehung auf die Allheit beimischen: ich denke nur die Vielheit ohne Allheit, nicht die Ausnahme von derselben. Dieses ist nöthig, wenn die logische Momente den reinen Verstandesbegriffen untergelegt werden sollen; im logischen Gebrauche kann man es beim Alten lassen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 20.
We must therefore analyze experience in general, to see what is contained in this product of the senses and the understanding, and how the judgment of experience itself is possible. At its foundation lies the intuition of which I am conscious, that is, perception (perceptio), which belongs solely to the senses. But, second, judging also belongs to it, and this belongs solely to the understanding. This judging can take two forms: either I merely compare the perceptions and connect them in a consciousness of my state, or I connect them in a consciousness in general. The first judgment is merely a judgment of perception and as such has only subjective validity; it is merely a connection of perceptions in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence, contrary to the common supposition, it is not enough for experience to compare perceptions and connect them in one consciousness by means of judging. This gives rise to no universal validity and necessity of the judgment, through which alone it can be objectively valid and be experience.
Thus a quite different judgment must precede, before perception can become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept that determines the form of judging in general with respect to the intuition, connects the empirical consciousness of the latter in a consciousness in general, and thereby gives empirical judgments universal validity. Such a concept is a pure a priori concept of the understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition, in general, the way in which it can serve for judgments. Let such a concept be the concept of cause. It then determines the intuition subsumed under it—for example, that of air—with respect to judging in general: namely, that the concept of air, with respect to expansion, should serve in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of cause is therefore a pure concept of the understanding, entirely distinct from any possible perception, serving only to determine the representation contained under it with respect to judging in general, and thus to make a universally valid judgment possible.
Now before a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, the first requirement is that the perception be subsumed under such a concept of the understanding. For example, air falls under the concept of cause, which determines the judgment concerning it, with respect to expansion, as hypothetical.301.1 This expansion is thereby represented not as belonging merely to my perception of air in my present state, or in several of my states, or in the perceptual state of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment that air is elastic becomes universally valid, and only thereby a judgment of experience, because certain judgments precede it that subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect. They thereby determine the perceptions not merely in relation to one another in my subject, but with respect to the form of judging in general—here the hypothetical form—and in this way make the empirical judgment universally valid.
If we analyze all our synthetic judgments insofar as they hold objectively, we find that they never consist of mere intuitions connected in a judgment simply by comparison, as is commonly supposed. Rather, they would be impossible unless, beyond the concepts abstracted from intuition, a pure concept of the understanding had also been added, under which those concepts were subsumed and thus first connected in an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure mathematics in its simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle that a straight line is the shortest between two points presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of magnitude. This is certainly no mere intuition, but has its seat solely in the understanding, and serves to determine the intuition of the line, with regard to the judgments that may be made about it, as to their quantity—namely plurality (as iudicia plurativa).302.1 For these judgments mean that a given intuition contains many things of the same kind.
301.1. For an example that is easier to grasp, consider the following: when the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm. This judgment is a mere judgment of perception and contains no necessity, however often I and others may have perceived this; the perceptions are only habitually found connected in this way. But if I say that the sun warms the stone, then beyond the perception the understanding's concept of cause is added, which necessarily connects the concept of sunshine with that of heat. The synthetic judgment becomes necessarily universally valid, and hence objective, and is transformed from a perception into experience.
302.1. I would prefer this name for the judgments that in logic are called particularia. For the latter expression already contains the thought that they are not universal. But if I begin with unity (in singular judgments) and thus proceed to totality, I cannot yet introduce any reference to totality: I think only plurality without totality, not an exception to it. This is necessary if the logical moments are to be made the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding; in logical use, matters may be left as they are.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 20.
We must therefore analyze experience in general. We need to see what this product of the senses and the understanding contains, and how a judgment of experience itself is possible. Its basis is intuition of which I am conscious, that is, perception (perceptio), which belongs only to the senses. But a second element is also needed: judging, which belongs only to the understanding. This judging can take two forms. First, I can merely compare perceptions and connect them in a consciousness of my state. Second, I can connect them in a consciousness in general. The first judgment is merely a judgment of perception and, to that extent, has only subjective validity. It is just a connection of perceptions in my state of mind, without reference to the object. So, contrary to the usual assumption, comparing perceptions and connecting them in one consciousness through judging is not enough for experience. This does not produce the universal validity and necessity of the judgment that alone can make it objectively valid and turn it into experience.
So a quite different judgment must come first, before perception can become experience. The given intuition must be brought under a concept that determines the form of judging in general with respect to that intuition. This concept connects the empirical consciousness of the intuition in a consciousness in general, and thereby gives empirical judgments universal validity. Such a concept is a pure a priori concept of the understanding. All it does is determine for an intuition the general way in which it can serve in judgments. Suppose this concept is the concept of cause. It determines the intuition brought under it—for example, that of air—with respect to judging in general. Namely, the concept of air must stand to expansion as the antecedent stands to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment. So the concept of cause is a pure concept of the understanding. It is entirely different from any possible perception. It serves only to determine the representation contained under it with respect to judging in general, and thus to make a universally valid judgment possible.
Before a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, then, the perception must first be brought under a concept of the understanding of this kind. For example, air comes under the concept of cause, which determines the judgment about it, with respect to expansion, as hypothetical.301.1 This means that expansion is represented not merely as belonging to my perception of air in my present state, or in several of my states, or in other people's state of perception. It is represented as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment that air is elastic becomes universally valid, and only then a judgment of experience, because certain judgments precede it. They bring the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect. In this way they determine perceptions not merely in relation to one another in my subject, but with respect to the form of judging in general—here, the hypothetical form. This is how they make the empirical judgment universally valid.
If we analyze all our synthetic judgments insofar as they hold objectively, we find that they never consist of mere intuitions connected in a judgment simply by comparison, as people usually think. Instead, these judgments would be impossible unless something were added to the concepts drawn from intuition: a pure concept of the understanding. The concepts drawn from intuition are brought under it, and only then are they connected in an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure mathematics in its simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle that a straight line is the shortest between two points presupposes that the line is brought under the concept of magnitude. This concept is certainly not a mere intuition. It belongs solely to the understanding. It serves to determine the intuition of the line in relation to the judgments that may be made about it, with respect to their quantity, namely plurality, as plural judgments (iudicia plurativa).302.1 For what these judgments mean is that a given intuition contains many things of the same kind.
301.1. For an example that is easier to grasp, take the following: when the sun shines on the stone, the stone becomes warm. This is merely a judgment of perception and contains no necessity, no matter how often I or others may have perceived this. The perceptions are only usually found connected this way. But if I say that the sun warms the stone, the understanding's concept of cause is added to the perception. This concept connects the concept of sunshine necessarily with that of heat. The synthetic judgment becomes necessarily universally valid, and therefore objective. It changes from a perception into experience.
302.1. This is the name I would prefer for the judgments that logic calls particularia, or particular judgments. For that latter expression already contains the thought that they are not universal. But if I start from unity, in singular judgments, and move on toward totality, I cannot yet mix in any reference to totality. I am thinking only of plurality without totality, not of an exception to totality. This is necessary if the logical functions are to serve as the basis for the pure concepts of the understanding. In their logical use, the old terminology can remain.
About this section
Section 20 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 26 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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